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Abstract 
This thesis sets out to empirically examine the relationship between international campaigns 
which originate in and continue to be driven by Twitter and domestic women’s rights.  The 
study looks at eight campaigns targeting seven countries, with over 1 million Tweets and 
1500 pieces of legal evidence.  The study looks at four aspects of legal change: legislation, 
institutionalisation, law enforcement, and dialogue with international human rights bodies.  
The campaigns are explored in four areas as well, looking at persistence, users, engagement, 
and Tweet content.  
The study sets out to provide evidence for whether hashtag campaigns can contribute to 
domestic legal change, and, if so, if certain campaign behaviours are more associated with 
change and in what way.  Overall, this study has found that hashtag campaigns can contribute 
towards domestic legal change, both positively and negatively.   Two campaigns resulted in 
backsliding, three had no impact, two led to tactical concessions, and one campaign showed 
some elements of tentative success.  Campaigns which are domestically driven, with a high 
level of foreign-attention, showing persistence, engagement, and consistency are more likely 
to see to positive legal outcomes.  Conversely, campaigns which lack in domestic drive, can 
be seen as ‘foreign meddling’, and fail to achieve persistence, engagement, or consistency are 
more likely to see to negative outcomes. 
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Chapter 1 : Introduction 
 
#Introduction 
 
Hashtag campaigns have become part of everyday life, with people even using the word 
‘hashtag’ in general conversations (as in ‘how are you today?’ ‘hashtag feeling tired.’1).  
News outlets use Tweets from both the general public and from well-known figures to report 
on top stories.  That which trends on Twitter becomes a headline.  Official political 
announcements which used to be exclusive to broadsheets are made on Twitter first.2  Twitter 
is certainly not the only social media platform that has made its way into the mainstream 
provision of news and information, but the ease of using hashtags for organising, sharing, and 
discussing topics is unique to Twitter.  Hashtags have also found their way onto other 
platforms; as they originated on Twitter, their present day ubiquity underscores the power of 
Tweets.3      
 
This power has been harnessed by many, including non-governmental organisations 
(‘NGOs’).4  When working as a human rights advocate, campaigning for policy changes to 
improve the lives of women and girls, I noted a distinct and extremely rapid transition in the 
NGO world to social media.  Every campaign suddenly ‘had’ to have a social media drive.  
Rather than asking our organisation’s members to go out and volunteer locally (as we had 
done in the past) we were now asking them to send a Tweet, like a Facebook post, or sign a 
change.org petition, for most members targeting a foreign country.  Participation may have 
increased, but our understanding of the potential outcomes was not.  Monitoring and 
evaluation rigor were nigh on impossible with these social media campaigns.  As a 
 
1 At the time of writing, the author can confirm that this is a true statement.   
2 Bart Cammaerts, ‘Protest Logics and the Mediation Opportunity Structure’ (2012) 27 European Journal of 
Communication 117. 
3 While hashtags are searchable and appear on other social media platforms, Twitter is the primary space for 
utilising hashtags.   
4 Sara Vissers and Dietlind Stolle, ‘Spill-Over Effects Between Facebook and On/Offline Political Participation? 
Evidence from a Two-Wave Panel Study’ (2014) 11 Journal of Information Technology & Politics 259; C Guo 
and GD Saxton, ‘Tweeting Social Change: How Social Media Are Changing Nonprofit Advocacy’ (2013) 43 
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 57; Giselle A Auger, ‘Fostering Democracy through Social Media: 
Evaluating Diametrically Opposed Nonprofit Advocacy Organizations’ Use of Facebook, Twitter, and 
YouTube’ (2013) 39 Public Relations Review 369; Lindley Curtis and others, ‘Adoption of Social Media for 
Public Relations by Nonprofit Organizations’ (2010) 36 Public Relations Review 90; Hyunjin Seo, Ji Young 
Kim and Sung-Un Yang, ‘Global Activism and New Media: A Study of Transnational NGOs’ Online Public 
Relations’ (2009) 35 Public Relations Review 123. 
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practitioner, without assessments or even a general idea of what these campaigns were doing, 
I felt as though our responsibility as advocates for women and girls was at risk.  Thus, the 
idea for this research was born.  This thesis therefore sets out to explore the relationship 
between international, Twitter-driven campaigns and changes to domestic law, looking 
specifically at women’s rights.5   
 
There are now over four billion individuals using the internet, representing a 53% global 
penetration rate, with over three billion of these users active on social media.6  This is a 13% 
increase since 2017.7  Of those using social media, 330 million are on Twitter, placing it 
seventh of all social media platforms.8  These numbers, however, mask significant 
inequalities.9  The divide in household access to the internet between developed, developing, 
and least developed countries persists, with household access to the internet in developed 
countries twice as high as that in developing countries, and five times as high as least 
developed countries.10  While 70% of North Americans, 66% of Northern Europeans, and 
54% of Western Europeans actively use social media, only 12% of Central Asians, 6% of 
Middle Africans, and 20% of Southern Asians are social media active.11  This could lead to 
problems in transnational advocacy via social media, whereby the majority of users are, 
statistically, in the Global North, but the campaigns tend to target the Global South.  
Concerns are imminent about the ability of the domestic voice to play a significant role in the 
campaign, compounded by the social media functionality which may favour the elite.12  
Equally, statistics show that in every region in the world, men are using the internet more 
than women.  The gender gap is even more pronounced in developing and least developed 
countries.13  Even more concerning is that this gender gap is increasing in the developing and 
least developed countries.14  This added layer of inequality creates another complex concern 
when using social media for women’s rights campaigns in particular.     
 
5 ‘International’ Twitter-driven campaigns are those campaigns which originated in and continued to be driven 
by Twitter, which have attracted both domestic and international attention. 
6 ‘Digital in 2018: World’s Internet Users Pass the 4 Billion Mark’ (We Are Social UK, 30 January 2018) 
<https://wearesocial.com/uk/blog/2018/01/global-digital-report-2018> accessed 4 October 2018. 
7 ibid. 
8 ibid. 
9 International Telecommunication Union, ‘Measuring the Information Society Report 2017’ (2017) 
<https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/publications/mis2017.aspx> accessed 4 December 2018. 
10 ibid. 
11 ‘Digital in 2018: World’s Internet Users Pass the 4 Billion Mark’ (n 6). 
12 Kate Ott, ‘Social Media and Feminist Values: Aligned or Maligned?’ (2018) 39 Frontiers: A Journal of 
Women Studies 93. 
13 International Telecommunication Union (n 9). 
14 ibid. 
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Using theories of legal change and norm institutionalisation to inform methodological 
choices, this research takes a unique and innovative approach to measuring and modelling the 
relationships between Twitter driven campaigns and domestic legal change.  The research is 
framed by the spiral model of human rights change, building upon the body of scholarship 
critiquing the model for its underrepresentation of domestic voice and overly simplistic view 
of long-term, meaningful legal change.  Similarly, there is an emerging body of literature 
which critiques the use of social media for activism, building upon traditional media effects 
theories.15  Using social media as a mode for transnational activism could exacerbate the 
critiques of the spiral model, given the landscape presented above.16   
 
The specific research questions addressed in this thesis are: 
1. Can international campaigns originating in and driven by Twitter contribute to 
domestic legal change in women’s rights? 
2. If so, which campaign behaviours are associated with change? 
This research makes unique contributions to academia in three key areas across law and 
international relations. 
1. Examining the relationship between international Twitter campaigns on 
domestic legal change for women:  Significant research is now being done in and on 
the Twittersphere, however as social media grows and changes, substantial gaps in 
knowledge still exist.17  Little is being done to empirically explore the relationship (or 
 
15 Malcolm Gladwell, ‘Small Change’ [2010] The New Yorker 
<http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/10/04/small-change-malcolm-gladwell> accessed 14 March 2016; 
Malcolm Gladwell and Clay Shirky, ‘From Innovation to Revolution: Do Social Media Make Protests 
Possible?’ (2011) 90 Foreign Affairs 153; Clay Shirky, Here Comes Everybody: How Change Happens When 
People Come Together (Updated with a new chapter, Penguin Books 2009); Clay Shirky, ‘The Political Power 
of Social Media: Technology, the Public Sphere, and Political Change’ (2011) 90 Foreign Affairs 28. 
16 Reilly Dempsey Willis and Benjamin Mason Meier, ‘Framing the Position of Social Media in the Local 
Institutionalization of International Human Rights Norms’ in Thorsten Bonacker, Judith von Heusinger and 
Kerstin Zimmer (eds), Localization in Development Aid: How Global Institutions enter Local Lifeworlds 
(Routledge 2017). 
17 E Schwarz, ‘@hannah_arendt: An Arendtian Critique of Online Social Networks’ (2014) 43 Millennium - 
Journal of International Studies 165; Philip Alston, ‘Introduction: Third Generation Human Rights Fact-
Finding’ (2013) 107 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 61; Margaret 
Satterthwaite, ‘Finding, Verifying, and Curating Human Rights Facts’ (2013) 107 Proceedings of the Annual 
Meeting (American Society of International Law) 62; Brian Root, ‘Statistics and Data in Human Rights 
Research’ (2013) 107 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 65; Steven R 
Ratner, ‘The Political Dimension of International Human Rights Fact-Finding’ (2013) 107 Proceedings of the 
Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 70; Anita Breuer, Todd Landman and Dorothea 
Farquhar, ‘Social Media and Protest Mobilization: Evidence from the Tunisian Revolution’ (2015) 22 
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lack thereof) between international Twitter campaigns on domestic law, looking at the 
utility of Twitter for transnational advocacy (both organic and networked) for 
improving domestic women’s rights.18  This is an area ripe for empirical 
exploration.19   
2. Taking a comparative approach to measure Twitter campaigns: Many Twitter 
studies focus on an in-depth analysis of one particular campaign,20 or comparing two 
campaigns in the same country,21 whereas this research takes a unique methodological 
step to a multi-country study, looking at the differences and similarities across seven 
countries representing a wide geo-political spectrum.  This will add a new dimension 
to the academic understanding of Twitter’s relationship with legal systems.  A 
comparative approach can uncover important findings that differ from a single 
country study.   
3. Experimenting with new methodologies in examining norm institutionalisation to 
bring the ‘law’ more into focus, specifically in relation to the spiral model:  This 
research builds upon the innovative approach taken by Meier and Kim in their work 
on examining norm institutionalisation.22  Applying a modified version of this 
normative work specifically to Twitter will make an important contribution to the 
study of norms.  This normative aspect of the research fills noted gaps in the literature 
on the spiral model, addressing the issue of whether governments ‘talk the talk’ after 
 
Democratization 764; Julia Elyachar, ‘Writing the Revolution: Dilemmas of Ethnographic Writing after the 
January 25th Revolution in Egypt — Cultural Anthropology’ <http://www.culanth.org/fieldsights/209-writing-
the-revolution> accessed 28 April 2016; Khaled Fahmy, ‘The Real Tragedy Behind the Fire of Institut d’Egypte 
— Cultural Anthropology’ (Cultural Anthropology) <http://culanth.org/fieldsights/233-the> accessed 28 April 
2016; Mahboubeh Abbasgholizadeh, ‘“To Do Something We Are Unable to Do in Iran”: Cyberspace, the Public 
Sphere, and the Iranian Women’s Movement’ (2014) 39 Signs 831; Nima Naghibi, ‘Diasporic Disclosures: 
Social Networking, NEDA, and the 2009 Iranian Presidential Elections’ (2011) 34 Biography 56. 
18 Amanda Potts and others, ‘Exploring “Success” in Digitally Augmented Activism: A Triangulated Approach 
to Analyzing UK Activist Twitter Use’ (2014) 6 Discourse, Context & Media 65; Charli Carpenter and B Jose, 
‘Transnational Issue Networks in Real and Virtual Space: The Case of Women, Peace and Security’ (2012) 12 
Global Networks 525; I Chiluwa and P Ifukor, ‘“War against Our Children”: Stance and Evaluation in 
#BringBackOurGirls Campaign Discourse on Twitter and Facebook’ (2015) 26 Discourse & Society 267; 
Debolina Dutta and Oishik Sircar, ‘India’s Winter of Discontent: Some Feminist Dilemmas in the Wake of a 
Rape’ (2013) 39 Feminist Studies 293. 
19 Schwarz (n 17). 
20 Divya Titus, ‘Social Media as a Gateway for Young Feminists: Lessons from the #IWillGoOut Campaign in 
India’ (2018) 26 Gender & Development 231; Tilly A Gurman, Catherine Nichols and Elyssa S Greenberg, 
‘Potential for Social Media to Challenge Gender-Based Violence in India: A Quantitative Analysis of Twitter 
Use’ (2018) 26 Gender & Development 325; Rosemary Pennington, ‘Making Space in Social Media: 
#MuslimWomensDay in Twitter’ (2018) 42 Journal of Communication Inquiry 199. 
21 Ben O’Loughlin and others, ‘Twitter and Global Political Crises: Cycles of Insecurity in #PrayforParis and 
#PrayforSyria’ (2017) 10 Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication 175. 
22 Benjamin Mason Meier and Yuna Kim, ‘Human Rights Accountability Through Treaty Bodies: Examining 
Human Rights Treaty Monitoring for Water and Sanitation’ (2015) 26 Duke Journal of Comparative and 
International Law 139. 
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they ‘walk the walk’.23  In other words, once a treaty is signed or a law changed 
(walking the walk), is long term meaningful change manifested in government 
discourse, policies, and approaches (talking the talk)? 
 
The impact of the thesis beyond academia is to provide activists, advocates, practitioners, and 
individuals around the world with rigorous, evidence-based knowledge about the long term 
effects of hashtag campaigns.  The study identifies campaign characteristics which are more 
likely to be associated with positive legal outcomes, as well as campaign characteristics and 
behaviours which are likely to be associated with no change, or, in some cases, potentially 
negative legal changes.  While this is one small contribution, perhaps this research can have a 
real world, positive impact on women and girls.  As Simmons stated, ‘[w]hen the tweets turn 
from dinner preferences to revolutionary politics, that can matter.’24  But how, why, and 
when?25 
 
The Spiral Model 
 
In 1998, Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink published a ground-breaking book in 
transnational advocacy, where they outlined their ‘boomerang model’.26  The model used a 
visual metaphor of a boomerang to describe the relationship between domestic civil society 
and transnational advocacy networks (‘TANs’) in advocating for domestic change.  The 
metaphor envisions domestic groups ‘boomeranging’ out to transnational networks to exert 
foreign pressure on domestic governments.  This theory opened significant doors to the work 
of TANs and marked a watershed moment in activism research.   
 
Shortly thereafter, the boomerang model formed the baseline for the development of a more 
detailed, predictive model.  Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink pulled together a series of case studies 
 
23 Simmons explicitly calls for this kind of research, stating that further examination of the spiral model that has 
not yet been undertaken could include: ‘actual textual analysis of a relevant corpus of government statements, 
press releases, documents, speeches, and debates that would demonstrate a change in the language governments 
use when discussing policies related to rights practice.’  Beth A Simmons, ‘From Ratification to Compliance: 
Quantitative Evidence on the Spiral Model’ in Thomas Risse-Kappen and Stephen C Ropp (eds), The persistent 
power of human rights: from commitment to compliance (Cambridge University Press 2013). 
24 Beth A Simmons, ‘International Studies in the Global Information Age’ (2011) 55 International Studies 
Quarterly 589, 590. 
25 Beth A Simmons, ‘Preface: International Relationships in the Information Age’ (2013) 15 International 
Studies Review 1. 
26 Margaret E Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International 
Politics (Cornell University Press 1998). 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
7 
 
on human rights change to identify consistent patterns, trends, and outcomes.  The result was 
the spiral model of human rights change.27  The model, again using a visualisation, resembles 
a spiral moving across three groups of horizontally aligned actors (domestic state, domestic 
civil society, and international actors) and through five vertically aligned phases of change.  
Again, the pivotal element of the model, necessary for change, was (and still is) the influence 
of the international actors.  The model was revisited in 2013, and, although some 
clarifications were suggested, the basic tenets of the model were upheld through additional 
case studies and scope condition identification.28  Since its first publication, the spiral model 
has been tested, interrogated, and both critiqued and lauded as a revolutionary approach to 
activism.   
 
Having undertaken a survey of the critiques of the spiral model, this thesis posits that they 
fall into five primary categories:29 
1. The model under-represents domestic actors, structures, and voices.30 
2. The modality of the spiral model runs a distinct risk of sparking backlash from the 
domestic government.31 
 
27 Thomas Risse, Stephen C Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), The Power of Human Rights: International Norms 
and Domestic Change (Cambridge Univ Press 1999). 
28 Thomas Risse-Kappen, Stephen C Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), The Persistent Power of Human Rights: 
From Commitment to Compliance (Cambridge University Press 2013). 
29 These are explained in detail in Chapter 2. 
30 Alison Brysk, ‘Communicative Action and Human Rights in Colombia: When Words Fail’ [2009] Colombia 
Internacional 36; Anthony Tirado Chase, ‘The State and Human Rights: Governance and Sustainable Human 
Development in Yemen’ [2003] International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 213; Isabelle Cheng and 
Lara Momesso, ‘Look, the World Is Watching How We Treat Migrants! The Making of the Anti-Trafficking 
Legislation during the Ma Administration’ (2017) 46 Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 61; Umit Cizre, ‘The 
Truth and Fiction About (Turkey’s) Human Rights Politics’ (2001) 3 Human Rights Review 55; Xinyuan Dai, 
‘The “Compliance Gap” and the Efficacy of International Human Rights Institutions’ in Thomas Risse-Kappen 
and Stephen C Ropp (eds), The persistent power of human rights: from commitment to compliance (Cambridge 
University Press 2013); Man-ho Heo, ‘Mongolia’s Political Change and Human Rights in Five-Phase Spiral 
Model: Implications for North Korea: Mongolia’s Political Change and HR’ (2014) 29 Pacific Focus 413; 
Andreas Laursen, ‘Israel’s Supreme Court and International Human Rights Law: The Judgement on “Moderate 
Physical Pressure”’ (2000) 69 Nordic Journal of International Law 413; Alejandro Anaya Muñoz, 
‘Transnational and Domestic Processes in the Definition of Human Rights Policies in Mexico’ (2009) 31 
Human Rights Quarterly 35; Rolf Schwarz, ‘The Paradox of Sovereignty, Regime Type and Human Rights 
Compliance’ (2004) 8 The International Journal of Human Rights 199; Simmons, ‘From Ratification to 
Compliance: Quantitative Evidence on the Spiral Model’ (n 23). 
31 Brysk (n 30); Omar G Encarnación, ‘International Influence, Domestic Activism, and Gay Rights in 
Argentina’ (2013) 128 Political Science Quarterly 687; Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, ‘How to Influence 
States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law’ (2004) 54 Duke Law Journal 621; Kathryn Sikkink, 
‘The United States and Torture: Does the Spiral Model Work?’ in Thomas Risse-Kappen and Stephen C Ropp 
(eds), The persistent power of human rights: from commitment to compliance (Cambridge University Press 
2013); Anja Jetschke, ‘The Power of Human Rights a Decade after: From Euphoria to Contestation?’ in Thomas 
Risse-Kappen and Stephen C Ropp (eds), The persistent power of human rights: from commitment to 
compliance (Cambridge University Press 2013). 
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3. Some countries get ‘stuck’ and never progress through to the final phase of the model, 
thus lacking in long-term, meaningful change to the laws and their implementation.32 
4. The model presupposes a baseline level of domestic state capacity to instigate and 
implement change.  This is not always true.33 
5. The model relies heavily on naming and shaming and the advocacy work done by 
transnational networks, whilst ignoring the role of material incentives often presented 
by foreign governments, not just civil society.34 
 
Beyond the overarching non-neutrality of Twitter rooted in its algorithms and filter bubbles,35 
there are five relevant areas of critique of specific to using social media for activism, building 
upon media effects theories: 
1. As evidenced earlier, social media is predominantly a tool of the Global Northern 
elite, potentially creating homogenisation through functionalities.36 
2. Social media is organic and thus less ‘controllable’ than other campaigns.37 
3. Social media campaigns could potentially lack persistence, coming and going faster 
than meaningful change demands.38 
 
32 Raed A Alhargan, ‘The Impact of the UN Human Rights System and Human Rights INGOs on the Saudi 
Government with Special Reference to the Spiral Model’ (2012) 16 The International Journal of Human Rights 
598; Brysk (n 30); Jetschke (n 31); Eran Shor, ‘Conflict, Terrorism, and the Socialization of Human Rights 
Norms: The Spiral Model Revisited’ (2008) 55 Social Problems 117. 
33 Tanja Borzel and Thomas Risse, ‘Human Rights in Areas of Limited Statehood: The New Agenda’ in Thomas 
Risse-Kappen and Stephen C Ropp (eds), The persistent power of human rights: from commitment to 
compliance (Cambridge University Press 2013); Jack Goldsmith and Stephen D Krasner, ‘The Limits of 
Idealism’ (2003) 132 Daedalus 47; Shor (n 32). 
34 Goldsmith and Krasner (n 33); Jérôme Y Bachelard, ‘The Anglo-Leasing Corruption Scandal in Kenya: The 
Politics of International and Domestic Pressures and Counter-Pressures’ (2010) 37 Review of African Political 
Economy 187; Ronald R Krebs and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, ‘Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The 
Power of Political Rhetoric’ (2007) 13 European Journal of International Relations 35; Robyn Linde, 
‘Statelessness and Roma Communities in the Czech Republic: Competing Theories of State Compliance’ (2006) 
13 International Journal on Minority & Group Rights 341; Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri, ‘Trials and Errors: 
Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice’ (2003) 28 International Security 5. 
35 Andrew Henry Jakubowicz, ‘Alt_Right White Lite: Trolling, Hate Speech and Cyber Racism on Social 
Media’ (2017) 9 Cosmopolitan Civil Societies: An Interdisciplinary Journal 41; Sarah J Jackson and Brooke 
Foucault Welles, ‘Hijacking #myNYPD: Social Media Dissent and Networked Counterpublics: Hijacking 
#myNYPD’ (2015) 65 Journal of Communication 932; Ott (n 12); Rune Karlsen and others, ‘Echo Chamber and 
Trench Warfare Dynamics in Online Debates’ (2017) 32 European Journal of Communication 257. 
36 ‘Digital in 2018: World’s Internet Users Pass the 4 Billion Mark’ (n 6); Ott (n 12). 
37 Sarah Joseph, ‘Social Media, Political Change, and Human Rights’ (2012) 35 Boston College International 
and Comparative Law Review 145; Gladwell (n 15); Evgeny Morovoz, ‘The Internet’ (2010) 179 Foreign 
Policy 40. 
38 Marta Poblet and Jonathan Kolieb, ‘Responding to Human Rights Abuses in the Digital Era: New Tools, Old 
Challenges’ (2018) 54 Stanford Journal of International Law 259. 
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4. Campaigns tend to virally take off without participants having much knowledge of the 
domestic situation.39 
5. Social media campaigns do not present many incentives for governments to change as 
participants do not put themselves at risk or have a stake in outcomes.40 
 
These categories form the basis for this study’s design, giving credence to the variables 
which have been selected and explored for their role in forming the relationships between 
international Twitter campaigns and domestic legal change.  The theoretical framework 
provides the architecture for the methodological design of this study.  Critiques of the spiral 
model enable the research to focus not only on the potential positive outcomes, but also the 
risks.  Adopting a critical approach to the spiral model and the role of transnational advocacy 
in domestic legal change will open the door to exploring the full breadth of potential 
outcomes – positive and negative.  
 
To answer these questions, this study looks at nearly 1 million Tweets across eight campaigns 
targeting domestic legal change in seven countries.  The campaigns included in this study are: 
1. #stopstoning – calling for changes to the law in Iran which sets stoning as a form of 
the death penalty for women accused (often falsely) of adultery 
2. #letwomengotostadium – advocating for the lifting of a ban on women attending 
men’s volleyball matches in Iran, seen as an affront to women’s autonomy and 
equality 
3. #farkhunda – the brutal mob murder of a young woman in Afghanistan, in the 
presence of police, was caught on film and went viral on social media.  The resulting 
hashtag campaign in her name called upon the government to strengthen law 
enforcement to protect women from violence, particularly in the public sphere. 
4. #sendeanlat – rates of femicide in Turkey have been steadily rising for many years.  
When a young woman was raped and murdered on a bus, her story led to the 
campaign #sendeanlat, which roughly translates into ‘share your story’.  The 
 
39 Srilatha Batliwala, ‘Grassroots Movements as Transnational Actors: Implications for Global Civil Society’ 
(2002) 13 VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary & Nonprofit Organizations 393; Lilie Chouliaraki, 
‘Post-Humanitarianism Humanitarian Communication beyond a Politics of Pity’ (2010) 13 International Journal 
of Cultural Studies 107; Stuart Garman, ‘New Communications Technologies in Emergencies’ in Roger 
MacGinty and Jenny H Peterson (eds), The Routledge Companion to Humanitarian Action (Routledge 2015); K 
Davis Cross, ‘Rethinking Epistemic Communities Twenty Years Later’ (2012) 39 Review of International 
Studies 137. 
40 Gladwell and Shirky (n 15); Gladwell (n 15); Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani, Social Movements: An 
Introduction (2nd edn, Blackwell Publishing 2006). 
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campaign specifically called upon the government to repeal a law which allowed 
mitigation in many femicide cases based on ‘provocation.’ 
5. #mydressmychoice – a woman in Nairobi was publicly and violently stripped naked 
because she was wearing a mini-skirt.  This incident was also videoed and went viral 
on social media.  The ensuing hashtag campaign advocated for stronger laws to 
protect women from violence and more action from front line law enforcement.   
6. #delhigangrape – When a young woman was brutally gang raped and murdered on a 
bus in India, her story ignited outcry via social media.  The campaign demanded that 
the government strengthen laws and law enforcement, particularly in the courts, to 
protect women and girls.   
7. #niunamenos – machismo culture in Argentina is often blamed for the high rates of 
femicide.  After a report of a young woman murdered because of her gender, activists 
turned to social media to catalyse the country.  The campaign had very clear demands 
for changes and improvements to the laws around femicide, including the 
establishment of a national registry of femicide. 
8. #women2drive – for decades, a religious decree banned women from driving in Saudi 
Arabia.  Activists decided to use social media to reinvigorate their campaign, filming 
themselves driving and posting the videos online.  The campaign took off, demanding 
that the ban be lifted.   
 
It is important to recognise that the attention drawn to issues highlighted in social media 
campaigns will be necessarily different than the potential effects from traditional media.  
Social media, organic in nature, allows the framing and attention on an issue to reflect, at 
least to some extent, society’s views more so than traditional (edited and curated) media.  
This is of course not without drawbacks, which are explored in detail in Chapter 2 of this 
thesis.  All of the campaigns in this study either started with or became popularised via a 
Tweet and continued to be driven by the use of Twitter.  The campaigns were known more by 
the hashtag than any other descriptor.  The campaigns sought to use mass public support and 
pressure to force governments to act.  They all set out to improve the lives of women and 
girls through domestic legal change.  Yet very little is known about the long-term influence 
on or relationship with law – positive, negative, or neither.  This research seeks to understand 
the full range of potential outcomes through a large scale, comparative study to determine 
whether campaigns originating in and driven by Twitter are associated with legal change.  
Ultimately, the thesis seeks to identify a ‘package’ of campaign characteristics that are most 
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closely aligned with positive legal change to create an ‘ideal’ hashtag campaign.  Equally 
important, the study will identify risky Twitter campaign behaviours which are correlated to 
negative outcomes.   To the best of the author’s knowledge, this kind of large scale, 
comparative study specifically looking at the relationship between international campaigns 
driven by Twitter and domestic women’s rights has not yet been done.   
 
To do this, the research explores three sets of variables: context (understanding the baseline 
domestic political and demographic environment), Twitter campaign characteristics (the 
independent variables), and legal change (the dependent variables).  The context variables 
look at a variety of domestic aspects, from government type to the presence of women’s 
rights NGOs to internet penetration.  Twitter campaigns are examined based on number of 
Tweets per day, the relationship between retweets, replies, and likes, user profiles, and Tweet 
content.  Legal change is broken down into four categories: legislation, institutionalisation 
(including soft law, government discourse, budget allocations, etc.), law enforcement (from 
front line policing through to the highest level of court cases), and examination of the 
treatment of women’s rights norms through state dialogue with UN treaty bodies.  
 
Results 
 
This research has found that campaigns which originate in and continue to be driven by 
Twitter are associated with a wide range of legal outcomes, from the situation being worse 
after the campaign through to potentially positive changes for women.  As introduced above, 
legal change was measured across four areas: legislative change, evidence of long term 
institutionalisation of the campaign goals, how the law is implemented and enforced, and 
how the government approaches the issue in dialogue with relevant UN treaty bodies.  A 
simple rating scale was used to quantify the level of change across each of the four areas, 
starting from a score of one which represents a situation where the campaign has been 
associated with negative outcomes, where the legal status of women and girls has changed for 
the worse.  A score of five represents a ‘perfect’ change where all of the campaign’s legal 
change goals were achieved and implemented and women are actively benefitting from the 
campaign.  A score of three equates to no change.  It is worth noting that no campaign was 
rated as a one, nor was any campaign rated as a five.  
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Table 1.1: Summary of Results 
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Overall legal change 
(average) 
2.00 2.50 2.63 2.75 3.00 3.13 3.63 3.88 
Overall campaign score 
(composite) 
2.12 2.15 2.60 2.78 3.53 3.92 4.01 3.91 
Legislation 2.00 3.00 3.50 2.50 3.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
Institutionalisation 3.00 2.00 3.00 2.50 3.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 
Law enforcement 1.00 2.00 1.00 3.00 2.50 2.00 2.00 2.50 
UN reporting 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.50 4.00 4.00 
 
The levels of change varied greatly across the legal components, with the most change seen 
in legislation itself.  Some change was seen in institutionalisation, which is broadly defined to 
include government discourse, soft law and policies, and, where accessible, budget 
allocations.  Law enforcement, which includes the whole scope from front line policing 
through to the highest level of court cases, showed the most reluctance to change for women, 
with the least positive outcomes.  Evidence of norm institutionalisation through dialogue with 
UN treaty bodies illustrated a range of outcomes.  In short, campaigns which are consistent, 
persistent, domestically driven but with international attention, and which draw down from 
international women’s rights norms (the components of the composite campaign score in 
Table 1.1 above) are associated with more positive change (the overall legal change figure in 
Table 1.1).  Campaigns which lack domestic voice and drive, fail to attract a high level of 
foreign pressure, lack in persistence and consistency, show more volatile and varying 
messaging, and are less aligned with international women’s rights norms, are associated with 
more negative outcomes.   
 
Structure 
 
Chapter 2 of this thesis sets out the theoretical framework and methodology.  The chapter 
traces a brief history of the development of the spiral model, looking at literature in 
constructivism, norm evolution, and transnational advocacy networks, leading to an in depth 
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explanation of the spiral model itself.  A significant part of this chapter lays out the primary 
critiques of the spiral model, mapping and coding a variety of papers and studies to generate 
overarching categories of assessments of the model’s validity.  These critiques provide the 
basic architecture for study design and methodological choices.  Literature on the non-
neutrality of social media, media effects, and the role of activism through social media are 
also introduced.  The chapter culminates in the presentation of a research map which guides 
the rest of the thesis.  Technical details on the specific methodological choices are included in 
the appendices.     
 
A key finding of this study, as shown in Table 1.1, was that Twitter campaigns are associated 
with a variety of legal outcomes.  The campaigns can be loosely grouped into four categories 
of outcomes: negative/regressive, status quo, semi-positive, and positive.   Chapters 3, 4, 5, 
and 6 present detailed findings and analyses of each of these categories of outcomes.  These 
chapters first present a chronological exploration of legal change, looking at legislation, 
institutionalisation of legal norms, the role of law enforcement including policing and the 
judiciary, and normative evaluation of the presence of change in dialogue with relevant UN 
treaty bodies and Universal Periodic Reviews.  These areas are analysed for the time period 
before the campaign started and after the campaign started to gauge change.  This analysis 
provides critical insight into the overall categorisation of legal outcomes.   
 
These chapters then describe and analyse in detail the Twitter campaigns themselves, 
exploring how the campaigns behaved and what the key characteristics were.  For example, 
who were the most active participants in the campaigns?  Did the campaigns peak and die off 
or was there consistent activity over time?  Were participants retweeting or replying?  How 
were the campaigns normatively framed over time in the content of Tweets?  These questions 
paint a distinct picture for each group of campaigns.  These chapters answer research 
question 1: Can international campaigns originating in and driven by Twitter contribute to 
domestic legal change in women’s rights? 
 
Chapter 7 draws all of the legal and campaign analyses together through statistical testing and 
modelling.  This chapter tests each of the variables to specifically address research question 
2: Which campaign behaviours are associated with change?  This chapter presents the 
quantification of the Twitter variables and the legal variables.  These quantified variables are 
then statistically tested to identify significant relationships between campaign behaviours and 
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characteristics and legal outcomes.  This chapter culminates in presenting a simple linear 
regression to model the relationship between campaigns driven by Twitter and legal change.   
 
Finally, the concluding chapter draws the major findings together, providing an overarching 
analysis of the relationship between international campaigns originating in and driven by 
Twitter and legal change in domestic women’s rights.  This chapter presents what an ‘ideal’ 
campaign might look like, providing much needed evidence-based guidance to advocacy 
networks and activists around the world.  The chapter also presents the limitations of the 
study and identifies key areas for future work.   
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Chapter 2 Research Framework 
 
Introduction 
 
International relations scholars came together in the 1990s to model the role of transnational 
advocacy networks in moving governments from a regime of human rights abuses to a regime 
of legal conformity with human rights norms.  It was called the spiral model of human rights 
change, and it was on evidence from 10 case studies.1  The model was again revisited in 
2013, exploring some of the critiques and pushing the model into new issue and geographic 
areas.  The evaluation reaffirmed its validity in mapping and predicting legal, human rights 
change.  At the time, it was ground-breaking.  Not only did the model prove the importance 
and indeed necessity of transnational actors, but it also showed that there was an identifiable 
pattern.  Human rights change was shown to be systematic, coherent, and consistent, across a 
spectrum of different countries and cultures.  The model has been both lauded and heavily 
critiqued.  It is worth noting at the outset that the original model was developed before social 
media campaigning became prevalent.   
In this research framework chapter, I first explore the development of the model, laying the 
theoretical groundwork and tracing the model’s roots.  This leads to describing the spiral 
model itself, moving into a survey of the main critiques, and coding them into five different 
areas – lack of progression, domestic backlash, under-emphasis of the role of domestic actors 
(and conversely overemphasis of the role of transnational actors), overlooking critical 
capacity issues, and finally ignoring the importance of material incentives.  Similarly, 
academic and scholarly critiques of social media activism, stemming from media effects 
literature, are then presented.  These critique areas are used to develop the research design, 
informing the variable selection, analysis and understanding, and framing conclusions.  Each 
independent variable of interest is derived from one of the critique areas, ensuring that the 
research itself is grounded in theory and scholarship, to fully understand the utility of 
Twitter-driven campaigns in legal change.  In essence, the research asks the same questions 
scholars asked of the spiral model, but in a social media environment.  Ample time is then 
spent presenting the theoretically informed and grounded methodology.   
 
1 Kenya, Uganda, South Africa, Tunisia, Morocco, Indonesia, the Philippines, Chile, Guatemala, and Eastern 
Europe. 
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Constructivist Roots 
A new international relations theory emerged in the 1980s which attempted to bridge gaps 
between competing theories of realism (states are driven by power and thus in a constant state 
of aggression) and neoliberal institutionalism (states are not driven by power alone and thus 
are in a constant state of  cooperation).2  This emerging theory used the concept of 
‘constructivism’ from other fields of research.  Applied to the field of IR and legal change, 
state interests and identities are not set in stone as previous theories held, but rather are 
mutually constitutive and changeable.3  It is the state interactions themselves that determine 
interests and identities.  The strand of constructivism taken in this thesis is best summed up 
by Adler when he states ‘the main goal of constructivism is to provide both theoretical and 
empirical explanations of social institutions and social change with the help of the combined 
effect of agents and social structures.’4  This thesis takes this conventional constructivist 
approach.5   
Constructivists define power broadly, taking in not just material, economic, military forms, 
but also power in the form of the ability to define the rules of the game and dictate the norms 
and institutions that restrict or constrain behaviours and actions.  Constructivism, as with 
previous IR theories, continues to carve out important spaces for language and discourse: 
‘speech acts...not only describe a reality, they also construct it.’6  It is through communication 
(interactions) that the act of mutual constitution (of identities and interests) occurs.7  The 
constructivist approach underscores that reality is also constructed through dialogue.8   
Meaning is negotiated, and depends entirely on the interpretations of both the ‘sender’ and 
the ‘receiver’.9   Wendt explains this process as ‘signalling, interpreting, and responding’ and 
 
2 Emanuel Adler, ‘Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics’ (1997) 3 European Journal of 
Interntional Relations 319. 
3 Thomas Risse, ‘“Let’s Argue!”: Communicative Action in World Politics’ (2000) 54 International 
Organization 1, 5 discussing the work of Onuf, Kratochwil, and Wendy; John Gerard Ruggie, ‘What Makes the 
World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge’ (1998) 52 International 
Organization 855. 
4 Adler (n 2) 325. 
5 As opposed to a critical constructivist approach.  See, e.g. Hopf. 
6 Friedrich V Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in 
International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Reprint, Cambridge Univ Press 1989). 
7 Richard J Evanoff, ‘Universalist, Relativist, and Constructivist Approaches to Intercultural Ethics’ (2004) 28 
International Journal of Intercultural Relations 439; Matthew J Hoffmann, ‘Is Constructivist Ethics an 
Oxymoron?’ (2009) 11 International Studies Review 231. 
8 Evanoff (n 7) 449. 
9 ibid 500. 
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sees it as a social act in and of itself.10  Risse also delves into the study of the role of language 
and communication in constructivism, finding that a ‘logic of arguing’, when certain 
conditions are present, can be a critical aspect in negotiating collective meaning and shared 
understandings in international relations.11  These negotiations have real world impact, 
shaping and changing how states behave, interact, and relate to each other.  This forms the 
theoretical basis for the spiral model itself.    
Notably, many feminists take a radical constructivist approach, whereby gender is socially 
constructed, but constructed in a male-dominated, hetero-patriarchal normative 
environment.12  Understanding this environment and the norms and rules which follow allows 
feminist researchers to deconstruct gender inequalities and the power relations which 
continue to favour males over females (in a socially determined way).  Most researchers 
agree that gender is an analytical tool, not a methodology.13  A constructivist approach brings 
this lens into focus.14  As this research will focus on women's rights in various forms, it is 
important to recognise that a constructivist approach will frame the research so that the 
gendered nature of the norms and their formation (and change) can be illustrated.  As a 
variable, it is absolutely critical to consider the gendered nature of the power dynamics and 
hierarchies which pave the way for normative change.   
Conventional constructivists ‘seek to explain the social construction of reality’.15  It is this 
empirical approach that opens doors to understanding how certain rules, norms, and 
institutions are constructed, the interests and identities which fuelled their formations, the 
knowledge and discourse which underpin them, and how they operate within a set of given 
conditions.16 Social facts necessitate social interpretation and understanding, which make 
them inherently different from natural facts.  Constructivists, through research, strive to 
attach meaning and understanding to those social facts, to understand the socially determined 
world in which these facts are created and operationalised.  In this way, researchers can 
 
10 Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics’ (1992) 46 
International Organization 391, 405. 
11 Risse (n 3). 
12 Laura Sjoberg and J Ann Tickner, ‘Feminist Perspectives on International Relations’ in Walter Carlsnaes, 
Thomas Risse and BA Simmons (eds), Handbook of International Relations (2nd edn, SAGE Publications Ltd 
2013). 
13 ibid. 
14 Emanuel Adler, ‘Constructivism in International Relations: Sources, Contributions, and Debates’ in Walter 
Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and BA Simmons (eds), Handbook of International Relations (2nd edn, SAGE 
Publications Ltd 2013). 
15 Adler (n 2) 328. 
16 Adler (n 2). 
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employ objectivity to understand subjectivity.  This is not to say that constructivism is not 
rife with internal debate over empirical perspectives, but for the purposes of this research, 
utilising the tenets of constructivism, employing an empirical, conventional constructivist 
methodology will underpin the understanding of human rights change.17   
Norms 
Constructivism gives formal rise to the study and appreciation of norms, and in particular 
human rights norms, within the field of IR.18  Norms are generally defined as ‘standards of 
behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations’19 or ‘a standard of appropriate behaviour 
for actors with a given identity.’20  The constructivist approach is thus needed to understand 
and explore said identities.  The study of norms, at the heart of this research, sits squarely 
within this conventional constructivist approach.21  Whilst the concept of ‘norms’ in 
international relations and law predates the evolution of constructivist frameworks, using a 
constructivist approach to the study of norms ties together the understanding of state 
behaviours (constructivism) with behavioural standards (norms).22  Using a norms approach 
also allows for the core IR concepts of self-interest, power, and language to remain a part of 
 
17 There are some methodological challenges with this constructivist approach in empirical research.  For 
example, if everything is constructed and nothing is “real” in international relations, then we may feel that we 
do not have an objective reality against which to measure research findings  (Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, 
‘Foregrounding Ontology: Dualism, Monism, and IR Theory’ (2008) 34 Review of International Studies 129; 
Friedrich Kratochwil, ‘Constructing a New Orthodoxy? Wendt’s “Social Theory of International Politics” and 
the Constructivist Challenge’ (2000) 29 Millennium (03058298) 73.) However, according to Jackson the goal is 
to produce knowledge – and if the research is systematic, consistent, honest, and rigorous, then knowledge had 
indeed been produced. 
18 Kathryn Sikkink, ‘Transnational Politics, International Relations Theory, and Human Rights’ (1998) 31 PS: 
Political Science and Politics 517, 517–523; John L Campbell, ‘Ideas, Politics, and Public Policy’ (2002) 28 
Annual Review of Sociology 21; Jeffrey T Checkel, ‘Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in 
Contemporary Europe’ (1999) 43 International Studies Quarterly 83; Martha Finnemore, ‘Are Legal Norms 
Distinctive?’ (2000) 32 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 699, 699; Lisa L Martin 
and Beth A Simmons, ‘Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions’ (1998) 52 International 
Organization 729, 738; Jeffrey W Legro, ‘Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the “Failure” of Internationalism’ 
(1997) 51 International Organization 31, 31; Elias Steinhilper, ‘From “the Rest” to “the West”? Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples and the Western Bias in Norm Diffusion Research’ (2015) 17 International Studies Review 
536, 537. 
19 Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie, ‘International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the 
State’ (2009) 40 International Organization 753, 767. 
20 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’ (1998) 52 
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the decision-making process.  In fact, Goertz goes so far as to state ‘[n]orms and their impact 
on behaviour cannot be studied apart from issues of power and self-interest.’23   
Norms, when accepted, create obligations.24  A common definitional thread also seen in the 
literature on norms is the idea of consequences for non-compliance25 and the use of 
sanctions.26  The literature is in fact teeming with references to the importance of 
consequences in defining norms, even to the extent of utilising the term ‘punishment’ for 
non-conforming behaviour.27  In the real world, of course, this does not mean that all 
individuals or states will conform all the time, as each decision is made against a background 
of all the exogenous factors at play.28  Once again, the constructivist approach here holds that 
states interests and identities will both change and be changed by interactions; thus a 
constructivist understanding of norms presents a very dynamic picture.  It is a complex web 
when looking at the influence of international norms on domestic policies.29   
The process whereby a norm comes to be is commonly referred to as the ‘life cycle’ of a 
norm.30  In the first stage, called norm emergence, an individual or group of individuals 
actively work to frame an idea as a norm.  These individuals are called ‘norm 
entrepreneurs’.31  It is important to note that norms do not generally become norms on their 
own but rather it takes active work to take an idea and construct it so that it becomes a 
norm.32  According to Finnemore and Sikkink, at the international level, norm entrepreneurs 
tend to have an organisational platform, usually the establishment or use of transnational 
advocacy networks (explored in more detail later in this chapter), non-governmental 
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Issues’ (1992) 36 The Journal of Conflict Resolution 634, 661. 
24 Andrew P Cortell and James W Davis, ‘Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms: A 
Research Agenda’ (2000) 2 International Studies Review 65. 
25 Robert Axelrod, ‘An Evolutionary Approach to Norms’ (1986) 80 The American Political Science Review 
1095. 
26 Goertz and Diehl (n 23). 
27 Stephen D Krasner, ‘Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables’ in 
Stephen D Krasner (ed), International regimes (11. print, Cornell Univ Press 2004); Kratochwil (n 6); Sikkink, 
Katherine, ‘The Power of Principled Ideas: Human Rights Policies in the United States and Western Europe’ in 
Judith Goldstein and Robert O Keohane (eds), Ideas and foreign policy: beliefs, institutions, and political 
change (Cornell University Press 1993); James G March and Johan P Olsen, ‘The Institutional Dynamics of 
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organisations, international bodies such as the UN, and other platforms.33  Once a norm 
‘emerges’, it must reach a ‘tipping point.’  After the tipping point is reached, the norm enters 
a process referred to as ‘cascading’, where, as the descriptive word suggests, the norm 
becomes so widely accepted that those not embracing the norm are seen as non-conforming, 
and are enticed to become norm followers.34  At this point, there must be some kind of reward 
for norm compliance (even if it just belonging) and some kind of consequence for norm 
breaking (even of a social nature, such as reputational damage).  The spiral model addresses, 
generally, human rights norms which have gone through this life cycle and now carry 
consequences for non-conformity.  Some human rights norms are more widely accepted than 
others; this thesis looks at women’s rights and in many campaigns violence against women.  
These norms are not universal but have generally become internationally accepted.  
Therefore, there is at least some form of consequence for non-conformity to the norms in this 
study.   
Finally, norms become internalised.  At this point, the norm becomes so pervasive that it is 
part of ‘everyday life.’35  The norm is no longer questioned, and non-conforming behaviour is 
both rare and carries a significant consequence, sometimes quite ‘painful.’36  In the 
international setting, internalised norms provide a baseline level of predictability, stability, 
legitimation, and even trust between nation states, and at best can provide a level of 
deterrence.37  With the constructivist perspective, norms help to shape and understand 
interests and identities, which can then help to predict interactions.  Having institutionalised 
and internalised norms allows states to negotiate and debate, to enter into agreements, and to 
make commitments to one another bilaterally or multilaterally.  Without norms, levels of 
uncertainty increase which can lead to (arguably) less action and more stagnation.  Many 
factors play a role in the likelihood of a norm reaching this stage of the life cycle, such as 
legitimation, prominence, and intrinsic characteristics of the norm.38  For example, concepts 
which resonate across cultures are more likely to be the basis of norms which are eventually 
institutionalised.39  This is not, of course, without controversy, debate, or examples to the 
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contrary,40 but the majority of scholars accept that a norm with transnationally agreed roots is 
more likely to take hold.   
Well established norms are often codified in law, where they can ‘exert long-term effects on 
policy making.’41  Some scholars hold that if a norm is strong enough, it matters not whether 
it is codified into law or not, as individuals and states will abide.42  In other words, if norms 
are influencing action and behaviour, does it matter whether they have been codified into law, 
and in particular international law, at all?43  Some, on the other hand, find that the act of 
moving a norm into a set law changes the stakes and carries more weight than the norm on its 
own.44  Conversely, laws based on weak norms are less likely to be successful enforced or 
abided.45  In this way social norms and laws ‘are often mutually supporting.’46   
This model of norm institutionalisation is not without critique.  Relevant to this research, 
there is a growing body of scholarship which highlights the ‘Western’ bias in norm 
institutionalisation, both in study and in practice.47  Scholars have pointed out, rightfully so, 
that the majority of research into norms has focussed on predominantly Western norms.48  
When viewed in light of the life cycle described above, the heavily Western bias of norm 
entrepreneurs and norm framing becomes evident.  This could also be intensified when using 
a social media platform to engage in normative work.  Steinhilper notably titles his article 
‘From the West to the Rest’ to capture the essence of this bias in the study of norms.49  The 
ideas of ‘norm makers’ and ‘norm takers’ also emerge in this literature, where ‘norm makers’ 
are almost exclusively seen as Western or Northern agents, and ‘norm takers’ are those in the 
Global South.50   
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Building on this overly Westernised approach, domestic norms, structures, and policies are 
often critical but overlooked or under-emphasised variables in predicting outcomes and 
behaviours.51  The so-called ‘second wave’ of research in norms works to prioritise and 
re(visit) the preeminent role of domestic structures and agents in the institutionalisation of 
international norms.52  Much of the current literature finds that domestic variables have a 
significant effect on the internationalisation of international norms.53  If a norm does not or 
cannot fit within the domestic state's interests or preferences then it will not internalise at the 
domestic level.54  Cortell and Davis go further to specify domestic factors which explain the 
likelihood of institutionalisation – the domestic ‘salience’ of the norm and the domestic 
‘structural context.’55 They find that more attention needs to be paid to understanding the 
process and the mechanisms at the domestic level which lead to the institutionalisation of an 
international norm.  Their approach is to focus not on the norm itself, but rather the domestic 
factors surrounding the norm.56  Domestic actors can use an international norms to bolster 
their work, but this is highly dependent on the interests of state and societal actors, and that 
domestic structures are a central determinant of the impact of international norms.57  Acharya 
adds to this scholarship factors such as ‘the authority of key norm-takers, the strength of prior 
local norms, [and] the credibility and prestige of local agents.’58  Martin and Simmons in fact 
find that, under certain conditions, international institutions amplify domestic identities and 
interests.  In other words, institutions will move actors already on a certain path further along 
that path, whilst those who have interests and identities further away from the institution will 
remain the same, or perhaps regress.59  While the role of domestic actors and structures do 
form part of the spiral mode, a primary area of critique draws from this second wave 
normative work to find that the model under-specifies and under-emphasises the domestic 
factors while over-emphasising the role of international factors.  A key part of this thesis is to 
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empirically explore the role of domestic voices in Twitter-driven campaigns to move 
domestic states towards international women’s rights norms, resting on these second-wave 
normative theories and critiques of the spiral model.    
Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs) 
As noted above, critical players in the life cycle of norms are transnational advocacy 
networks, defined generally as groups working across state borders on a given issue, from a 
place of shared values and discourse, made up of non-state actors.60  TANs are often norm 
entrepreneurs, framing issues in ways that help move them along the life cycle, with the 
ultimate goal of institutionalisation and internalisation.  The work of TANs is thus inherently 
linked to norms.61   
[Transnational advocacy networks] contribute to changing perceptions that both state 
and societal actors may have of their identities, interests, and preferences, to 
transforming their discursive positions, and ultimately to changing procedures, 
policies, and behaviour.62 
Constructivism, bringing together state interests, identities, interactions, and information, is 
the core of the work of TANs, while norm institutionalisation is the desired outcome.  These 
networks allow for the gathering and sharing of information which can be critical to shaping, 
changing, and driving political agendas. 63  Building on its centrality in constructivism, the 
role of information is central to the work and effectiveness of TANs.64  Information is 
generally contained in facts and testimony, and is used to frame issues in a way that is 
sympathetic to the cause and ultimately leads to change.65  In addition to the role of 
information, TANs also use symbolism, leverage, and accountability (i.e. naming and 
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shaming) to achieve their goals.66  The most successful TANs almost always work in 
partnership with domestic groups or individuals, reinforcing efforts to overcome domestic 
barriers.67  However, some criticise TANs for being predominantly Western, both in location 
and values, where ‘critics claim that this physical location in the most developed countries 
has led these social change INGOs to reflect primarily the sensibilities of citizens or 
governments in the developed world.’68   
Social media has fundamentally changed the ability of networks to share information.69  
Whereas prior to the advent of social media, TANs would have undertaken specific and 
strategic work, with the organic and participatory nature of social media, it is possible that 
this has changed.70  Interestingly, Keck and Sikkink specify that traditional TANs work does 
not generally involve mass mobilisation, which could be used to challenge the platform of 
social media in human rights campaigning.71   
The Spiral Model of Human Rights Change 
In sum, we argue that the diffusion of international norms in the human rights 
area crucially depends on the establishment and the sustainability of networks 
among domestic and international actors who manage to link up with 
international regimes, to alert Western public opinion and Western 
governments.72 
Building upon Keck and Sikkink’s ‘boomerang model’ which began to specify the role of 
TANs in domestic activism,73 the spiral model frames ‘the various processes involved in the 
movement from norm expectation to real country-level results.’74  Broadly, the model tracks 
how states move from human rights repression to denial, to tactical concessions, to 
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prescriptive status, and finally to rule-consistent behaviour.  The initial concept of a 
boomerang visualised advocacy work as domestic groups ‘boomeranging’ out to 
transnational groups and repeating the process to achieve change.  This model was further 
developed and refined into a spiral, moving from domestic actors to transnational actors to 
target governments, again repeating in a spiralling motion to work through five phases to 
achieve long-term, meaningful legal change.  Transnational actors and foreign pressure are 
essential to the model when moving from repression to denial, and again from denial to 
tactical concessions. Since the development of this model, some scholars have also found that 
the continued presence of transnational advocacy is critical to move from tactical concessions 
through to norm institutionalisation.75 
The authors set out to formally research the role of norms and norm institutionalisation in 
human rights and legal change.  Their aim was to link theory to practice, models to impact, 
particularly in the legal field of human rights.76  The model is therefore both legal and 
political.  10 case studies of countries that were known to have moved from a regime which 
violated human rights norms to a regime which, to some extent at least, respected, protected, 
and fulfilled human rights norms were selected for in depth study.  Across all 10 cases 
studies, similar patterns were identified.  These patterns were analysed and led to the 
development of a ‘model’, rooted in constructivism, academic understanding of norm 
institutionalisation, and previous research into the role of TANs.   
The model begins with the combination of a human rights violating state and a ‘weak’ 
domestic opposition.  Once the international network becomes involved, mobilisation occurs 
and pressure is exerted.  At this stage, the domestic state moves from repression to denial; the 
government publicly denies that there is any violation of human rights occurring.  Sustained 
pressure from the international network forces the domestic government to, eventually, make 
some sort of ‘tactical concession’ to relieve the pressure.  This is the critical turning point of 
the process of legal change.  This move opens the door for the domestic opposition to gain 
strength and for the international network to continue to exert pressure and mobilise against 
the domestic state.  Eventually, states engage in either policy or regime change.  The final 
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phases of the model see the domestic state accept the international norm and, in some cases, 
institutionalise the norm fully.  The visual model, showing the spiral action, is below.   
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Figure 2.1: The Spiral Model of Human Rights Change 
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The glue holding the model together is the networking between international groups and 
domestic groups.  The international groups are responsible for exerting the pressure necessary 
to move the domestic regime through a process of legal change; some pressure from the 
‘bottom up’ is needed from domestic groups, but the lynchpin of the model is the leverage 
provided by the international network.  The model seeks, ‘ultimately, to specify the causal 
mechanisms by which international norms affect domestic structural change.’77   
Transnational actors are accredited with movement in the key early stages of the model, 
rooted in international naming and shaming, while also ‘empowering and strengthening the 
initially weak domestic opposition.’78  It is not until well into the third, sometimes fourth 
phase, that the role of domestic civil society comes into play.  Even then, it is framed as a 
‘supplemental’ pressure to that from the transnational actors.79  When revisited a decade later, 
Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink focussed more on examining the spiral model as a theory of legal 
change, noting that ‘international lawyers have become aware of the increasing social science 
scholarship on human rights, while political scientists started to take the particular 
characteristics of law seriously.’80 
 
The Spiral Model as a Theory of Legal Change 
The most important general legal questions, it seems to me, both in theory and 
practice, concern, first, the nature of the relationship between a society and the legal 
rules that operate within it, and, second, the forces that cause law to change.81 
One of the unique contributions of this research from a theoretical perspective is the work it 
does to apply international relations theories and methodologies to analyse legal change.82   
Traditional legal research takes a doctrinal approach, using case law, legislation, and 
academic analysis to explore how the law changes.  These approaches tend to use a natural 
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law,83 positivist,84 or legal realist85 framework.  These frameworks view legal change as an 
internal process.   Laws are changed through a social, democratic, institutionalised process.86  
This thesis takes a different approach, focussing on the role of non-state actors and external 
influences in changing law.  Legal change is situated as an external process, capitalising on 
the interdisciplinarity central to this work. Of note, a sub-study of this thesis (in the process 
of being published elsewhere) explores whether these external forces fall within a 
Habermasian ‘utopia’ which focusses on the voices of the many, or a Sunstein ‘echo 
chamber’, where the voices of the many are silenced by the elite few.87 
Additionally, this research takes a non-linear, non-binary theoretical approach to exploring 
legal change.  Many traditional legal scholars adopt an evolutionary view of legal change, 
tracing how laws reflect society, and, as societies move through evolutionary processes, so 
does the law.88  Law is an expression of ‘collective conscience’ which, based in an 
anthropological understanding of humans, changes.89  These theories, though not without 
modern critique, echoed a directional legacy throughout theories of legal change.  Legal 
change in this approach is seen as a linear process.  The spiral model, though attempting to 
change two-dimensional thinking to three-dimensional thinking, is still critiqued for its uni-
directionality and overly simplistic understanding of legal change.90  Although the authors 
recognise that the relationship between norms, identities, and interests are not one-directional, 
the movement towards legal change specified in the model is.  There are a series of binary 
relationships, such as ‘from above’ and ‘from below’ which fail to acknowledge many 
realities of the processes of legal change.91  This thesis rejects the linear, binary approach to 
understanding legal change and explores the critique of the spiral model for its uni-
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directionality, drawing down from international relations theories and sociological 
approaches.  These concepts are explored more fully in Chapter 8 of this thesis.     
Finally, legal change is traditionally distilled down to pure legislative or case law analysis.  
While this is an important aspect of what is deemed ‘legal’, it is just one small part of the 
overall landscape of law which affects individuals in their everyday life.  ‘Law’ includes a 
wider range of indicators, not just hard law written into legislation or treaties.  One of the 
unique contributions of this research is the wide definition and exploration of ‘legal change’, 
encompassing not just the law as it is written, but the law as it is institutionalised and 
implemented.  Goodale and Engle-Merry have undertaken extensive research into this area, 
exploring how, when, where, and why normative legal change occurs.92  It is not a simple, 
uni-directional, linear process from advocacy to change, but rather a complex, nuanced, 
interconnected back and forth.  This research therefore applies the spiral model as a theory of 
legal change, whilst recognising some of its shortcomings through a critical approach.  Legal 
change is analysed based on the work of external forces, as opposed to traditional internal 
analysis, at the same time rejecting the conventional linear, binary, and uni-directional 
approaches.  
Criticisms of the Spiral Model 
 
Evan Shor provides a blunt but accurate overview of the critiques of the spiral model: it is 
‘too crude, deterministic, and holds a somewhat naively optimistic view.’93  An in-depth 
survey of scholarship testing and critiquing the spiral model resulted in the identification of 
five primary categories of broadly agreed upon weaknesses:  1) an over-emphasis of 
international (Western) actors coupled with a lack of recognition of the power of domestic 
actors, 2) ignoring the risk of government backlash against foreign involvement, particularly 
of a Western nature, 3) a general problem of progression, where many states do not move 
through to the final phases of the model (without recognition in the model of this problem), 
4) although there are some scope conditions present in the model’s description, these 
conditions do not give adequate treatment to domestic capacity, and, finally 5) the model’s 
reliance on naming and shaming without seriously taking into account the role of other 
incentives (i.e. material).  These critiques, coupled with the critiques of social media, are the 
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cornerstones of this thesis, informing the choice of variables used to test the utility of 
international Twitter-driven campaigns for domestic human rights change.  This chapter 
therefore culminates in the production of a ‘research map’ which matches the spiral model 
critiques to the identified risks of campaigning via social media and the media effects 
literature.  This research map is re-visited throughout the thesis to frame, understand, and 
interpret results.   
Domestic actors 
 
Many scholars and studies focus on the spiral model’s lack of prioritisation of domestic 
factors.  Munoz’s work in Mexico found that the work of transnational groups was equalled 
by the work of domestic groups, and it was this combination that led to positive change, more 
so than had the TANs dominated change as specified by the spiral model.94  Encarnacion 
applied the spiral model to the gay rights’ movement in Argentina, and came to the 
conclusion that it was the work of the domestic movement that was critical to change.95  
Another interesting perspective was presented in Cheng’s work, where she found that human 
rights change was achieved in Taiwan, but this meant that the Taiwanese people had to adopt 
Western norms and approaches which were not conducive or reflective of domestic culture or 
desires.96  In the Israeli context, despite the theoretical applicability of the model, long term 
change was not achieved in part because the work was supported by domestic activists, but 
not by the broader domestic citizenry.97  Cizre identified similar problems in the Turkish 
context whereby the intervention of TANs resulted in domestic NGO dependency on foreign 
funding, which alienated them from the wider society.98  In her work examining the model in 
Colombia, Brysk finds that the nature of the violations meant that the government was able to 
effectively silence the voice of international actors, that the presence of TANs may have 
increased the violence, and indeed that the human rights norms in question needed to be 
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broadly accepted by domestic society on the whole, not just activist groups.99  The 
combination of these elements in the Colombian context meant that human rights change was 
not possible.   
Domestic regime is also potentially underspecified in the spiral model.  Both Schwartz and 
Heo find that domestic regime change was the most critical component in achieving change, 
not the role of TANs.100  Schwartz in particular criticises the model for having, essentially, 
just one independent variable – the involvement of TANs.  He finds that, in reality, the 
process is much more dynamic and domestically driven.  Similarly, Chase tested the model’s 
applicability in Yemen, and found that the lack of recognition of the importance and 
influence of domestic actors, both government, activist, and non-activist, may explain the 
lack of human rights change.101   Although she still found that, broadly, the model is largely 
proven by quantitative studies, Simmons also presents similar critiques in her review.102 
Although the spiral model carves important space for domestic civil society, the crux of the 
model is the strong-arm intervention from international actors.  As can be seen in the 
visualisation of the model, almost all of the specified change comes from the actions and 
influence of international voices.  This runs the risk of returning to the now-rejected ‘victim 
saviour’ dichotomy, where TANs and other international actors must come ‘to the rescue’ 
and use their power and clout to pressure domestic governments to change.103  While this 
pressure is necessary, it is not both sufficient and necessary.  Rather, these critiques find that 
it is the domestic drive and voice which are the cornerstones of change.  Although there may 
be a place for TANs to exert pressure, this pressure must stem from domestic roots and must 
reflect the voice of the people who will be most affected by any change, or lack thereof.    
This thesis focusses heavily on the risks inherent in over-reliance on foreign pressure.  One of 
the main concerns is that change will not occur if domestic actors, structures, and voices are 
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not central to a campaign.  Just as critics find that the spiral model may not ‘work’ without a 
stronger focus on domestic factors, hashtag campaigns which are driven by foreign actors and 
voices may not achieve the desired change.  This thesis empirically explores this risk. 
Target Government Backlash 
Stemming from the potential under-specification of the role of domestic actors, a similar 
critique finds that the over-reliance on foreign actors runs the very real risk of domestic 
government backlash.  Goodman and Jinks generally find that the model is part of a dynamic 
process and does indeed lead to predictions about the nature of human rights change, 
however they also discuss the model’s lack of attention to potential backlash.104  Similarly, 
Jetschke and Liese also broadly uphold the model, but raise concerns over the model’s ability 
to open the door to government counter-framing of issues.105  Sikkink applies the spiral model 
in the US setting in the 2013 revisit, and again although her research applies to more 
authoritarian governments, she finds that backlash in the US context was damaging to the 
process.106  Returning to her study in Colombia, Brysk notes that the involvement of 
international actors may have fuelled some of the human rights violations carried out by the 
state, particularly in the government’s use of violence against both domestic and foreign 
actors.107  Though not directly seen in his work in Argentina, Encarnacion highlighted how 
many other Latin American countries purposefully rejected gay rights as a Western, 
American ideal which derailed any domestic movement.108  
Particularly as Western bias and influence appears to become less and less palatable to non-
Western countries, the sustained international involvement specified by the model runs the 
risk of sparking domestic regressive backlash.  Governments have been seen to purposefully 
and intentionally act out in response to the ‘foreign meddling’ in domestic affairs.  Without 
due accord to the position and voice of domestic actors, the spiral model not only overlooks 
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but indeed paves the way for this kind of backlash which can have devastating long-term 
effects. 
This risk builds upon the previous section.  Not only does the over-emphasis on foreign 
actors run the risk of lack of change, it can also in effect make things worse than before.  
Particularly in social media, which tends to be seen as a Western tool (and statistically 
remains so109), the possibility of government backlash is exacerbated.  With the organic, user-
driven, and at times uncontrollable nature of social media, messaging is harder to temper to 
reduce the risk of government backlash.  If a domestic government perceives a Twitter-driven 
campaign more as ‘meddling’ and less as ‘advocating’ there is a real potential for backlash in 
many different, and unpredictable, forms.  This thesis analyses empirical evidence to 
investigate how target governments react to international Twitter-driven campaigns 
advocating for domestic legal change.   
Lack of progression 
In his study in Saudi Arabia, Alhargan found that the model was an excellent representation 
of the first three phases, but that it deviated when progressing beyond tactical concessions.110 
Jetscke and Liese in their work also find issues with progression.111  Again, they find that the 
first three phases hold true, but phases four and five can be problematic.  Brysk in another 
study on sexual politics found that there was a stalling effect between commitment and 
compliance.112  Shor not only found a lack of progression as problematic, but indeed 
identified countries which in fact regressed.  He therefore takes issue with the uni-
directionality of the model introduced above in addition to the potential for lack of 
progression.113 
At many points in the development of the spiral model, the researchers tracked a government 
through to Phase Four and concluded that, with time, the government would indeed move 
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into Phase Five.114  Additionally, in some cases the establishment of Phase Five has been less 
than thorough.  Governments are considered to have institutionalised said norms if they ‘talk 
the talk’ but we do not truly know if they ‘walk the walk’.115  In other words, true 
institutionalisation needs to be measured and examined much more specifically.  Too many 
times, governments dipped their toes in the metaphorical water of human rights norms but 
then failed to fully institutionalise the normative change which would positively affect 
domestic civil society.   
If campaigns at times struggle to move governments from prescriptive status through to rule-
consistent behaviour, the fickle and capricious nature of social media then becomes an area of 
significant concern.  In the simplest of terms, if a campaign that is strategically and 
hierarchically managed and operated fails to institutionalise human rights norms, how could a 
social media campaign, moving quickly and passing in and out of public attention, possibly 
be successful in instituting long-term meaningful change?  Again, this thesis uses empirical 
evidence from Twitter-driven campaigns to provide some insight into this question.   
Domestic Capacity 
Domestic capacity has also been examined as a potential weakness in the spiral model.  
Borzel and Risse explore the applicability and utility of the model in limited statehood 
contexts.  They find that the model is still relevant, but with less impact on a government 
with limited capacity.116  Of note, their work points out that the model only really has two 
options for governments: deliberate non-compliance or compliance.  There is no scope in the 
model for non-compliance not due to deliberate state decisions.  Goldsmith and Krasner come 
to a similar conclusion about the model ignoring national capabilities.117  Shor’s exploration is 
equally fascinating, where he finds that the model does not leave any room for security 
threats or differentiation of domestic practices.  This lack of accommodation for domestic 
capacity issues, either due to potential conflict or differing practices, renders the model 
problematic in his view.118 
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Although the second incarnation of the model attempted to address some of the capacity 
criticisms, it still remains a weak point.119  The model does not appropriately accommodate 
the practicalities of domestic government capacities.  In other words, there are cases where 
the government, for lack of a better word, wants to change but lacks the capacity to do so.  
Capacity may be infrastructure related or power related, but either way the government is in a 
position where it cannot progress through the model.  The model does not allow for this kind 
of ‘deviation’ where domestic capacity becomes a significant variable which impacts on final 
outcomes.  
International Twitter-driven campaigns are even less likely to be able to accommodate for 
domestic capacity.  Governments are targeted by social media users with little to no 
knowledge of the ability to implement change.  The pseudo-mob mentality on social media 
does not stop to think about whether change is even possible before demanding domestic 
change.  Again, this risk is potentially exacerbated if the campaign is foreign-driven.  If 
domestic capacity does indeed dictate whether a campaign will be successful or not, a 
Twitter-driven campaign could face even greater challenges. 
Incentives 
 
Krebs and Jackson present a strong argument that, when it comes to governments instituting 
change, persuasion alone usually is not enough.120  Linde’s work applying the model to the 
Czech Republic found that, while reputational damage did play a critical role given the 
political environment and timing, in reality economics played more important part than 
persuasion alone.121  When looking at corruption in Kenya, Bachelard found that not only did 
the spiral model not take account of material incentives for positive change, but in fact did 
not take account of the possible role of material incentives for not changing, particularly in a 
context dealing with corruption.122  Similarly, Goldsmith and Krasner also highlight the 
potential role of material interests which are not accounted for in the model.123  Snyder and 
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Vinjamuri also discuss the need for both carrot and stick in the institutionalisation of change, 
something which the model does not fully address.124 
The current model discounts and ignores the very real importance of incentives other than 
reputational damage.  Rather than building the role of incentives into the model, the model 
chooses to ignore this aspect. For example, some of the case studies did indeed show that 
incentives, in the end, were part of the movement towards rule consistent behaviour, but the 
model instead seems to place causality on the sustained pressure from international actors and 
TANs.125 
International Twitter-driven campaigns will rely almost exclusively on reputational harm and 
naming and shaming as incentives for change.  This kind of pressure, while certainly useful, 
may not rise to the level necessary to institute long-term, meaningful domestic change.  This 
thesis will study the level of personal ‘risk’ in these campaigns as a way to assess how 
powerful the incentives for governments to change are.   
The Role of Social Media 
 
Similar to the critiques of the spiral model, this chapter now turns to a critical approach to 
understanding the role of social media in activism and campaigning for women’s rights.  
Here, it is useful to draw analogies to the literature on media effects, the ‘CNN effect’, and 
the role of the media in agenda setting.126  These theories (and the debates within) explore the 
role of the media in influencing public opinion and political agendas.  A visual model can be 
used to situate this thesis within the media effects literature: 
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Figure 2.2: Situating within the media effects literature 
 
 
Each arrow represents an aspect of the media effects literature, indicating influence (the 
dotted lines are indirect forms of influence).  The right-hand side of the figure represents, 
primarily, the majority of the media effects literature.127  The left-hand side is an emerging 
area of research, cutting across many disciplines.  This study looks to explore the strength, 
effectiveness, and, to some extent, the directionality of the arrows primarily on the left-hand 
side.  The focus of this thesis, in this initial research at least, is on the relationships between 
social media and the government, via individual users.  Some researchers go so far as to see 
this as a bypassing effect: ‘significant communicative acts with political and social effects 
bypass states and traditional media alike.’128  Although this is an overly simplistic view 
which looks at the micro and macro level as distinct, the reality is that these lines are blurred 
and there are both individual level and societal level effects.129   
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In essence, the media effects literature shows that the media have an impact on public 
opinion, and that public opinion does then sway political agenda setting and government 
actions, as well as potential changes of regimes through elections (with a definite Western 
focus on liberal democracies).  Social media and traditional media have a burgeoning 
relationship of influence, best conceptualised as cyclical in nature.  Traditional media is now 
influenced by social media as much as the reverse.130  As described by Livingston: 
Today, digital media are interactive and the distinction between producer and 
consumer is blurred.  As a result, content is often caught up in a recursive process of 
saliency reinforcement by both new media, such as Twitter and YouTube, and 
traditional media, such as CNN.131 
 
A media effects framework helps to conceptualise some of the macro level questions this 
thesis seeks to address: what effect does social media have on individuals?  Does it influence 
their decision to participate in the campaign at a population level (in terms of the population 
of the campaign)?  How does the media affect the manner in which they participate (i.e. do 
they reply, do they retweet, do they write their own original Tweet?)  Is there an impact on 
how often they engage with the campaign?  The answers to these questions then have an 
additional cyclical effect by feeding into the social media campaign and altering the influence 
at individual level.  As social media is user-driven, there is a bi-directionality of influence 
that continues, changes, and flows over time.  This research certainly does not purport to 
answer all of these questions, but it is firmly situated in the knowledge that the relationships 
of influence and effect are a complex interwoven web. Castells explains this as a 
‘multimodal’ system, both ‘synchronous and asynchronous.’132  Perloff presents a thoroughly 
visceral picture of the interactions: ‘a complex, labyrinth-like area in which perceptions 
become reality, reality is enshrouded by perceptions, and perceptions hinge on the very 
important factor of whether you are considering the media’s impact on other people or 
yourself.’133  Although outside the scope of this thesis, there is also a vibrant debate about the 
potential homogenising effect of social media, creating echo chambers of influence.134 
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This research explores five specific risk areas identified in social media campaigning: the 
elite-driven nature of the media, the organic, and potentially chaotic, approach to framing, the 
proven ‘fickleness’ of trends and campaigns on social media, the potential for a damaging 
lack of knowledge and understanding of the domestic situation from foreign online 
campaigners, and the perception of domestic governments of the lack of risk and investment 
from (foreign) online campaign participants.135 
 
Elite-driven 
It is well established that communication has a ‘fundamental’ relationship with power 
structures.136  Social media is driven, shaped, and built by a global elite which tend not to 
reflect non-Western values.137  Although there is (and definitely was) some argument that 
social media is potentially less elite-driven than traditional media,138 current approaches 
recognise the continued power imbalances even in new digital media.  The very code which 
operationalises the platforms comes from a Western, capitalist, predominantly white male 
world, laden with unconscious (and perhaps conscious) bias.  Using these platforms to 
address issues affecting non-white women in non-Western countries seems a paradox which 
is hard to accept.  This is compounded by the algorithms and filter bubbles which are meant 
to personalise or even monetise the user experience, leading to ‘echo chambers’ which may 
be closed to non-dominant discourse.139  This is a huge risk when campaigning online.   
Additionally, as evidenced by the statistics presented in Chapter 1 of this thesis, social media 
still tends to be dominated by users from the Global North.140  In this study, despite efforts to 
 
135 Reilly Dempsey Willis and Benjamin Mason Meier, ‘Framing the Position of Social Media in the Local 
Institutionalization of International Human Rights Norms’ in Thorsten Bonacker, Judith von Heusinger and 
Kerstin Zimmer (eds), Localization in Development Aid: How Global Institutions enter Local Lifeworlds 
(Routledge 2017). 
136 Castells, ‘Communication, Power and Counter-Power in the Network Society’ (n 126) 238; See also Manuel 
Castells, Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age (Second edition, Polity Press 
2015). 
137 Chrysi Dagoula, ‘Mapping Political Discussions on Twitter: Where the Elites Remain Elites’ (2019) 7 Media 
and Communication 225; Sebastian Stier, Wolf J Schünemann and Stefan Steiger, ‘Of Activists and 
Gatekeepers: Temporal and Structural Properties of Policy Networks on Twitter’ (2018) 20 New Media & 
Society 1910; Kate Ott, ‘Social Media and Feminist Values: Aligned or Maligned?’ (2018) 39 Frontiers: A 
Journal of Women Studies 93; Grant Blank, ‘The Digital Divide Among Twitter Users and Its Implications for 
Social Research’ (2017) 35 Social Science Computer Review 679. 
138 For a discussion on the elite-driven nature of traditional media, see, e.g. Piers Robinson (n 127) 303–4; For a 
discussion on the potential of social media for non-dominant discourse, see, e.g. Castells, ‘Communication, 
Power and Counter-Power in the Network Society’ (n 126). 
139 Willis, Reilly Dempsey (n 87). 
140 ‘Digital in 2018: World’s Internet Users Pass the 4 Billion Mark’ (n 109). 
Chapter 2: Research Framework 
41 
 
identify and analyse a campaign targeting a domestic law in the Global North, the vast 
majority of hashtag campaigns target countries in the Global South.  Ireland (#repealthe8th) 
is in the Global North but was excluded from the final study as it was not as driven by 
Twitter as the other campaigns were.  Argentina is arguably a ‘Global North’/ Western/ 
developed country and is the only campaign in this study where the target government is not 
in the Global South.  Therefore, there is indirect evidence suggesting that many international 
Twitter driven campaigns continue to target countries in the Global South.  Viewed in light of 
the critique of the spiral model that it under-emphasises the role of domestic actors and 
domestic voices, looking at social media campaigns this is likely to be of even more concern.  
With social media dominated by users from the Global North, and campaigns targeting 
countries in the Global South, the likelihood of domestic users and voices being ‘drowned 
out’ by foreign influence is high.  Equally, the platforms are designed in an elite-driven way 
which reduces the likelihood of non-Western, non-elite voices gaining visibility.   
Social media is organic and chaotic 
By definition, social media is ‘social’ because content is user-driven (though see discussion 
on the underlying algorithms and filter bubble which act as gatekeepers for some messages to 
emerge and others to die off – not all users have equal access).141  ‘Messaging is organic, 
created and promulgated by users’, and likely to be a sub-section of elite users at that.142  
According to Castells, ‘it is self-generated in content, self-directed in emission, and self-
selected in reception by many that communicate with many.’143  No longer do the knowledge 
based hierarchies of advocacy networks or the expertise levels of epistemic communities 
apply; rather an elite-hierarchy which is unmanaged dictates the rules.144  This does not mean 
that there is no scope for organisationally driven framing, but there are no guarantees that 
users will carry the messaging as set out by formal advocacy networks.145  Therefore there is 
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little control over the messaging which will dominate the campaigns or ‘earn’ visibility 
through the platforms themselves.   
The ‘noisiness’ of a multitude of competing frames is also identified as problematic in the 
media effects literature.146  There is little control over how messaging evolves, changes, or 
fluctuates over time.  As stated by a feminist writing about the #delhigangrape campaign: 
‘[f]eminist voices have been a part of these projects, but the chorus of slogans made it 
difficult to decipher who was saying what.’147  This differs significantly from the more 
traditional work of transnational advocacy networks where framing and messaging is 
carefully and strategically constructed and crafted to suit particular purposes.  Constructed 
messaging is, ideally, sensitive to domestic context and reflective of domestic society.  
Organic and potentially elite-driven social media messaging, which can be retweeted 
thousands of times, is user-generated and may not reflect those strategic choices or 
sensitivities.  As Joseph writes, ‘social media can also spread bad ideas and content just as it 
can spread good ideas and content.’148  Another area of concern is the ability of counter-
narratives or repressive regimes to co-opt or thwart an advocacy campaign.149   
‘Fickleness’ of social media 
Social media campaigns could potentially lack persistence, coming and going faster than 
meaningful change demands.  This risk draws down from the ‘CNN effect’, a theory which 
holds that the speed of the spread of news with modern technology has a potential ‘policy 
forcing’ effect on decision makers.150  According to Gilboa,  this effect can mean that ‘media 
pressure on reluctant governments are most likely to result in minimalist policies aimed at 
defusing pressure for interventions on the ground.’151  Governments can no longer make 
carefully considered decisions, but rather are forced to respond with almost immediate effect, 
sometimes to reports that are ill-founded or lacking in evidence.152  The media effects 
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literature identified this as problematic simply when television became more connected via 
satellite feeds; this effect when mapped onto social media is likely to increase.     
Media effects studies also highlight the so-called ‘sleeper effect’, whereby the influence of 
the media on individuals may not manifest for quite some time.153  With the speed at which 
social media moves, this sleeper effect could problematise the long-term potential of the 
influence.  Hashtags which are trending today may not trend next week or may not even be 
around next month.  Research has shown that the average lifespan of a Tweet, including 
Retweets, is just 18 minutes.154  Social media experts recommend that campaigns for business 
or marketing last between 45 days and nine months.155  Using these metrics as indicators of 
users’ general social media attention span, this indicates that hashtag campaigns are at risk of 
being relatively short-lived.  If longevity is a concern of advocacy campaigns under the spiral 
model, then campaigns on social media are even more uncertain to progress through to rule 
consistent behaviour.  In her work on exploring the use of social media in Iran after the 2009 
elections, Naghibi found that the Iranian protests dominated North American media – until 
the death of Michael Jackson.156  Western attention cared about the Iranian protests, but only 
until the King of Pop overdosed.  Additionally, information spreads quickly, including 
erroneous or false Tweets.157  In fact, the pace of social media has even been characterised as 
‘dangerous’ to international law, in direct conflict with the slow and methodical pace of 
international justice.158 
 
153 Perse and Lambe (n 129). 
154 ‘When Is My Tweet’s Prime of Life? (A Brief Statistical Interlude.)’ (Moz) <https://moz.com/blog/when-is-
my-tweets-prime-of-life> accessed 10 December 2018; ‘The Life Span of a Tweet: Why Fast Isn’t Fast Enough 
in a Crisis’ (Stanton Communication, 16 March 2017) <https://stantoncomm.com/life-span-tweet> accessed 10 
December 2018. 
155 ‘Multi-Channel Marketing: How Long Should Campaigns Last?’ (Technology TherapyTM Group, 12 January 
2015) <https://technologytherapy.com/long-multi-channel-advertising-campaigns-last/> accessed 10 December 
2018; ‘How Long Does a Typical Social Media Campaign Last?’ (Ignite Social Media - The original social 
media agency, 7 February 2008) <https://www.ignitesocialmedia.com/lifestyle/how-long-does-a-typical-social-
media-campaign-last/> accessed 10 December 2018. 
156 Nima Naghibi, ‘Diasporic Disclosures: Social Networking, NEDA, and the 2009 Iranian Presidential 
Elections’ (2011) 34 Biography 56. 
157 Joseph (n 141); ‘Bring Back Our Girls: Boko Haram Should Be Scared of a Hashtag’ The Independent (13 
May 2014) <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/the-bring-back-our-girls-campaign-is-working-
boko-haram-should-be-scared-of-a-hashtag-9360830.html> accessed 11 December 2018. 
158 Marta Poblet and Jonathan Kolieb, ‘Responding to Human Rights Abuses in the Digital Era: New Tools, Old 
Challenges’ (2018) 54 Stanford Journal of International Law 259. 
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Lack of knowledge of the domestic context or voice 
Somewhat derivative of the first social media risk outlined in this section, with many hashtag 
users likely being foreign there is a major concern that individuals are campaigning blindly, 
without any knowledge of the domestic context, voice, or desires.  Research has shown that 
the vast majority of social media activity is in ‘entertainment’; this could blur the lines 
between serious advocacy campaigns and personal desires for online identity creation.159  One 
researcher has even gone so far as to refer to social media activism as a ‘narcissistic 
compulsion to self-disclose.’160  A powerful quote on this topic comes from a commentary on 
the #bringbackourgirls campaign:  
The dualistic construction of women as worthy of political recognition due to 
their relationship to a more privileged agent [comparing the girls to Obama’s 
daughters] works powerfully in the age of hashtag activism through its ability to 
draw emotional response and impassioned reaction from a non-contiguous and 
apathetic populous...The enthusiastic Western adoption of #BringBackOurGirls 
must also be treated skeptically for its failure to consider its own imperial 
dynamics.161 
It is highly unlikely that every individual who adds their voice to an international Twitter-
driven campaign will have background knowledge or understanding of the issue from the 
domestic perspective.  Scholars have been raising concerns about the role of transnational 
advocacy networks in domestic human rights issues for many years. 162  Coupled with the 
statistics presented earlier, there is a significant risk that the majority of those participating in 
a hashtag campaign will have little knowledge of the domestic situation.  This runs several 
advocacy risks, two of which are of significant relevance to this research.  First and foremost, 
this ‘foreign’ influence, if not reflective or respective of domestic factors, could lead to 
government backlash.  As this is a critique of the spiral model, again the risk is likely 
 
159 Schwarz (n 144). 
160 Naghibi (n 156) 59. 
161 Meredith Loken, ‘#BringBackOurGirls and the Invisibility of Imperialism’ (2014) 14 Feminist Media 
Studies 1100. 
162 Srilatha Batliwala, ‘Grassroots Movements as Transnational Actors: Implications for Global Civil Society’ 
(2002) 13 VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary & Nonprofit Organizations 393; Lilie Chouliaraki, 
‘Post-Humanitarianism Humanitarian Communication beyond a Politics of Pity’ (2010) 13 International Journal 
of Cultural Studies 107; Stuart Garman, ‘New Communications Technologies in Emergencies’ in Roger 
MacGinty and Jenny H Peterson (eds), The Routledge Companion to Humanitarian Action (Routledge 2015); 
Cross (n 63). 
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heightened in social media campaigns.  Second, there is a risk of off-point messaging which 
is not what women and girls living in the target country actually want.  This is why it is a 
golden rule of advocacy to ensure that those affected by decisions are involved in decisions 
(the right to participation).  Given the removed nature of social media, with the typical user 
profile, it is likely that hashtag campaign participants simply do not know enough about the 
domestic situation, context, or voice to accurately and effectively campaign for change.  
There is a significant risk that messaging, organically emerging from Twitter users, could be 
off-point or even antithetical to the needs of domestic women and girls.  Scholars have 
critiqued the spiral model for not having enough sensitivities to the domestic context; once 
again this critique is potentially amplified when looking at social media campaigns.   
No ‘risk’ to campaign participants 
One of the main tenets of the slactivist literature is that true activism is rooted in the personal 
risk that activists take when participating in a campaign – arrest, losing a job, marking their 
identity, even potential physical harm.163  Gladwell makes this eminently clear when he writes 
‘Facebook activism succeeds not by motivating people to make a real sacrifice but by 
motivating them to do the things people do when they’re not motivated enough to make a real 
sacrifice.’164   This personal risk or sacrifice, in traditional campaigning, underscores to the 
governments how important the issue is to voting citizens.165  From a feminist perspective, 
there is also something particularly important about using the physical female body in acts of 
protest.166  Although there is extensive research exploring how ‘collective identity’ and 
community building can be achieved in protest movements on social media and how this may 
translate into some offline political activity,167 the efficacy of this new kind of protest is 
 
163 Gladwell (n 144); Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani, Social Movements: An Introduction (2nd edn, 
Blackwell Publishing 2006). 
164 Gladwell (n 144). 
165 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics (Cambridge 
University Press 1994); Joel Penney, ‘Social Media and Symbolic Action: Exploring Participation in the 
Facebook Red Equal Sign Profile Picture Campaign’ (2015) 20 Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 
52. 
166 Karina Eileraas, ‘Sex(t)Ing Revolution, Femen-Izing the Public Square: Aliaa Magda Elmahdy, Nude 
Protest, and Transnational Feminist Body Politics’ (2014) 40 Signs 40. 
167 Manuel Castells, Networks of Outrage and Hope : Social Movements in the Internet Age (Cambridge, UK ; 
Malden, MA : Polity Press, 2015 2015); Paolo Gerbaudo, Tweets and the Streets. Social Media and 
Contemporary Activism (London : Pluto Press, 2012 2012); Paolo Gerbaudo and Emiliano Treré, ‘In Search of 
the “We” of Social Media Activism: Introduction to the Special Issue on Social Media and Protest Identities’ 
(2015) 18 Information, Communication & Society 865; Stefania Milan, ‘From Social Movements to Cloud 
Protesting: The Evolution of Collective Identity’ (2015) 18 Information, Communication & Society 887. 
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contested.168  The disruption caused by social media protests are, arguably, less damaging to 
domestic governments.169   
Leading scholars have shown that online collective identity is more likely in networks which 
extend outside of the virtual environment; in other words online networks are more 
successful if they are an extension of face to face networks.170  This network potential is 
likely to be lost in transnational campaigns, given the international nature of the participants’ 
locations.  Although for some there is risk even in participating in online campaigning, for 
many there is no real risk. 171  This lack of risk translates into a lack of incentive for the 
domestic government to change.  The only incentive for governments to change is the naming 
and shaming pressure, which may extend from social media into traditional media.  However, 
as critics of the spiral model point out, other incentives may be necessary to truly push a 
domestic government to change.  The lack of risk and associated incentives in social media 
campaigns may simply not rise to the level necessary to see long term, meaningful, 
institutionalised change.  When researching the impact of social media on an early campaign, 
Save Darfur, the researchers found that: 
Considering the extraordinary size of this movement (1.2 million members), the 
influence and accessibility of the world’s largest social medium (Facebook), and 
the moral urgency of the social issue at stake (genocide), the amount and quality 
of activism that resulted from the myriad online interactions among Cause 
members were extraordinarily modest.172 
Critique Mapping 
The crux of this work is to match these critiques of the spiral model to risks inherent in social 
media campaigning, thus providing a sound theoretical basis for the empirical work.     
 
168 Schwarz (n 144); Maria Bakardjieva, ‘Do Clouds Have Politics? Collective Actors in Social Media Land’ 
(2015) 18 Information, Communication & Society 983. 
169 Della Porta and Diani (n 163); Cammaerts (n 141). 
170 Bond and others, ‘A 61-Million-Person Experiment in Social Influence and Political Mobilization’ (2012) 
489 Nature 295; Schwarz (n 144). 
171 Malcolm Gladwell and Clay Shirky, ‘From Innovation to Revolution: Do Social Media Make Protests 
Possible?’ (2011) 90 Foreign Affairs 153; Gladwell (n 144); Della Porta and Diani (n 163). 
172 Kevin Lewis, Kurt Gray and Jens Meierhenrich, ‘The Structure of Online Activism’ [2014] Sociological 
Science 1, 4. 
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Table 2.1: Linking Spiral Model Critiques to Social Media Risks 
Theoretical 
grounding 
Social media risk Link 
Lack of focus on 
domestic 
actors/overemphasis on 
Western approaches 
Social media is elite-
driven and non-
neutral; campaigns 
may be dominated 
and/or driven by elite 
international actors 
If there is concern that traditional 
advocacy campaigns may place too much 
emphasis on the role of 
transnational/Western actors, this risk is 
greater in a social media environment 
where campaigns are more likely to be 
dominated and/or driven by 
foreign/Western elite participants. 
Potential government 
backlash 
Social media is 
organic and chaotic 
by nature, with little 
to no control or 
organisation 
tempering messages 
to governments 
The lack of ability to manage the 
messaging means that campaigns may be 
framed in a way which unintentionally or 
inadvertently sparks government 
backlash. 
Lack of long-term 
progression 
Social media 
campaigns seem to or 
could potentially lack 
persistence, coming 
and going faster than 
meaningful change 
demands 
The short attention span of social media 
may not give campaigns long enough to 
properly effect long-term, meaningful, 
institutionalised change – even more so 
than traditional campaigns. 
Ignores domestic 
capacity issues 
Campaigns tend to 
virally take off 
without much 
knowledge of the 
domestic situation 
Without knowledge of the domestic 
situation, Twitter campaigns may be 
asking for changes which the domestic 
government is not in a position to make.  
This concern was relevant to traditional 
campaigns with much more organisation 
and knowledge; the nature of social 
media campaign participants raises even 
more concern about the lack of 
knowledge of the domestic government’s 
capacity to institute change. 
Ignores material or 
nuanced incentives 
Social media 
campaigns do not 
present many 
incentives for 
governments to 
change as users do 
not put themselves at 
risk or have a stake 
in outcomes 
If there were concerns that pure naming 
and shaming incentives were not enough 
to explain domestic government changes 
as per the spiral model, social media 
presents even less incentive for 
governments to change.   
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This map provides an overview of the research framework for this thesis and will be used at 
several points throughout to ensure clarity and focus.  This is the ‘golden thread’ of the work. 
Methodological Framework 
 
Research questions 
With this theoretical grounding, this research therefore sets out to answer the following 
questions: 
3. Can international campaigns originating in and driven by Twitter contribute to 
domestic legal change in women’s rights? 
4. If so, which campaign behaviours are associated with change? 
Overall design 
Several different methodological approaches were explored in the early stages of research.  
The first approach considered was to attempt to find matched case studies, with one being 
driven by online activities and one driven by traditional offline activities.  The campaign 
outcomes would then be quantified and compared, to identify differences in legal changes.  
After extensive thought, discussion, and even colloquium presentations, it was decided that, 
before comparing ‘apples’ (social media campaigns) to ‘oranges’ (offline campaigns), it was 
necessary to develop an in-depth understanding of the ‘apples’ on their own.  This approach, 
exploring online campaigns first, then leaves the door open for future work to move to a 
comparative approach between online and offline campaigns.   
Another approach which in the end was discarded was the inclusion of stakeholder 
interviews.  This would have been much more relevant had the comparative approach 
described above been adopted.  Stakeholder interviews could have helped to clarify campaign 
goals, challenges, and perhaps outcomes.  However, again, it was decided that this first stage 
research was best focussed on the campaigns themselves and the development of an in-depth 
baseline understanding of the campaign behaviours, uninfluenced by stakeholder perceptions.  
Equally, with online campaigns there is a risk in exercising researcher bias in identifying 
campaign organisers.  The campaigns are, by definition, organically driven.  Choosing 
‘organisers’ may have provided potentially misleading or biased data.  Stakeholder interviews 
may be appropriate in future research, when moving to a comparative process.   
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It has also been suggested to undertake a traditional media analysis to explore the relationship 
between the social media messaging and activities and those of traditional media, again 
stemming from the media effects theories.  This would help to explain just how ‘organic’ and 
individual-driven the framing and messaging of the campaigns were, compared to how the 
campaign was framed on non-social media.  Mapping the interaction of non-social media 
with social media in these campaigns could provide additional useful insight.  Again, this was 
deemed to be something to explore in future iterations of the research, adding too much to 
this initial study. 
Theoretically, the research has also undergone changes in approach which influenced the 
methodological choices.  The initial approach was not critical of the spiral model, but rather 
relied solely on the risks inherent in using social media and the non-neutrality of the 
platforms.  After significant time spent with current literature on the spiral model, the 
theoretical approach completely shifted to taking this critical perspective on the spiral model.  
At first, the critical approach was underscored by Moravcsik’s liberal theories.173  In fact, the 
first full draft of the thesis included significant work using Moravcsik’s theories to critique 
the spiral model.  However, at that stage the thesis presented as confusing, trying to achieve 
too much and answer too many questions.  Again, it was decided to pare back and focus on 
one stream of research, leaving other pieces for the future.  There is every intention to engage 
in further theoretical work, drawing heavily from Moravcsik, to critique the spiral model.   
Campaign selection 
With the overarching framework and architecture built, the next and perhaps most crucial 
step in the research was the selection of hashtag campaigns.  A large-scale mapping exercise 
was undertaken to identify all possible hashtag campaigns for women’s rights.  51 campaigns 
were initially identified.  Through an iterative process, a set of distinct selection criteria was 
then developed: 
1. International attention 
2. More than 1,000 Tweets 
3. Seeking specific domestic legal change (either repealing an existing law, passing a 
new law, or implementing an existing law) in the area of women’s rights 
 
173 Moravcsik, ‘Taking Preferences Seriously’ (n 51); Moravcsik, ‘The Origins of Human Rights Regimes’ (n 
51). 
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4. Originating in, and continuing to be driven by, Twitter 
As discussed in Chapter 1 and again revisited in Chapter 8, selection criteria four was pivotal 
to the study.  These are all campaigns which ‘took off’ with a Tweet.  Some campaigning 
may have been ongoing before the original Tweet, but the campaigns did not garner 
significant attention until the hashtag campaign emerged.  Therefore, these campaigns all 
originated in and are rooted in Twitter via a hashtag.  The campaigns then all had to continue 
to be driven by Twitter.  This means that the campaigns centred on social media – they were 
referred to by the hashtag (i.e. it was not generally known as, say, Ni Una Menos, it was 
referred to as #niunamenos), activities were organised on social media, activists shared 
information and knowledge on Twitter, key messages were developed and spread via Twitter 
(though see discussion on the non-neutrality of Twitter later in this chapter), and this 
continued drive and focus on social media was clear throughout the entire lifespan of the 
campaign.  This, by no means, is to claim that there were no other campaign activities taking 
place, but rather that there is something inherently different about campaigns which originate 
in and continue to be driven by Twitter.  They are Twitter-based and Twitter-driven 
campaigns, not Twitter-only campaigns.  The role of social media in mobilising, messaging, 
and framing is different from campaigns which are not driven by Twitter.  It is this difference 
which necessitates study to help understand the role of social media driven campaigns in 
legal change.   
Of the initially identified 51 campaigns, all fit criteria one.  19 campaigns were excluded on 
criteria three, as they sought to raise awareness and dialogue, but not to change specific 
domestic law.  Eight campaigns were excluded for targeting legal change, but not in one 
specific domestic location (one of which also failed on criteria two).  Five were excluded for 
campaigning for general domestic legal change, not specific.  Four were excluded for 
focussing on individual cases and not changes in the law as a whole.  Two were excluded for 
having multiple hashtags.  This left a possible list of 13.  The target number of campaigns 
was 10, given data collection and time constraints.  Three more were excluded from the final 
list to ensure a range of geographic targets and issues in focus.  The final list of 10 is 
presented below. 
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Table 2.2: Overview of Study Campaigns 
Campaign Target 
location 
Topic Legal change sought 
#delhigangrape India Violence Against 
Women and 
Girls (‘VAWG’) 
Strengthening laws protecting 
women from sexual violence, 
including prosecutions 
#farkhunda Afghanistan VAWG Strengthening laws prosecuting 
perpetrators of violence against 
women and improving 
frontline policing to protect 
women and girls in public 
spaces 
#letwomengotostadium Iran Discrimination Call for a change to law which 
bans women from entering 
sporting stadiums to watch 
men’s volleyball 
#mydressmychoice Kenya Bodily integrity Properly implementing 
existing laws protecting 
women from violence, 
particularly in the public 
sphere 
#niunamenos Argentina VAWG, 
femicide 
Strengthening laws protecting 
women from femicide, 
including prosecutions 
#sendeanlat Turkey Rape, VAWG Strengthening laws protecting 
women from femicide, 
including prosecutions 
#stopstoning Iran VAWG/gender 
equality 
Repealing a law which calls for 
stoning as a form of capital 
punishment 
#Women2Drive Saudi 
Arabia 
Equality Lifting a ban on women 
driving 
#malala Pakistan Right to 
education 
 
Strengthening laws around 
girls’ access to education 
#notacriminal  Ireland Bodily integrity Decriminalisation of abortion 
(Details of the facts of each campaign are presented in the relevant analytical chapters.) 
During the process of data collection and initial analysis, two campaigns were excluded, 
#malala and #notacriminal.  #malala, although the largest and arguably most ‘famous’ 
campaign in the study, was excluded as the content of the Tweets significantly lost focus on 
girls’ right to education in Pakistan.  The hashtag quickly changed and became focussed on 
Malala herself as a spokesperson, activist, and role model for girls’ rights in general.  This 
therefore meant the campaign failed to meet the original selection criteria.  Initial analysis of 
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#notacriminal Tweets showed that this hashtag was subsidiary to another hashtag, 
#repealthe8th.  Tweets for #repealthe8th were then collected.  Legal data was collected for 
this campaign and it became very clear that this campaign was not driven by Twitter, but 
rather was a ‘traditional’ advocacy campaign using a multitude of tools and strategies.  
Twitter was just one.  The campaign was therefore, in the late stages of the study, excluded.  
This left eight campaigns for the final analysis.   
The exclusion of #notacriminal is particularly important, as it underscores the careful 
consideration and attention paid to ensuring that the campaigns in the study were rooted in 
and driven by Twitter.  By excluding this campaign well into the study, this shows how the 
selection criteria were rigorously, consistently, and objectively applied throughout.  This also 
shows that it is possible to clarify the differences between a campaign that is driven by 
Twitter and a campaign which merely uses Twitter. 
Variable selection 
 
Variables were selected from a dual process of identifying metrics to measure the desired 
characteristics from the research map and assessing available data.  An initial list of 25 
potential variables were identified based on the research framework only.  These were then 
compared to the data available through a matching process, resulting in a variable map 
containing 22 variables, five to measure context, 12 independent variables from Twitter data, 
and five dependent variables to measure legal change.     
Context variables were identified to ensure that country characteristics could be examined.  
Independent variable/Twitter data included the following information: date of the Tweet, 
content of the Tweet, author of the Tweet, and the number of times it was liked, retweeted, or 
replied to.  From the most 100 prolific users in each campaign, additional information was 
collected on location, profile, number of campaign Tweets, number of Tweets ever sent, and 
number of followers.  This data generated a total of 513 parameters for study. 
Finally, an initial list of five legal categories was set to measure the dependent variable of 
legal change and outcomes.  This list included hard law, soft law, budget allocation, judicial 
involvement, and UN reporting.  As the data was collected and analysed, the list was reduced 
down to four and amended: legislative change, institutionalisation (including government 
discourse, soft law, and budgets), law enforcement (to cover both police involvement and the 
courts), and UN dialogue.  These categories adequately covered the data which was available 
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while providing ample evidence for quantifying legal change.  The full list of legal variables, 
including important information on the process of quantification, is included in Appendix 1. 
Throughout the process of data collection, cleaning, and analysis, some adjustments and 
modifications were necessary.  The final variable map included eight context variables 
measured across 14 parameters, seven Twitter variables measured across 513 parameters, and 
four legal variables measured across 150-200 pieces of evidence per campaign.  The full list 
of parameters and definitions is also included in Appendix 1.   
Challenges174 
This research presented a host of methodological challenges.  Each challenge, however, also 
presented a route for improving and strengthening the research design and providing new 
levels of insight and analysis.  These challenges are briefly outlined below. 
Ethical concerns 
There are some ethical considerations when using Twitter data.  Although users certainly 
know and understand that their Tweets will remain publicly available, equally they did not 
explicitly consent to their Tweets being used in academic research.  With full cognisance of 
this conflict, this research has had ethical approval from the University of East Anglia’s 
General Research Ethics Committee.  Specific identifiers have been removed from any Tweet 
content included in the thesis, and only relevant Tweet language has been included (i.e. not 
the entire Tweet content).  While it is theoretically possible to use the information in this 
thesis to find Tweets and therefore find the profiles of the users, efforts have been made to 
minimise any risk or any ethical concerns.  Additionally, the vast majority of the analysis 
looks at macro, population-level data which also goes some way to minimising ethical 
concerns. 
Data collection 
The process of finding historical Twitter data was extremely complex.  At the time of writing 
the initial research proposal, historical Tweets were freely available via various online tools.  
However, Twitter changed the terms and conditions for accessing historical Tweets (defined 
 
174 For an in-depth discussion of the methodological challenges, see Reilly Dempsey Willis, ‘Exploring the 
Relationship between Global Twitter Campaigns and Domestic Law: Methodological Challenges and Solutions’ 
(2020) Forthcoming Information and Communications Technology Law. 
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as more than two weeks old) during the initial phases of the research.  This therefore meant 
that the data needed for the study was going to be difficult to obtain.  
Quotes were gathered for the monetized services available for purchasing bulk sets of Twitter 
data.  This was deemed to be far outside the research budget and this option was therefore 
null.  Web scraping was explored, however this option clearly violates the Twitter terms and 
conditions and was rejected on this basis.  The final option was to collect the Tweets 
manually.  This entailed using Twitter’s advanced search function and copying and pasting 
Tweets.  This is fully in line with Twitter’s terms and conditions.175  Although time and 
labour intensive, this method of data collection was chosen as the best possible option for 
collecting the data.   
In the end, this became an incredibly important process within the study.  Having the 
opportunity to scroll through all of the Tweets and thus become intimately familiar with each 
campaign positively influenced the end result analysis.  The process of manual collection 
meant that for each campaign, significant time was spent developing an understanding of 
campaign drivers, ebbs and flows of Tweets and information, images which appeared perhaps 
hundreds of times, Tweets which were retweeted regularly, the issues, topics, and even 
emotions which dominated different epochs, and an overall general impression of what was 
really happening in each campaign.  Although outside the scope of this thesis, this manual 
collection process also brought the counter-narrative phenomena to the fore.176  Seeing the 
sometimes overwhelming presence of counter-narratives or campaign co-option was a 
fascinating and indeed unexpected outcome of this data collection process.  
Translation 
Significant time, effort, and creativity went into the problem of translation.  How could a 
study that critiques the spiral model for its overemphasis on Western actors and under-
emphasis on domestic voices be valid if Tweets in the mother tongue were not analysed?  
Equally, how could a PhD thesis access the resources necessary to translate several hundred 
 
175 Twitter, ‘Developer Agreement and Policy’ <https://developer.twitter.com/en/developer-terms/agreement-
and-policy.html> accessed 15 September 2018; ‘Archiving Tweets: Reckoning with Twitter’s Policy’ (Insight 
News Lab) <http://newslab.insight-centre.org/tweetarchivingchallenges/> accessed 15 September 2018. 
176 Willis, Reilly Dempsey (n 87). 
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thousand Tweets?  This was an extraordinarily difficult barrier to overcome in the research 
design and much time was spent thinking, testing, and exploring options. 
First, it is important to note that translation only affected one area of independent variables 
(content).  Persistence, engagement, and users could be analysed without large scale 
translation.  The exploration of consistent, variable, and international norms, alongside the 
sentiment analysis, were the areas which necessitated translation.  Equally, some of the 
campaigns targeted English speaking countries; again, translation was not a concern in these 
campaigns.   
The initial, and unsatisfying, decision was that translation was simply too expensive and 
complicated.  Only English Tweets would be included in the content analysis.  However, 
upon further reflection, this just seemed unacceptable given the nature and overall aims of the 
study.  After extensive problem-solving thoughts, a novel approach was devised.  As the 
normative analysis was only looking at sets of most commonly used words or phrases, only 
these needed to be translated, which could easily be done via Google Translate.  In other 
words, the 100 most commonly used words or phrases could be collected from Tweets in any 
language, and the short sets of results could then be translated into English.  There was no 
need to translate the entire set of Tweets, just the emerging norms.  Equally, the presence of 
international norms was distilled down into a list of roughly 100 key words and phrases.  This 
list could be translated via Google Translate into any number of languages and searches 
undertaken accordingly. 
The initial study design did not include sentiment analysis.  However, once all the Tweets 
were collected it was decided that adding in the sentiment analysis would be a fairly 
straightforward endeavour that would not add too much time to the data collection.  Once this 
was in place, it was then discovered that a fairly simple programmatic add-on for sentiment 
analysis included translation.  Therefore, in the end, it was actually possible to translate 
Tweets.   
Correlation 
The issue of correlation versus causation is ripe in any study of this nature.  Robinson 
highlights this point when exploring the CNN effect: ‘the difficulty [is in] measuring exactly 
the precise impact which media has on policy…and the significance each attaches to policy 
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certainty (and uncertainty) in determining media influence.’177  Similar challenges are 
discussed across many areas of media effect studies.178  As with the media effects literature, it 
is not possible to show direct causation in this kind of research, but it is possible to ensure the 
study design is rigorous enough to allow for correlations and indirect relationships to be 
shown.179  In this case, the correlations are between the campaigns and the legal outcomes.  
As written in a forthcoming paper,  
Correlation can also be underscored by timelines, quotes, and government 
activities.  For example, in some cases there were spikes in Tweets followed by 
government action (#delhigangrape).   In other cases, the government specifically 
referred to the hashtag campaign when discussing legislative changes 
(#stopstoning).   Government officials implementing change even referred to the 
hashtag itself, announcing changes on Twitter (#niunamenos).   The campaigners 
themselves used Twitter as the platform to engage officials in some instances.  In 
#niunamenos, candidates in upcoming elections were asked to sign a pledge to 
implement the campaign demands and, critically to Tweet this pledge out.180        
It is this kind of evidence which supports the finding of relationships between the campaigns 
and the legal outcomes are valid.  
 
The non-neutrality of Twitter  
 
This research is very cognisant of the non-neutrality of social media.181  Feminists in 
particular have highlighted with concern the inherent gender biases in the framework on 
which social media are built.182  When translated into campaign and activist research, there 
must be some recognition of the algorithms that allow certain information to flow and other 
information to fade away and the filter bubbles which create ‘personalised’ online 
experiences.183  The data generated for this study was created within a power-laden hierarchy 
 
177 Piers Robinson (n 127) 304. 
178 Perse and Lambe (n 129). 
179 Piers Robinson (n 127) 305. 
180 Willis (n 174). 
181 AH Jakubowicz, ‘Alt_Right White Lite: Trolling, Hate Speech and Cyber Racism on Social Media’ (2017) 9 
Cosmopolitan Civil Societies: An Interdisciplinary Journal 41; Jackson and Foucault Welles, above n 4. 
182 Ott (n 137). 
183 Ott, above n 14; Karlsen and others, above n 2. 
Chapter 2: Research Framework 
57 
 
which tends to favour the elite (discussed in detail earlier in this chapter).184  These structures, 
algorithms, and filter bubbles may distort the framing, messaging, and content of the Tweets.  
Equally, these aspects of Twitter which lend themselves to homophily may mean that certain 
Tweets gain more visibility not because of the Tweet itself, but because of the algorithms 
working in the background.  Certain campaign messages will reach some sub-sections of the 
participant population but not all.  This needs to be understood as a limitation of the study.  
To that end, the Twitter account which was created to collect data was used solely for this 
purpose, with very few follows and even fewer followers.  Although this does not address the 
macro level underlying issues and biases, it does at least attempt to minimise bias in the data 
collection.   
 
Quantification of legal change 
Legislation 
As a key outcome variable from the spiral model is legislative change, it is crucial to look at 
this variable as an indicator of ‘success’ of the campaigns.185  To this end, relevant laws and 
legislation were identified and collected from before the campaign and after the campaign 
started.  Change was measured against the stated goals of the campaigns.  As a criterion for 
inclusion in the study was a clear legal goal, each campaign therefore had a stated desired 
change in some form of legislation.  This aspect of the legal analysis was, therefore, fairly 
straightforward.   
Institutionalisation 
Beyond simply hard law legal change, advocates are well aware that soft law is needed to 
move from rhetoric to implementation on the ground.  This measure indicates the regime’s 
willingness to institutionalise the norm.  To gauge how the domestic government really 
addressed the issues in the question, a wide range of documentation and reporting was 
collected and analysed from before and after the campaign.  This ranged from policies and 
regulations intended to implement the law (for example, a national strategy on violence 
against women), budgetary information (for example, how much money does the government 
spend on programmes to reduce violence against women?), evidence of government 
 
184 Dagoula (n 137). 
185 Goodale and Engle-Merry (n 91). 
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discourse relating to the campaign and the issue (press releases, interviews, media reports), 
NGO documentation providing domestic insight into the ‘on the ground’ situation for women 
and girls, and any other relevant and reliable information discovered through a snowballing 
technique.  When read together, these various pieces created a mosaic picture of how far 
changes had been institutionalised to benefit women and girls domestically.  Change was 
measured by how much the picture ‘aligned’ with the goals of the campaign.  For example, if 
the law changed, were there systems, policies, and regulations also put in place to ensure that 
the law could be implemented and supported properly?  Did the government use language 
that reflected the goals of the campaign?  Was there evidence of an increase in budget 
allocation to programmes designed to address the issue in question?  Again, when taken 
together, this analysis tended to show a clear, measurable outcome for each campaign.   
Law enforcement 
The involvement of courts has been cited as an important aspect of institutionalising norms 
and moving from Phase 3 to Phases 4 and 5 of the spiral model.186  Proper use of law 
enforcement and litigation can ‘make or break’ how the norm is activated on the ground.  
When this research first began, the intention was to focus purely on case law relevant to each 
campaign.  However, when in depth research on the legal change began in earnest, it became 
very clear that front line policing was equally important to measuring legal change.  To that 
end, and as much as feasible, information was collected on the actions of police and rates of 
prosecutions, as well as case law and judicial decisions.  Again, the campaigns were 
generally very clear on the changes that were sought in law enforcement and thus there were 
clear benchmarks for measuring change.    
 UN Treaty Body Dialogue 
The final area of law used to measure legal change was the state dialogue with relevant UN 
treaty bodies.  This stemmed from the innovative methodology developed by Meier and Kim 
in their work on water and sanitation.187  This process of coding and using state reports to 
explore the role of international human rights norms in domestic governance provided 
another important dimension to the measurement of legal change.  Analysing what is and is 
 
186 Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (n 72). 
187 Benjamin Mason Meier and Yuna Kim, ‘Human Rights Accountability Through Treaty Bodies: Examining 
Human Rights Treaty Monitoring for Water and Sanitation’ (2015) 26 Duke Journal of Comparative and 
International Law 139. 
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not reported by the state opens a fascinating window on how the government approaches the 
issue in question, particularly in an international context.  For example, many governments 
will use process indicators to show work they have undertaken to implement women’s rights 
– leaflets printed, workshops held, public service announcement produced – but very few 
include outcome indicators – reductions in incidents of violence against women, increases in 
prosecutions, improvements in social attitudes, and so on.  Reviewing the language used in 
UN reporting from the government also gave exceptional insight into the institutionalisation 
of norms, both positive and negative.  It was truly amazing to read some of the replies from 
the governments during face to face dialogue with the committees.  Again, change was 
measured against levels of alignment with the campaign goals.    
Taken together, these four distinct areas of legal change provided a holistic and coherent 
analysis of domestic legal change.     
Using Composite Scores 
For each variable, a process was also undertaken to distil the rather large number of 
parameters down to one composite score.  For the independent variables, parameters which 
were ordinal, scaled, and most reflected the research questions were identified.  The 
numerical data was then divided into quintiles for each parameter, and each campaign given a 
score of 1-5 based on the quintiles.  These were reversed for negative parameters.  The 
average of these scaled scores provided the composite score in each independent variable for 
each campaign.  The full list of parameters included in the composite scores in included in 
Appendix 3.   
Creating composite scores can be useful, but brings the risk that nuanced information will be 
lost.  For this reason, while the composite scores were analysed in detail, this was not at the 
expense of the individual parameters.  The overall composite score comprised of persistence, 
engagement, users, and messaging/norms (context and sentiment are not ‘scaled’ and 
therefore cannot be used in a regression analysis).  
Conclusion 
In sum, the selected variables (detailed in Appendices 1 and 5) and null hypotheses can now 
be added to the overall map of research: 
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Table 2.3: Research Map 
Critique/Risk Independent 
variable(s) 
Null hypothesis (that which 
this research sets out 
disprove) 
Lack of focus on domestic 
actors/overemphasis on Western 
approaches; social media is elite-
driven and non-neutral; campaigns 
may be dominated and/or driven by 
elite international actors 
Twitter profiles of 
100 most prolific 
users in each 
campaign 
Campaigns dominated by 
foreign actors will be more 
successful. 
Potential government backlash; 
lack of message tempering due to 
organic nature of medium 
Content analysis  Consistency of messaging in 
Tweets will not affect 
campaign outcomes. 
Lack of long-term progression; 
‘fickleness’ and speed of social 
media 
Persistence 
(Tweets per day) 
Persistence of Tweets in 
Twitter driven campaigns do 
not affect campaign outcomes. 
Ignores domestic capacity issues; 
lack of knowledge of domestic 
context 
Context (various 
indicators of 
domestic political 
context and 
situation for 
women) 
Domestic context has no 
impact on campaign success. 
Ignores material or nuanced 
incentives; does not present enough 
incentive for change to domestic 
government 
Engagement (reply, 
retweet, and like 
data) 
Campaigns driven by ‘likes’ 
will have the same impact as 
campaigns driven by replies 
(replies used as a proxy for 
engagement/ investment/risk in 
campaign, as opposed to a 
simple click to like) 
Weaknesses in spiral model are 
amplified in social media driven 
campaigns 
Combined 
quantified 
variables 
Twitter variables have no 
relationship to campaign 
outcomes. 
   
This chapter has served to provide a full account of the development of the research 
framework, starting from theory and moving into methodology and execution.  This chapter 
has shown the theoretical grounding of the research design, deeply rooted in social empirical 
constructivism (conventional) and building upon the body of literature which critiques the 
spiral model of human rights change.  These critiques, alongside the academic concerns with 
social media campaigning and media effects literature, provide the lynchpin of this research, 
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informing methodological choices, variable selection, and research questions throughout the 
entire process.  At every stage, the research is tied back to these critiques to frame the 
understanding of whether and how international Twitter-driven campaigns affect domestic 
legal change for women’s rights.  The chapter then illustrated exactly how these critiques 
were studied in the selected campaigns through a detailed assessment of decisions made 
regarding design and analysis.  Decision-making was both ever-prevalent and fundamental to 
the success of the research.  At each stage, decisions were based on these critiques.  The 
chapters which follow present each campaign in detail, exploring the context, legal outcomes, 
and Twitter characteristics. 
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Chapter 3 : Negative Outcomes: #stopstoning, #letwomengotostadium 
 
Introduction 
 
Two of the eight campaigns in this research showed negative outcomes after the social media 
activity - #stopstoning and #letwomengotostadium.  Both targeted legal change in Iran.  After 
the #stopstoning campaign there was a change in the law which allows judges to hand down a 
sentence of stoning more easily than before the campaign started.  Analysis of government 
statements and legislative reports uncover indications that the changes to the law were made, 
at least in part, in response to the Western media attention.  Reliable reports show that more 
women have been stoned to death since the campaign started than before.  
#letwomengotostadium saw no changes to the law while activists appear to be more 
rigorously targeted for arbitrary arrests and unnecessarily lengthy detentions, again more so 
after the campaign started than before.  This chapter begins by giving an overview of the two 
campaigns and their goals.  The context of Iran is presented in a comparative approach to the 
other countries in the study.  The chapter then presents the findings of the analysis of the law 
before and after the campaign, and finally turns to the key findings in the characteristics of 
the Twitter campaign.  
It is of the utmost importance to lay out, at the outset, the differences in outcomes.  At first 
blush, it could very easily have been concluded that the regressive results were not related to 
the characteristics of the Twitter campaigns, but were simply down to the closed and 
authoritative nature of the target domestic government – Iran.  However, two findings 
disprove this theory and allow for the continued examination of the Twitter campaigns.  First, 
there were differences in degrees of regression between the two Iranian campaigns.  If the 
only influencing variable were the target country itself, then the outcomes of the two 
campaigns would have been much more similar.  Although both campaigns showed 
regressive outcomes, there were very important differences in the degree and range of 
regressive outcomes that indicates that something else is at play other than just the closed 
nature of the target Iranian government.  Second, Iran shows domestic context which is 
similar, and in some instances even better, than other countries in the study.  This again 
underscores that, while of course the nature of the target government is an important variable, 
other variables are needed to explain the full breadth of differences.   
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#stopstoning campaign overview 
 
Stoning is a type of judicial execution condoned by the majority of states and NGOs.1   A 
small number of countries continue to use this practice, primarily through religious doctrine 
justifications.  As these executions are considered unlawful internationally, reports and 
statistics are difficult to obtain.2  These cases also bring up issues around access to justice and 
judicial reform.3  The law in Iran allows for death by stoning for a handful of crimes, mostly 
involving adultery.  The story that sparked the international hashtag campaign was that of 
Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani.  Sakineh was found guilty of adultery in 2006 and sentenced 
to death.  Whilst she confessed on television to adultery and involvement in her husband’s 
murder, the confession is highly contested.  It is argued that Sakineh was under duress at the 
time.4  Sakineh’s case, like many others, was compounded when her defence attorneys were 
also arrested and held in detention.5  Iranian officials have a ‘track record’ of bringing 
criminal charges against anyone attempting to defend individuals such as Sakineh.6  Her case 
was brought to international attention when it was taken up by Amnesty International.  
Although Amnesty regularly releases reports and calls to action for women at risk of stoning, 
this particular case sparked international outrage and the hashtag campaign emerged.  
Domestic activists, repressed on the ground, turned to social media and social networks to 
organise and progress the cause.7   
While Sakineh herself was eventually released and then acquitted, other women were not so 
lucky.  Many Iranian women are sentenced under false accusations and more women are 
sentenced to stoning than men.8  The majority of stonings are for women, who are generally 
more vulnerable due to systemic discrimination, illiteracy, economic injustices, and social 
injustices.9  Differences in stoning sentences based on gender is listed as one of the laws 
 
1 Amnesty International, ‘Iran End Executions by Stoning’ (2008) MDE 13/001/2008; Amnesty International, 
‘Iran Executions by Stoning’ (2010) MDE 13/095/2010. 
2 Amnesty International, ‘Stoning: Global Summary’. 
3 Amnesty International, ‘Iran End Executions by Stoning’ (n 1); National Council of Resistance of Iran, 
‘Women in Pursuit of Justice: Arbitrary Trends and Illegal Proceedings Victimizing Female Political Prisoners 
in Iran’ (2017). 
4 Amnesty International, ‘Iran Stoning Sentence Suspension Not Enough’ (8 September 2010). 
5 Amnesty International, ‘Fears Grow for Iran Stoning Case Lawyer and Son’ (3 November 2010); Amnesty 
International, ‘Iran Must End Harassment of Stoning Case Lawyer’ (28 July 2010). 
6 Amnesty International, ‘Fears Grow for Iran Stoning Case Lawyer and Son’ (n 5). 
7 Mahboubeh Abbasgholizadeh, ‘“To Do Something We Are Unable to Do in Iran”: Cyberspace, the Public 
Sphere, and the Iranian Women’s Movement’ (2014) 39 Signs 831. 
8 For a dramatic interpretation of a harrowing true story, the documentary film The Stoning of Soraya M. 
9 See, e.g. Amnesty International, ‘Iran End Executions by Stoning’ (n 1) 6–7; Amnesty International, ‘Iran 
Executions by Stoning’ (n 1) 3; Mohammad Nayyeri, ‘Gender Inequality and Discrimination: The Case of 
Iranian Women’ (Iranian Human Rights Documentation Center 2013) 11; Maryam Hosseinkhah, ‘The 
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which contradicts the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (‘CEDAW’) as per Iranian authorities.10  Because men are legally and religiously 
allowed to engage in polygamy and temporary marriage, they have mitigating factors to 
excuse what otherwise would be charged as adultery.  Women are not afforded these 
allowances.11 
The impression left is that Sakineh was spared specifically because of the international 
attention, but that this left the hard-line conservatives and religious clerics angry at the 
foreign interference.  Reports of clandestine local stonings carried out under provincial 
judges’ sentences have increased since the campaign, seemingly in response.  Mahmood 
Amiry-Moghaddam, the spokesperson of Iran Human Rights, said: ‘we hope that the 
international attention that Mrs. Ashtiani’s case has received, will also be directed towards all 
the others sentenced to death by stoning and will continue until this barbaric punishment is 
removed from the penal law’.12  This quote summarises very well the overall campaign and 
the effect that was had on the law in Iran.   
#letwomengotostadium campaign overview 
 
Women in Iran have not been allowed to attend certain male sporting events since the 
revolution.  A particular ban on attending men’s football matches was put in place in 1979.  
That ban was then extended in 2012 to men’s volleyball matches.  The ban is intended to 
protect women from foul language and the potentially uncouth environment in sporting 
events.  However, volleyball had always been seen as quite a family friendly sport and the 
ban sparked outrage among women.   
The #letwomengotostadium campaign began in 2014, just before a large international 
volleyball tournament was to be held in Tehran.  No women were allowed in the stadium in 
 
Execution of Women in Iranian Criminal Law: An Examination of the Impact of Gender on Laws Concerning 
Capital Punishment in the New Islamic Penal Code’ (IHR 2012); ibid; Rochelle Terman and Mufuliat Fijabi, 
‘Stoning Is Not Our Culture: A Comparative Analysis of Human Rights and Religious Discourses in Iran and 
Nigeria’ (The Global Campaign to Stop Killing and Stoning Women 2010) 8; International Federation for 
Human Rights (FIDH), ‘Iran/Death Penality: A State Terror Policy’ (2009); Justice for Iran, ‘Gender 
Discrimination at Its Worst: An Overview of the Discriminatory Laws of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Family 
Life: Submission to the United Nations Working Group on Discrimination against Women in Law and in 
Practice’ (2014). 
10 National Council of Resistance of Iran, ‘CEDAW: Why the Iranian Regime Does Not Join CEDAW? A  
Study by the Women’s Committee of the National Council of Resistance of Iran’ (2016) 3. 
11 ibid 4. 
12 Iran Human Rights, ‘At Least 7 Stonings Implemented by the Iranian Authorities in the Past 4 Years. 14 More 
Sentenced to Stoning’ <https://iranhr.net/en/articles/603/> accessed 13 April 2017. 
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2014; amidst several arrests of women attempting to enter was one British Iranian woman 
who was later imprisoned.  Her case garnered much international attention.  Although the 
President and the Vice President for Women’s Affairs announced in early 2015 that the ban 
would be lifted for the summer tournament, just days before the event the sporting authorities 
reneged and said that women would not be allowed in.  Some foreign women were allowed in 
the stadium, but no Iranian women.  The ban was again tested in February 2016 when another 
international tournament was held in Kush.  The international volleyball association (The 
Fédération Internationale de Volleybal/FIVB) had stated that they would cease awarding 
tournaments to Iran if women were not allowed in, but again in the eleventh hour the Iranian 
authorities announced that women would continue to be banned and the FIVB backed off 
claiming that cultural issues were outside its remit.  Women were allowed to watch from a 
rooftop café for a time, but even that was closed off by the end of the tournament.  The FIVB 
came under pressure again in 2017 before the February tournament; this time it took a hard 
line and said that they would cancel all international tournaments in Iran if women were not 
allowed.  Women were thus allowed into the stadium for the February tournament on Kush 
Island in 2017.  However, since that time no women have been allowed to attend any 
tournaments, including the major summer tournament in Tehran.  This campaign was 
characterised with slightly less backlash than #stopstoning but overall negative outcomes.13  
 
Context 
 
As introduced earlier, it must be first explored whether the negative outcome of these 
campaigns was based on context of the target domestic country, both being Iran.  The initial 
thought would be that as the two campaigns with negative outcomes were targeting the same 
domestic government, it would be the domestic context that explained the negative outcomes.  
However, an in-depth exploration of the context variables indicate the Iran is not significantly 
different from other countries in the study which showed more positive change.  Although the 
context for Iran is not particularly good, the important aspect for this study is that the context 
is not significantly different from more successful countries.  This does not indicate that the 
 
13 Since the initial submission of this thesis, a woman who was arrested attempting to attend a football match in 
Iran set herself on fire before her trial and tragically died. While to some, attending a sporting event may seem 
trivial, to the women in Iran it is a life and death matter. See, e.g. Minky Worden, ‘Woman Banned from 
Stadiums in Iran Attempts Suicide’ (Human Rights Watch, 9 September 2019) 
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/09/09/woman-banned-stadiums-iran-attempts-suicide> accessed 23 October 
2019. 
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poor outcomes were based on the target government or domestic political situation alone.  It 
is also worth noting that, technically, Twitter is banned in Iran, although most individuals 
who want to use Twitter are able to through workarounds.14  This is also clear from the 
number of Tweets and Twitter accounts which are from Iran. 
The World Justice Project index of openness does have a statistically significant relationship 
to outcomes.  Here, Iran showed the lowest scores.  This indicates that governments which 
are more ‘open’ and transparent in general are more likely to respond positively to social 
media campaigns.  However, as will be seen throughout this thesis, the campaigns themselves 
do matter in addition to the openness of the government.  It is possible that had the Twitter 
campaign behaved differently, more positive, or at least less negative, changes could have 
been seen.   
Iran is also the only country in the study that has not signed or ratified CEDAW and has only 
ratified six international human rights treaties.  This was less than other countries in the 
study.  As seen in the exploration of the dialogue with UN treaty bodies later in this chapter, 
Iran exhibits scepticism of the (perceived) Western-driven nature of the international human 
rights regime.  The anti-Western rhetoric and discourse seen in reaction to the social media 
campaigns was certainly echoed in the dialogue with treaty bodies.  
Therefore, the contextual picture does not significantly set Iran apart from other countries in 
the study.  We can see that the lack of openness of the government most likely played a part, 
but again it is not likely that this was the sole reason for the negative legal outcomes, nor the 
degree of regression.  Although Iran does stand out for its lack of engagement with the UN 
human rights mechanisms, this alone does not explain why the campaigns in this country 
were less successful than the others.  Rather, it more an indication of Iran’s reticence towards 
what are perceived as Western-driven norms and foreign intervention, a finding that is in line 
with the critique of the spiral model and the overall impressions of the campaigns.   
  
 
14 Sheera Frenkel, ‘Iranian Authorities Block Access to Social Media Tools’ The New York Times (3 January 
2018) <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/02/technology/iran-protests-social-media.html> accessed 28 
December 2018. 
Chapter 3 – Negative outcomes: #stopstoning and #letwomengotostadium 
67 
 
Legal Outcomes 
 
These two campaigns showed the poorest legal outcomes.  #stopstoning showed substantial 
regression in legislation, law enforcement, and the representation of women’s rights norms in 
UN dialogue.  #letwomengotostadium led to no changes in the law coupled with evidence of 
regression in institutionalisation and law enforcement.  Both campaigns brought out 
conservative hard-liners and exposed government discourse which is hostile to ‘Western’ 
influences, the perceived goals of the Twitter driven campaigns.  Law enforcement was likely 
used as a tool to re-assert domestic power. 
Legislation 
 
Although neither campaign showed positive change in legislation, #stopstoning showed more 
distinct regression.  Before the #stopstoning campaign, stoning to death was a penalty 
prescribed for adultery while married.15  Under Shari’a law, which came into force after the 
1979 Islamic Revolution,16 sexual activity outside of marriage is considered to be hadd crime; 
sexual intercourse between a man and a woman who are not married is zina.  Zina is punished 
as a hadd crime which is 100 lashes or death by stoning.17  The Islamic Penal Code was 
officially adopted in 1991, and explicitly allowed for death by stoning.18  Guilt must be 
proved by confession four times in front of a judge, or testimony by four male eyewitnesses 
or three men and two women, or the ‘knowledge’ of the judge.19  A moratorium on stoning 
was passed in 2002, but it was ignored by many judges, and the moratorium did not affect the 
written law.20  In September 2003, a law was passed which appeared to undermine the 
moratorium.21  The practice came back into being more acutely after the defeat of the 
 
15 See, e.g. Amnesty International, ‘Iran End Executions by Stoning’ (n 1); Amnesty International, ‘Iran 
Executions by Stoning’ (n 1); Extra-Legal Executions in Iran, ‘Capital Offenses in the Islamic Republic of Iran: 
Submission to the UPR’ (2009); Hosseinkhah (n 9); Nayyeri, Mohammad, ‘The Question of “Stoning to Death” 
in the New Penal Code of the IRI’ (IHR 2012). 
16 Hosseinkhah (n 9). 
17 Nayyeri (n 9) 10. 
18 Islamic Penal Code 1991 Articles 83 – prescription of punishment, 63 - crimes, 102/104 - methods, 
68/71/74/81/105 - burden of proof; See, e.g. Hosseinkhah (n 9); Terman and Fijabi (n 9) 18–19; Justice for Iran, 
‘Mapping Stoning in Muslim Context’ (The Global Campaign to Stop violence against women in the name of 
culture 2012). 
19 Amnesty International, ‘Iran: New Executions Demonstrate Need for Unequivocal Legal Ban of Stoning’; 
Amnesty International, ‘Iran End Executions by Stoning’ (n 1) 3; Nayyeri, Mohammad (n 15); Hosseinkhah (n 
9); Terman and Fijabi (n 9). 
20 See, e.g. Amnesty International, ‘Iran: New Executions Demonstrate Need for Unequivocal Legal Ban of 
Stoning’ (n 19); International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) (n 9); Justice for Iran (n 18). 
21 Amnesty International, ‘Death Penalty/Stoning: Mokarrameh Ebrahimi’. 
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reformist party and the election of President Ahmadinejad.22  Amnesty reports that the Deputy 
Head of the Judiciary has made highly anti-Western remarks in defence of stoning as an 
appropriate punishment based on religious law and beliefs.23   
Although the Penal Code has been reformed since the start of the campaign, it still allows for 
execution by stoning.  The drafting of the New Islamic Penal Code began in 2007, in 
anticipation of the 2012 expiry date for the 1991 Code.  It was approved in 2011.  Whilst 
stoning has been explicitly removed from the new penal code, this does not mean that stoning 
is outlawed.  Rather, the code is silent on the matter, which therefore allows judges to 
interpret Shari’a law as they choose.  Article 167 of Iran’s Constitution gives this power: ‘In 
case of the absence of any such law, [the judge] has to deliver his judgment on the basis of 
authoritative Islamic sources and authentic fatwa.’  Therefore the silence in the Constitution 
means that execution by stoning is still legal in Iran.  The crime of adultery is still considered 
hadd within the Penal code, although the crime of zina is no longer specifically mentioned.24  
Stoning is also referenced in other Articles (172 and 198) of the new code which again adds 
to the clarity that it is indeed allowable under the new code.25   
Note 4 of Article 221.5 of the 2007 draft stated: ‘[if] the enforcement of stoning should create 
disturbance and prove damaging to the regime, the verdict of stoning…could be changed to 
execution.’  This was completely removed from later drafts, notably after the campaign 
began.26  Ali Shahrokhi, Head of the Judicial and Legal Commission of the Islamic 
Consultative Council has stated: ‘it is in the best interest of the regime if certain [penalties] 
under the law of Hudud, namely stoning, are not referenced in the Code.’ (emphasis added) 27  
Officials have since stated that the reference to stoning was removed specifically in response 
to the negative international attention: 
Some people in the international arena have a very biased view of stoning and used it 
against Iran. They meant that stoning is a violation of human rights.  Stoning is only 
 
22 Terman and Fijabi (n 9) 20. 
23 Amnesty International, ‘Iran End Executions by Stoning’ (n 1) 4. 
24 Hosseinkhah (n 9); Nayyeri, Mohammad (n 15); Human Rights Watch, ‘Iran: UPR Submission’ (2014); 
Justice for Iran (n 9); ‘Iran’s New Penal Code Retains the Punishment of Stoning’ 
<http://justice4iran.org/publication/call-for-action/iran-new-penal-code-stoning/> accessed 13 April 2017; 
National Council of Resistance of Iran, ‘Iranian Regime’s 20-Year Conduct since Beijing Platform for Action 
and Accountability to International Community’ (2015) 30. 
25 Hosseinkhah (n 9); Justice for Iran (n 9); Human Rights Watch, ‘Iran: Proposed Penal Code Retains Stoning’ 
(3 June 2013). 
26 Hosseinkhah (n 9). 
27 ibid. 
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removed from the law but it still exists in Sharia and cannot be removed from the 
Sharia.28 
#letwomengotostadium campaigned for a different kind of legal change – lifting a ban which 
technically is not legally binding.  However, there are some policing regulations which are in 
place which treat the ban as law and therefore, in practice, is takes on a legally binding 
nature.  On only one occasion since the campaign began has the ban been overridden to allow 
women into a stadium.  The ban is still very much in effect and it seems that neither the 
domestic nor the international pressure was enough to push the government to legislative 
change.   
Institutionalisation 
 
Neither campaign showed positive change in the evaluation of institutionalisation.  In both 
campaigns, there is ample evidence of the government rejecting the perceived Western ideals.  
Though this represented no change from before the campaign in #stopstoning, in 
#letwomengotostadium it was the campaign itself which brought out the reactions from hard 
line religious conservatives, at times in opposition to the ruling government.  Again, this 
seems to be a reaction to ‘foreign’ social media activism, highlighting and even aggravating 
the fissure between elected government and powerful religious leaders.   
Prior to the #stopstoning campaign, officials were already vocally disparaging of the 
‘Western’ perspective on stoning: ‘The real and fabricated images of stoning in the foreign 
media and their destructive impact on Islam and Iran are well-known.’29  It was also reported 
that just after the UN General Assembly passed a moratorium on the death penalty, Iranian 
officials said it was ‘part of the West’s wanton attempts to export to other countries 
ideological issues of their own particular interest.’30  It has been suggested that central Iranian 
government had instructed provincial courts to remain silent on the use of stoning since 
2001.31   
Government discourse was similar once the campaign began, exposing the tensions between 
foreign relations and provincial authorities.  As one example, the Iranian Embassy in London 
 
28 Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, ‘Annual Death Penalty Report 2012’ (2012) 17. 
29 ‘Emad Baghi’s “The Bloodied Stone”’ (Center for Human Rights in Iran, 2 August 2008) 
<https://www.iranhumanrights.org/2008/08/baghibloodiedstone/> accessed 13 April 2017. 
30 Extra-Legal Executions in Iran (n 15). 
31 US State Dept, ‘Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016’ (2016) 
<https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper> accessed 13 April 2017. 
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issued a statement specifically aimed at the international community stating that Sakineh 
would not be stoned; just a few days later the head of the provincial judiciary said that the 
sentence of stoning was still in place.32  Quotes from religious leaders continued to show this 
rejection of so-called ‘Western’ influence.  For example, the head of Iran’s Human Rights 
Committee dismissed the focus on the stoning sentence as Western ‘propaganda’.33  
The lack of institutionalisation of international women’s rights norms was quite evident in the 
government’s report on the 20-year review of the implementation of the Beijing Platform for 
Women.  In listing identified obstacles to eliminating violence against women, the State 
proffered reasons such as victim reluctance to report incidence to the police, lack of women’s 
awareness, women’s avoidance of pursuing cases due to ‘personal views and family culture’, 
and the ‘promotion of violence and using “women” as a “means” through foreign media…’.34  
This kind of rhetoric places the blame on women victim/survivors and completely avoids any 
suggestion of underlying root causes, discrimination, or inequalities.  Similarly, in relation to 
the refusal to sign and ratify CEDAW, the State holds that too many rights contained within 
the treaty are in contradiction to Islam.35  This kind of discourse and approach shows a 
complete rejection of international women’s rights norms, even when those norms seem to be 
accepted and desired by domestic women.36  This rejection appears to be similarly exhibited 
both before and after the campaign, showing no change. 
#letwomengotostadium appears to show a negative change in government discourse and 
institutionalisation in response to the campaign itself.  There is very little evidence of the 
government’s approach to women attending men’s volleyball matches before the ban came 
into effect, although it can be speculated that it was not seen as problematic given that 
football matches had been banned since 1979, but volleyball was not banned until 2012.  
What is known is that the ban was ‘designed to shield women from men’s rowdiness in sport 
 
32 Amnesty International, ‘Action Appeal’. 
33 Hugh Tomlinson, ‘Ashtiani Freed after 9 Years on Death Row’ (The Times, 2014) 
<https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/ashtiani-freed-after-9-years-on-death-row-5gk8c3nnds7> accessed 13 April 
2017. 
34 The Vice Presidency for Women & Family Affairs, ‘National Review on Women’s Status in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran (Beijing+20)’ (2015) 29. 
35 One NGO goes so far as to hold that the regime “say CEDAW is an attempt by the West to globalize its 
culture and that western standards of human rights and women's rights could not be accepted and implemented 
by the World of Islam.  Denying universality of human rights, Ali Khamenei, the mullahs' supreme leader, 
believes that acceptance of such western prescriptions are against Islamic dignity and are counter-productive, 
because the regime would have to surrender to the instructions of "Arrogant Powers" and endorse them.” 
(NCRI, CEDAW, 2).   
36 National Council of Resistance of Iran, ‘CEDAW: Why the Iranian Regime Does Not Join CEDAW? A  
Study by the Women’s Committee of the National Council of Resistance of Iran’ (n 10). 
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stadia and to pre-empt the temptation of genders mixing.’37  This kind of statement shows a 
highly paternalistic and stereotyped approach to women.  Just before the campaign began, 
Ayatollah Khamenei stated that: 
[T]he westerners have, for a variety of reasons, misunderstood the issues of women, 
but have succeeded through their propaganda machine to promote their incorrect and 
destructive understanding of women throughout the world while suppressing any 
opposite voice.38 
The campaign itself seemed to open the door for exposing the tensions between elected 
government officials, particularly those in charge of foreign relations, and domestically 
focussed male religious leaders. In June 2014, the (then) Minister for Women’s Affairs 
Molaverdi announced in an interview that the ban was not actually socially accepted and that 
the government would review its legality.39  In April 2015, government official Abdolhamid 
Ahmadi, Iran’s Deputy Minister of Sports and Youth Ministry, told the Islamic Republic 
News Agency that plans were in place to lift the ban.  This was seemingly confirmed by 
Molaverdi.  Opposition in government, Babak Dinparast, then immediately stated that there 
were no plans in place to lift or change the ban.  This back and forth continued throughout 
2015.40  In June of that year, a law enforcement spokesperson confirmed the ban was still in 
place and had legal status.41  The chairman of Tehran Islamic seminaries council, Ayatollah 
Rashad, said that ‘given the improper physical and moral conditions of stadiums for women, 
their presence is not in the interest of society’.42  In the week leading up to the June 2015 
tournament, religious groups produced fliers which called women attempting to attend the 
event ‘sluts’ and ‘prostitutes’ and claimed that ‘on Friday there will be blood’.  Similar 
 
37 James M Dorsey, ‘Bowing To Pressure: Iran Grants Women Spectators Access To Sporting Event’ 
(Huffington Post, 19 February 2017) <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/bowing-to-pressure-iran-grants-
women-spectators-access_us_58a92da2e4b0fa149f9ac73d> accessed 27 April 2017. 
38 ‘West’s Approach to Women Issues “Profoundly Deviant”: Leader’ (The Iran Project, 20 April 2014) 
<http://theiranproject.com/blog/2014/04/20/wests-approach-to-women-issues-profoundly-deviant-leader/> 
accessed 25 April 2017. 
39 Leila Mouri, ‘My Share, Half of Azadi:  Let Iranian Women Go to Stadium’ (Huffington Post, 19 June 2014) 
<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/leila-mouri/my-share-half-of-azadi-le_b_5508962.html> accessed 27 April 
 (Mehr News Agency (17 June 2014 ’دستور حسن روحانی برای بررسی حضور بانوان در سالن مسابقات والیبال‘ ;2017
<http://www.mehrnews.com/news/2313394/ والیبال-مسابقات-سالن-در-بانوان-حضور-بررسی-برای-روحانی-حسن-دستور > 
accessed 25 April 2017. 
40 ‘Rouhani Minister Expresses Outrage That Women Were Banned from Attending Iran-US Volleyball Match’ 
(Center for Human Rights in Iran, 23 June 2015) <http://www.iranhumanrights.org/2015/06/rouhani-minister-
women-volleyball/> accessed 28 December 2018. 
41 ibid. 
42 ‘Senior Cleric Opposes Women’s Presence in Sports Stadiums’ (The Iran Project, 13 June 2015) 
<http://theiranproject.com/blog/2015/06/13/senior-cleric-opposes-womens-presence-in-sports-stadiums/> 
accessed 25 April 2017. 
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sentiments were posted on social media sites as well.43  The fissure between the elected 
government officials and the male religious leaders was excruciatingly clear, with the 
religious power seeming to dominate.  
Molaverdi was very public with her reaction to this particular incident, notably taking to 
Facebook to state that the government had been pressured by the religious leaders, claiming 
that the hard line conservative pressure came ‘from those who were denounced two years ago 
by voters, and who had crawled into their cave of oblivion for eight years’. 44  The post was 
confirmed as her own. Molaverdi said (also on Facebook) that the publication of the fliers 
was by: 
[T]hose who call themselves followers of God... and which used words that one 
loathes to repeat, clearly constitute several offences under the law…Even if one day 
our beloved girls and women forgive this crowd, they will never forget them and keep 
these days in their historical memory.45   
An interview with the FIVB in November 2015 seemed to indicate the support from central 
government to lift the ban was strong, and noted that resistance was instead from the religious 
hardliners.46  A women’s rights activist summed up the situation and the lack of 
institutionalisation in September 2016: 
So the ban exists for one reason only and that reason is neither cultural nor historical, 
but political. Ali Khamenei and his regime want to curtail women′s rights further and 
further, in accordance with their religious convictions…With regards to women′s 
rights, Rouhani′s term has indeed been a huge disappointment, especially because he 
made many promises in 2013, which included the potential easing of the stadium 
ban…In July, the regime promised that women could purchase tickets and attend the 
 
43 ‘Female Iran VP Scolds Hardliners over Volleyball Ban’ (Middle East Eye) 
<http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/female-iran-vp-scolds-hardliners-over-volleyball-ban-411944926> 
accessed 25 April 2017. 
44 ibid; See also Human Rights Watch, ‘Iran: Volleyball Federation Should Penalize Ban on Women’ (Human 
Rights Watch, 2 July 2015) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/07/02/iran-volleyball-federation-should-penalize-
ban-women> accessed 28 December 2018. 
45 ‘Female Iran VP Scolds Hardliners over Volleyball Ban’ (n 43). 
46 “Convincing Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, a relative moderate who has notably improved Iran's relations 
with the Western world and has also enhanced women's rights by appointing female Foreign Ministry 
spokespersons since he assumed office in 2013, is unlikely to prove too difficult.  The situation is complicated 
by the power still held by conservative religious figures, including the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.” 
‘Exclusive: FIVB “Hopeful” Ban on Women Attending Volleyball Matches in Iran Will Be Lifted by February’ 
(1448634240) <http://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1032038/exclusive-fivb-hopeful-ban-on-women-
attending-volleyball-matches-in-iran-will-be-lifted-by-february> accessed 25 April 2017.  
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international volleyball matches again, but when the online sale began, a ‘sold out’ 
alert appeared. So the problems have not changed.47 
Law Enforcement 
 
These campaigns both led to highly regressive tactics used by law enforcement officials, both 
front-line and in the judiciary.  In #stopstoning, there were reported increases in the number 
of stoning sentences handed down after the campaign, while in #letwomengotostadium there 
were ample reports, some quite egregious, of increases in arbitrary arrests and detentions. 
Collecting information about stoning sentences is difficult given the clandestine nature of 
how they are carried out, particularly in rural settings.  However, three organisations are 
considered reliable for reporting on stonings.  Their findings are summarised in the following 
table: 
Table 3.1: Reliable reports of stoning in Iran, 2001-2017 
Year Amnesty International 
Reports: Stonings 
Iran Human Rights 
Annual Reports: Stonings 
NCRI reports 
2001 2 or 3 women stoned   
2006 1 woman and 1 man stoned   
2008    
2009    
2010    
TOTAL 4 women stoned over a 10-year period 
CAMPAIGN STARTS 
2011    
2012  4 women stoned  
2013   2 women stoned 
2014    
2015    
2016    
2017    
TOTAL 6 women stoned over a 7-year period 
 
47 Quantara, ‘Iran’s Stadium Ban on Women: Excluding the People’ <https://en.qantara.de/content/irans-
stadium-ban-on-women-excluding-the-people> accessed 27 April 2017. 
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Although these are relatively small numbers, this does indicate a 115% increase from before 
to after the campaign, notably in the years closer to the campaign’s height.  While it cannot 
be said with any certainty that the increases were a reaction against the social media 
campaign, what is clear is that the campaign did not achieve its goal of ceasing the use of 
stoning as a punishment.  Before the campaign, Stop Stoning Forever reported that they have 
saved 13 women and 2 men from executions by stoning.48  Amnesty and activists both 
pointed to strategic domestic and international pressures as important in securing successful 
appeals, acquittals, or pardons in some individual cases.49  The social media campaign, 
however, was a different kind of campaign which, arguably, saw less positive results.  The 
stoning sentence for Sakineh herself was eventually lifted, however activists were sceptical, 
concerned that her case would be treated differently than others.50  
The most regressive outcome of the #letwomengotostadium campaign was the arrest of 
British Iranian Ghoncheh Ghavami.  She attempted to enter the June 2014 tournament and 
was temporarily detained but released.  She was then called back to the police station, 
purportedly to collect her phone, and was re-arrested.  She was kept in solitary confinement 
for over a month where she was allegedly interrogated and mistreated with significant 
failings in due process.51  She was eventually released in November 2014, after six months of 
detainment without charge.  It has not gone unnoticed that the woman targeted for arrest and 
detention relating to the activism was a British Iranian national, perhaps sending a message 
about foreign involvement in issues deemed to be solely of domestic concern.52  The lengthy 
detainment showed a marked change in law enforcement, which can be correlated in time to 
the climax of the campaign.  Since then, at most major volleyball tournaments (and other 
sports for that matter), there are usually a small number of women arrested for attempted to 
enter the stadium, however they are generally detained for a short amount of time and are 
released. 
 
 
48 Amnesty International, ‘Iran Executions by Stoning’ (n 1) 7. 
49 ibid 8; ‘A Rare Victory for Women’s Rights in Iran’ (openDemocracy) 
<http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/dg_asg> accessed 13 April 2017. 
50 Amnesty International, ‘Iran Stoning Sentence Suspension Not Enough’ (n 4). 
51 Human Rights Watch, ‘Ghoncheh Ghavami: The Shifting Goal Posts of Iran’s Hardliners’ (Human Rights 
Watch, 21 October 2014) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/10/21/ghoncheh-ghavami-shifting-goal-posts-irans-
hardliners> accessed 18 October 2017. 
52 Although space does not allow for a full discussion, it is important to note the complex political history of the 
British-Iranian relationship.  See, e.g. Īraj Pizishkzād and Dick Davis, My Uncle Napoleon: A Novel (1st ed, 
Mage Publishers 1996). 
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UN Dialogue 
 
Both campaigns revealed a negative relationship between the State and the UN human rights 
mechanisms.  There seemed to be some movement from the Iranian government towards 
international women’s rights norms in the early 2000s, however this changed dramatically 
after the stoning issue garnered international attention.  The government’s response was 
highly defensive and anti-Western.  As relating to equality principles and the 
#letwomengotostadium campaign, little to no change was detected.  It is also important to 
keep in mind that Iran has not signed or ratified CEDAW, is only party to six human rights 
treaties, does not allow for any individual complaints, and has several reservations lodged 
around the supremacy of Islam.   
As early as 1991 the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (‘CESCR’) began 
inquiring about the treatment of women in the penal system.  As expected, the State response 
was that the penal code was in accordance with Islam.53  The committee in a later report 
stated the government submission (in general) was not sufficient and oral arguments and 
replies were relied upon.  As part of the oral statements the Iranian representative then called 
into question the independence and activity of the Committee itself and made remarks 
concerning the targeting of Iran in political warfare and exaggerated accusations.54  This does 
not indicate a good relationship with international human rights mechanisms.  Most of the 
reports through the 1990s and early 2000s continued this pattern of Iran relying on the 
supremacy of Islam and the Committees pointing out the State’s lack of meaningful 
engagement with the processes.  This includes a 1993 Human Rights Committee (‘HRC’) 
dialogue specifically raising concerns about the use of the death penalty in cases of adultery.55  
 
53 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘Report on the 5th Session’ (1991) UN Doc E/1991/23. 
54 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘Summary Record of the 8th Meeting’ (1993) UN Doc 
E/C.12/1993/SR.8; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘Concluding Observations: Iran’ 
(1993) UN Doc E/C.12/1993/7. 
55 Human Rights Committee, ‘Comments of the Human Rights Committee: Iran (Islamic Republic Of)’ (1993) 
UN Doc CCPR/C/79/Add.25 para 8.  Again in 1999 in dialogue with Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (‘CERD’) evidence of lack of engagement is present.  The Committee questioned the lack of 
ratification of international instruments into domestic law, bringing again into question Iran’s rule consistent 
behaviour with human rights institutions.  Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, ‘Summary 
Record of the 1339th Meeting’ (1999) UN Doc CERD/C/SR.1339.  The state’s response again deferred to Islam 
and went so far as to say ‘the Committee’s task was to examine racial discrimination and not to discuss whether 
Islam was fair or unfair’  ibid 9. A similar back and forth was present in the Committee on the Rights of thee 
Child (‘CRC’) 2000 reporting cycle.  The CRC report drew specific attention to concerns over the use of 
stoning.  Committee on the Rights of the Child, ‘Concluding Observations: Iran’ (2000) UN Doc 
CRC/C/15/Add.123 para 38. 
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Many of the State reports rely on things like workshops or events to show implementation, 
with references to aims and goals, but no indication of outcomes.   
The 2003 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (‘CERD’) State report 
raised some positive points about women’s rights in Iran, albeit with a focus on employment, 
education, and health.56  The government in fact dedicated several paragraphs to discussing 
equality of women, seemingly recognising that empowerment of women was an issue.57  
However, later on the committee expressed regret that Iran had not become a party to the 
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (‘CEDAW’).58  
This generally positive trend continued in the 2003 CRC reporting cycle, where the State 
voluntarily provided ample information about tackling domestic violence, improving 
education for women, and increasing opportunities for employment.  The committee 
continued to raise concerns about implementation, discrimination against girls/women, and 
Iran’s general reservation to the convention.59  
Of particular note is the 2005 Mission to Iran by the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against 
Women (‘SRVAW’).60  She confirmed what discourse tended to indicate in other reports – 
that women do have access to education, employment, and health, but that it is very much 
under ‘strict surveillance and within well-defined boundaries’.61  She specifically addressed 
the issue of stoning: 
The death penalty, particularly by stoning, has been a major area of concern. The 
Special Rapporteur received numerous reports of women on the death row, sentenced 
mainly for sexually or morally oriented offences such as adultery…Their stories 
reflect gender biases in the attitudinal and institutional structure of the country within 
which they, some still children, have become labelled criminals.62 
 
56 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, ‘Seventeenth Periodic Reports of States Parties: 
Islamic Republic of Iran’ (2003) UN Doc CERD/C/431/Add.6. 
57 ibid 33–35. 
58 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, ‘Summary Record of the 1597th Meeting’ (2003) 
UN Doc CERD/C/SR.1597 para 57. 
59 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, ‘Summary Record of the 1015th Meeting’ (2003) 
UN Doc CRC/C/SR.1015. 
60 UNHRC, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its Causes and Consequences: 
Mission to the Islamic Republic of Iran’ (2006) UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/61/Add.3. 
61 ibid 25. 
62 ibid 41. 
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She went on to raise concerns that despite the moratorium, stoning remained legal and was 
still handed down as a sentence.63 
By 2008, the Special Rapporteur began issuing urgent appeals for women sentenced to death 
by stoning.64  The Iranian government replied that stoning was an important deterrent which 
was fundamental to Islam.  Stoning is seen as different from execution, serving a more 
specific religious purpose and therefore sufficiently justified to maintain the sanctity of the 
family.65  The government also stated that three stoning sentences had been overturned but 
did not address the other four cases in the SRVAW’s appeal.     
It is worth noting that, after the #stopstoning campaign, Iran joined the Commission on the 
Status of Women (‘CSW’) in 2011 and was appointed to the committee in 2014.  Generally, 
after the campaign started, the reports show a regression in dialogue, with more open 
defensiveness and antagonism towards the West.  The first reporting cycle after Sakineh’s 
case rose to international prominence was with CERD in 2010.  The Committee specifically 
asked Iran to address the issue of Sakineh’s case.66  After the State outlined the myriad ways 
in which her case was legitimate, the Iranian representative went on to say ‘that the case did 
not fall within the scope of the Committee’s mandate. The media had politicized the case and 
used it as an opportunity to disseminate negative propaganda about his country.’67 
Concerns about violence against women, the death penalty, and stoning were all raised in the 
2011 HRC report.68  The State replied with a significant amount of information about how far 
Iran had come in improving the status of women.69  When asked directly about the death 
penalty, the government seemed to dodge the question.  The government did address the 
situation of women human rights defenders, reporting that many of their activities were in 
fact illegal and contributed to public disorder.  Iran defended state action which they 
 
63 ibid 43. 
64 UNHRC, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, 
Yakin Ertürk Addendum Communications to and from Governments’ (2008) UN Doc A/HRC/7/6/Add.1. 
65 UNHRC, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, 
Yakin Ertürk Addendum Communications to and from Governments’ (2009) UN Doc A/HRC/11/6/Add.1 para 
302. 
66 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, ‘Summary Record of the 2016th Meeting’ (2011) 
UN Doc CERD/C/SR.2016 paras 38, 47, 50. 
67 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, ‘Summary Record of the 2017th Meeting’ (2010) 
UN Doc CERD/C/SR/2017 para 25. 
68 Human Rights Committee, ‘Summary Record of the 2834th Meeting’ (2011) UN Doc CCPR/C/SR.2834 
paras 24–28. 
69 ibid 49–50. 
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characterised as ‘soft’, ‘tolerant’, and ‘constructive’.70  This is a chilling account of how Iran 
deals with activists, saying that the government is being soft, tolerant, and constructive when 
they arrest, detain, and allegedly physically harm arrested activists.  In their concluding 
observations, the Committee continued to have concerns over women’s rights (in particular 
women in decision making and women activists) and the ongoing use of the death penalty.71  
In the 2012 follow up report, the Committee raised concern that the government had, in fact, 
not answered some of the questions about the death penalty, in particular issues around 
stoning and the number of executions, and the use of death penalty for crimes not considered 
serious internationally.72  This upholds the analysis that the government was evading these 
questions. 
The most egregious evidence of the State’s hostility towards the UN human rights 
mechanisms was in the 2013 State reply to CESCR’s list of issues.  The State wrote that one 
of the Committee’s questions was ‘a fictitious and irrelevant claim’73 and went on to say ‘We 
believe question 4 goes beyond the content of the Covenant, and are amazed to see this 
question.’74  Later, in relation to marital rape, the State reports that ‘“Marital rape” is a 
concept that goes beyond commitments of the State party to the Covenant. Moreover, there is 
no international agreement or consensus on the wording of this concept and the “marital 
rape" is beyond the scope of the Covenant.’75  Further on, when discussing divorce, one of the 
acceptable grounds used as an example by the government was ‘beating or other forms of 
continuous abuse by the husband that is not normally tolerable by the wife are examples of 
undesirable conditions.’76  These public, recorded statements taken together do not reflect 
discourse from a State which is institutionalising international norms on women’s rights and 
eliminating all forms of violence against women.  If this is the kind of dialogue that the State 
uses to defend its human rights record, one can imagine what the situation is like on the 
ground.  The open and blatant antagonism towards the UN system and its ‘Western’ values 
was made very clear in these examples.   
 
70 Human Rights Committee, ‘Replies from the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the List of Issues’ 
(2011) UN Doc CCPR/C/IRN/Q/3/Add.1 para 102. 
71 Human Rights Committee, ‘Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee Islamic Republic of 
Iran’ (2011) UN Doc CCPR/C/IRN/CO/3. 
72 Human Rights Committee, ‘Summary Record of the 2835th Meeting’ (2012) UN Doc CCPR/C/SR.2835. 
73 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘Replies of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the List of 
Issues’ (2013) UN Doc E/C.12/IRN/Q/2/Add.1 para 5. 
74 ibid 7 referring to issues around SOGI. 
75 ibid 39. 
76 ibid. 
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The Special Rapporteur on the Situation in Iran77 in March 2014 writes that, in an interview 
with an Iranian lawyer, 
The lawyer recalled that Iranian law allows for women who report rape to be 
prosecuted of adultery [and a possible sentence of stoning] in cases where they are 
unable to convince a judge of their charges, given that the allegations imply that the 
women had engaged in extra-marital relations. The lawyer also pointed out that rape 
cases were very difficult to prove and put women wishing to report the crime at risk 
of being prosecuted for a capital offence, which likely deterred women victims from 
coming forward.78 
The report then brings to light the increases in executions more generally, and specifically 
notes that in 2013 at least 28 women were publicly hanged.  The report also corroborates that 
the new penal code still allows for the death penalty, specifically stoning, in crimes of 
adultery.79   The 2015 report raised similar concerns.80  The 2016 report specifically mentions 
that the new penal code still allows for stoning, and that there was a stoning sentence for 
adultery handed down in 2015.  The government claimed that the sentence had been 
commuted, while continuing to argue that stoning is perfectly legitimate to uphold the tenets 
and values of Islam.81    
The 2015 Universal Periodic Review (‘UPR’) State report attempts to paint women’s rights 
in a very positive light,82 yet the antagonism between the State and the international 
community was again rife: 
 
77 In 2011, the UN approval and appointed a SR in the situation of human rights in the Islamic republic of Iran.  
Human Rights Council, ‘Resolution Adopted by the Human Rights Council’ (2011) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/16/9.  
The first report was published in September of that year.  The SR drew specific attention to the rights of women, 
citing issues around the worth of women, family and marriage laws, targeting of women’s rights activists, and 
notably referring to government statements which seemed to blame women’s dress for incidents of VAW.  
UNHRC, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran’ 
(2011) UN Doc A/66/374 para 56.  The SR also drew attention to the widespread use and increase in executions, 
many done in secret or without due process.  Notably, however, no mention is made of stoning or the death 
penalty as applied to women in particular.   
78 UNHRC, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran’ 
(2014) UN Doc A/HRC/25/61 para 79. 
79 ibid 16. 
80 UNHRC, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran’ 
(2015) UN Doc A/HRC/28/70. 
81 UNHRC, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran’ 
(2016) UN Doc A/HRC/31/69 para 15. 
82 Human Rights Council, ‘Universal Periodic Review National Report Iran’ (2014) UN Doc 
HRC/WG.6/20/IRN/1 para 77. 
Chapter 3 – Negative outcomes: #stopstoning and #letwomengotostadium 
80 
 
Iran views the “Resolution on the Situation of Human Rights in Iran” and the 
appointment of the Special Rapporteur, as a political, discriminatory and unfair 
process that is based on double standards. Unfortunately, this process is being pursued 
by certain Western countries as a means to achieve their political wills. Such a biased 
approach, visibly contradicts human rights principles and norms that were drafted to 
promote and protect these ideals.83 
While the State report is silent on the matter of the death penalty, both the compilation report 
and the stakeholder report reiterated previous concerns.  Iran rejected recommendations 
calling for in-country visits, and rejected all 38 recommendations to repeal or change the 
death penalty.  
#letwomengotostadium draws from many of the same reports, albeit with a different issue 
focus.  The same overarching findings apply, whereby Iran does not exhibit full engagement 
with the international human rights mechanisms or norms, though some promising progress 
was seen in the early to mid-2000s.  More recent reports show a regression in engagement 
and a re-emergence of nationalistic, religious norms.   
Issues relating to women’s rights to enter stadiums and participate in sporting events as 
supporters were raised as far back as 1993, when the HRC raised concerns about a 
prohibition on women practicing sport in public.84  Nearly a decade later, in 2010, the State 
report to the HRC was still using language which reinforced traditional gender stereotypes 
and the primacy of women’s roles in the family.85  Notably, there was also much government 
discussion about encouraging women to participate in sports.  This focus on women’s access 
to sport is reiterated in the 2010 UPR State report.86   
 
83 ibid 118. 
84 Comments of the Human Rights Committee 1993 (CCPR/C/79/Add25) para 13. 
85 Human Rights Committee, ‘Third Periodic Reports of States Parties: Iran’ (2010) UN Doc CCPR/C/IRRN/3 
paras 217, 219, 225.  Another good example (though just one of many) of Iran’s approach to placing women 
within the context of the family comes in the 2011 CESCR state report: “Based on the provisions of paragraph 3 
of its terms of reference stressing the importance of ‘policy making and planning for the consolidation of sacred 
family unit through facilitating the formation of family, protecting its sanctity and basing family relations on the 
Islamic law and ethics’ and also benefiting from the teachings of the Holy Quran and the traditions of the Holy 
Prophet Mohammad (peace be upon him), the provisions of the Constitution of the State and other laws and 
regulations in force in the Islamic Republic of Iran, the women’s social and cultural council has formulated 
policies on the formation, consolidation and elevation of family.” Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, ‘Second Periodic Report Submitted by States Parties Islamic Republic of Iran’ (2011) UN Doc 
E/C.12/IRN/2 para 148.  
86 Human Rights Council, ‘Universal Periodic Report National Report Iran’ (2009) UN Doc 
A/HRC/WG.6/7/IRN/1 paras 97, 101. 
Chapter 3 – Negative outcomes: #stopstoning and #letwomengotostadium 
81 
 
Concerns were not raised again until the 2011 HRC cycle, where the committee again 
expressed concern around the ban on women practicing sport in public.87  The government 
replied that women were enjoying success in national and international sports, which seemed 
to be a careful avoidance of a direct answer.88  A similar approach was seen in the 
government’s replies to the 2013 CESCR list of issues, where the Iranian State noted that it 
was making efforts in the area of sports for women, whilst staying silent on the specific bans 
in question.89 
Once the campaign began, the dialogue changed.  The 2015 HRC summary report 
specifically addresses the issue of Ghavami’s arrest and detention.90  Again in 2016 the CRC 
raises the issue of women’s access to sports.91  Notably, the 2015 UPR reports do not give the 
issue much attention.92  Although access to sport for women was raised as a concern, it was 
about women’s participation, not equality in access as a fan.   
Across all four legal variables, the situation is the same or worse after the social media 
attention.  The disparaging remarks about the West and foreign media seem to indicate a 
strong backlash against these campaigns.  In particular, removing stoning from the Penal 
Code and making it more subjective, with direct reference to Western media attention as the 
driving force behind this decision, goes some way to showing a correlation between social 
media activity and regression for women’s rights.  For #letwomengotostadium, the arrest and 
detention of Ghavami, a British Iranian, at the climax of the campaign again sends a message 
about the Iranian government’s reaction to Western interference.  At the very least, it is clear 
that neither campaign made a positive difference as stonings continue and women are still not 
allowed to enter stadiums.  
 
87 Human Rights Committee, ‘Summary Record of the 2834th Meeting’ (n 68) para 19. 
88 ibid 50. 
89 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘Replies of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the List of 
Issues’ (n 73) paras 10, 16. 
90 UNHRC, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran’ 
(n 80) para 150. 
91 Committee on the Rights of the Child, ‘Concluding Observations on the Combined Third and Fourth Periodic 
Reports of the Islamic Republic of Iran’ (2016) UN Doc CRC/C/IRN/CO/3-4 para 79. 
92 Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Islamic Republic of 
Iran’ (2014) UN Doc A/HRC/28/12. 
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Twitter Characteristics 
 
These were the two smallest campaigns in the study, with 1,093 (#stopstoning) and 7,173 
(#letwomengotostadium) total Tweets analysed.  Analysis indicates that the campaigns were 
just big enough to garner a baseline level of international attention which appeared to lead to 
backlash against foreign interference, but not big enough to rise to the level of combined 
foreign and domestic pressure needed to push for positive change.  These campaigns showed 
high proportions of non-domestic users and, given that these are not English-speaking 
countries, a relatively high proportion of Tweets in English.  Across all of the Twitter 
variables, these two campaigns showed a marked lack of persistence, low levels of 
engagement, and high proportions of non-domestic users.  These characteristics opened the 
door to backlash (against the foreign intervention) without repercussions, with the lack of 
domestic drive providing no incentives or pressure.   
It is therefore possible that the negative foreign attention combined with the lack of domestic 
pressure created an environment conducive to government backlash, contributing to the 
regressive outcomes explored above.  This is one of the key critiques of the spiral model.   
The model does not allow any room for the very real risk that governments may exhibit a 
negative backlash against the transnational pressure, leading to outcomes which can be more 
negative than positive.  These campaigns seem to provide empirical evidence of this risk.  
This is also one of the major risks inherent in social media campaigns.  There is no control 
over who will and who will not participate in a campaign.  It is impossible when a campaign 
starts in earnest to predict whether there will be enough domestic pressure alongside a 
balanced amount of transnational pressure.  These campaigns very much illustrate these risks.   
Persistence (Tweets per day) 
 
#stopstoning and #letwomengotostadium showed poor indicators of persistence.  These 
campaigns did not have the long-term investment that the other campaigns had, despite the 
fact that #stopstoning was the longest running campaign in the study.  #stopstoning showed a 
very low variation in the number of Tweets per day, with an average of 0.46 (indicating the 
high number of days with 0 Tweets) and a standard deviation of 5.09 – meaning that across 
the campaign the majority of days had somewhere between zero and five Tweets per day.  
This, compared to other campaigns, is very low. Of note, the only two #stopstoning peaks 
were organisationally driven by Women Living Under Muslim Law (‘WLUML’).  The first 
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occurred when WLUML started a change.org petition for Sakineh and again when WLUML 
organised a ‘Thunderclap’ social media event to gather support and attention.  Other days 
with small peaks revolved around landmarks in Sakineh’s case.  Interestingly, there was only 
Tweet when she was released and pardoned for good behaviour.  #stopstoning simply did not 
attract the levels of sustained attention as the other campaigns.  It may be because it started 
fairly early, in 2010.  This was only four years after Twitter began.  Other campaigns which 
started after Twitter had become more popular may have seen better success in gathering 
supporters.   
#letwomengotostadium had higher peaks and more fluctuation in both domestic and 
international attention, indicating interest and involvement, but overall the campaign did not 
sustain the peak levels.  There were only two peak days and one peak period, centred around 
the annual tournament in Tehran.  The rest of the campaign was relatively quiet, with just a 
handful of Tweets keeping the momentum, exhibiting similar characteristics to #stopstoning.   
Also of note, there was very little social media attention when the British Iranian woman was 
released, although some international media outlets did pick up the story.  Both campaigns 
showed very long periods of complete inactivity.   
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Figure 3.1: Timeline of Tweets in #stopstoning and #letwomengotostadium 
 
 
Two of the most prominent variables in this study are the number of days in the campaign 
with more than zero Tweets and the number with more than five Tweets.  Campaigns with 
more ‘active’ days throughout showed much more positive legal change.  Overall, this tells us 
that while peaks may matter in gathering attention, continued and sustained activity matters 
too.  The Iranian campaigns showed the greatest numbers and proportions of inactive days, 
thus not showing the kind of pressure needed for the government to institute change.    
Engagement (Retweets, Likes, and Replies) 
 
The #stopstoning campaign had an exceptionally low reply to Tweet ratio; it did not therefore 
spark much dialogue or inter-user engagement.  Very few users replied to Tweets in the 
campaign.  There was a higher ratio of Retweets to Tweets, at 1.55.  This means that for 
every Tweet there were between one and two Retweets.  These ratios show a general lack of 
engagement with the campaign.  #letwomengotostadium produced a different but equally 
important engagement metric in the extraordinarily high ratio of likes to Tweets at 6.78.  This 
was consistently high during both peak and non-peak periods.  For comparison, other 
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campaigns ranged from 0.2 to 2.7, thus underscoring the exceptional nature of this 
campaign’s level of like activity.   
Another method of measuring engagement is the log(n) log(s) plot, explained fully in 
Appendix 5.  The two Iranian campaigns’ behavioural patterns are as follows: 
Figure 3.2: log(n) log(s) plot for #stopstoning 
 
 
Figure 3.3:log(n) log(s) plot for #letwomengotostadium 
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These are very different patterns.  Although there are far fewer engagements in the 
#stopstoning campaign due to the small number of overall Tweets, a pattern can still be seen, 
with a sharp gradient in likes and a more moderate gradient in replies and Retweets.  This 
shows that there are comparable numbers of Tweets being liked many times, but far fewer 
Tweets being liked only a few times.   Contrast #letwomengotostadium, where, as expected 
given the above discussion, the gradient for likes is much less steep, indicating that while 
there are expected numbers of Tweets being liked many times, there are also very high 
numbers of Tweets being liked just a few times.  #letwomengotostadium showed the most 
gradual slope for likes in the entire study.  We also see in #letwomengotostadium an even 
steeper slope for replies, showing again that while there are the expected low numbers of 
Tweets being replied to many times, there is equally a low number of Tweets being replied to 
a few times.  This reflects the overall lack of dialogue in this campaign. 
The striking level of likes in #letwomengotostadium errs towards Gladwell or Morovoz’s 
theories on slactivism.93  Similarly, #stopstoning showed very low levels of replies.  Neither 
campaign produced dialogue or debate, indicative of the lack of sustained attention and 
engagement.  Again, these factors all remove any pressure or incentive on governments to 
institute change.  If the campaign does not spark attention or engagement with followers, then 
the drivers of change are not likely strong enough to pressurise the government.   
Users (profiles of 100 most active users) 
 
These campaigns showed the lowest percentages of domestic users, one of the central 
critiques to the spiral model.  Here, the lack of domestic drive (alongside the lack of 
persistence and engagement) likely allowed the government backlash without repercussion.  
Having such low percentages of domestic users in the top 100 (1% and 32% respectively) 
rendered these campaigns particularly foreign.  These campaigns were not driven or ‘owned’ 
by Iranian women.  This lack of domestic voice is likely associated with a negative impact on 
the end result.  These campaigns are striking examples of the harm that can result from a 
campaign which is perceived as ‘Western’ pushing for change in a non-Western setting, 
coupled with an absence of domestic voices.  Quotes and actions from the Iranian 
 
93 Malcolm Gladwell, ‘Small Change’ [2010] The New Yorker 
<http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/10/04/small-change-malcolm-gladwell> accessed 14 March 2016; 
Malcolm Gladwell and Clay Shirky, ‘From Innovation to Revolution: Do Social Media Make Protests 
Possible?’ (2011) 90 Foreign Affairs 153; Evgeny Morovoz, ‘The Internet’ (2010) 179 Foreign Policy 40; 
Evgeny Morozov, The Net Delusion: How Not to Liberate the World (Allen Lane 2011). 
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governments, both in relation to these campaigns and on women’s rights in general, showed a 
very clear backlash against foreign interventions.  Had these campaigns been more 
domestically driven, and had they garnered inescapable international attention which rose to 
the level of incentivising change, then perhaps the legal outcomes would have been different.  
However, they ended up sitting in a void of sorts, with just enough foreign voices to spark 
backlash from the Iranian government, but not enough domestic and international attention to 
necessitate change.   
Digging deeper into the profiles of the 100 most active users, there is another interesting, and 
perhaps damaging, aspect.  In both campaigns, Tweets from the 100 most active users made 
up a larger proportion of the total campaign than seen in other, more successful, campaigns.  
Although this is partially due to the smaller number of Tweets and users overall, it still 
indicates that the campaign was driven by a relatively small user group, which we now know 
was also foreign.   
Coding the profiles into broad categories showed some interesting results in both campaigns, 
though particularly in #stopstoning.  This campaign was overwhelmingly foreign-driven; 
most of the foreign users were individuals or organisations (i.e. WLUML).  Non-domestic 
individuals accounted for 51% of the Tweets sent from the 100 most active users and 24% of 
the reach.  Non-domestic organisations came in at 28% and 36%.  Notably, there was a group 
of European Union politicians who became very active in the campaign.  However, as we 
have seen in reactions from the Iranian government, this Western involvement was not 
particularly well received.  It can be speculated, given the Iranian government’s discourse 
and rhetoric, that social media from EU MEPs would not be the kind of pressure that would 
lead to positive legal change.   
#letwomengotostadium was also heavily non-domestic, though not as striking as 
#stopstoning.  The largest category of users in the top 100 were non-domestic individuals.  
Although there were numerically fewer domestic individuals (16 compared to 28), they were 
far more prolific in their campaign activity, accounting for 34% of the Tweets from the 100 
most active users.  #letwomengotostadium did show less regressive results than #stopstoning, 
perhaps because of the stronger representation of domestic individuals in the campaign.  It is 
possible that this drive from individuals prevented #letwomengotostadium from the level of 
regression seen with #stopstoning.  In other words, this level of individual activity perhaps 
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did succeed in putting some pressure on the government – not enough to warrant change, but 
enough to curb some of the potential backlash seen in #stopstoning. 
The active organisations in the #stopstoning campaign notably had further reach (i.e. more 
followers) than active organisations in any other campaign – 380,814 compared to the other 
campaigns which ranged from 3,681 (#women2drive) on the lowest end to the high end at 
132,943 from #niunamenos.  This indicates that high levels of activity from organisations 
with far reach does not equate to higher levels of positive change.  These organisations were 
also more active, proportionally, in #stopstoning than in other campaigns (responsible for 
28% of the most active users’ Tweets as compared to 1-19% in other campaigns). Perhaps as 
the active organisations in #stopstoning were overwhelmingly foreign, this reach and activity 
level actually worked against the campaign, promulgating the saviour savage dichotomy 
which sparked regressive backlash from the Iranian government.94   
Content Analysis (Sentiment, Personalisation, Framing, Messaging, and Norms) 
 
The analysis of content paints a varied but interesting picture.  Both campaigns showed very 
little reference to female or male pronouns, with average presence of first-person pronouns.  
Most campaigns in this study show more references to ‘her’ or ‘she’, indicating a 
personalisation of the campaign and a focus on (usually) a female victim.  However these 
backlash campaigns showed almost no female pronouns.  Equally, other campaigns show at 
least some presence of male pronouns such as ‘he’ or ‘his’.  Generally, this also indicates 
personalisation, albeit against a perpetrator.  In these campaigns, there were no male 
pronouns in the analysis.  These campaigns may therefore have had a less ‘personal’ 
approach, focussing on population level changes not individual cases. 
  
 
94 Makau W Mutua, ‘Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights’ 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1525547> accessed 21 October 2018. 
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Both campaigns showed a fairly high presence of organically emerging but consistent 
framing and messaging.  The figure below is a visual representation of the words most oft-
used across the whole of the campaign; the larger the font the more the word appeared in 
Tweets.  
Figure 3.4: Consistently used words, #stopstoning 
 
Figure 3.5: Consistently used words, #letwomengotostadium 
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As seen earlier in this chapter, many of the peaks in #stopstoning related to organisationally 
driven activities, such as Thunderclaps.  It is interesting to see that so many of the Tweets in 
this campaign contained words such as please, sign, today, and petition.   It is also notable 
that the hashtags #VAW and #humanrights and the word countries were consistent in the 
campaign, showing perhaps the high level of non-domestic users (these are very ‘global’ 
terms).  #letwomengotostadium showed very subject specific words, such as stadiums, 
volleyball, enter, gym, game, and ban or banned.  The consistent messages in these two 
campaigns were very different from each other.  #stopstoning overall showed a more global 
campaign focus, while #letwomengotostadium was very focussed on the domestic issue.   
Organic framing and messaging, as defined in this study (see also Appendix 5), are those 
words which emerge from the campaign but come and go based on time periods.  In other 
words, they are the topics which everyone ‘talks about’ for a few days, then they wither 
away.  High presence of these organic messages are negatively associated with government 
backlash specifically in dialogue with UN treaty bodies.  #stopstoning showed the highest 
presence of organic framing and the most government backlash of any campaign.  It is likely 
that this relationship emerges from the lack of controlled messaging on social media.   
Content tables (Appendix 4) show the ebb and flow of the campaigns over the event-defined 
time periods.  Interestingly, #stopstoning began domestically focussed, with many specific 
cases and women referenced.  Over time, it appears that the campaign took on a more 
‘global’ tone, which may relate to the findings earlier in this chapter regarding the lack of 
domestic focus and the lack of domestic drive in this campaign.  It appears that the Tweet 
contents reflect this characteristic of this campaign, which is likely to have contributed to the 
backsliding effect.   
#letwomengotostadium told a more domestic story, at times with reference to the religious 
fundamentalism against which the campaigners were fighting and specific domestic politics 
(i.e. ‘Rouhani’).  This may be why there were some positive outcomes in the campaign.  
However, the overall messaging seems very ‘factual’ relating to sporting events themselves.  
Perhaps the lack of strong framing and messaging in this campaign contributed to the overall 
lack of change.   
Across all the campaigns, the percent of international norms which are present to any extent 
is statistically significant.  These campaigns, unsurprisingly, showed very little representation 
of international women’s rights norms.  #stopstoning in fact showed the least number of 
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international norms at just 23%.  By way of comparison, #women2drive showed 86%.  This 
lack of invoking international norms seems to relate to a lack of success. 
Conclusion 
 
In short, these two campaigns illustrate the critique of the spiral model on the risk of 
government backlash.  The characteristics of the Twitter campaigns opened the door to this 
risk which was manifested in the regressive outcomes, albeit to different degrees.  Both 
campaigns lacked in persistence and engagement, and the low levels of activity that did occur 
were non-domestically driven.  Although consistent messaging was exhibited, without 
persistence, engagement, or domestic pressure, in essence, it did not matter.   The 
#stopstoning campaign is associated with a change in the penal code which now allows for 
stoning to be used at the discretion of local judges, and evidence indicates that more women 
have been stoned since the campaign began than before.  The dialogue with UN treaty bodies 
manifested hostility towards Westernism, thus unsurprising that a campaign which is 
perceived as Western-driven would not be associated with positive outcomes.  Similarly, 
#letwomengotostadium has not led to changes in the ban bar one isolated incident, yet more 
egregious examples of arbitrary arrest and detention have been seen in reaction to the 
campaign.   
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Introduction 
 
The next group of campaigns showed, on balance, little to no change.  There were gains in 
some areas and losses in others, rendering the situation for women and girls on the ground no 
different than before the campaigns.  While the gains and losses differed in each campaign, 
these campaigns showed striking similarities in Twitter behaviours.  They all gained 
significant attention in the time frame immediately after the spark incidents, but very quickly 
faded from public consciousness.  It appears as though this initial mass interest led to some 
small changes but without continued public pressure or interest the governments were free to 
ignore the long-term goals of the campaigns.   
#farkhunda campaign overview 
 
On 19 March, 2015, an Afghan mob attacked and killed Farkhunda Malikzada in the streets 
of Kabul.  She had been in an altercation with a caretaker at a shrine, and he loudly accused 
her of burning the Koran.  He was illiterate and it later emerged was selling illegal items from 
the shrine.  She was, in fact, a religious scholar.  A mob of men formed and beat her, stoned 
her, threw her off a building, drove over her body, burned her, and left her in the dry river 
bed.  Police were present but were unable to stop the mob.  The incident was caught on video 
and shared online.  Some officials, believing her guilt, endorsed the incident in the aftermath.  
It quickly became clear that she was innocent, and the resulting outrage led to one of the 
largest protests ever in Afghanistan.  It did not go unnoticed that the attack was not carried 
out by Taliban, but rather by ‘normal’ Afghan men, wearing jeans and T-shirts.1  One news 
commentator shared this insightful perspective on the protests and their portrayal on social 
media: ‘an extremely disturbing selfie mania, the narcissistic tradition of our generation, 
found its way among the crowd. Pictures with the signs. Pictures with the crowd. Tweet. 
Tweet. Tweet. It all became about "me, myself, and I."’2  
 
1 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, ‘Report to the United States Congress’ (2016) 10; 
Zarghuna Kargar, ‘Farkhunda: The Making of a Martyr’ BBC News (11 August 2015) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-33810338> accessed 23 May 2017. 
2 ‘Farkhunda’s Murder: A National Tragedy’ (TOLOnews) <https://www.tolonews.com/opinion/farkhundas-
murder-national-tragedy> accessed 29 December 2018. 
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The focus of the campaign was on the lack of law enforcement, including police and their 
perceived impunity, as well as a call for proper and transparent trials of those involved.3  
Unfortunately, the international public pressure led to hasty trials, the verdicts of which were 
then overturned.  Criticism of the government’s approach was rife:4   
When we began speaking out along with thousands of Afghans around the world, 
we hoped that Farkhunda’s murderers would be brought to justice and that her 
case would set a precedent for the legal system to protect the safety and rights of 
Afghan women. But a year later, the lack of justice has had significant 
implications for women’s rights in Afghanistan, where the majority of 
perpetrators of violence against women never face legal repercussions. The 
government’s failure to maintain justice has emboldened criminals and left 
Afghan women more vulnerable to violence.5 
#sendeanlat campaign overview 
 
On 11 February, 2015, Turkish student Ozgelan Aslan was murdered.  A bus driver attempted 
to rape her, and when she fought back, he killed her.  He called his father and a friend who 
both then attempted to assist the driver in covering up the murder and disposing of the body.  
Her body was not found until the 13th.  No lawyer would agree to defend the perpetrators, and 
all three were convicted and given aggravated life sentences without the possibility of parole.  
The driver was given additional time but was subsequently murdered in prison. 
The hashtag #sendeanlat emerged, which means ‘share your story’, as a way for women to 
show how many have been affected by violence or femicide in Turkey.6  The hashtag led to 
 
3 ‘Thousands March in Kabul Demanding Justice for Woman Killed by Mob’ The Guardian (24 March 2015) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/24/farkhunda-thousands-march-in-kabul-demanding-justice-
for-woman-killed-by-mob> accessed 23 May 2017; ‘Afghan Woman Lynched by Mob Becomes Rights 
Symbol’ CBS News <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/afghan-woman-farkhunda-lynched-mob-rights-symbol/> 
accessed 29 December 2018. 
4 Human Rights Watch expressed concern over the quick trial: "This trial leaves the impression that the Afghan 
government wants a quick and dirty process to get this case out of the headlines and move on -- rather than real 
justice and a real examination of how such a terrible attack could have happened," ‘Farkhunda Murder: 4 
Sentenced To Death’ (TOLOnews) <https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/farkhunda-murder-4-sentenced-
death> accessed 29 December 2018. 
5 ‘A Year Later, Still No Justice for Farkhunda’ (Foreign Policy) <https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/01/a-year-
later-still-no-justice-for-farkhunda/> accessed 23 May 2017. 
6 Helen Davidson, ‘Rape and Murder of Young Woman Sparks Mass Twitter Protest in Turkey’ The Guardian 
(17 February 2015) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/17/turkish-woman-ozgecan-aslans-sparks-
anti-violence-campaign-sendeanlat> accessed 3 August 2017; Mustafa Akyol, ‘The Monsters among Us’ 
(Hürriyet Daily News) <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/the-monsters-among-
us.aspx?pageID=449&nID=78486&NewsCatID=411> accessed 3 August 2017; ‘Turkey Women Share 
Harassment Stories after Grim Murder’ Al Jazeera 
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several protests and rallies in Turkey and around the world to raise awareness of the high 
rates of violence against women in Turkey.7  Ozgecan’s murder and the hashtag campaign 
became flashpoints of anger about the rising levels of femicide, the lack of prosecutions, and 
the loopholes in the Turkish laws that allowed many perpetrators to secure reduced sentences 
or easy appeals.  Laws were in place to address the issue of femicide, but they were not being 
implemented or making a difference on the ground.  Stemming from the hashtag campaign, 
‘Ozgecan’s Law’ was proposed, which was intended to prevent the reduction of sentences of 
perpetrators but was never passed into law.   The campaign seems to have led to prosecution 
in this particular case, but no reduction in the numbers of femicide victims nor a meaningful 
change in the law.8  Deeply rooted patriarchy and push back against the West were also 
exposed in the government’s discourse around women and equality.9 
#mydressmychoice campaign overview 
 
On 7 November, 2014, a woman was publicly stripped and beaten at a bus stop in Nairobi, 
Kenya.  She was called ‘jezebel’ and was accused of ‘tempting’ men in the area, based on a 
perception of the clothing she was wearing.  The attack was videotaped, and the video 
quickly went viral online.  In the aftermath, more public strippings took place.10  It became 
 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/02/150216101649506.html> accessed 3 August 2017; Jim Roberts, 
‘Turkish Women Launch Twitter Campaign against Sexual Violence’ (Mashable) 
<http://mashable.com/2015/02/16/ozgecan-aslan-sparks-sexual-violence-hashtag/> accessed 3 August 2017; 
‘Turkish Women Relate Sexual Harassment Stories via Social Media’ (Hürriyet Daily News) 
<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-women-relate-sexual-harassment-stories-via-social-media-
.aspx?pageID=238&nID=78413&NewsCatID=341> accessed 3 August 2017; ‘Turkish Women Share Stories of 
Abuse’ BBC News (17 February 2015) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/blogs-trending-31504416> accessed 3 
August 2017; Charlotte Alfred, ‘Women In Turkey Share Devastating Stories Of Sexual Harassment In 
#Sendeanlat Twitter Campaign’ Huffington Post (17 February 2015) 
<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/02/17/turkey-sendeanlat-twitter-campaign_n_6699702.html>. 
7 Davidson (n 6); ‘Attacks on Women Continue In Turkey Despite Protests Over Student’s Brutal Murder’ 
(VICE News) <https://news.vice.com/article/attacks-on-women-continue-in-turkey-despite-protests-over-
students-brutal-murder> accessed 3 August 2017; ‘Protests Across Turkey Denounce Violence Against Women 
After Student’s Brutal Murder’ (VICE News) <https://news.vice.com/article/protests-across-turkey-denounce-
violence-against-women-after-students-brutal-murder> accessed 3 August 2017; ‘Thousands Protest Murder of 
Özgecan Aslan’ (Hürriyet Daily News) <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/thousands-protest-murder-of-
ozgecan-aslan-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=78520&NewsCatID=341> accessed 3 August 2017. 
8 Caitlinrose Fisher, ‘Legislation Is Not Enough: Turkey Fails to Enforce Its Violence Against Women Laws’ 
(Global Rights for Women, 10 April 2015) <http://globalrightsforwomen.org/2015/04/10/legislation-is-not-
enough-turkey-fails-to-enforce-its-violence-against-women-laws/> accessed 3 August 2017. 
9 Mehmet Yilmaz, ‘Why the Insistence on “Turkish-Style” Rules?’ (Hürriyet Daily News) 
<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/why-the-insistence-on-turkish-style-
rules.aspx?pageID=449&nID=96240&NewsCatID=503> accessed 3 August 2017; ‘Explained: How Özgecan"s 
Murder United, Divided Turkey’ (Hürriyet Daily News) <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/explained-how-
ozgecans-murder-united-divided-turkey.aspx?pageID=238&nID=78414&NewsCatID=509> accessed 3 August 
2017. 
10 ‘#Mydressmychoice v #Nudityisnotmychoice’ (Go Woman Africa) 
<http://gowomanafrica.com/mydressmychoice-vs-nudityisnotmychoice/> accessed 6 November 2017. 
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clear that this type of incident was not new in Kenya, but in this case posting the video on 
social media pushed people to take action.11  The hashtag resulted in a large scale public 
protest in Nairobi, with both women and men turning out to say no to violence against 
women.12  On the one side, activists saw this as an act of violence against women, calling for 
stronger enforcement of existing laws.  On the other side, conservatives used the incident to 
call for new ‘decency’ laws to be passed, to control what women can and cannot wear in 
public.13  The counter-narrative in this campaign was very strong, and though male-
dominated it was not solely men who were advocating for decency laws.14  A similar issue 
was then deliberated in neighbouring countries Uganda and Namibia.15   Although extensive 
debate in the government ensued, it seems that none of the campaign goals were fully 
realised. 
 
 
 
11 Indhira Santos, ‘#MyDressMyChoice: Tackling Gender Discrimination and Violence in Kenya One Tweet at 
a Time’ (16 March 2015) <http://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/mydressmychoice-tackling-gender-
discrimination-and-violence-kenya-one-tweet-time> accessed 3 October 2017. 
12 ‘#MyDressMyChoice: Kenyans Hold Rally to Support Woman Beaten for Wearing Miniskirt’ 
<http://www.dw.com/en/mydressmychoice-kenyans-hold-rally-to-support-woman-beaten-for-wearing-
miniskirt/a-18069645> accessed 11 October 2017.   
The campaign officially called for the following: 
• “Immediately investigating and arresting all perpetrators of the attacks; urgently deploying police 
squads to public bus stations to prevent gender violence, including harassment. 
• More aggressively cracking down on those inciting violence and similar attacks on women, whether in 
public or on social media, pursuant to Section 96 of the Penal Code. 
• Comprehensively and urgently addressing the Kenyan Government’s obligation to combat violence 
against women, including: community sensitization and awareness campaigns, regulatory action to 
ensure accountability of bus operators, and necessary legal reforms to strengthen the 2006 Sexual 
Offenses Act in light of these offenses. 
• Urging the media to exercise caution in sharing the graphic videos of the women being attacked and 
stripped, as the videos re-victimize and stigmatize the survivors and are emboldening copycat 
criminals. Ultimately, these videos should be treated as evidence of criminal activity.”  ‘Stop the 
Violent Attacks on Women: #MyDressMyChoice’ (Equality Now) 
<https://www.equalitynow.org/stop_the_violent_attacks_on_women_mydressmychoice?locale=en> 
accessed 29 December 2018. 
 
13 ‘#MyDressMyChoice - Protests in Kenya after a Woman Is Publicly Stripped’ 
<https://www.globalcitizen.org/es/content/mydressmychoice-protests-in-kenya-after-a-woman-is/> accessed 6 
November 2017; ‘#MyDressMyChoice’ (14 November 2014) 
<http://africasacountry.com/2014/11/mydressmychoice/> accessed 3 October 2017; ‘My Dress, Whose Choice?’ 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/blogs/africa/2014/11/99751.html> accessed 6 November 2017. 
14 Basia Cummings, ‘Kenyans Protest after Woman Is Beaten and Stripped in Public’ The Guardian (17 
November 2014) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/17/kenya-mydressmychoice-protest-woman-
stripped> accessed 11 October 2017; ‘Stop the Violent Attacks on Women: #MyDressMyChoice’ (n 12). 
15 Cummings (n 14); ‘My Dress, Whose Choice?’ (n 13). 
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Context 
 
This group covers a very wide range of geo-political, socio-economic, and demographic 
environments.  It is also important to note the delicate political situations in Afghanistan and 
Turkey in particular – Afghanistan’s post-Taliban relationship with the US is complex and 
intricate, and Turkey’s ongoing relationship with the EU is equally fragile.  Generally, there 
are no discernible patterns in looking at the basic context variables for these three countries.  
Turkey and Kenya showed some of the highest gender equality indices of all eight 
campaigns, outranked only by Argentina.  This indicates that simply having a more equal 
society does not necessarily indicate that a women’s rights campaign will be successful.  
Afghanistan reported worse indicators of baseline gender equality than Iran yet showed more 
positive outcomes.16  This is an interesting finding, as it could have been hypothesised that 
countries with a better starting point for women would be more inclined to move towards 
more positive change.  However, this group of countries disproves that hypothesis on both 
ends – the countries with better indicators of gender equality did not show positive change, 
and the country with indicators showing the highest level of gender inequality did not show 
the most negative legal outcomes.  Another finding of note is the presence of women’s rights 
civil society organisations in these countries.  These countries all have a strong domestic 
movement with a healthy level of civil society activity.  Perhaps this prevented the countries 
from more negative legal outcomes.   
Legal Outcomes 
 
These campaigns showed, on average, little to no legal change.  Gains made in some areas 
were counter-balanced by negative outcomes in other areas.  #farkhunda showed particularly 
poor judicial outcomes but with somewhat positive legislative changes, #sendeanlat showed 
 
16 One day before her murder, Amnesty International issued a statement concerning the risks of violence against 
women in public in Afghanistan and the lack of law enforcement available to protect them.  Amnesty 
International, ‘UNAMA Mandate Extension a Clear Reminder to Prioritise Human Rights in Afghanistan’ 
(2015) 3.  The roots of violence against women in Afghanistan are deep and troubling.  See, e.g. ‘Farkhunda, 
Victim of a Society of Oppressors and the Oppressed’ (Radio Salam Watandar) 
<http://salamwatandar.com/english/Article.aspx?a=19458> accessed 1 June 2017.  Women were often targeted 
during the civil wars in the 1980s and 1990s, and when the Taliban took control the plight of women was even 
worse.  After the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, violence against women was widely practiced and tolerated.  
Amnesty International, ‘Afghanistan Women Still under Attack - a Systematic Failure to Protect’ (2005); 
Human Rights Watch, ‘The “Ten-Dollar Talib” and Women’s Rights Afghan Women and the Risks of 
Reintegration and Reconciliation’ (2010).  The attack on Farkhunda was 14 years into the new regime, less time 
than the entirety of the Taliban rule.   
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almost no change with the law proposed by the campaign never even voted on by the 
government, and #mydressmychoice showed slightly poor outcomes in the courts with 
slightly positive indications in the institutionalisation of ending violence against women.  On 
the whole, very little changed for women and girls living in Afghanistan, Turkey, or Kenya.   
Legislative Change 
 
Current legislative frameworks in Afghanistan are generally quite new, many passed since 
the fall of the Taliban in 2001.  While the Constitution continues to prioritise Islam, it also 
has several articles protecting women’s equality and bodily integrity.17  Afghanistan passed a 
progressive law to end violence against women in 2009 (‘EVAW’),18 however there is a large 
divide between legislating and implementation on the ground.19  Amnesty International found 
that the government was under international pressure to legislatively address violence against 
women, but that simply passing the law did not translate into changes on the ground.20  The 
UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (‘UNAMA’) reports also cite many weaknesses of the 
law.21  Major problems exist with the categorisation of cases and the continued use of 
traditional dispute resolution mechanisms.22  Using EVAW as a basis for judgment in court 
happened in just 4% of relevant total reported cases.23  
The law is legally binding as it was passed by the President, but it never went before 
Parliament.  Efforts to later strengthen the law then put it to Parliament where it was met with 
 
17 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan The Constitution of Afghanistan 2004 ss 22, 24, 44. 
18 Law on Elimination of Violence against Women (EVAW) 2009. 
19 Human Rights Watch, ‘“I Had to Run Away” The Imprisonment of Women and Girls for “Moral Crimes” in 
Afghanistan’ (2012) 104. 
20 Amnesty International, ‘UNAMA Mandate Extension a Clear Reminder to Prioritise Human Rights in 
Afghanistan’ (n 16) 4; Amnesty International, ‘Too Many Missed Opportunities: Human Rights in Afghanistan 
under the Karzai Administration’ (2014) 2; Amnesty International, ‘Back-Tracking, Compromises, and Failed 
Pledges - Human Rights Sidelined in Afghanistan.  Amnesty International Submission to the UN Universal 
Periodic Review’ (2014) 7. 
21 United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, ‘Still a Long Way to Go: Implementation of the Law on 
Elimination of Violence against Women in Afghanistan’ (2012) 11–12.  As also reported by SIGAR, “Many 
elements of the 2009 law seek to terminate the customs, traditions, and practices that allow or encourage 
violence against women. However, UNAMA found that many law enforcement authorities were either unaware 
of the law or were unwilling to enforce it, resulting in the persistence of acute gender inequity” Special 
Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, ‘Report to the United States Congress’ (2011) 84. 
22 United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, ‘A Long Way to Go: Implementation of the Elimination 
of Violence against Women Law in Afghanistan’ (2011) 21–26; United Nations Assistance Mission in 
Afghanistan, ‘Still a Long Way to Go: Implementation of the Law on Elimination of Violence against Women 
in Afghanistan’ (n 21) 48; United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, ‘A Way to Go: An Update on 
Implementation of the Law on Elimination of Violence against Women in Afghanistan’ (2013) 21–22. 
23 United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, ‘A Long Way to Go: Implementation of the Elimination 
of Violence against Women Law in Afghanistan’ (n 22) 10. 
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heated conservative backlash.24  One MP stated that he was ‘surprised that the president had 
issued the decree in the first place and hinted that the law was an attempt by foreigners to 
impose western values on Afghan society’. 25  Before the law could be overturned or 
overruled, it was sent back to Commissions for redrafting and clarifying.  This is a good 
indication of the tensions in the Afghani government, with one side driven by international 
pressures and incentives and the other supported by domestic religious conservatives.  This 
makes progress in the area of women’s rights and violence against women particularly 
difficult, not entirely dissimilar from Iran (though with a more complex relationship to the 
West), where tensions between central government and hard-line conservatives are palpable.   
After the attention the campaign brought to the issue, efforts to implement a new draft law on 
harassment of women intensified, intended to clarify some of the identified ambiguities in the 
EVAW law.26  The new law was passed by Parliament, but has not yet been signed by the 
President.27  However, within Afghan procedural law this means it is actually still applicable.  
This particular Act was apparently met with far less debate than the EVAW.  However, some 
are lobbying for the president not to sign it.28  Activists feel that the new law, rather than 
clarifying the EVAW, is actually duplicative and perhaps contradictory, covering some of the 
same crimes but in two different pieces of legislation.29   The laws are in flux, with strong 
groups lobbying for progressive and supportive laws and conservative groups lobbying for 
more traditional laws which are, arguably, less favourable for women.30  Therefore there is a 
potentially positive change in the efforts of the government, at least to some extent, to 
improve the existing law.  However, these improvements are not always in agreement with 
 
24 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, ‘Report to the United States Congress’ (2013) 139; 
Amnesty International, ‘Too Many Missed Opportunities: Human Rights in Afghanistan under the Karzai 
Administration’ (n 20) 3; Afghan Women’s Network, ‘Beijing+20 Afghanistan Civil Society Progress Report’ 
(2015) 21. 
25 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, ‘Report to the United States Congress’ (n 24) 139. 
26 ‘Harassment of Women in Afghanistan: A Hidden Phenomenon Addressed in Too Many Laws | Afghanistan 
Analysts Network’ <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/harassment-of-women-in-afghanistan-a-hidden-
phenomenon-addressed-in-too-many-laws/> accessed 1 June 2017. 
27 ibid; ‘Senate Approves Anti-Harassment Of Women And Children’s Act’ (TOLOnews) </afghanistan/senate-
approves-anti-harassment-women-and-childrens-act> accessed 1 June 2017. 
28 ‘New Afghan Law Targets Sexual Harassment’ (Institute for War and Peace Reporting) 
<https://iwpr.net/global-voices/new-afghan-law-targets-sexual-harassment> accessed 1 June 2017. 
29 ‘Harassment of Women in Afghanistan: A Hidden Phenomenon Addressed in Too Many Laws | Afghanistan 
Analysts Network’ (n 26). 
30 AWN Shadow report in 2016 stated: “The implementation of gender sensitive laws and policies remains 
limited, hindered by conservative forces, which consider women’s empowerment against the traditional values 
of Afghanistan as a country. There is a growing fear among women’s rights activists for the roll back of 
women’s rights that have been gained in the 15 years, as commitments made by the government continues to 
remain on paper alone” (AWN shadow, para 23).   
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the recommendations of women’s rights groups, nor are they being implemented properly by 
the authorities or the courts.31 
Moving to Turkey and the issues in the #sendeanlat campaign, there is a similar situation with 
legislative outcomes.  Turkey had been praised for legislating on violence against women.32  
However, in a 2011 Human Rights Watch report, the government’s response to domestic 
violence was seen as contradictory and full of gaps.33  This included a penal code provision 
which allowed for sentence mitigation based on ‘provocation’ or ‘incitement.’34  The report 
goes on to highlight the mistrust most women feel towards the police and the relevant 
authorities.35  This is echoed in a quote from a woman in Afghanistan when told about the 
new Harassment Law and the ability to lodge complaints: ‘That would make me happy.  But 
what would really be a big help is if the policemen themselves didn’t harass me.’36 
The problem therefore, similar to Afghanistan, is in implementation, particularly by 
authorities and the courts.37  For example, the Turkish law (Law No. 6284) provides for 
restraining orders and temporary protective measures, but the statistics show that many of the 
femicides occurred despite these mechanisms being in place.  In 2016, 6% of femicides were 
of women with existing protection orders, and 9% were killed despite asking for protection 
 
31 United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, ‘Justice through the Eyes of Afghan Women: Cases of 
Violence against Women Addressed through Mediation and Court Adjudication’ (2015). 
32 “the last decade has witnessed a ground-breaking shift in the legal approach to violence against women in 
Turkey, as almost all the inadequate or discriminatory provisions mentioned above have been changed. The 
primary driving force for these reforms has been the advocacy and lobbying efforts of a strong women’s 
movement in Turkey. These reforms have not only brought forth significant legislative advances, but also have 
led to a visible shift in terms of public discussion and attention to violence against women and challenging 
prevalent attitudes and constructs.”  Good Practices in Legislation on Violence against Women in Turkey and 
Problems of Implementation 2008 (EGM/GPLVAW/2008/EP13) 2. 
33 Human Rights Watch, ‘“He Loves You, He Beats You” Family Violence in Turkey and Access to Protection’ 
(2011). 
34 ibid. 
35 “Law enforcement officers often prioritize preserving family unity, and push battered women to reconcile 
with abusers rather than pursuing criminal investigations or assisting women in getting protection orders.”  ibid 
31. 
36 ‘New Afghan Law Targets Sexual Harassment’ (n 28). 
37 Republic of Turkey, ‘Report Submitted by Turkey Pursuant to Article 68, Paragraph 1 of the Council of 
Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Baseline 
Report)’ (2017); ‘Fighting for Women’s Rights in Turkey - International Viewpoint - Online Socialist 
Magazine’ <http://www.internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article3891> accessed 15 September 2017. 
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orders or when the orders expired – 15% in total.38  The same was true in the past with 10% 
in 2015,39  8.9% in 2014,40 and 13.5% in 2013.41   
Again, very similar to the situation in Afghanistan, a new law was proposed in the aftermath 
of the #sendeanlat campaign which was never passed.  It was known as ‘Ozgecan’s law’ and 
would have amended the Turkish Criminal Law Article 82 to specify gender-based killing, as 
well as amending articles 85-86 and 106 to reflect gender-based killing.42  The proposed law 
changed the permissibility of postponing punishment in the Execution Act, particularly on the 
grounds of mental illness as statistics show this is abused as a justification in femicides.43  
Finally, the law called for changes to sentencing to ensure that perpetrators are not released 
early.44  The government promised to pass the law in 2015 but it was delayed on more than 
one occasion, and in fact has never been passed.45   
Finally turning to Kenya, once again a very similar legislative picture exists.  Fairly robust 
laws were in place to protect women from violence, yet violence continued.  After the 
campaign, a new law was proposed to bolster existing legislation, but it was rejected by 
Parliament.  Prior to the campaign, in 2006, Kenya had enacted the Sexual Offences Act, the 
first legislation in Kenya to recognise sexual harassment as a crime.  It covers a wide range of 
sexual offences, importantly with commensurate minimum sentences, an improvement over 
 
38 ‘Men Kill At Least 261 Women, Girls in 2016’ (Bianet - Bagimsiz Iletisim Agi) 
<http://www.bianet.org/english/women/183255-men-kill-at-least-261-women-girls-in-2016> accessed 7 August 
2017. 
39 ‘Men Kill over 284 Women in 2015’ (Bianet - Bagimsiz Iletisim Agi) 284 
<http://www.bianet.org/english/women/172165-men-kill-over-284-women-in-2015> accessed 7 August 2017. 
40 ‘Men Kill 281 Women in 2014’ (Bianet - Bagimsiz Iletisim Agi) 
<http://www.bianet.org/english/women/161678-men-kill-281-women-in-2014> accessed 7 August 2017. 
41 ‘Men Kill 214 Women in 2013’ (Bianet - Bagimsiz Iletisim Agi) 214 
<http://www.bianet.org/english/women/152706-men-kill-214-women-in-2013> accessed 7 August 2017. 
42 ‘Platform Law Proposal Full Text to Stop the Murder of Women’ 
<https://kadincinayetlerinidurduracagiz.net/haklarimiz/2251/kadin-cinayetlerini-durduracagiz-platformu-yasa-
teklifi-tam-metni> accessed 15 September 2017. 
43 ibid. 
44 ibid; Agence France-Presse, ‘Three Men Get Life Sentence for Murder and Attempted Rape of Student in 
Turkey’ The Guardian (4 December 2015) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/04/three-men-life-
sentence-murder-student-turkey-ozgecan-aslan>; ‘Femicides on the Rise as Watchdog Releases First Quarter 
Figures’ (Hürriyet Daily News) <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/femicides-on-the-rise-as-watchdog-
releases-first-quarter-figures.aspx?pageID=238&nID=97398&NewsCatID=339> accessed 3 August 2017; 
Christina Asquith, ‘Ozgecan Aslan and Violence Against Women in Turkey’ The New York Times (23 February 
2015) <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/24/opinion/ozgecan-aslan-and-violence-against-women-in-
turkey.html>. 
45 ‘Sign the Petition’ (Change.org) <https://www.change.org/p/özgecanyasası-çıksın-yasalar-kadınları-korusun-
ba-yildirim> accessed 15 September 2017; ‘Sadece 2016’da 236 Kadın #25Kasım’ (Change.org) 
<https://www.change.org/p/%C3%B6zgecanyasas%C4%B1-%C3%A7%C4%B1ks%C4%B1n-yasalar-
kad%C4%B1nlar%C4%B1-korusun-ba-yildirim/u/18584990> accessed 15 September 2017. 
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the discretion previously allowed under the Penal Code.46  The Sexual Offense Act of 2006 
was intended to be a major improvement over previous laws.  It took many iterations and 
debates to reach a point of majority support.47  Yet, once again, problems in implementation 
by authorities and judges allowed violence against women to continue.48  
After the campaign, some progress was initially made with a handful of legislative updates to 
protect women passed by Parliament.49   But a new proposed law, the Sexual Offences 
(Amendment) Bill 2016 was rejected by MPs in February 2017.50   The amendments were 
intended to criminalise unwanted contact and bargaining around sexual attacks.51  The bill 
was supported by women’s rights groups.  It was reported that mostly male ministers rejected 
the amendments, claiming that the amendments could be easily misinterpreted.  Although 
there were parts that had support, such as establishing specialised units in police stations, the 
bill was thrown out in its entirety.52 
The issue of decency laws is still ripe.  Of note, before #mydressmychoice, there was a 
proposed bill in a Kenyan county to ‘ban the miniskirt’.53  Then in 2015, not long after the 
campaign, some universities in Kenya began to pass and enforce dress codes on campus 
 
46  (Kenya Law: Situational Analysis and the Legal Framework on Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in 
Kenya: Challenges and Opportunities http://kenyalaw.org/kl/index.php?id=4512 (last visited Nov 6, 2017).   
47 ‘Choike - Legislating against Sexual Violence: The Kenyan Experience’ 
<http://www.choike.org/nuevo_eng/informes/4717.html> accessed 11 October 2017; Agency for Cooperation 
and Research in Development, ‘Making the Law Count: Kenya: An Audit of Legal Practice on Sexual Violence’ 
(2009) 17. 
48 “The novel provisions within the SOA may lead one to conclude that all loopholes in the law have been 
sealed, that SGBV cases are now easily prosecuted in the Kenyan legal system and that survivors are now 
benefitting from a gender and survivor friendly judicial process in Kenya. However, the law still has some 
challenges in applicability.” Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development (n 47) 17. 
49 “There has been some progress to get justice for women being publicly assaulted in Kenya. In late December 
2014, the Security Laws (Amendment) Act of 2014 became law. While there are serious issues surrounding 
provisions in the law that run counter to protecting human rights, Article 17 criminalizes these strippings.”  
‘Stop the Violent Attacks on Women: #MyDressMyChoice’ (n 12). 
50 Daniel Psirmoi, ‘MPs Reject Changes to Sex Offences Law’ (The Standard) 
<https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001229527/mps-reject-changes-to-sex-offences-law> accessed 11 
October 2017. 
51 The Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 2016 included the following amendments: 
• Defining “indecent act”  more broadly, including unwanted touching or exposure 
• Increasing fines 
• A provision whereby perpetrators are excluded from care work 
• Tightens provisions for plea bargaining, so that individuals who sought to cover up their crime have a 
minimum sentence 
• More special units and training for law enforcement 
• Sex education in schools 
52 Psirmoi (n 50). 
53 ‘Kenyan Politician Wants to Ban Miniskirts and Tight Trousers’ (Index on Censorship, 12 March 2014) 
<https://www.indexoncensorship.org/2014/03/kenya-county-wants-ban-miniskirts-tight-trousers/> accessed 6 
November 2017. 
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which called for ‘decent’ dressing.54  One commentator posited that ‘Perhaps these schools 
are “protecting” their students from self-styled “fashion police” who have attacked and 
stripped women on the streets of Nairobi and other major towns in Kenya…in the-not-so-
distant past over what they consider “inappropriate dressing”.’55 In September 2017, county 
employees in two counties in Kenya were ordered to ‘dress decently’.56  Similar tactics were 
used in neighbouring Uganda, where a dress code was passed in 2017 for civil servants.57  
Also in Uganda, an anti-pornography bill (which is also known to be used as a decency law to 
regulate women’s attire) was also then reviewed but passed muster and is still in force.58  
There were very similar legislative outcomes across all three of these campaigns.  Fairly 
robust and modern laws on violence against women existed prior to the incidents which 
sparked the campaigns.  However, significant problems in implementation of these laws were 
identified in all three countries which allowed for the spark incidents of violence against 
women to occur.  The attention these campaigns brought to the issues seemed to result in 
proposed changes to the existing laws, intended to fill gaps and improve implementation.  In 
Afghanistan, the new law is in effect (though not officially passed) but has been met with 
criticism from advocates and thus far has not made much difference on the ground.  Issues in 
implementation, particularly dealing with authorities and the courts, have not changed.  In 
both Turkey and Kenya, the proposed new laws failed in Parliament.  These campaigns did 
not achieve the desired legislative changes.   
 
 
 
54 ArtMattersInfo, ‘Kenyan Universities Call for “Decent” Dressing and Grooming’ (ArtMatters.Info, 18 
November 2015) <http://artmatters.info/2015/11/kenyan-universities-call-for-decent-dressing-and-grooming/> 
accessed 6 November 2017. 
55 ibid. 
56 ‘County Staff Asked to Dress Decently’ (Daily Nation) <http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Nakuru--Nyandarua-
counties-ask-staff-to-dress-decently/1056-4081652-11cjwvdz/index.html> accessed 6 November 2017; 
‘Understanding Africa’s “Fashion Gestapo”: Miniskirts, Maxi Skirts Make-up and Long Beards’ (MG Africa, 5 
December 2014) <http://mgafrica.com/article/2014-12-04-understanding-africas-fashion-police/> accessed 6 
November 2017. 
57 Patience Atuhaire, ‘Mini-Skirts and Morals in Uganda’ BBC News (9 July 2017) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-40507843> accessed 6 November 2017; Anneeth Kaur Hundle, 
‘Uganda’s Colonial-Style Dress Code’ <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/08/uganda-colonial-
style-dress-code-170808072148083.html> accessed 6 November 2017. 
58 ‘Uganda Bans Miniskirts as MPs Pass Anti-Pornography Bill’ The Independent (19 December 2013) 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/no-thighs-please-uganda-bans-miniskirts-as-mps-pass-anti-
pornography-bill-9016686.html> accessed 6 November 2017; But see ‘Women Free to Wear Miniskirts - 
Lokodo’ (Daily Monitor) <http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Women-free-to-wear-miniskirts---
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Institutionalisation 
 
Starting again with Afghanistan and #farkhunda, some positive changes were seen in the 
institutionalisation of women’s rights norms after the attention drawn to the issue by social 
media.  In the years leading up to her murder, the Afghan government was continually 
criticised for not doing enough to protect women.  In 2011, Trust found that Afghanistan was 
the world’s most dangerous place for women.59  In 2012, the Afghan Women’s Network 
stated they were ‘concerned that there is a lack of genuine commitment by the government to 
protect women’s rights.’60  According to Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 
Reconstruction (‘SIGAR’), there were warnings that women’s rights could face serious 
challenges and backsliding with the withdrawal of US troops in 2014.61  Then just four days 
before her murder, President Ghani was in Washington D.C. giving a speech to US Congress 
in which he spent significant time emphasising the importance of equality for women.62  
Given the complex history and delicate relations with the West, and the US in particular, 
Ghani’s speech may very well have been an act of lip service rather than an actual indication 
of domestic political will to change.  It could also be indicative of the domestic tensions in 
Afghanistan, between elected government officials determining foreign policies and religious 
leaders focussed domestically, similar to Iran, and reflecting the critiques of the spiral model 
identified by Borzel and Risse regarding lack of domestic capacity.63  Either way, the 
government had not made efforts to improve women’s rights in the years leading up to 
Farkhunda’s death.    
 
59 ‘The World’s Most Dangerous Countries for Women 2011’ <http://news.trust.org/spotlight/the-worlds-most-
dangerous-countries-for-women-2011> accessed 19 June 2017. 
60 Afghan Women’s Network, ‘Afghanistan CEDAW Shadow (NGO) Report’ (2012) 27–28. 
61 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, ‘Report to the United States Congress’ (n 24) 140; 
Amnesty International, ‘Strengthening the Rule of Law and Protection of Human Rights, Including Women’s 
Rights, Is Key to Any Development Plan for Afghanistan: Open Letter to Participants in the International 
Donors Conference on Afghanistan in Tokyo’ (2012). 
62 “A mental and cultural revolution must take place over the treatment of women in and by our society. There is 
no point talking about how much we respect women’s honour, if we let it go unpunished or allow harassment in 
our streets.  We’ve signed the global conventions to end discrimination again women and we will implement 
them vigorously but work is still need to convince our [people?] that protection of women’s’ rights is part and 
parcel of their own quest for social justice.  I as the leader of Afghanistan am personally committed to work with 
the mullah, activists, and top leaders of our country to bring about this mental change.” John Boehner, President 
Ashraf Ghani of Afghanistan’s Address to a Joint Meeting of Congress 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cgqc7MO9zl0>. 
63 Tanja Borzel and Thomas Risse, ‘Human Rights in Areas of Limited Statehood: The New Agenda’ in Thomas 
Risse-Kappen and Stephen C Ropp (eds), The persistent power of human rights: from commitment to 
compliance (Cambridge University Press 2013). 
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The #farkhunda incident therefore was, sadly, not surprising.  The government did make 
some attempts after the campaign to make progress in the institutionalisation of the 
elimination of violence against women.  For example, the High Commission and 
Commissions for the Elimination of Violence Against Women ‘increased’ from 2014-2016, a 
‘trust fund’ was established to deal with cases of violence against women, a department in the 
Attorney General Office was created to combat violence against women, and there was the 
adoption of a regulation for the prevention of sexual harassment.64  The government spoke 
about the importance of awareness raising, stating they were using schools and media outlets 
to reach the general population.65 
However once again frontline change did not seem to follow.  SIGAR undertook interviews 
with Afghan women in 2016 to learn more about progress and challenges.  Security was the 
main challenge that women reported.  Interviewees reported that there was ‘backlash’ and 
that violence was on the rise.66 
Several women recalled the murder of Farkhunda Malikzada, pointing out that the 
men who beat Farkhunda to death were not Taliban.  These were young guys in 
jeans with iPhones. The hatred and the grudge they had against women is very 
powerful.67 
Since the campaign, women recounted feeling less secure, with the knowledge of what 
Afghan men are capable of.68  On one positive note, interviewees also felt that violence 
against women was being reported more because of the media attention the campaign 
brought.69  
Similar findings were presented in an Afghan Women’s Network (‘AWN’) 2015 report, 
highlighting that violence against women was still a major problem in the country, despite the 
laws and advances in other areas of women’s rights.70  In particular, harassment of women on 
the streets (similar to Farkunda) and in the workplace was cited as a specific and major 
 
64 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ‘Progress Report on Women’s Status and Empowerment and National 
Action Plan (NAP 1325)’ (2016) 7. 
65 ibid 27. 
66 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, ‘Report to the United States Congress’ (n 1) 9. 
67 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, ‘Report to the United States Congress’ (n 1). 
68 ibid 10. 
69 ibid 16. 
70 Afghan Women’s Network, ‘Afghan Women’s Network Annual Report 2015: “Steps Toward Quality”’ 
(2015) 8. 
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issue.71 AWN reported numerous instances of lobbying the government to address issues 
around violence against women, with what appeared to be little to no progress.72 
Turkey showed a similar pattern.  While Afghanistan is balancing a delicate relationship with 
the US, Turkey is balancing a delicate relationship with Western Europe based on its desire to 
integrate with the EU.  Therefore we see government lip service to ‘Western’ issues such as 
women’s rights and eliminating gender equality, however little to no effort to institutionalise 
norms.73  Discourse analysis can uncover the ‘true’ approach of those in power, with the 
Prime Minister himself having been quoted as saying that men and women cannot be in equal 
positions.74  He also made comments about women’s duty as mothers, disparaging feminists.75 
These underlying and harmful stereotypes of women used by the government have been 
labelled as ‘anti-female’ by women’s groups and were in fact blamed for the rising incidents 
of femicide.76  
 
Officially, there were two national action plans to combat violence against women in 
Turkey.77  Although these action plans called for the establishment of many support services 
and shelters, civil society criticised the continued lack of implementation and 
institutionalisation.78  Some went so far as to find that the policies created overly bureaucratic 
 
71 ibid 18. 
72 Another example: "Once again, Afghanistan's government has shown the world that this country is hell for 
women.  We knew Afghanistan's judicial system, law and order would never work in favour of women in 
Afghanistan, and we were proven right after all the accused in Farkhunda's case were not punished.  I don't trust 
the government any more. We are on our own." ‘Afghanistan: “Farkhunda Will Not Be Forgotten”’ 
<https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/03/afghanistan-farkhunda-forgotten-
160317115433960.html> accessed 29 December 2018.   
73 ‘Fight against Domestic Violence Stalls in “Patriarchal” Turkey’ (Hürriyet Daily News) 
<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/fight-against-domestic-violence-stalls-in-patriarchal-
turkey.aspx?pageID=238&nID=69455&NewsCatID=339> accessed 3 August 2017. 
74 ‘Özgecan’ın Ölümü Kadına Yönelik Şiddette Milat Olur Mu?’ BBC Türkçe 
<http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2015/02/150220_ozgecan_aslan> accessed 15 September 2017; 
‘Erdoğan"s Remarks on Gender Equality Stir Fury’ (Hürriyet Daily News) 
<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/erdogans-remarks-on-gender-equality-stir-fury-
.aspx?pageID=238&nID=74820&NewsCatID=338> accessed 3 August 2017; Davidson (n 6); ‘Turkey 
President Erdogan: Women Are Not Equal to Men’ BBC News (24 November 2014) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-30183711> accessed 3 August 2017; ‘Turkish President Erdoğan 
Says Gender Equality “against Nature”’ (Hürriyet Daily News) <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-
president-erdogan-says-gender-equality-against-nature.aspx?pageID=238&nID=74726&NewsCatID=338> 
accessed 3 August 2017. 
75 “Our religion regards motherhood very highly.  Feminists don't understand that, they reject motherhood.”   
 ‘Turkey President Erdogan: Women Are Not Equal to Men’ (n 74); ‘Turkish President Erdoğan Says Gender 
Equality “against Nature”’ (n 74). 
76 ‘Turkey’s Femicide Problem’ <http://harvardpolitics.com/world/turkeys-femicide-problem/> accessed 3 
August 2017; Bianet, ‘BİANET (Independent Communication Network) Shadow Report to GREVIO’ (2017). 
77 Çiğdem Tozlu and Asuman Göksel, ‘WAVE Violence against Women Country Report Turkey’ (2016). 
78 ibid 39. 
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systems which made more problems than were solved.79  The government also replaced the 
Ministry for Women and Family with the Ministry of Family and Social Policies in 2011, 
removing women’s issues from the ministry.80 Again, this shows the underlying lack of 
political will to engage with women’s rights issues. 
 
Just days after Ozgecan’s murder, the Ministry of Family and Social Policies announced a 
series of actions to renew and implement the national action plan on the fight against violence 
against women, including the establishment of more women’s shelters and an impact analysis 
of the focus of the campaign, Law No. 6284.81  However, a recent report found that the 
national action plan has not, in fact, been renewed.82  There appears to continue to be 
significant lip service from both ruling party and opposition parties on eliminating violence 
against women, verbally addressing both prevention and prosecutions.83  Time has shown that 
these discussions were and continue to be short lived and lacking in teeth.84  There is also 
some indication that the government may have taken action against the media in the 
aftermath of the incident, attempting to quell the negative attention.85 
 
79 ibid. 
80 ‘Turkish Women Rising’ (Ms. Magazine Blog, 23 March 2017) 
<http://msmagazine.com/blog/2017/03/23/turkish-women-rising/> accessed 7 August 2017; Human Rights 
Watch, ‘Turkey: Backward Step for Women’s Rights’ (Human Rights Watch, 2011) 
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/06/09/turkey-backward-step-womens-rights> accessed 3 August 2017. 
81 Law to Protect Family and Prevent Violence Against Women 2012 (6284); ‘Turkish Family Ministry Plans 
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against-women-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=78548&NewsCatID=341> accessed 3 August 2017. 
82 Bianet (n 76) 9. 
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<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-pm-pledges-to-act-on-women-
killings.aspx?pageID=238&nID=78388&NewsCatID=338> accessed 3 August 2017; Emily Feldman, ‘Violence 
against Women in Turkey: Erdogan Takes a Surprising Stand’ (Mashable) 
<http://mashable.com/2015/02/19/erdogan-violence-against-women/> accessed 3 August 2017. 
84 ‘Turkey’s Femicide Problem’ (n 76); US State Dept, ‘Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016’ 
(2016) <https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper> accessed 13 April 2017; 
Bianet (n 76) 8; ‘Turkish Leaders Celebrate International Women’s Day’ (Hürriyet Daily News) 
<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-leaders-celebrate-international-womens-day------
.aspx?pageID=238&nID=79370&NewsCatID=338> accessed 3 August 2017; ‘Erdoğan Says Turkey’s Main 
Opposition Leader “Politicizes” Murder of Özgecan’ (Hürriyet Daily News) 
<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/erdogan-says-turkeys-main-opposition-leader-politicizes-murder-of-
ozgecan.aspx?pageID=238&nID=78483&NewsCatID=338> accessed 3 August 2017; ‘Erdoğan Urges Muhtars 
to Protect Women from Violence’ (Hürriyet Daily News) <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/erdogan-urges-
muhtars-to-protect-women-from-violence-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=79480&NewsCatID=338> accessed 3 
August 2017; ‘Is Life Getting Worse for Women in Erdogan’s Turkey?’ BBC News (4 March 2015) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-31709887> accessed 3 August 2017. 
85 There were 50% fewer reports on violence against in the first 100 days of 2017 than there had been in 2016.  
“This fall in press reports, even as violence against women was increasing, is another sign of violence against 
women. The closure of a number of media outlets and restrictions in press freedom in Turkey likely played a 
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Finally moving to Kenya and #mydressmychoice the commonalities in legal outcomes for 
this group of campaigns continue.  Yet again, there were policies and programmes in place 
intended to address the issue of violence against women but implementation and 
governmental institutionalisation were lacking.  A poll from 2010 underscored how little 
these laws and policies were changing experiences for women and girls, with 48.2% of 
women fearing sexual harassment from a household member.86 
National guidelines on the management of sexual violence were intended to ensure a rights-
based, multi-agency holistic approach to supporting victims of sexual violence, in particular 
addressing a dignified procedure for the collection of evidence. 87  But again, gaps between 
policy and implementation were significant.  One NGO attempted to identify why this gap is 
so problematic in Kenya, and found a range of challenges and barriers, including many issues 
around inadequate resourcing, limited capacity, and socio-cultural issues.88  This was echoed 
in the work produced by a Task Force set up to oversee the implementation of the Sexual 
Offences Act.89 
The President did take some action in the immediate aftermath of the spark incident, 
launching a new national framework towards response and prevention of gender based 
violence, which was intended to coordinate efforts across sectors towards a more effective 
and efficient approach. 90  Of note, the framework specifically draws down from international 
norms found in the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, the Beijing Platform for Action, and the Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategy.91  This 
coincided with the country’s first 16 days against violence against women national campaign.   
The #mydressmychoice campaign, similar to the other status quo campaigns, clearly pushed 
government officials to address the issue and denounce the incident 92  including a Tweet from 
the President.93   However, in this particular campaign, the attention also prompted the 
 
(Hürriyet Daily News) <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/173-women-killed-in-turkey-in-first-five-months-
of-2017-report.aspx?pageID=238&nID=113936&NewsCatID=509> accessed 3 August 2017. 
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87 ‘Kenya Law: Situational Analysis and the Legal Framework on Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in Kenya: 
Challenges and Opportunities’ <http://kenyalaw.org/kl/index.php?id=4512> accessed 6 November 2017. 
88 Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development (n 47); ‘Kenya Law: Situational Analysis and the 
Legal Framework on Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in Kenya: Challenges and Opportunities’ (n 87). 
89 Human Rights Center, ‘Sexual Offences Act: Implementation Workshop’ (2012) 13. 
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counter-narrative to address the issue, where ‘local news reported various interviews with 
local men who think that the mobs did the right thing,’ arguing that there is ‘moral decay in 
society’ and that the victim learned a lesson.  Others were critical of the movement out of a 
belief that a woman wearing a miniskirt lacks ‘decency.’ 94   
Despite all the attention to both sides of the decency debate, it seems little has changed.95  In 
2017 a commentator reported that, upon interviewing women, seven out of ten were still 
worried about what they wore based on where they were going.96  In other words, women still 
feel as though they need to dress more conservatively in the cities where the perceived risk of 
harassment is higher. 
Across all three countries, again, we see a very similar picture in the institutionalisation of 
women’s rights before and after the hashtag campaigns.  Policies and programmes were in 
place, but with the government lacking either the will or the capacity to prioritise meaningful 
change.  Violence against women was rampant in these countries despite the various action 
plans, frameworks, and strategies.  Discourse from government officials and other political 
parties shows endemic harmful stereotyping of women.  The campaigns attracted enough 
attention to push government officials to publicly denounce violence against women, and 
perhaps make a small token gesture to introduce a new, non-binding policy or programme, 
but with little to no impact on the epidemic.   
 
Law Enforcement 
 
Law enforcement in Afghanistan was one of the main concerns of the campaign, particularly 
given that there were police on site when Farkhunda was murdered and that the perpetrators’ 
sentences were commuted or acquitted altogether due to the rushed trials.  Some 
 
94 Santos (n 11). 
95 On November 16, 2016, two Nairobi gubernatorial candidates appeared on television for a live debate.  The 
male candidate not only called the female candidate a “socialite bimbo” but also stated “You are so beautiful, 
everybody wants to rape you.”  A few days later, the same female candidate attended an event wearing a black 
dress which showed her thighs, sparking debate on social media: “One Twitter commentator posted: “Her mode 
of dressing is alarming. Why behave like a teenage girl?”  The candidate replied “My great grandmother walked 
with less than I do. So did Eve. No apologies to make”.  Twitter reactions from the counter-narrative included 
the words ‘Bimbo’, ‘…spreading your womanhood’, ‘…dresses like she’s in a brothel’, ‘My dress my choice 
makes some people walk half naked’, ‘As much as we condemn Miguna (male candidate), let our women carry 
themselves in an unquestionable manner’.”  ‘Life after “My Dress My Choice”’ (Daily Nation) 
<http://www.nation.co.ke/lifestyle/saturday/Is-your-dress-really-your-choice/1216-3835390-c1h5aj/index.html> 
accessed 6 November 2017.   
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improvements had been seen in the years leading up the campaign.97  However, the same 
reports also found that many cases never made it to the official judicial process with many 
referrals still being made to traditional resolution mechanisms.98  A 2012 shadow report also 
pointed to informal dispute resolution as problematic to women’s access to justice.99  It was 
reported that only 7% of cases of violence under EVAW go through a judicial process.100  In 
the 2013, UNAMA found that while EVAW is being used for more registration of reported 
incidents, it is not being used in more cases for indictment.101  Taken together, this all 
indicates that the courts themselves might have been showing improvements in prosecutions, 
which is a significant step for Afghanistan, but that local barriers still existed which kept 
cases out of the system.   
 
One of the most negative outcomes from this campaign was the prosecution of the 
perpetrators, where 11 police officers were sentenced to one year in prison, eight individuals 
were sentenced to 16 years, and four were sentenced to death, including the caretaker who 
started the mob and a young man who was seen on tape throwing stones.102  The police 
officers were released on bail after an appeal, and four were acquitted.  All continue to work 
for the government.103  On appeal, three of the men sentenced to death had their sentences 
commuted to 20 years in prison, and the youth had his sentence commuted to ten years.104  
The appeal trial was notably held behind closed doors.105  Human Rights Watch identified 
vast problems with these court cases: 
At every stage of this case the Afghan criminal justice system failed to adequately 
investigate, hold to account or appropriately punish those responsible. The trials 
 
97 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, ‘Report to the United States Congress’ (2012) 123; 
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, ‘Report to the United States Congress’ (n 24). 
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99 Afghan Women’s Network, ‘Afghanistan CEDAW Shadow (NGO) Report’ (n 60) paras 23–25. 
100 ‘A Year Later, Still No Justice for Farkhunda’ (n 5). 
101 United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, ‘A Way to Go: An Update on Implementation of the Law 
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103 Alissa J Rubin, ‘Flawed Justice After a Mob Killed an Afghan Woman’ The New York Times (26 December 
2015) <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/27/world/asia/flawed-justice-after-a-mob-killed-an-afghan-
woman.html> accessed 23 May 2017. 
104 Human Rights Watch, ‘Dispatches: Afghanistan’s Legal System Fails Farkhunda, Again’ (Human Rights 
Watch, 9 March 2016) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/03/09/dispatches-afghanistans-legal-system-fails-
farkhunda-again> accessed 5 June 2017; Kargar (n 1); Rubin (n 103); ‘A Year Later, Still No Justice for 
Farkhunda’ (n 5). 
105 Rubin (n 103). 
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of those originally accused were conducted in haste and riddled with procedural 
errors, with many defendants lacking legal counsel.106  
The Afghan Women’s Network also raised concerns about the trials.107 More generally, the 
network comments that: 
Kabul City as the country capital is becoming day by day worse for women’s 
social protection, these kinds of events without prosecution, arresting of the 
perpetrators and failure to implement justice become cause of the constraints 
against women’s movement as their active presence in all fields.108 
The network, through a study, found that the lack of prosecutions has led to a culture of 
impunity and weak governance.109  This was echoed in a 2015 shadow report.110  Other 
sources indicate that the lack of repercussions has emboldened men to harass women more 
often.111  Most agree that the negative attention brought to the country through social media 
pressured the situation, leading to rushed trials which were then overturned, increasing the 
feeling of impunity.112  All of this makes the situation worse for women and girls in 
Afghanistan. 
The picture is somewhat similar in Turkey.  Although prosecutions and convictions are not as 
rare, mitigating factors to reduce sentences are common.  Very little is reported on the role of 
the courts prior to Ozgelan’s murder, other than the low prosecution rates and the high use of 
mitigating factors for reduced sentences.  The three men accused of involvement in the 
murder – the driver, his father, and his friend – were all found guilty and sentenced to 
aggravated life imprisonment.113  The minibus driver was later killed in prison.  President 
Erdogan stated that he would personally follow the case and that ‘violence against women is 
 
106 Human Rights Watch, ‘Dispatches’ (n 104). 
107   “it was further mentioned Civil society expected the Supreme Court to mete justice, but even after eight 
months, the unfair practices of the legal system and violations of law in connection the case of Martyr 
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the bleeding wound of our country.’114  It is possible that his investment in this particular case 
and not others led to heavy prosecution here but not systematically for other cases of violence 
against women. 115   Activists identified that courts were continuing to use good behaviour 
and provocation as mitigating factors.116  
Statistics show a slight decrease in the percentage of gender-based violence cases benefitting 
from mitigating factors after the campaign, from roughly 24% in 2015 to 22% in 2016.    It 
seems that specifically for homicide, it may have reduced from 45% in 2014 to 28% across 
2015-2016, but the statistics are difficult to pinpoint.117  The number of reported cases was 
much higher in the later years, indicating that the raw number of mitigations is likely similar.  
It is also worth noting that cases involving a man and a woman in a pre-existing relationship 
are not eligible for aggravated sentences.  In 2015, this excluded 67 out of 284 cases from 
potentially aggravated sentences.118  Gülsüm Kav from the We Will Stop Femicide Platform 
said in July 2017: 
This year we have monitored 108 court cases in the first three months, half of 
which ended with reduced sentences due to good behavior. Recently we also see 
long trial periods. Any late arrival of justice is itself a form of injustice. What’s 
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.aspx?pageID=238&nID=88257&NewsCatID=509> accessed 3 August 2017. 
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(Hürriyet Daily News) <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/violence-against-women-in-turkey-increases-both-
in-number-and-brutality.aspx?pageID=238&nID=91880&NewsCatID=569> accessed 3 August 2017; ‘Abated 
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<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/abated-sentence-for-man-who-stabbed-wife-to-death-in-
southeast.aspx?pageID=238&nID=93694&NewsCatID=509> accessed 3 August 2017; ‘Court Lessens 
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more, we have also started seeing more postponements of sentences, especially in 
cases of sexual violence.119 
In Kenya the courts have been attempting to deal with sexual and gender-based violence 
cases more positively in a victim-centered approach, although progress is slow.120  This effort 
pre-dates the campaign.  In a case in 2013, the Supreme Court found in favour of the 
petitioners, opining that the police failed to investigate claims of sexual violence adequately 
and thus violated fundamental freedoms and rights.121  This was seen as a landmark case for 
gender-based violence, underscoring the unacceptable and indeed illegal nature of the lack of 
action taken by the police.  However, this was a Supreme Court case and the approach of the 
lower courts is still patchy.  Some statistics indicate that conviction rates in some areas are as 
low as 24%.122  Research also shows that the Sexual Offences Act is used primarily to 
prosecute cases of defilement (underage sex), and not to tackle more violent crimes.123 
One of the cornerstones of this campaign was the problematic requirement for victims to file 
a complaint at the police station.  This was a major barrier for many women in Kenya.  In the 
case that sparked #mydressmychoice, the victim did not file a complaint and therefore the 
police claimed, in the beginning, that they could not take any action.124  However, once the 
campaign climaxed, as many as 200 men were arrested.  The BBC has reported that ‘mass 
arrests are often carried out by police in Kenya when they are under public pressure. It leads 
to the arrest of many innocent people who are later released.’125  The government also set up 
an ‘anti-stripping squad’ in the police unit in Nairobi.  They also arrested five men 
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specifically linked to the initial incident.126  Impunity is another major challenge in Kenya.  A 
statement endorsed by many Kenyan women’s rights groups in March 2015 outlined several 
incidents of violence, many involving MPs or the police, who are often protected from 
prosecution.127 
Since the campaign, the courts still vary in their treatment of gender-based violence cases.  
For example, in 2016, a judge overturned a 20 year sentence for a man who ‘defiled’ a young 
girl, finding that the girl had acted like an adult (sneaking into a man’s house to engage in 
sexual activity) and therefore should be treated as an adult.128  Women’s groups publicly 
denounced the ruling as a set-back for women and efforts to end gender-based violence.129   
Little has changed in the judicial system in Kenya in its treatment of gender-based violence.  
It seems that for every landmark decision taking a step forward, another decision takes things 
a step back.   
Across all three of the status quo campaigns, we therefore see similar patterns of poor 
handling of gender-based violence in law enforcement, particularly in the courts.  In 
#farkhunda, the rushed trials have ‘emboldened’ criminals and contributed to an increase in 
the perception of impunity.  For #sendeanlat, although some improvement may have been 
seen, for the most part mitigating factors of good behaviour and provocation are still widely 
used to reduce sentences for gender-based violence and femicide.  In Kenya with 
#mydressmychoice, much variation is seen in the treatment of cases of gender-based 
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violence, with some very positive and progressive examples alongside some very negative 
and regressive rulings.   
 
UN Dialogue 
 
Early UN reports from and to Afghanistan paint a complex picture, with clear impacts of war 
and religious tensions.  Dialogue from the early 1990s was similar to other Islamic countries, 
with the treaty bodies raising concerns about situations on the ground, in particular for 
women and girls, and the government reporting on laws and systems, but not their 
implementation.130  In 1995, there was a complete change of tone to reflect the horrors of the 
war and the decimation of infrastructure to support and protect women and girls.131  State 
reports often said that the situation for women and girls could not be improved until the 
conflict ended.132  By 1998, a Resolution was passed specifically addressing the rights of 
women and girls.133  Reports also continued to illustrate the tension between the Taliban 
interpretation of Islam and the perception of threat from Western interference.134 
With the fall of the Taliban and the implementation of the transitional government, there was 
evidence of hope for women and girls.  A key pillar of the Bonn Agreement was gender 
equality.135  However, the transition was not without risk to women and girls: 
Afghan women leaders face the threat of a violent backlash, and it is reported that 
in rural areas conservative women’s groups are increasingly organizing 
 
130 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘Initial Reports Submitted by States Parties: 
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UN Doc CCPR/C/SR.1462 paras 7–8. 
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E/CN.4/2002/43 paras 45–47. 
Chapter 4: Status Quo Campaigns: #farkhunda, #sendeanlat, #mydressmychoice 
115 
 
themselves against what is perceived to be an overly liberal women’s movement 
in Kabul.136  
The state continued to work towards reform and transition, ratifying CEDAW in 2003.137  
These efforts did not seem to have any impact on societal beliefs, particularly regarding 
customary law, access to justice, and incidents of violence against women.138  In 2006, the 
Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women (‘SR on VAW’) brought attention to a 
specific case which illustrated the realities for women in Afghanistan.  A woman was 
allegedly murdered for ‘her adoption of a Western attitude, her open interaction with her 
male colleagues on television and her choice of western music.’139  Although the SR on VAW 
sent three communications to the state on this matter, there were no replies.  
At this stage, it becomes abundantly clear that there are many, many reports from the UN on 
the situation in Afghanistan, but far fewer responses or reports from Afghanistan.  
Interventionism in the country was astoundingly high and seemed to cause pushback and 
potential resentment.  The government finally did respond to the 2009 CESCR list of issues.  
In relation to gender equality, the Afghani government stated:  
The Government is firmly committed to mainstreaming gender issues across the 
country to help women realize equal participation and full involvement in 
Afghanistan's economic, social and cultural development. However, it takes far 
more number of years to reach gender-equal society in Afghanistan. It is due to 
many years of war and traditional society in Afghanistan as well as government’s 
financial restrictions, gaps between policies and practices, and lack of strong civil 
society protecting and promoting women’s rights.140 
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In 2011, Afghanistan had its first reporting dialogue with CEDAW.  Several pages of the 
state report dealt specifically with violence against women.  The government acknowledged 
that violence targeting women ‘even on the street’ was a problem and they were seeking to 
address it in amendments to EVAW.141  The 2013 report on the situation, yet again, raised 
concerns that the efforts made by the government were not actually reducing the risk or 
incidence of violence.142  Of note, the report also stated: ‘Those cases…[that] receive public 
attention due to their egregious nature represent the tip of the iceberg of incidents of violence 
against women throughout the country’ (emphasis added).143  Generally, the UN dialogue 
becomes extremely repetitive.  The same issues and concerns are raised, and the same 
responses are given.144  It seems Farkhunda’s case and the attention it received did not lead to 
any change in approach or discourse, but rather served to highlight the ongoing problems 
seen in these reports for over a decade. 
Turkey, on the other hand, is actively involved in the UN human rights system.  As is true 
across all the status quo campaigns, concerns about violence against women were present in 
the UN dialogue both before and after the campaign with little perceptible change in 
approach, discourse, or content.  Violence against women was first raised in the 1996 
CEDAW state report; the hearing on this report noted that violence against women in the 
private domain was an issue.145  The state party indicated that new legislation specifically 
addressing violence against women was necessary.146  The Committee raised concerns about 
the growing fundamentalist movement and Turkey’s continued reservations to the 
Convention, noting specifically the ‘growing climate of violence against women and girls’147  
and that there were ‘very serious attitudinal and behavioural patterns in Turkey, among both 
men and women.’148  
The next CEDAW cycle took place in 2003.  The state reported new domestic violence 
legislation, the lifting of CEDAW reservations, and the ratification of the Optional Protocol.  
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The report contained a whole section on violence against women, which shows how the issue 
had become more and more prominent.  Interestingly, one of the barriers identified by the 
state to addressing violence against women was the ‘provocative role the media continues to 
display in covering acts of violence.’149  Several Committee members asked about violence 
against women, how the law was being implemented, and whether gaps were being identified 
and addressed.150  The state relied heavily on their provision of awareness raising and 
educational training for authorities and the public.151 
In 2009, a case was decided by the European Court of Human Rights, Opuz v. Turkey.152  The 
court found that the failings of the criminal justice system ‘undermined the deterrent effect’ 
and that the state authorities did not do enough to protect the applicant from harm.  The 
CEDAW Committee then raised the Opuz case, inquiring about specific measures taken to 
implement the decision.  The state responded that they ‘did not fully agree with the decision 
of the Court, as Turkey’s legal framework was well developed and a great deal of work had 
gone into reforming legislation.’153 
Similar shortcomings were identified in the 2009 CESCR dialogue, which led to a lengthy 
back and forth between the defensive position of the state and the probing position of the 
 
149 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, ‘Combined Fourth and Fifth Periodic 
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153 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, ‘Summary Record of the 937th Meeting’ 
(2010) UN Doc CEDAW/C/SR.937 para 61.  The ECtHR has heard several cases on violence against women in 
Turkey, uniformly finding in favour of the petitioners: (2013): Izci v. Turkey (42606/05), (2015) Durmaz v. 
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treaty body.154  This process was echoed in the 2010 UPR process.155  Again in 2011, the HRC 
was very forthright in their list of issues, asking for a long list of statistics, examples, and 
further information about how the various laws and institutions were actually working to 
protect women.156  In session, the issue was raised again and the state reluctantly replied that 
amendments had been made to increase penalties for honour killings, that other changes had 
been introduced, that there were more shelters, and pointed to Turkey as the first signatory of 
the Istanbul Convention.157  Time and time again, committees are probing Turkey to provide 
evidence as to how the laws are actually protecting women and girls, and time and time again 
the answers are lacking.  Turkey continually relies on process indicators (activities 
completed) as opposed to outcome indicators (the impact of said activities).    
In 2014, Turkey submitted its 7th periodic report to CEDAW.  Notably, this was the first time 
Turkey clearly used the term ‘femicide’ in a state report to the UN.158  This reporting cycle 
concluded after the campaign began.  After Ozgecan’s murder, CEDAW raised serious 
concerns about the ‘judicial leniency’ and the use of good behaviour and provocation as 
mitigating factors.159  The state defensively responded that: 
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Social and Cultural Rights, ‘Summary Record of the 3rd Meeting’ (2011) UN Doc E/C.12/2011/SR.3 paras 25, 
50.  The state responded that laws were in place and provided some figures.  However, the committee found the 
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implementation of the 2007-2010 National Action Plan to Combat Violence against Women. The Committee is 
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in the State party and that the remedies available to victims of domestic violence are ineffective”.Committee on 
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Article 29 of the Criminal Code stipulated that unjust provocation could not be 
considered as a mitigating factor in cases of honour killings, rape or sexual 
assault. The determination of a defendant’s good conduct as a mitigating factor, 
which was entirely at the discretion of the judge, was based on his or her record 
and behaviour and on the expected impact of the punishment on his or her future 
life.160 
The concluding observations take a noticeably different approach to the issue of violence 
against women, placing far more emphasis on Turkey’s shortcomings and problems.161  
The second round UPR began in 2014 but did not conclude until the campaign was tapering 
off in April 2015.  Notably, several countries in the Working Group ‘welcomed’ or ‘took 
positive note of’ work done to combat violence against women.162  Many countries who had 
been positive about the steps Turkey had taken still made recommendations about 
implementation and enforcement.  Therefore, although there are less reports available from 
the time period since the campaign began, initial evidence indicates that there is little to no 
change, showing both positive and negative interactions on the issue, as was the case with 
Afghanistan.   
The final campaign to explore is #mydressmychoice.  Again, the overall picture is much the 
same before the campaign as after the campaign, with little to no perceptible differences 
uncovered through analysing the dialogue with the UN human rights mechanisms.  As early 
as 1981, the HRC raised concerns about the status of women in Kenya.163  Concerns were 
raised again in 1993 by CESCR.164   In the 2000 CEDAW cycle, the committee specifically 
raised concerns over the implementation of the domestic violence law.165 
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The 2004 HRC dialogue uncovered an interesting statement made by the state: ‘The police 
department had even allowed civil society groups, including women’s rights advocates, to go 
to their training camps to conduct human rights training’ (emphasis added).166  This kind of 
language does not indicate political will or meaningful institutionalisation of gender equality, 
where the state in essence thinks it has done women’s rights activists a ‘favour’ in allowing 
them to attend.  This was echoed in the Committee’s concluding observations.167  In 2006 the 
CEDAW committee similarly found that ‘There appears to be lack of political goodwill on 
the part of the legislators, a reason to explain the delay in having the [sexual violence and 
domestic violence] Bills discussed and passed into law.’168  The government had an 
expectedly defensive response.169 
The 2007 CESCR list of issues was very forthright in highlighting the problem of violence 
against women.170  The government did reply to the question with information on the Sexual 
Offences Act, the Domestic Violence Bill, the associated task force, and educational and 
training efforts.  The paragraphs were verbatim from the state replies to CEDAW the same 
year.  The 2010 cycle was almost identical, with the Committee asking for information and 
the state deflecting on why the bills had not yet been passed into law.171  
After #mydressmychoice began, the state submitted a report to CESCR writing: ‘the 
government acknowledges that there is still a lot that needs to be done as the enforcement of 
this [violence against women] act is still very slow.’172  Similar dialogue occurred in the 2016 
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Kenya’ (2010) UN Doc CEDAW/C/KEN/Q/7/Add.1 paras 31–34.  Similar concerns were raised in the CCPR 
dialogue. 
172 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘Replies of Kenya to the List of Issues’ (2016) UN Doc 
E/C.12/KEN/Q/2-5/Add.1 para 92. 
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and 2017 CEDAW reports.173  The reports and dialogue therefore show absolutely no change 
after the campaign took off. 
All three of these campaigns show extremely similar patterns in their interactions with the 
UN human rights mechanisms.  Concerns around violence against women were raised both 
before and after the campaigns, often rooted in implementation and enforcement issues, and 
often pointing to a lack of political will or ability to address the issue.  These patterns of 
discourse were almost identical before and after the campaign, showing no change. 
 
Twitter Characteristics 
 
These campaigns were quite average in many aspects, including overall participation, with 
#farkhunda at 8,600 Tweets, #sendeanlat at 38,407, and #mydressmychoice at 44,573.  
Interestingly though, the campaigns showed unusual variation in the number of non-English 
tweets.  #mydressmychoice targeted an English-speaking country and thus the percent of 
non-English Tweets is expectedly low (5%).  However, #farkhunda showed a similarly low 
percentage when the target country is not English speaking (9%), exactly the same as 
#stopstoning.  Conversely, #sendeanlat had 76% of Tweets in languages other than English. 
Overall, these hashtag campaigns illustrate many of the inherent risks in social media 
campaigning.  They all garnered relatively large levels of attention in the immediate 
aftermath of the spark incidents but were unable to sustain any meaningful levels of attention 
or engagement.  It is likely that this lack of persistence was responsible for the overall lack of 
legal change.  In all campaigns, some effort was made to change laws, but there simply was 
not enough continued pressure to lead to long term positive or progressive changes.  The 
 
173 Of note, both before and after the campaign, at no point in any of the UN reports to or from the state are 
public strippings specifically addressed.  However, a shadow report in 2017 stated: “acts of gender-based 
violence can include muggings, which occur daily, public stripping of women, for example on public transport, 
and there have even been cases of murder. Tradition and religion are often used as excuses for such treatment of 
women, demoralising them and providing a safeguard for their perpetrators.”  Franciscans International, 
Edmund Rice International and The Office of Justice Peace and Integrity of Creation Franciscans Africa, ‘Civil 
Society Responses to the List of Issues in Relation to the Eighth Report of Kenya to CEDAW’ (2017) para 13.  
Although lengthy, the report gives a very accurate and comprehensive view off gender-based violence in Kenya, 
from a domestic voice: “In Kenya, as in many other countries, victims of gender-based violence, particularly 
sexual violence, suffer from stigma and discrimination. As a result, the incidences of gender-based violence 
remain highly underreported….Moreover, it is reported that in some cases the police officers are reluctant to 
take up such cases, considering them as “private affairs.” Even when they do respond, the procedures often take 
long, which has led to a mistrust of survivors on state institutions’ response to resolve cases of gender-based 
violence”  ibid 14–15. 
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capricious nature of social media struggled to maintain pressure on the governments long 
enough to implement meaningful legal change.  Equally, this initial considerable attention led 
to the specific perpetrators in these cases facing charges, but the lack of sustained attention or 
activity meant that systematic changes have not been realised in any of the three countries.  
Impunity is thus a very real danger. 
Persistence (Tweets per day) 
 
These three campaigns showed very similar persistence behaviours.  All three campaigns 
showed the same characteristics – extreme peaks around the time of the spark incident 
followed by low numbers of Tweets for the remainder of the campaign.  The spark incidents 
here all garnered enormous attention with initial peaks rising above 10,000 for both 
#sendeanlat and #mydressmychoice.  All three campaigns had a very high percentage of 
Tweets in peak periods, 53% for #farkhunda, 89% for #sendeanlat, and 71% for 
#mydressmychoice.  The figure below illustrates this similarity: 
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Figure 4.1: Number of Tweets per day, status quo campaigns 
 
  
Here all three campaigns show their highest peaks at the very beginning, with little to no 
increase across the life of the campaign.  #farkhunda showed a few small residual peaks, but 
not nearly as high as the initial spark incident and interest.  These peaks were markedly 
different from the other campaigns, which showed more peaks spread throughout the lifespan 
of the campaigns or longer initial peak periods.  It is plausible that the initial high level of 
interest provided the pressure needed to begin some areas of positive change, but the lack on 
ongoing or continued persistence and interest left the campaigns ‘unfinished’.  This would 
explain why these campaigns made positive strides in some areas but lack of progress in 
others for an overall status quo outcome. 
This is also reflected in the percentage of days with more than five Tweets.  Although higher 
than the two Iranian campaigns, these three campaigns did not see results nearly as high as 
the more successful campaigns.   
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Table 4.1: Number of active days, status quo campaigns 
 #farkhunda #sendeanlat #mydressmychoice 
Number of days Tweets > 0 366 382 487 
Number of days Tweets > 5 121 84 119 
Number of days Tweets > 100 20 10 29 
Percent of days Tweets = 0 40% 42% 35% 
Percent of days Tweets > 5 20% 13% 16% 
 
More successful campaigns saw at least 25% of campaign days with more than five Tweets, 
while less successful campaigns were under 5%.  Again, this could explain the status quo 
outcomes.  There was enough attention at the very start of the campaign to push some 
changes through, but not enough sustained attention to carry the campaign on and drive 
through more long-term, meaningful changes.  This differs from the tactical concessions 
campaigns which saw much more sustained attention through the campaigns and much higher 
peaks in the beginning.   
Engagement (Retweets, Likes, and Replies) 
 
In the engagement metrics, these campaigns showed very different behavioural patterns.  
#farkhunda showed a high proportion of Retweets.  At first glance it may seem that this 
shows a lack of engagement, as simply Retweeting something does not take as much effort or 
involvement as replying or writing original content.  However, having explored these 
campaigns in great detail, Retweeting can also be linked to consistent messaging.  This may 
have been one of the more positive aspects of the #farkhunda campaign.  #mydressmychoice 
was also a campaign driven by Retweets, though not to same extent as #farkhunda.   
#sendeanlat, on the other hand, was a campaign dominated by likes.  This in essence shows a 
lack of engagement as simply ‘liking’ a Tweet takes the least amount of effort and, arguably, 
contributes the least to the overall campaign.  For every Tweet in the #sendeanlat campaign, 
there were nearly three Likes.  In a negative sense, this lack of engagement could again be a 
reason why the campaign did not progress as far as it could have.   
Across all of the campaigns, the level of replies during non-peak periods is a statistically 
significant indicator of positive legal change.  These three status quo campaigns showed 
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expected mid-range performance, with more non-peak dialogue than the backsliding 
campaigns but not as much as the successful campaigns.   
The final lens through which to interrogate the levels of engagement are the log(n) log(s) 
plots. 
Figure 4.2: log(n) log(s) plot for #farkunda 
 
 
Figure 4.3: log(n) log(s) plot for #sendeanlat 
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Figure 4.4: log(n) log(s) plot for #mydressmychoice 
 
 
All three campaigns, across both peak and non-peak periods, showed a steep reply gradient, 
indicating that far fewer Tweets had low levels of replies.  This mirrors the findings above.  
#farkhunda and #sendeanlat then show similarities in the gradients for Retweets and likes, 
both with likes having a slightly higher gradient than Retweets, but only slightly.    
#mydressmychoice had a similar difference in gradients, but with Retweets showing a higher 
initial intercept.  This again underscores the findings above that #mydressmychoice was more 
driven by Retweets and that #sendeanlat in particular was driven by likes.   
 
Users (Profiles of 100 most active users) 
 
Coding the user profiles showed particularly interesting results in this group of campaigns.  
Nearly 25% of the 100 most active users in #farkhunda were non-domestic individuals.  The 
next largest category was non-domestic activist.  Together, the non-domestic individuals and 
non-domestic activists accounted for 37% of Tweets from the 100 most active users.  Also of 
note, non-domestic news agencies accounted for 40% of the reach of the 100 most active 
users, significantly more than any other category.  This indicates that the domestic voice was 
not seen nearly as much as the non-domestic voice, particularly when viewed alongside the 
low percentage of non-English Tweets.  This may have been partially down to the algorithms, 
filter bubbles, and non-neutrality of Twitter discussed in Chapter 2. 
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This finding is consistent with the perception that foreign media pressured the government 
into forcing swift, and in the end erroneous, trials, which according to experts has now 
‘emboldened’ criminals.  The Afghan government is particularly sensitive to foreign media, 
as evidenced by US State Department reports and UN dialogue.  Given the history and the 
current geo-political positioning this is not surprising.  A campaign driven by foreign voices 
would, therefore, be associated with reactionary actions and not necessarily long-term 
meaningful change.  On the other hand, #mydressmychoice was the most domestically driven 
campaign in the whole study, with 72% of the 100 most active users from Kenya.  
#mydressmychoice, although overall still a status quo campaign, did see more positive legal 
change than #farkhunda.  It is very likely that this difference can be explained, at least in part, 
by the presence and strength of domestic drive and voice (or lack thereof). 
#sendeanlat is the first campaign where we see the counter-narrative in the 100 most active 
users, with one domestic, Tweeting 19 times with a reach of 80, and one non-domestic, 
Tweeting 17 times with a reach of 2302.  Although not particularly large in number, the 
presence of the counter-narrative in the 100 most active users could have an adverse impact 
on outcomes.  Additionally, the counter-narrative voice in this campaign represented 
religious conservatives, a barrier to legal change that has been identified in many campaigns.  
In this sense, it was not against the goals of the campaign per se, but equally this was not a 
voice in favour of women’s rights or international human rights norms for gender equality, as 
evidenced by the Tweets below. This kind of discourse presents an anti-Western view that is 
generally not conducive to protecting, respecting, or fulfilling women’s rights.   
‘As Darwinist materialist education continues, lovelessness and ruthlessness prevail, violence 
does not come to an end. Adnan Oktar’ 
‘The brutal assaults that women are jealous of their chastity, beauty, cleanliness. a.okt’ 
‘When a man is left alone with a foreign woman, surely the third one is a satanic.’  
‘There is a painful punishment in the world and in the Hereafter for those who want to spread 
the illusion’ 
 
Similarly, #mydressmychoice opened the door to a strong counter-narrative around so-called 
decency laws.  Rather than addressing the underlying issues allowing violence against 
women to run rampant (despite the name #mydressmychoice, the campaign’s goals were 
about preventing violence against women regardless of what women do or don’t wear), this 
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counter-narrative focussed on what women wear, arguing that women should be dressing 
‘decently’ to end public strippings.  In this campaign, three of the 100 most active users 
represented this perspective, all domestic, generally with a Christian profile.   
‘If interested in walking half naked then do it to yur bf & NOT to the world, it's embarassin’ 
 ‘ladies should mind thea dressing’ 
 ‘2 wrongs don't make a right. But the first wrong is a very bad wrong. Strip them up!’ 
 ‘Decency is absolute and not relative as most of you campaigners of scunty dressing are 
trying to make us believe.’ 
 ‘A wife of noble character is her husband’s crown, but a disgraceful wife is like decay in his 
bones.’ 
‘The righteous person is rescued from trouble, and it falls on the wicked instead.’ 
‘Then out came a woman to meet him, dressed like a prostitute and with crafty intent.--
Proverbs 7:10’ 
For these users to be in the top 100 most active users in the entire campaign certainly 
underscores the harmful distilling down of the issue to what women wear as opposed to the 
underlying conditions which allow violence against women.  These users very much 
encapsulate what one activist said: 
Tragically, the conversation centred on the hemline of dresses instead of the sex 
gangs. Women blamed women for the indecent dressing that provoked the 
strippings. People of stature in the church said that if stripping was the only way 
to achieve decency, they would support it…Still more people said that the debate 
was about decency, and that was all.  The Church leadership was silent…The 
President was silent. The First Lady was silent.174 
Also interesting in #mydressmychoice was the emergence of ‘entertainment industry’ users.  
These accounted for 13% of 100 most active users, with 1,281 Tweets and a reach of over 1.5 
million, primarily domestic.   It appears that these users were attempting to capitalise on the 
trending hashtag, with examples such as: 
 
174 Meshack Yobby, ‘Women, Gangs, and Silence’ (26 November 2014) 
<http://forum.ngeckenya.org/chat/women-gangs-and-silence> accessed 1 January 2019. 
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 ‘Young, Wild And Free! #MyDressMyChoice See More Photos On http://mpasho.co.ke/live  
#MpashoLive’ 
 ‘Ladies Displaying A LOT of LEG At The #MyDressMyChoice Protest. Visit 
http://mpasho.co.ke/live  For More Photos’ 
 ‘FASHION OR CRAP ? MEN CAN YOU DATE SUCH A GIRL ? 
#MYDRESSMYCHOICE =>http://bit.ly/15W5eEe’ 
One account used the hashtag for clickbait articles about things like football, cooking, or 
scandalous stories.  Another had a similar self-promoting approach: 
 ‘New Music Alert : Nitampata Wapi By Diamond Platnumz-> http://bit.ly/11JilGY  
#mydressmychoice’   
This use of the hashtag to promote the entertainment industry was prominent enough that it 
was noticed when Tweets were being manually collected.  This was one of the primary 
impressions of the campaign from scrolling through the catalogue of Tweets.  Club nights 
were even advertised using the hashtag: 
 ‘This friday we be happening inside club legends thikaIts the #spinfridays with 
@DJSIRMIXX_254 and I#Mydressmychoice’ 
 ‘Join us Tonight @ClubTribeka, Come Dressed the way you want #YourDressYourChoice 
#MyDressMyChoice @AnotherKOT’ 
 ‘Karaoke Starz Takes Center Stage Tonight at Club Rumourz, With 20k at Stake 
http://nyumbanitv.com/karaoke-starz-takes-center-stage-tonight-club-rumourz-20k-stake … 
#MyDressMyChoice’   
This kind of activity again underscores the risks inherent in using social media for 
campaigning.  There is no way to control who uses the hashtag or how it is used.  Counter-
narratives and those seeking to exploit attention can easily co-opt a hashtag, in this case even 
quickly becoming the most active users, at times distorting, perverting, or even mocking the 
campaign’s original goals to protect women’s rights.  Across all three campaigns, the user 
profiles may uncover some of the reasons behind the negative legal outcomes: #farkhunda 
was heavily driven by non-domestic users from Western countries, while the #sendeanlat and 
#mydressmychoice opened doors to counter-narratives, conservative voices, and off-topic 
messaging.   
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Content Analysis (Sentiment, Personalisation, Framing, Messaging, and Norms) 
 
Although sentiment, overall, is not a statistically significant predictor of legal change, 
#sendeanlat showed the most negative scores out of all the campaigns, meaning that the 
content of the Tweets, on average, had a more negative tone.  One hypothesis for this 
negative tone could have been the subject matter of femicide, however several other 
campaigns dealt with femicide, violence, and other harrowing events similar to this spark 
incident but did not show this level of negativity.  Another hypothesis could be that the lack 
of positive outcomes and campaign stagnation could have had an effect on the Tweets 
themselves.  It is difficult to say if this then perpetuated the lack of progress in the campaign.  
This too could be evidence of the damage that can be done to a campaign through the non-
neutrality of social media platforms.  The algorithms, filter bubbles, and ‘personalisation’ 
which is intended to improve user experience could have perpetuated the negative sentiment 
in this campaign, which could in turn have contributed to the lack of positive legal changes.  
In other words, if the Tweets became more negative with the government’s lack of 
implementing change, but negative Tweets hold a campaign back, then perhaps the cycle was 
self-fulfilling.  In order to investigate further, a plot over time can be helpful: 
Figure 4.5: Sentiment over time, #sendeanlat 
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Here we see the sentiment score over time.  Points below 0.5 are negative, and those above 
are positive, representing an average score per day plotted over time.  Looking at the 
sentiment over time, it appears that there was a cluster of negative Tweets towards the 
beginning of the campaign with a few scattered very negative days throughout.  On the 
whole, the somewhat chaotic nature of the positive and negative scores does not show any 
sort of definitive pattern.  It is therefore not possible to conclude whether the negative Tweets 
influenced the lack of legal outcomes, equally it is not possible to conclude that they did not. 
#farkhunda had the lowest percentage of first-person representation (total times first person 
pronouns were used divided by total number of Tweets), at just 15%.  First person pronouns 
indicate ownership and action in the campaign, as in ‘I am doing something’ or ‘I believe’ or 
‘I stand up for…’  The lack of first-person pronouns in this campaign could indicate an 
‘othering’ effect.  On the opposite end, #sendeanlat showed 79% of Tweets including a first-
person pronoun.  This shows an enormous amount of personal investment in the campaign.  
As the hashtag roughly translates to ‘tell your story’, it seems that many individuals 
participating in the campaign did tell a personal story, stories which may have been very 
negative given the finding above.  #sendeanlat also showed the highest percent of second 
person pronouns at 48%.  This may indicate that those Tweeting with the hashtag were 
encouraging others to do the same, or perhaps placing blame on a general ‘you’.   
#farkhunda showed more consistent framing, with messaging staying constant and uniform 
across the event-based time periods (this echoes the high proportion of Retweets).  Due to the 
nature of the campaign, #sendeanlat had just two event-based time periods.  Again, there 
were more consistent messages than variable, although the variable framing in the non-peak 
period did send a coherent and clear message.  #mydressmychoice had fewer consistent 
messages than variable, though the variable content across different event-based time periods 
was very similar.  The following figures visually represent the number of times each word 
was used in a Tweet. 
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Figure 4.6: Consistently used words, #farkhunda 
 
 
Figure 4.7: Consistently used words, #sendeanlat 
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Figure 4.8: Consistently used words, #mydressmychoice 
 
There was very consistent framing and messaging present in #farkhunda, whereas 
#sendeanlat and #mydressmychoice showed far less consistency.  #farkhunda also showed 
significant focus on the court case and the legal system.  #sendeanlat, while still focussing on 
Ozgecan Aslan throughout the campaign, was far less specific.  The other consistently used 
words could have been part of any campaign.  #mydressmychoice was more akin to 
#letwomengotostadium, with a factual focus on the issue in the campaign, namely public 
strippings of women by men.  Interestingly, the words ‘should’ and ‘dress/dresses/dressed’ 
both appear in the consistent messaging.  This may be, to some extent, representing the strong 
counter-narrative which used the hashtag to advocate for women dressing more 
conservatively.    
The variable framing and messaging in these three campaigns show differences.  #farkhunda 
stayed quite reflective of the trials and sentencing, a core part of the overall goals of the 
campaign.  #sendeanlat did not tend to show a clear focus or messaging, although emotional 
words in the non-peak period were very prevalent.  #mydressmychoice remained focussed on 
the incident with very factual words, with the exception of the potential prevalence of the 
counter-narrative.  This inconsistency and variation may have contributed to the lack of 
change; without clear, consistent, on point framing and messaging, the campaigns were not 
likely to achieve the desired change.    
Finally, looking at the presence of international norms in these campaigns (statistically 
significant), as expected there is a very average representation across all three campaigns, 
ranging from 54% to 72% of international norms present.  Interestingly, these campaigns 
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showed the lowest rates of Tweets with international norms, with only 23%, 24%, and 29% 
respectively.  This means that even though the international norms were mentioned, they 
were not mentioned very often.  This may have contributed to the lack of change seen in 
these campaigns.  Perhaps had the international norms been used more the campaigns would 
have seen higher success levels.   
 
Conclusion 
 
These campaigns most exemplify the chaotic and unmanaged risks of social media, though 
each campaign showed different aspects of the spiral model critiques.  All three campaigns 
showed a marked lack of persistence, with very high peaks around spark events but very little 
continued or sustained attention or dialogue.  #sendeanlat in particular showed a lack of 
engagement.  #farkhunda lacked in domestic voices, while #sendeanlat and 
#mydressmychoice opened doors for counter-narratives.  These characteristics combined 
show very little incentive for the governments to make or implement meaningful changes.  
This is then represented in the legal outcomes, where these campaigns, overall, left women 
and girls in much the same situations as they were before the campaigns started.   
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Chapter 5 : Tactical Concessions: #delhigangrape and #niunamenos 
 
Introduction 
 
The next set of campaigns showed very similar outcomes as well as Twitter campaign 
behaviours.  Both climaxed in close proximity to domestic, democratic elections with the 
possibility of regime change, and in both cases the government in power implemented 
legislative change extremely quickly.  The legislative changes were generally seen as 
responses to the public attention driven by social media and indeed met many of the goals of 
the campaigns regarding the letter of the law.  However, likely due to the speed with which 
the changes were made and the governments’ lack of long-term attention to the issues, little 
to no change has been seen on the ground.  Metrics of institutionalisation, in particular in 
India, underscore the short-term, reactionary nature of the changes.  
 
#delhigangrape overview 
 
On December 16, 2012, a young woman and a male companion boarded a minibus in Delhi.  
The bus driver and a group of men beat the man unconscious and raped the woman.  The 
victims were left by the side of the road and it took several hours for someone to find and 
help them.  The woman died two weeks later, on 29th December, after being transferred to a 
hospital in Singapore.  Her death sparked a massive outcry about violence against women in 
India and the lack of protections afforded to them.  Large scale protests took place in India 
and around the world in solidarity.1   
The hashtag campaign sought better legal protections and law enforcement for violence 
against women and sexual violence.  Some felt that the campaign was successful in raising 
awareness domestically.2  However awareness raising is usually not enough, and most feel 
that much, much more needs to be done to protect women and girls.3  This case also brought 
 
1 Niharika Mandhana and Anjani Trivedi, ‘Indians Outraged Over Rape on Moving Bus in New Delhi’ The New 
York Times - India Ink (18 December 2012) <https://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/18/outrage-in-delhi-after-
latest-gang-rape-case/>; ‘Key Events in the Delhi Gang Rape Case’ (news.trust.org) 
<http://news.trust.org/item/20130909143244-h09lu/> accessed 13 March 2018. 
2 ‘A Year after the Delhi Gang Rape, What Has Changed?’ <http://www.dw.com/en/a-year-after-the-delhi-gang-
rape-what-has-changed/a-17293325> accessed 20 February 2018. 
3 ibid. 
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the impact of class based discrimination on sexual violence to the forefront.4  The hashtag 
campaign is best summed up by this quote: 
The fierce debate in the weeks after the attack – setting conservatives who 
blamed westernisation against liberals blaming reactionary sexist and patriarchal 
attitudes – has faded. A package of laws increasing punishments for sexual 
assault and redefining a range of offences may do some good, campaigners 
concede, if enforcement is simultaneously improved, but dozens of men accused 
of rape remain members of local and national parliamentary assemblies…It is a 
few weeks of outrage against hundreds of years of tradition.5 
 
#niunamenos overview 
 
Ni Una Menos (‘not one less’) began as a small collective of activists a few months before 
the hashtag took off, in response to high levels of femicide in Argentina.  A few months later, 
a 14 year old girl was killed by her boyfriend and his mother when they discovered she was 
pregnant and wanted to keep the baby.6   The first Tweet, from a journalist, turned the 
collective into a hashtag campaign in response to this murder.7  The Tweet was shared by 
other journalists and together they decided to hold the first protest under the banner of 
#niunamenos; it is thought that celebrity participation in the campaign contributed to the 
 
4 “of every 10 women raped in India, nine are afraid to speak up against their perpetrators or do not have access 
to the social media.”  Jasmine Bala, ‘Behind the Curtain: On Unreported Rapes in India’ (9 March 2013) 
<https://www.girlsglobe.org/2013/03/09/behind-the-curtain-on-unreported-rapes-in-india/> accessed 20 
February 2018; ‘Does the Delhi Gang Rape Sentence Bring Closure?’ BBC News 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-24059601> accessed 20 February 2018. 
5 Jason Burke, ‘Delhi Rape: How India’s Other Half Lives’ The Guardian (10 September 2013) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/10/delhi-gang-rape-india-women> accessed 6 March 2018; See 
also Justin Rowlatt, ‘Viewpoints: Has Delhi Rape Case Changed India?’ BBC News (10 September 2013) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-24012424> accessed 13 March 2018. 
6 ‘Meet the Argentine Women Behind Ni Una Menos, the Feminist Collective Angela Davis Cites as 
Inspiration’ (Remezcla, 9 March 2017) <http://remezcla.com/features/culture/ni-una-menos-collective-
argentina-founders/> accessed 21 November 2017. 
7 Uki Goñi, ‘Argentine Women Call Out Machismo’ The New York Times (15 June 2015) 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/16/opinion/argentine-women-call-out-machismo.html>; Jamie Ballard, 
‘Battle Cry of #NiUnaMenos Echoes Through Latin America’ (Huffington Post, 22 June 2015) 
<https://www.huffingtonpost.com/jamie-ballard/battle-cry-of-niunamenos-_b_7631972.html>; Muireann 
O’Dwyer, ‘#NiUnaMenos; Standing up to Femicides and “Machismo” in Argentina’ (Gender and Politics, 3 
February 2016) <https://genderandpoliticsucd.wordpress.com/2016/02/03/niunamenos-standing-up-to-
femicides-and-machismo-in-argentina/> accessed 21 November 2017. 
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large scale of the participation.8  The campaign developed five clear legal demands.9  There 
were then well attended protests in June 2015, June 2016, the ‘Black Wednesday’ protest and 
strike in October 2016, and June 2017.  The June 2015 protest saw an estimated 200,000 
women in Buenos Aires alone,10 though some estimate it higher.11  In general, many of the 
campaign’s initial legislative goals were met, and fairly quickly.  However, long term 
implementation is severely lacking.12 
Context 
 
Although the outcomes of these campaigns were very similar, the context is not.  This finding 
continues to underscore earlier chapters where context shows to be less important than one 
might hypothesise.  
Gender indices for these countries are particularly interesting, with Argentina showing very 
positive rankings.   These indices indicate that women enjoy a fairly equal status in 
Argentina, at least compared to the other countries in this study.  India, on the other hand, 
showed very poor gender indices.  The baseline for women in these two countries was 
therefore quite different.  Perhaps reflecting the picture on the ground, India reported the 
highest number of civil society organisations working on women’s rights in the study, with 
560.  This was significantly higher than the other countries, with the next highest being 
 
8 Goñi (n 7); ‘Femicide in Argentina’ (Women Across Frontiers Magazine, 22 November 2015) 
<http://wafmag.org/2015/11/femicide-in-argentina/> accessed 13 November 2017; ‘“Ni Una Menos”: Feminism 
and Politics in Argentina’ <https://www.telesurtv.net/english/opinion/Ni-una-menos-Feminism-and-Politics-in-
Argentina-20150706-0011.html> accessed 21 November 2017. 
9 Implement the National Plan of Action for the Prevention, Assistance and Eradication of the violence against 
women, as established in the Law 26,485; Ensure victims’ access to justice; Develop a Unique Official Register 
of violence victims; Guarantee and deepen a program of Comprehensive Sex Education at all educational levels 
for a life free of discrimination and gender-based (“machista”) violence; guarantee the protection of the victims 
of violence ‘#NiUnaMenos | Not One Less’ (Vital Voices, 1 July 2015) 
<https://www.vitalvoices.org/2015/07/niunamenos-not-one-less/> accessed 21 November 2017; Irene, 
‘#niunamenos: A Combination of Offline and Online Feminist Activism’ (Decoding Digital Activism, 4 October 
2017) <http://wpmu.mah.se/nmict172group6/2017/10/04/niunamenos-feminist-activism/> accessed 21 
November 2017. 
10 Goñi (n 7). 
11 ‘Femicide in Argentina’ (n 8). 
12 Some legislative results were achieved as a consequence, but there is still a lot that needs to be done. Judge 
Elena Highton de Nolasco launched the Femicide Registration Unit for the Supreme Court. Following this, the 
National Government, through the Human Rights Committee, formalised the Unit, as well as the Fiscal 
Specialised Unit on Violence against Women (UFEM).  However big this progress may seem, between the first 
and second #NiUnaMenos protests (2015-2016) 275 women died as victims of gender violence.‘#NiUnaMenos: 
Against Femicide in Latin America’ (openDemocracy, 7 November 2016) 
<https://www.opendemocracy.net/democraciaabierta/andr-s-del-r-o/niunamenos-against-femicide-in-latin-
america> accessed 21 November 2017. 
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Kenya at 115.  There is clearly a vibrant, active, and internationally connected women’s 
rights movement in India with this number of officially registered Civil Society Organisations 
(‘CSOs’).  Argentina had only 40.  Data is not available to indicate the size or operating 
incomes of these CSOs, therefore it is possible that 560 small CSOs in India have the same 
potential impact as 40 large CSOs in Argentina.  However, even if this is true, the sheer 
difference in numbers does indicate that the situation for women and girls is likely different 
in the two countries.   
Engagement with international human rights mechanisms are quite different as well.  
Argentina showed the most formal engagement out of all countries in the study, with 13 
treaties ratified, including CEDAW and the Optional Protocols.  India has ratified eight 
treaties, also including CEDAW, but without the Optional Protocol and with three 
reservations.  As will be seen later in this chapter, India’s engagement with international 
human rights mechanisms for women is not ideal.  Again, based on context alone, one would 
expect very different outcomes in these two countries. 
The most interesting finding in these two campaigns was the proximity to potential regime 
change.  #niunamenos peaked approximately six months before a presidential election.  The 
election also included senate and local government seats.  General elections of this nature 
take place every four years in Argentina (senate and local have mid-term elections every two 
years).   As it turned out, there was a change in ruling party in the October 2015 election, just 
months after the largest peaks in the campaign.  The role of the elections in the campaign was 
made clear by one activist:  
#NiUnaMenos presented a series of five pledges for fighting violence against 
women, asking each of the candidates to sign their names to them. Crucially, they 
did it over Twitter and copied each Tweet onto their website…several candidates 
used the slogan ‘#NiUnaMenos’ directly in their campaign ads…13   
Similarly, in India, the spark incident took place 16 months before an election, again closer in 
time than other campaigns in the study.  Elections in India take place every five years.  As 
with Argentina, there was a change in ruling party as a result of the election following the 
campaign.  It can therefore begin to be seen that, perhaps, campaigns which peak in relatively 
 
13 ‘Four Months From #NiUnaMenos: Has Anything Changed?’ 
<http://www.argentinaindependent.com/currentaffairs/four-months-from-niunamenos-has-anything-changed/> 
accessed 21 November 2017. 
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close proximity to elections may force ruling governments to implement reactionary, tactical 
concession changes as a strategic choice for re-election, but without any political will to 
address the issue long-term.   
Legal Outcomes 
 
#delhigangrape and #niunamenos showed strikingly similar legal changes.  These are the first 
campaigns to show more positive than status quo or negative change, reporting very positive 
legislative outcomes in particular.  However, as introduced earlier in this chapter, this 
legislative change has not translated into meaningful institutionalisation, more so for India.  
Law enforcement in both countries, particularly in prosecutions and convictions, is very poor, 
reflecting that the positive change in the law is not being implemented properly.  Lack of 
implementation can lead to perceptions of impunity from potential and actual perpetrators.  
Additionally, as the governments have technically already addressed the campaigns’ primary 
goals through legislative change, there is little incentive for continued work or change from 
the state.  In this way, these campaigns can be seen as missed opportunities, where more 
work could have been done had the change not happened so quickly or reactively.  
Legislative change 
 
Sexual violence and rape in India were not a new phenomenon.14  Some groups proffered 
statistics that in India there was one rape every hour, with socially vulnerable women and 
girls more at risk.  A report by the BBC written after the #delhigangrape spark incident 
details the many similarly horrific stories of rape, violence, and murder in India, occurring 
before #delhigangrape, which were ‘forgotten’.15  Legislative reform had been at the forefront 
of activism for years, continually pointing to ongoing problems of low conviction rates, lack 
of political will, and problems with frontline unresponsiveness as obstacles to change.16 
 
14 ‘India Faces  Rape Debate’ BBC News (24 November 2002) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/2508929.stm> accessed 20 February 2018. 
15 “On most days, Indian newspapers report shocking new atrocities - a 10-month-old raped by a neighbour in 
Delhi; an 18-month-old raped and abandoned on the streets in Calcutta; a 14-year-old raped and murdered in a 
police station in Uttar Pradesh; a husband facilitating his own wife's gang rape in Howrah; a 65-year-old 
grandmother raped in Kharagpur.  But in a country where a rape is reported every 21 minutes, even these most 
horrific of crimes soon get forgotten - except by the victims and their families.  They are left to fight their long 
lonely battles for justice which, more often than not, is denied to them.  Justin Rowlatt, ‘The Rapes That India 
Forgot’ BBC News (5 January 2013) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-20907755> accessed 13 
March 2018. 
16 ‘India Faces  Rape Debate’ (n 14); Gethin Chamberlain, ‘Five Years after the Gang-Rape and Murder of Jyoti 
Singh, What Has Changed for Women in India?’ The Guardian (3 December 2017) 
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Some changes before #delhigangrape had been achieved.  After the rape of a 16 year old 
tribal girl in a police station, in 1983 the law was amended to say that if the victim says she 
does not consent, the court will believe her.17  An incident in 2009 led to 47 days of protests 
in Kashmir.18  The Attorney General at the time stated that simply a change in the law would 
not have an impact, as the rape culture was so ingrained in society.19  Disappointingly, an 
incident in 2010 which made headlines led to legislative changes not dissimilar to 
#delhigangrape.  The changes were intended to protect women using public transportation.20   
Many women’s groups found the legislative actions taken by the government to be lacking.  
Activists felt that the reforms tackled superficial issues and not underlying social issues, 
which they predicted would not lead to meaningful change.21  Even the report commissioned 
in the aftermath of the #delhigangrape found shortcomings in the government’s previous 
legislative efforts, with many promises left unfulfilled and policies left unimplemented.22 
After the #delhigangrape incident, the government appointed a legal commission, under 
Justice Verma (a former chief justice), to review laws on sex crimes and make 
recommendations.  The commission was given just 30 days to complete its work, which 
included a national public consultation.  Over 70,000 responses were received.23  The 
resulting report was published at the end of January 2013, only one month after her death.  
The committee identified ‘failure of governance’ as the root cause for the high incidence of 
sexual violence, blaming the government and the police for their ‘apathy.’24  The report called 
for broadening legal definitions, establishing special courts with women judges, allowing 
faster appeals, as well as more accountability and uniform forensic protocols.25 
 
<http://www.theguardian.com/society/2017/dec/03/five-years-after-gang-murder-jyoti-singh-how-has-delhi-
changed> accessed 6 March 2018. 
17 Rowlatt (n 15). 
18 ibid. 
19 ibid. 
20 ‘Delhi Police Move to Protect Women Workers after Rapes’ BBC News (10 December 2010) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/mobile/world-south-asia-11966664> accessed 20 February 2018. 
21 Working Group on Human Rights in India and the UN, ‘Human Rights in India: Status Report 2012’ (2012) 
119–120. 
22 Justice JS Verma, Justice Leila Seth and Gopal Subramanium, ‘Report on the Committee on Amendments to 
Criminal Law’ (2013) iii. 
23 Human Rights Watch, ‘“Everyone Blames Me” Barriers to Justice and Support Services for Sexual Assault 
Survivors in India’ (2017) 68. 
24 Chamberlain (n 16). 
25 ‘India Urged to Reform Rape Trials’ BBC News (23 January 2013) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-
india-21156283> accessed 20 February 2018; Chamberlain (n 16); Verma, Seth and Subramanium (n 22) 416. 
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 The Indian government took several steps in the aftermath of the protests:26 
1. Fast track courts were set up specifically for cases of sexual violence; trials ‘as far as 
possible’ are meant to be completed within two months27 
2. Criminal punishment was specified for police who fail to properly record a report of 
sexual assault28 
3. There is now a 20 year minimum prison sentence for rape which causes death or 
vegetative state with the possibility of life in prison or death penalty,29 with 
heightened sentencing for other sexual assault crimes30 
4. Heightened sentencing for repeat offenders31 
5. Rape definition now includes penetration by objects,32 other definitions are expanded33 
6. Stalking and voyeurism are now crimes34 
7. Changes were made to the laws around consent; the absence of physical struggle no 
longer equates to consent35 
8. The age of consent has changed to 18 which means that two teenagers engaging in 
consensual sexual activity could result in the male being charged with rape with no 
leniency36 
After the initial legislative changes were made, activists continued to lobby for changes to the 
way juveniles are treated in the Indian criminal justice system.  The main perpetrator in this 
case was just shy of his 18th birthday, meaning he was treated as a juvenile and received a far 
 
26 ‘One Year After Horrific New Delhi Gang Rape, India Still Struggles With Rape Culture’ 
<https://thinkprogress.org/one-year-after-horrific-new-delhi-gang-rape-india-still-struggles-with-rape-culture-
5d0d0f1ff404/> accessed 20 February 2018. 
27 ‘Explaining India’s New Anti-Rape Laws’ BBC News (28 March 2013) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
asia-india-21950197> accessed 6 March 2018. 
28 The Criminal Law Amendment Bill 2013 (Bill No 63-C) ss 166A, 166B. 
29 ibid 376A. 
30 ibid 376. 
31 ibid 376E. 
32 ‘A Year after the Delhi Gang Rape, What Has Changed?’ (n 2); Betwa Sharma, ‘A Year Later, Family of 
Delhi Gang Rape Victim Press for “Full Justice”’ The New York Times (2013) 
<//india.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/12/16/a-year-later-family-of-delhi-gang-rape-victim-press-for-full-justice/> 
accessed 20 February 2018; Nilanjana Bhowmick, ‘Death Sentences Handed Down in India’s Delhi Gang Rape 
Case’ Time <http://world.time.com/2013/09/13/death-sentences-handed-down-in-indias-delhi-gang-rape-case/> 
accessed 20 February 2018. 
33 The Criminal Law Amendment Bill ss 354A/B, 375. 
34 ibid 354C, 354D; ‘Explaining India’s New Anti-Rape Laws’ (n 27). 
35 The Criminal Law Amendment Bill s 114A; ‘Explaining India’s New Anti-Rape Laws’ (n 27). 
36 ‘Explaining India’s New Anti-Rape Laws’ (n 27); ‘Recommendations of the Justice Verma Committee: 10-
Point Cheat-Sheet’ <https://www.ndtv.com/cheat-sheet/recommendations-of-the-justice-verma-committee-10-
point-cheat-sheet-511292> accessed 20 February 2018; ‘Justice Verma Committee Report Summary’ 
<http://www.prsindia.org/parliamenttrack/report-summaries/justice-verma-committee-report-summary-2628/> 
accessed 20 February 2018; Verma, Seth and Subramanium (n 22). 
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more lenient sentence than the others.  This caused outrage in the campaign.37  In December 
2015, the government passed The Juvenile Justice Bill which meant that 16 year olds 
involved in particularly serious or heinous crimes would be tried as adults.38  This may have 
been a more positive legal outcome of the campaign, whereby the government took time and 
effort in debating and drafting the changes.  It is notable that the more long-term meaningful 
change seen in India is not specifically related to violence against women.  Although this is 
an important outcome for the Indian criminal justice system, it will not specifically benefit 
women and girls.   
Since the sexual violence legislative changes were passed, many have highlighted the 
shortcomings of the government’s actions.  Some campaigners feel that while the laws have 
changed and rapes are being reported, investigated, and perhaps prosecuted more, nothing has 
been done to prevent them from happening in the first place.39  The UN criticised India for 
not addressing the underlying societal causes of violence against women and sexual 
violence.40  Activists were concerned from the start at the use of the death penalty in sexual 
crimes: ‘if sentences are thought of as too harsh by the judges, the already high acquittal rate 
in cases of sexual violence will rise further.’41  Human Rights Watch found that there were 
still serious issues with poor police response and stigma, poor access to sensitive medical 
care, and lack of access to effective legal assistance, including continued delays even with the 
fast track courts.42  It appears that the public pressure of the campaign pushed the government 
to commission the report far too quickly and implement arguably superficial legislative 
changes.  In the strictest regard, the campaign was successful in lobbying for changes in the 
law, the goals of which were indeed met.  However it can be seen now that the changes were 
made too quickly to allow for any sort of meaningful implementation.  The evidence also 
suggests that the changes were specifically made prior to the elections, perhaps as a tactic by 
the ruling party to try to ensure re-election.    
A nearly identical picture comes through in Argentina.  The government had taken legislative 
steps to address violence against women, passing the first gender violence law in 1994,43 
 
37 ‘A Year after the Delhi Gang Rape, What Has Changed?’ (n 2). 
38 ‘Rajya Sabha Passes Juvenile Justice Bill, Nirbhaya’s Mother “satisfied” - Times of India ►’ 
<https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Rajya-Sabha-passes-Juvenile-Justice-Bill-Nirbhayas-mother-
satisfied/articleshow/50285328.cms> accessed 20 February 2018. 
39 Chamberlain (n 16). 
40 ‘One Year After Horrific New Delhi Gang Rape, India Still Struggles With Rape Culture’ (n 26). 
41 ‘Explaining India’s New Anti-Rape Laws’ (n 27). 
42 Human Rights Watch (n 23). 
43 Ley No. 24.417: Proteccion Contra la Violencia Familiar 1994. 
Chapter 5: Tactical concessions: #delhigangrape and #niunamenos 
 
143 
 
which was broadened and improved a few years later (Law 26.485).44 In 2012, the 
government passed a law specifically addressing femicide.45  As seen in India, however, 
women’s groups in Argentina noted that the laws alone did not have the desired impact.46  
Before #niunamenos, only eight of the 45 articles in Law 26.485 had been properly or fully 
implemented.47 
Shortcomings in the law were noted as a lack of education on the issue of violence against 
women, no national hotline, not enough shelters, no free legal assistance, and a lack of 
appropriate budget. 48  One of the focal points of #niunamenos was the inaction in 
establishing the official register to collect information on femicides.  Activists agreed that 
having access to such data would reveal the magnitude of the problem and provide an 
important evidence-base for future work. The lack of such data also indicated that the 
relevant government agencies were not fulfilling their responsibilities.49   
#niunamenos sought to address these shortcomings.  Within days of the protests which 
erupted from #niunamenos, the government announced steps to realise the implementation of 
Law 26.485.50  The first aspect to be addressed was the data collection issue and the 
establishment of the federal registry.  When announcing the registry, the vice president of the 
Federal Supreme Court of Argentina, Elena Highton de Nolasco, cited jurisdictional 
problems as the reason for the lack of previous progress and shifted blame to the provinces.51    
The government then claimed that the large scale protest driven by social media forced the 
 
44 Ley No. 26.485: Ley de protección integral para prevenir, sancionar y erradicar la violencia contra las mujeres 
en los ámbitos en que desarrollen sus relaciones interpersonales 2009; O’Dwyer (n 7). 
45 O’Dwyer (n 7); Graciela Rodriguez-Ferrand, ‘Argentina: Criminal Code Amendment to Include Femicide | 
Global Legal Monitor’ (3 May 2012) <//www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/argentina-criminal-code-
amendment-to-include-femicide/> accessed 21 November 2017; ‘El Femicidio Fue Aprobado En Diputados y 
Está Cerca de Ser Ley’ <https://www.clarin.com/sociedad/femicidio-aprobado-diputados-cerca-
ley_0_r1xDWS3vQx.html> accessed 1 January 2019. 
46 O’Dwyer (n 7). 
47 ‘#NiUnaMenos: Not One Woman Less, Not One More Death!’ (NACLA) </news/2016/11/01/niunamenos-
not-one-woman-less-not-one-more-death> accessed 21 November 2017; ‘Casi No Se Aplica La Ley Contra Los 
Femicidios’ <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1799664-casi-no-se-aplica-la-ley-contra-los-femicidios> accessed 21 
November 2017. “In April 2009, law 26.485 on Violence Against Women was enacted. When the law was 
promulgated, several active feminist groups took it as a very good start. Three years later, one can say that law 
26,485 is a great legal tool with no use. The law itself is complete, though extremely long, not fully regulated, 
and most importantly, very difficult to implement.”  ‘Women’s Rights: An Unfinished Business’ 
<http://www.argentinaindependent.com/socialissues/development/womens-rights-an-unfinished-business/> 
accessed 21 November 2017.   
48 ‘Women’s Rights: An Unfinished Business’ (n 47). 
49 ‘Femicide in Argentina’ (n 8). 
50 ‘60% of Femicides Committed by Partners’ <http://www.buenosairesherald.com/article/215488/> accessed 13 
November 2017. 
51 ‘Femicide in Argentina’ (n 8). 
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provinces to change their perspective and agree to the registry.52  Shortly thereafter, 
Argentina’s attorney general, Alejandra Gils Carbó, also set up a special prosecution unit for 
violence against women and confirmed the enactment of the registry.53  The registry’s first 
report was published just months later in September, corroborating the work previously done 
by women’s groups illustrating the magnitude of the problem.  Some provinces took action to 
improve legislation as well. 54  In October following the first wave of protests, the National 
Women’s Council also released an Action Plan, another demand of the campaign, including 
the establishment of a national hotline.55  Again, it is important to note that all of these 
changes were made before the pending national and regional elections.   
Sadly, even with the establishment of a registry, a national action plan, a hotline, a special 
prosecution unit, and local legislative efforts, little change is seen in the incidence of 
femicide.  As will be seen later in this chapter, there has been a particular lack of impact in 
the courts.  These changes were seemingly implemented in a ‘knee jerk’ fashion in reaction to 
the combination of public pressure in the sheer scale of the campaign and the pending 
elections.  The changes were not accompanied by any meaningful institutionalisation or 
efforts to address underlying, root causes of violence against women in Argentina. 
Institutionalisation 
 
For many years before #delhigangrape, the Indian government had not prioritised the 
elimination of violence against women, generally seen as paying lip service when incidents 
were reported in the media but not following up with action or investment.56 
In a 2010 survey, nearly 80% of women in New Delhi reported being worried 
about their safety, and a quick glance at any paper in the morning will offer some 
insight as to why. Let’s take last Thursday. On April 26, the Times of India 
covered the following stories: an alleged rape by a Delhi cop, two separate cases 
 
52 “the demonstration was extremely useful for us since so many of the jurisdictions that hadn’t signed the 
agreements to be part of the registry finally agreed to sign up on June 4,” (Mariana Gras, president of the 
Council).”   
53 ‘Femicide in Argentina’ (n 8). 
54 ibid. 
55 ibid. 
56 Debolina Dutta and Oishik Sircar, ‘India’s Winter of Discontent: Some Feminist Dilemmas in the Wake of a 
Rape’ (2013) 39 Feminist Studies 293; Burke (n 5). 
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of naked and mutilated female corpses being dumped in different parts of the city, 
and a husband who murdered his wife whom he suspected of infidelity.57   
With the government not being seen to take the issue seriously, neither did the general public.  
Polls showed that most men in Delhi thought that harassing women on the street in public 
was acceptable behaviour and that many police felt the victims of sexual violence were to 
blame.58  Local politicians equally gave little importance to the issue.59  Interestingly, the 
government’s first reaction when #delhigangrape social media led to widespread protests was 
to crack down on the protesters themselves, assumingly to shut down the criticism of the 
government which allowed this violent act against a woman to occur. 60  It took a whole week 
before the government’s reaction became sympathetic.61  This capricious approach did not sit 
well with the public, being ‘dismissed as too little, too late.’62  It was this environment which 
spurred the government to set up the commission. 63 
With elections in the near future, it was not long before the opposition party took up the 
issue, asking what the current government had done to protect women and calling for stricter 
laws.64  Many politicians joined in the public dialogue, pointing fingers, issuing blame, 
inciting anger, and calling for change.65  One of India’s most high ranking police officers 
joined in, notably on Twitter, blaming a failure of governance.66  Judges in turn blamed the 
police for letting the perpetrators slip through.67 
Public discourse ranged from defensive to aggressive, with some voices even exposing deep 
seated misogyny.68  This continued for quite some time.  Nearly a year later, a government 
 
57 ‘New Delhi’s Women Problem: What Does It Take to Make a City, and Society, Safe?’ 
<http://world.time.com/2012/05/02/new-delhis-women-problem-what-does-it-take-to-make-a-city-and-society-
safe/> accessed 20 February 2018. 
58 Burke (n 5); ‘Student “Gang-Raped on Delhi Bus”’ BBC News (17 December 2012) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-20753075> accessed 20 February 2018. 
59 Burke (n 5). 
60 Gardiner Harris, ‘5 in New Delhi Rape Case Face Murder Charges’ The New York Times (3 January 2013) 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/04/world/asia/murder-charges-filed-against-5-men-in-india-gang-
rape.html> accessed 20 February 2018. 
61 Burke (n 5). 
62 ibid. 
63 ‘Delhi Gang Rape: Parliamentary Panel Summons Union Home Secretary, Delhi Police Chief - Times of 
India’ <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Delhi-gang-rape-Parliamentary-panel-summons-Union-home-
secretary-Delhi-police-chief/articleshow/17707153.cms> accessed 20 February 2018. 
64 ‘Parliament Uproar over Delhi Rape’ BBC News (18 December 2012) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
asia-india-20765869> accessed 20 February 2018. 
65 ibid. 
66 Mandhana and Trivedi (n 1). 
67 ‘Delhi Gang-Rape: What Was the Police Doing, Asks Angry High Court’ <https://www.ndtv.com/cheat-
sheet/delhi-gang-rape-what-was-the-police-doing-asks-angry-high-court-507939> accessed 20 February 2018. 
68 Chamberlain (n 16). 
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official publicly stated ‘if you can’t prevent rape, enjoy it’, reigniting the Twitter debate 
about attitudes towards rape in India, in particular the culture of victim-blaming.69 Language 
and attitudes expressed by those in power continued to show a lack of understanding of the 
seriousness of the epidemic of violence against women in India.70  Another high profile case 
occurred in 2014, when two girls aged 12 and 14 in a rural area where raped and hanged on 
their way to use a field for a toilet.  It was alleged that the police ridiculed and ignored the 
family when they reported trouble, apparently due to caste discrimination.71  In 2017, a 
Thomson Reuters research poll found that Delhi was seen as the ‘world’s worst megacity for 
sexual violence against women,’ though some saw this as more of a perception than a 
reality.72  Regardless, this evidence does not show that the government worked toward 
meaningful institutionalisation of women’s rights or to implement changes in the laws after 
the hashtag campaign.73    
The situation in Argentina is similar – all the right discourse in all the right places, but the 
truth of a lack of meaningful institutionalisation emerges when looking a bit deeper.  Even 
the President at the time of #niunamenos, back when he was a governor, was quoted as 
saying: 
Deep inside, all women like to hear a piropo (catcall), even women who say they 
don’t. I don’t believe them. There can’t be anything nicer than being told how 
pretty you are, even if it comes along with vulgarity, like being told what a nice 
ass you have.74   
 
69 Miriam Berger, ‘India’s Top Police Official: “If You Can’t Prevent Rape, Enjoy It”’ 
<https://www.buzzfeed.com/miriamberger/indias-top-police-official-if-you-cant-prevent-rape-enjoy-it> 
accessed 6 March 2018. 
70 ‘One Year After Horrific New Delhi Gang Rape, India Still Struggles With Rape Culture’ (n 26). 
71 ‘The Village Where Cousins Were Raped and Hanged’ BBC News (30 May 2014) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-27622236> accessed 20 February 2018. 
72 ‘Delhi, Sao Paulo Seen as Worst Megacities for Sex Attacks on Women’ 
<https://af.reuters.com/article/commoditiesNews/idAFL4N1M14XB> accessed 20 February 2018. 
73 Although for an unrelated cause, in April 2017, the governments in Jammu and Kashmir banned 22 social 
media sites, including Twitter, to curb protest.   The governments "felt that continued misuse of social 
networking sites and instant messaging services is likely to be detrimental to the interests of peace and 
tranquillity in the state.”  ‘J&K Government Bans 22 Social Networking Sites Citing Their Misuse - Times of 
India’ <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/jk-government-bans-22-social-networking-sites-citing-their-
misuse/articleshow/58382769.cms> accessed 23 February 2018.  This adds yet another dimension to the 
evidence of the lack of institutionalisation of international human rights norms.   
74 Goñi (n 7); ‘“Ni Una Menos”: Feminism and Politics in Argentina’ (n 8); ‘Feminism Around the World: 
#NiUnaMenos Protest in Argentina Highlights Epidemic of Violence Against Women’ 
<https://www.themarysue.com/feminism-around-the-world-argentina-ni-una-menos/> accessed 21 November 
2017. 
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This statement is very illustrative of the South American ‘machismo’ or ‘machista’ culture.75  
Street harassment is common, even socially acceptable as an expression of masculinity to 
some.76  Argentina is identified as a deeply patriarchal country, ‘plagued with sexist 
stereotypes.’77  Almost identical to India, for some time women’s groups have raised 
concerns about institutionalised apathy to violence against women, particularly through 
police victim-blaming and a lack of convictions in the courts.78 
Publicly, government officials seemed to address this perceived apathy in the aftermath of the 
#niunamenos protests.  Many politicians attended the protests for photo opportunities, using 
the images in their election campaigns.79  Although to some this was political opportunism, to 
many it was an important step forward in accountability and agenda setting.80  There was 
some evidence that the hashtag campaign influenced local elections, in a positive way (a 
known misogynist lost his seat).81  Front-line workers noted that more women used shelters 
and national helplines. 82  A new national action plan specifically addressing violence against 
women was announced, continuing to address the goals of the campaign, particularly in terms 
of education and increases to available services.83  Additionally, the government ‘elevated’ 
the National Women’s Council within the government to give the agency more autonomy.84  
Notably, many female legislators introduced bills to protect women from violence in the 
months following the campaign (Dirección de Información Parlamentaria, Honorable Cámera 
de Diputados de la Nación, República Argentina).85  Some experts posit that perhaps there 
 
75 O’Dwyer (n 7); ‘#NiUnaMenos: Against Femicide in Latin America’ (n 12); Sarah Gordon, ‘NiUnaMenos: 
How the Brutal Gang Rape and Murder of a Schoolgirl United the Furious Women of Latin America’ The 
Telegraph (10:22) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/life/niunamenos-how-a-schoolgirls-brutal-gang-rape-
and-murder-united/> accessed 21 November 2017. 
76 Goñi (n 7). 
77 ‘Women’s Rights: An Unfinished Business’ (n 47). 
78 US State Dept, ‘Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015’ (2015) 13. 
79 ‘“Ni Una Menos”: Feminism and Politics in Argentina’ (n 8). 
80 ‘Four Months From #NiUnaMenos: Has Anything Changed?’ (n 13). 
81 ‘“Ni Una Menos”: Feminism and Politics in Argentina’ (n 8). 
82 ‘Feminism Around the World: #NiUnaMenos Protest in Argentina Highlights Epidemic of Violence Against 
Women’ (n 74); ‘#NiUnaMenos | Not One Less’ (n 9); ‘Four Months From #NiUnaMenos: Has Anything 
Changed?’ (n 13). 
83 ‘Argentina Has New Gender Violence Plan’ BBC News (27 July 2016) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
latin-america-36901113> accessed 13 November 2017; US State Dept, ‘Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices for 2016’ (2016) 15 <https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper> 
accessed 13 April 2017. 
84 Karla Zabludovsky, ‘This Woman Devoted Her Life To Keeping Women Safe. And Then A Man Killed Her.’ 
<https://www.buzzfeed.com/karlazabludovsky/these-women-tried-to-take-hashtag-activism-into-the-streets> 
accessed 21 November 2017. 
85 Madeline Gannon, ‘At What Cost? Discrepancies between Women’s Legislative Representation and Effective 
Policy to Protect Women from Violence in Argentina’ (2016) 33 SIGMA Journal of Political and International 
Studies 81, 82. 
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was success because there are quota systems in place in Argentina, and although the female 
politicians had not made much change prior to the movement, the protests may have enabled 
the female politicians already in post to take more drastic action.86 
It seems, however, that for every positive and perhaps meaningful action the government 
took to institutionalise a commitment to women, there was an equal negative action.  In one 
instance, the government was accused of being ‘incompetent’ when they publicly announced 
the location of three new safe houses for victims of domestic violence.87  The fact that the 
protests continued alone gives credence to the lack of political will and investment in women.  
Femicides themselves have likely increased in the years since the campaign. 88  In short:  
activists in Argentina fear that, for all the efforts they made, for all the noise they 
created, women’s rights have barely inched forward — with new laws largely 
ignored, few safe havens for victims of abuse, and a justice system that remains 
dominated by men.89 
Law Enforcement 
 
The Verma Report was very clear in its findings about the role of the courts in allowing the 
epidemic of violence against women in India prior to the #delhigangrape case and 
campaign.90  Myriad cases of failures in the justice system for victims of gender based 
violence existed before the #delhigangrape incidents.91  The case of the perpetrators of the 
#delhigangrape caught and held the attention of the public.  As explored later in this chapter, 
many of the peak days in the campaign related to milestones in the progression of the legal 
case.  On January 3, 2013, murder charges were filed against the five alleged perpetrators as 
well as charges of destruction of evidence and attempted murder of her male companion.  The 
 
86 Gannon (n 85). 
87 ‘#NiUnaMenos: Fighting Femicide In Argentina | The Mary Sue’ <https://www.themarysue.com/niunamenos-
fighting-femicide-in-argentina/> accessed 21 November 2017; Zabludovsky (n 84). 
88 ‘Argentina: Paro Contra Feminicidios y Maltrato a Las Mujeres’ <http://www.dw.com/es/argentina-paro-
contra-feminicidios-y-maltrato-a-las-mujeres/a-36094088> accessed 13 November 2017. 
89 Zabludovsky (n 84). 
90 “full justice continues to elude the victim of sexual harassment and sexual assault even after two decades 
(after a landmark case)…The mindset of the judiciary also needs to be improved by their education in gender 
sensitivity. The women’s tragedy is to face the compounding of gender and social injustice contrary to the 
constitutional promise to ‘secure a social order in which justice, social, economic and political, shall inform all 
the institutions of national life’, and the State’s obligation ‘to eliminate inequalities in status, facilities and 
opportunities, not only amongst individuals but also amongst groups of people’”  Verma, Seth and 
Subramanium (n 22) 15.  
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sixth suspect was treated as a juvenile.92  The case was referred to the new fast track courts, 
set up in just days in response to the protests.93  One of the accused died in jail, in a 
questionable suicide.94  The four remaining men were found guilty.95  They were given the 
death penalty in September 2013.96  A front line worker aptly described the situation: 
This decision will have a positive effect on patriarchal and reactionary societal 
attitudes because they only understand the language of fear.  However, the full 
effect of this verdict will be felt only when it fast-tracks all other pending rape 
trials in the country and other rape victims get their justice too.97   
Others were not as positive about the sentence, finding that while authorities needed to take 
action on this case given the public attention driven by social media, the death penalty is also 
a violation of international human rights norms: ‘authorities must avoid using the death 
penalty as a quick-fix solution.’98 
 
92 Harris (n 60). 
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commits-suicide.html> accessed 20 February 2018; Niharika Mandhana and Heather Timmons, ‘Suspect in 
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95 ‘Anger and Calls for Justice in Delhi’ BBC News (10 September 2013) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
asia-india-24031909> accessed 20 February 2018. 
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The death penalties were upheld upon appeal in March 2014.99  However, the following day 
two of the sentences were put on hold for another appeal.100  The sentences were again upheld 
in May 2017, seen as an unusual move by the court given that a high percentage of death 
sentences are overturned or commuted.101  A recent study had found that death sentences in 
India are often handed down but rarely carried out.102  As is necessary for the death penalty in 
India, the judges found this to be the ‘rarest of rare cases.’103  In upholding the sentences, the 
judge opined: 
I hope that this gruesome incident in the capital and death of this young woman 
will be an eye-opener for a mass movement “to end violence against women” and 
“respect for women and her dignity” and sensitizing public at large on gender 
justice…The battle for gender justice can be won only with strict implementation 
of legislative provisions, sensitization of public, taking other pro-active steps at 
all levels for combating violence against women and ensuring widespread 
attitudinal changes and comprehensive change in the existing mind set.104  
Many believe that because this level of punishment is not doled out equally for all sexual 
assault cases, it will not serve as a deterrent.  Rather, it was the public outrage sparked by the 
social media attention and expressed in both online and offline activities which led to these 
extreme sentences, not the nature of the crime itself.105  A young woman who lived near the 
 
99 Vinay Sharma and Anr v State [2014] High Court of Delhi 1398/2013.   “the shocking incident left an 
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asia-india-26593587> accessed 20 February 2018. 
101 ‘In Rare Move, Death Sentence in Delhi Gang Rape Case Is Upheld’ The New York Times 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/05/world/asia/death-sentence-delhi-gang-rape.html> accessed 20 February 
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families of the perpetrators was quoted as saying, ‘the court should not give special 
preference to this case and must decide like it does in other cases. They should be punished 
within the law.’ 106  Another local woman felt instead that all rapists should be given the death 
penalty, including the rich and famous.107  Some even felt that there would have been more 
protests if the perpetrators had not been given the death penalty.108 
Other high profile cases have been decided since, with varying results.  Those cases where 
the government ‘feared’ public backlash led to harsh penalties, while those which garnered 
less attention were given softer sentences.109  The role of the courts is highly questionable, 
appearing to hand down death penalties when the media is involved, but releasing other 
perpetrators when it does not gain any attention.   
Indian crime statistics are publicly available, and, according to the official reports, the crime 
statistics on sexual violence paint a very telling picture.110  By 2016, conviction rates 
remained between 25-30% for rape and around 20% for sexual harassment.  As expected, 
there were minor improvements in the year immediately following the campaign, but as the 
echo of the campaign dwindled, so did the attention to violence against women.  Conviction 
rates of merely 25% for cases of rape are extremely low.  It is also interesting to note that in 
2013, one third of cases were labelled as false charges.  This could possibly indicate that 
police do not take cases of rape seriously (as stated by activists and victims over the years). 
Additionally, despite the establishment of fast track courts, the number of backlog cases does 
not seem to have changed much over the past decade.  At the end of 2016, 133,373 rape cases 
were still pending.  Over 30,000 sexual harassment cases were pending.   
The one positive to take from these statistics has nothing to do with law and order, but rather 
women themselves.  There was a marked increase in the number of rapes reported after the 
campaign which has been maintained since.  Given all the evidence, it is highly likely that 
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this number is much more representative than the lower number reported before the 
campaign, indicating that women are more empowered to come forward and report the crime.   
The combination of attention paid only to high profile cases with the persistently low and 
unchanging conviction rates shows that the situation is worse in India following the 
campaign.  A chance was created to make real improvements, but these were never realised.   
In Argentina, again there is a nearly identical picture, with persistently low conviction rates 
before and after the campaign.  In many cases of femicide, again both before and after the 
campaign, the victims had already sought the protection of the state.111  There were, and 
continue to be, many reports of incidents of violence when there was already a court 
restraining or protection order in place. 112  This is also not dissimilar to the situation around 
femicide in Turkey.   
According to the Argentinian Attorney General’s office, in 2010, complaints were filed in 
only three out of every ten suspected rape cases, and only one of those three was then 
prosecuted.113  Prior to the campaign there were also reports of judicial leniency and 
acceptance of the machismo culture.  One judge cited ‘violent emotion’ as a mitigating 
circumstance in one femicide case which led to a reduced sentence for the perpetrator.114  
Public outcry over that particular case did lead the government to pass legislation imposing 
stricter sentences.  The change, however, did not have the desired deterrent effect as 
femicides continued to increase.115    
After the campaign, these patterns continued.  In 2015, Human Rights Watch found that out 
of a reported 235 femicides, there were only seven convictions.116  Compiled statistics from 
the federal registry (set up in response to the campaign) shows the following:117 
  
 
111 ‘El Mapa de Los Femicidios En La Argentina’ <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1794148-el-mapa-de-los-
femicidios-en-la-argentina> accessed 21 November 2017. 
112 ‘Femicide in Argentina’ (n 8); ‘Argentines Protest Violence against Women’ 
<http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/6/4/Thousands-of-Argentines-rally-against-femicide.html> accessed 
21 November 2017. 
113 US State Dept, ‘Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2010’ (2010) 20. 
114 ‘How One Woman’s Murder Made Argentina Rethink the Idea of “Crimes of Passion”’ 
<https://www.newstatesman.com/culture/observations/2017/04/how-one-woman-s-murder-made-argentina-
rethink-idea-crimes-passion> accessed 21 November 2017. 
115 ibid. 
116 Human Rights Watch, ‘World Report 2017: Rights Trends in Argentina’ (2017) 
<https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/argentina> accessed 2 January 2019. 
117 Registro Nacional de Femicidios de la Justicia Argentina, ‘Datos Estadisticos Del Poder Judicial Sobre: 
Femicidios’. 
Chapter 5: Tactical concessions: #delhigangrape and #niunamenos 
 
153 
 
Table 5.1: Convictions rates of femicides, Argentina, 2014-2016 
Year  Total victims Convictions % Previous complaints % 
2014 225 27 13% 30 13% 
2015 235 7 3% 46 20% 
2016 254 22 9% 60 24% 
 
These statistics show that conviction rates have, in fact, decreased since the campaign.  These 
statistics also show the relatively high percentage of femicides where a previous complaint 
has been recorded.  This also confirms that femicides are increasing, from 225 in 2014 to 254 
in 2016.  One journalist summed up the situation: ‘However big this progress [the legislative 
achievements] may seem, between the first and second #NiUnaMenos protests (2015-2016) 
275 women died as victims of gender violence.’118  
Conviction rates in both countries are therefore shockingly low, hovering around 25% for 
sexual violence in India and 10% for femicide in Argentina.  These rates are consistent both 
before and after the hashtag campaigns.  With the legislative changes introduced, one would 
expect to see any meaningful change work its way to the courts with a resulting positive 
change in conviction rates by now.  Given the time that has passed since the legislative 
changes in both countries, it is reasonable to expect to see improvements in the judicial 
system.  However, this research indicates that the speed of the legislative changes was not an 
indication of meaningful state commitment and political will to address violence against 
women, but rather a reactionary tactical concession to appease the public’s visible anger 
driven by social media, most likely related to pending elections. 
UN Dialogue 
 
The final area to explore evidencing legal change is the catalogue of reports with UN human 
rights treaty bodies.  This dialogue, when examined closely, provides a wealth of information 
about the true situation for women and girls on the ground.  It also provides an in depth 
insight into the government’s perspective, uncovering truths about commitment and 
investment in women.  In this legal aspect, India and Argentina actually differed greatly in 
their relationship with the UN human rights mechanisms.   India showed rather surprising 
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aggression, defensiveness, and at times outright rejection of engagement with international 
human rights mechanisms.  Argentina, on the other hand, exhibited what could be an honest 
recognition of the problem of violence against women with evidence of some meaningful 
commitment to change.  This area is the primary reason Argentina overall scored better than 
India in legal outcomes.   
In early UN reports to and from India, there is a clear focus on marriage and women’s roles 
as mothers.  Although it seems some small steps were being taken towards liberalisation, the 
overall rhetoric fell squarely within traditional gender roles.119  When pushed on the 
government’s supposed commitment to improve the status of women,120  India responded: 
‘…that the macho image did not exist in India, where women were traditionally accorded a 
high degree of respect.’121  The Human Rights Committee raised similar concerns in the early 
1990s as well.122  There, India claimed that the ‘difficulty in reaching the goal of equality was 
more a social than a law enforcement problem.’123  
In 1999, India submitted a report to CEDAW citing legislative reform, awareness raising 
campaigns, and institutional restructuring as efforts undertaken by the state to address 
violence against women.124  Deeply rooted gender bias was again used by the State as an 
explanation for slow change.125  These kinds of statements are very similar to statements 
made by government officials during the #delhigangrape public outcry, nearly 20 years later.  
The next CEDAW state report, submitted in 2005, still talked about ‘pending’ changes to 
rape laws and ‘consideration’ of implementing suggestions from the national women’s 
machinery.126  Violence against women and girls featured high on the list of issues from the 
Committee and in dialogue with the state.127  The State again replied with challenges between 
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legislation and implementation.128  The cycles read very similarly, indicating little to no 
change in approach, impact, or effect had taken place.   
In 2001, the Special Rapporteur (‘SR on VAW’) on Violence Against Women had several 
communications with the government of India regarding allegations of rape, many of which 
dealt with police or armed forces.129  The government stated that six out of the ten cases 
raised were false or unsubstantiated accusations.  This indicates a rather dismissive state 
attitude towards the work of the SR on VAW and the issues raised in her communications.  
Similarly, in 2002 the SR on VAW communicated with the government on 11 cases dealing 
with serious allegations of rape and violence, many of which involved police inaction, 
intimidation, and death threats.130  India did not respond to any communications on 
allegations of cases of VAW from the SR in 2006.131  In 2007 the government only replied to 
one allegation, and claimed that after their investigation they could not substantiate the 
claim.132  In 2008, the government replied to a 2007 allegation, again finding that it was 
fabricated.133  Two additional allegations from 2008 led the government to ask for more 
information; according to the State’s response one was being investigated, three had no 
response, and the government found another to be false.134  In 2009, the SR received an 
allegation of serious government threats to a woman who had given a statement to the HRC 
about the situation of VAWG in India.  The government denied this.135  A further two 
responses were sent to previous communications where, unsurprisingly, the government 
found no basis or were unable to substantiate the claims.136  This dialogue is very indicative 
of the state not taking these issues seriously, over quite a lengthy time period. 
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The next engagement with international human rights mechanisms occurred while the 
campaign was reaching its climax.  In early 2013, the SR on VAW was invited to undertake a 
mission to India.137  This was clearly in response to the spark incident.  The SR found that 
sexual violence was widespread, affecting women’s feeling of security particularly in public 
urban spaces.  She also identified shame and stigma as barriers to justice, at times even 
leading to victim suicide.138  She then went on to highlight the lack of effective 
implementation of existing legislation, pointing to the exclusion of women’s participation in 
society as a primary underlying cause of the epidemic of violence.139  The SR specifically 
addressed #delhigangrape.  She found that: 
The laws that were adopted did not fully reflect the recommendations of the 
Verma Committee. The opportunity to adopt a holistic approach to violence 
against women, including addressing the root causes and consequences of such 
violence, was lost…Serious concerns were expressed with regard to the 
insensitive and taunting attitude of some members of Parliament with regard to 
the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act. The Special Rapporteur regrets that some 
political leaders are not fully committed to the process of legal and social change 
as regards women’s human rights.140  
The SR continued to draw attention to gaps in legislation, lack of redress, lack of holistic 
approach, and patriarchal norms as root causes of violence against women which were not 
being adequately addressed by the state.141  
Amnesty International also submitted a report in response to the SR’s mission, clearly 
supporting her findings and agreeing that the legislative reforms were not enough.142  The 
state’s response provides significant insight into the lack of institutionalisation of women’s 
rights norms and the resistance to engage with international human rights mechanisms and, 
although lengthy, is critical to this study: 
India is constrained to make certain observations on the Report of the Special 
Rapporteur as there are too many instances in the Report that leads a conclusion 
 
137 UNHRC, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, 
Rashida Manjoo Addendum Mission to India’ (2014) UN Doc A/HRC/26/38/Add.1. 
138 ibid 12. 
139 ibid 45. 
140 ibid 49–51. 
141 ibid 75–6. 
142 Amnesty International, ‘Written Statement Submitted by Amnesty International, a Non-Governmental 
Organization in Special Consultative Status’ (2013) UN Doc A/HRC/23/NGO/102 2. 
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that the Report lacks full objectivity and exhibits a tendency to over-simplify the 
issues at hand. It is rather difficult to comprehend the reasons for the Special 
Rapporteur, who despite her learned experience, has taken rather a 
simplistic approach while drawing conclusions, and thereafter present them 
as her findings. The proclivity for making unsubstantiated yet sweeping 
generalizations is very high in the Report, which tends to point to either a 
lack of understanding of issues or a high degree of prejudice playing a 
predominant role while arriving at such conclusions.  We do not agree with 
the labeling of ‘violence against women in India as systematic’, as noted in 
Paragraph 8. Such a sweeping remark smacks of a highly prejudiced state of 
mind. It also fails to recognize that India, the world’s largest democracy, values 
and respects the rule of law as one of its major strengths.143  
The government then asked for specific evidence for 14 statements made by the SR.144  
Having read several hundred UN periodic reports for this study, this statement was by far the 
most openly antagonistic, dismissive, and disappointing of all the reports.  For the State to so 
blatantly defend the government’s rejection of the magnitude of these issues, after the 
campaign, goes quite some way to affirming the significant lack of institutionalisation across 
the country. 
In the next CEDAW reporting cycle, similar discourse was exhibited by the State.145  Despite 
two follow up letters, the government of India did not submit its follow up report on the 
recommendations.146  These interactions, both before and after the campaign, are markedly 
different from the others analysed in this study.  Although Iran at times exhibited hostility, 
the depth and breadth of India’s continued aggression and rejection of the work of the 
international human rights mechanisms surpassed any other country studied.  The State’s lack 
of acceptance of the concerns and issues raised by both treaty bodies and, in particular, the 
 
143 UNHRC, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, 
Rashida Manjoo Addendum Mission to India: Comments by the State on the Report of the Special Rapporteur’ 
(2014) UN Doc A/HRC/26/38/Add.4 paras 2–3 emphasis added. 
144 ibid 12. 
145 “In the absence of any comparative international data, it is rather unclear as to the basis on which the 
Committee chose to frame the question starting with the phrase “Given the high prevalence of violence against 
women in the State Party”.” Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, ‘List of Issues 
and Questions in Relation to the Combined Fourth and Fifth Periodic Reports of India Addendum Replies of 
India’ (2014) UN Doc CEDAW/C/IND/Q/4-5/Add.1 para 9. 
146 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, ‘Letter to India’ (2016) UN Doc 
DB/follow-up/India/65; Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, ‘Letter to India’ 
(2017) UN doc DB/follow-up/India/67. 
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SR on VAW, is palpable.  The express dismissal of the problems indicates a serious lack of 
political will or even recognition of the continuing epidemic of sexual violence in India.  
Additionally, the communications from the government was more openly hostile after the 
campaign, indicating a decline in engagement.   
Argentina, on the other hand, showed an improvement in dialogue.  The State, at least in 
words, seemed to recognise the problems with femicide and violence against women, and, to 
some extent at least, was open to discussing the human rights implications with the 
international mechanisms.  There was evidence of more willingness to change after the 
campaign than before.   
The 1988 CEDAW report noted that while democracy had opened doors for women, much 
more needed to be done to fully integrate them.147  However, even in these very early 
reporting cycles, the committee was already noting that reforms indicated the government’s 
intention to address equality.148  The 1992 CEDAW state report includes a large section on 
VAW and the steps the government at national and provincial level had or was taking to 
prevent and address the issue.149  Again in the 1996 CEDAW State report there was a large 
section on work done to combat domestic violence, with a focus on victim treatment.150  In its 
summary, CEDAW continued to praise the government for their work on domestic 
violence.151 
Concerns first began to emerge with the 1999 CESCR session, where the committee felt that 
perhaps there were ‘inadequate mechanisms’ and ‘slowness of justice’ for women.152  In its 
concluding observations, the committee also highlighted the increase in incidents of violence 
against women, particularly domestic violence.  During the 1999-2000 reporting cycle with 
HRC, there was some back and forth about national and provincial legislation on domestic 
violence and violence against women.  However, the Committee still raised this as an area of 
concern in its concluding observations.153  It is also important to note that as far back as 1999, 
 
147 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, ‘Summary Record of the 112th Meeting’ 
(1988) UN Doc CEDAW/C/SR.112 para 7. 
148 ibid 9, 17. 
149 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, ‘Second Periodic Reports of States 
Parties: Argentina’ (1992) UN Doc CEDAW/C/ARG/2 paras 81–86. 
150 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, ‘Third Periodic Reports of States Parties: 
Argentina’ (1996) UN Doc CEDAW/C/ARG/3 18–20. 
151 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, ‘Summary Record of the 356th Meeting’ 
(1998) UN Doc CEDAW/C/SR.356 para 34. 
152 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘Summary Record of the 35th Meeting’ (1999) UN 
Doc E/C.12/1999/SR.35 para 42. 
153 Human Rights Committee, ‘Concluding Observations Argentina’ (2000) UN Doc CCPR/CO/70/ARG. 
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concerns were being raised over the lack of data collection, which became one of the focal 
points of #niunamenos.   
Nearly 10 pages of the 2002 CEDAW state report were dedicated to the work and 
programmes of the government in reducing domestic violence and violence against women, 
though mostly covering training, awareness raising, plans for the future, and interagency 
working.  Of note, the government still talked about the need to collect better statistics and 
the pilot domestic violence register.154  In the follow up CEDAW session, the committee 
stated ‘the follow-up report was rather disappointing with respect to Argentina’s efforts to 
eliminate violence against women,’ raising concerns over proper investigation of complaints 
and issues with persistently low conviction rates and barriers to accessing justice for 
victims.155  These concerns then featured highly in the 2008 UPR cycle for Argentina, in both 
the compilation report and the stakeholder report.156 
The 2008 CEDAW State report detailed legislation, the telephone hotline, shelters, 
specialised police services for women, and the work of the National Women’s Council.157  
The focus seemed to be very much on victim support, treatment, and services, but not as 
much about prevention.  Again, while important, a focus on process indicators at the expense 
of outcome indicators only shows part of the picture.  By the time the state replied to the 
Committee’s list of issues (2010), Law No 26.485 had been passed, including the 
‘observatory’ for collecting statistics.158  Although the State responded with lots of additional 
information, statistics on femicide were not included.159  In session, although many issues 
around VAW were discussed, the committee again asked for information on women 
murdered and the question was not answered.160  The issue thus remained an area of concern 
 
154 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, ‘Fifth Periodic Reports of States Parties: 
Argentina’ (2002) UN Doc CEDAW/C/ARG/5. 
155 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, ‘Summary Record of the 660th Meeting’ 
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(2010) UN Doc CEDAW/C/SR.926 para 29. 
Chapter 5: Tactical concessions: #delhigangrape and #niunamenos 
 
160 
 
in the concluding observations.161  Similar dialogue was evidenced in the 2008 HRC reporting 
cycle.162  
In its 2015 report to CEDAW, just months before #niunamenos, the government stated: 
Argentina joins the eight Latin American countries that have incorporated the 
concept of femicide into their legislation. Article 80 of the Argentine Penal Code, 
on homicide, includes femicide as an aggravating factor, carrying a sentence of 
life imprisonment.163  
Very little seemed to have progressed in those ten years, although the language was at the 
very least open to dialogue, which differs from the Indian discussions. 
CEDAW’s next list of issues in 2016 (after the campaign), once again, inquire about data 
collection.164  Finally, the state was able to provide official, federal statistics.165  In session, the 
government said: 
After a string of demonstrations across the country in which Argentinians had, for 
the third time in two years, expressed their outrage at femicide, the Government 
had taken note of the strength of public feeling and had for the first time placed 
the elimination of gender-based violence at the top of the political agenda.166 
The exchange which followed shows that the campaign, made so visible through the social 
media attention, did present enough pressure on the government to force action.167   This 
 
161 The Concluding Observations stated: “While welcoming the Comprehensive Law on the Prevention, 
Punishment and Elimination of Violence against Women in their Interpersonal Relations, Law 26,485 (2009), 
the Committee is concerned that, a year after its adoption, there has been no implementing legislation or 
sufficient allocation of financial resources to implement that law…The Committee encourages the State party to 
strengthen its system of data collection in regard to all forms of violence against women and to include such 
information under the Committee’s follow-up procedure referred to in paragraph 51 of the present concluding 
observations.” Concluding Observations Argentina 2010 paras 23–24.  
162 Human Rights Committee, ‘Fourth Periodic Report Argentina’ (2008) UN Doc CCPR/C/ARG/4 paras 113–
128; Human Rights Committee, ‘List of Issues Argentina’ (2009) UN Doc CCPR/C/ARG/Q/4 para 5; Human 
Rights Committee, ‘Summary Record of the 2691st Meeting’ (2010) UN Doc CCPR/C/SR.2691 paras 23, 33; 
Human Rights Committee, ‘Summary Record of the 2690th Meeting’ (2010) UN Doc CCPR/C/SR.2690 para 
57; Human Rights Committee, ‘Concluding Observations Argentina’ (2010) UN Doc CCPR/C/ARG/CO/4 para 
11. 
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to the List of Issues’ (2016) UN Doc CEDAW/C/ARG/Q/7/Add.1 para 9. 
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166 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, ‘Summary Record of the 1443rd Meeting’ 
(2016) UN Doc CEDAW/C/SR.1443 para 2. 
167 The Committee responded, “while the information provided about the State party’s efforts to combat gender 
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dialogue is also quite positive, certainly compared to India.  The Argentinian government at 
the very least speaks about the issue with importance and priority.  However, the evidence 
presented earlier in this chapter does show that the government’s actions have not had any 
impact on the ground for women or in the courts with convictions.  In fact, this lack of impact 
was raised as an area of concern in the next HRC reporting cycle, even using the word 
‘deplore’ to describe the lack of implementation of existing legislation.168  
The SR on VAW visited Argentina in 2016 and found that ‘machismo culture’ was a key 
reason for persistent gender based violence, and that ‘systems to prevent attacks were not 
fully functional.’169  She went on to point out that the data, while helpful in understanding the 
scope of the problem, showed that very little had changed for women in Argentina, 
particularly the low conviction rates.170  
Therefore, the impact of the actions of both the Indian and the Argentinian government were 
very similar.  In fact, neither country has seen a meaningful improvement in reducing 
violence against women, despite legislative changes introduced in response to the campaigns.  
India’s engagement with the international human rights mechanisms was far less positive 
than that of Argentina.  The language displayed in the reports showed India’s hostility 
towards the international mechanisms, while Argentina, at least on the surface, appeared to 
have a much more engaged and open approach. 
 
Twitter Characteristics 
 
#niunamenos was the largest campaign in the study, with 410, 858 Tweets analysed, 63% of 
which were non-English.  #delhigangrape was the second largest campaign with 144,867 
Tweets analysed, with 7% non-English (as expected from an English-speaking country).  
 
One Woman Less”) social movement sweeping Argentina and Latin America as a whole. Thousands of women 
had been protesting against macho behaviour and gender-based violence and in favour of greater equality and 
autonomy for women. She wondered to what extent the National Women’s Council envisaged aligning itself 
with that movement so that more far-reaching, more continuous campaigns against deep-rooted stereotypes and 
cultural attitudes might be launched.”  ibid 63.  The government replied with “while the #NiUnaMenos 
movement had initially emerged from online social networks, it was now an intrinsic part of Argentine culture: 
all of society was engaged in the fight to end femicide.”  ibid 66.  
168 Human Rights Committee, ‘Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic Report of Argentina’ (2016) UN 
Doc CCPR/C/ARG/CO/5 paras 9–10. 
169 ‘UN Special Rapporteur Challenges Argentina to Step up Protection of Women in “Machismo Culture”’ (21 
November 2016) <https://www.ohchr.org/fr/newsevents/pages/displaynews.aspx?newsid=20903&langid=e> 
accessed 2 January 2019. 
170 UNHRC, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, on 
Her Mission to Argentina’ (2017) UN Doc A/HRC/35/30/Add.3 paras 10–11. 
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These two campaigns showed very large peaks on many occasions, indicating a huge public 
following.  The significant public attention of these campaigns, combined in some part with 
the proximity of elections and related political interest, seemed to push the governments to 
engage in tactical concessions in the form the legislative change far too quickly, with little to 
no chance of long-term, meaningful change.  This reflects one of the core critiques of the 
spiral model, the lack of progression, where countries mapped along the spiral have gotten 
‘stuck’ at tactical concessions without moving fully to rule-consistent behaviour.  This was 
manifested in these campaigns, and likely exacerbated by the use of social media.   
Persistence (Tweets per day) 
 
These campaigns showed incredibly similar patterns of persistence, highlighting the large and 
sustained online public attention on the campaigns.  Although this led to increased public 
pressure on the governments, this pressure in some ways had a potentially negative impact, 
contributing to tactical concessions but losing potency to continue campaigning for 
institutionalisation and rule consistent behaviour.   
These two campaigns showed the highest averages of Tweets per day, with 100 for 
#delhigangrape and 589 for #niunamenos.  The two campaigns also showed the most peak 
days and peak periods.  #delhigangrape had 12 peak days over seven peak periods, with 28 
days having over 1,000 Tweets, and #niunamenos had 87 peak days over 21 peak periods, 
with 101 days with more than 1,000 Tweets.  The longest peak period in #delhigangrape was 
22 days, 34 in #niunamenos.  These numbers are far higher than other campaigns, and again 
paint a clear picture of the height of the public attention and pressure.   
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Figure 5.1: Number of Tweets per day, #delhigangrape and #niunamenos 
 
 
The chart above visualises the persistence of the campaigns over the active period (roughly 
600 days).  The backlash campaigns did not show nearly the same heights or lengths of 
peaks, and the status quo campaigns showed huge peaks but only the immediate aftermath of 
the spark incident.  These tactical concessions campaigns show far more persistence, with 
higher and more consistent peaks, longer peak periods, and peaks further into the life span of 
the campaigns.  However, as we see this persistence may have been too much, in that the 
online pressure which then triggered offline protests may have forced governments into 
premature action.   
Engagement (Retweets, Likes, Replies) 
 
Engagement metrics show less similarities between these two campaigns than measures of 
persistence.  #niunamenos was a campaign very much driven by Retweets and likes.  
Throughout the life of the campaign, the ratio of Retweets to Tweets was 3.07, meaning that 
for every Tweet in the campaign there were at least 3 Retweets (on average).  Although in 
some campaigns this might indicate a lack of engagement, in #niunamenos it appears that this 
very high level of Retweeting resulted in consistent messaging.  Particularly around the times 
of protests and rallies, similar images and notices about the upcoming protests were shared 
and Retweeted many times.  Surprisingly, however, #niunamenos also showed a very high 
ratio of likes to Tweets, second only to #letwomengotostadium.  This tends to indicate a low 
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level of engagement, i.e. simply clicking “like” to a Tweet involves the least effort and the 
lowest level of participation.  Perhaps this is one of the campaign behaviours that contributed 
to less positive outcomes, particularly in the areas of institutionalisation and law enforcement.  
More online dialogue tends to be associated with better outcomes, and a high proportion of 
likes shows a negative directionality in the correlation to legal outcomes (explained fully in 
Chapter 7).  In other words, more likes lead to less positive outcomes.  #delhigangrape 
showed a more evenly distributed behavioural pattern of engagement, driven by Retweets 
(and therefore consistent messaging) but not with such stark differences.     
Interestingly, this behaviour in #niunamenos differed from peak to non-peak periods.  One of 
the strongest statistical correlations in this study is the reply to Tweet ratio specifically during 
non-peak periods, showing the importance of ongoing and consistent levels of dialogue and 
engagement.  For #niunamenos, the reply to Tweet ratio during non-peak periods was much 
more in line with the other campaigns.  The campaign with the most positive ratio of replies 
to Tweets was #delhigangrape.  Here we see a point of similarity between the two campaigns, 
showing a positive and consistent level of conversation during non-peak time periods.   
Figure 5.2: log(n) log(s) plot, #delhigangrape 
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Figure 5.3: log(n) log(s) plot, #niunamenos 
 
 
In the log(n) log(s) plots, the differences between the two campaigns are clear.  The gradient 
for Retweets is similar across the two campaigns at -1.927 for #delhigangrape and -1.91 for 
#niunamenos.  However the gradient for likes is far higher in #niunamenos at -1.948 as 
compared to -2.257.  This again underscores the high level of likes in this campaign, both in 
the number of Tweets that are liked many times and in the high number of Tweets that are 
liked a small number of times.  The steep gradient for replies indicates less engagement in 
this metric, in other words there are similarly a low number of Tweets which instigate many 
replies, but equally a fairly low number of Tweets that instigate a low number of replies.  
#delhigangrape shows a different overall pattern, driven by Retweets but with more reply-
engagements than likes.   
Users (profiles of the 100 most active users) 
 
#delhigangrape and #niunamenos were again very similar in user profiles.  As the two largest 
campaigns, it is not surprising that these campaigns attracted a larger number of unique users.  
In total, 46,487 users participated in the #delhigangrape campaign with 185,883 unique users 
in #niunamenos.  Users in #delhigangrape Tweeted on average three times, with users in 
#niunamenos Tweeting twice.  Overall, nearly 40 million Twitter users were reached by the 
active campaigners in #delhigangrape and 11.2 million in #niunamenos.  This reach was 
considerably more than the other campaigns, again underscoring the online public pressure 
on the governments to take visible action quickly.     
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Both campaigns showed a high proportion of domestic users driving the campaign, and of 
those users most were individuals or news agencies.  Out of the 100 most active users in 
#delhigangrape, domestic individuals, non-domestic individuals, and domestic news agencies 
drove the campaign.  #niunamenos was also driven by domestic individuals and news 
agencies, but this was followed by domestic organisations.  These campaigns therefore 
showed a fair amount of interest from domestic news agencies.  In both campaigns, the 
domestic news agencies Tweeted enough times to be in this top 100 category.  What is also 
interesting is the reach of the domestic news agencies.  In India, the combined number of 
followers of the domestic news agencies accounted for 94% of the reach of these top 100.  In 
raw numbers, these active domestic news agencies reached over 37 million Twitter users.  
Again, it is very likely that this reach and public pressure was part of the motivation for the 
government’s reactionary legislative change.   
As indicated earlier in this chapter, #niunamenos also attracted the attention of government 
officials and politicians.  Although the numbers are fairly small, it should be noted that this 
means that, in raw numbers, four out of the most 100 active users in this campaign were 
involved in politics.  That is actually quite meaningful, given that this metric explores the 
most active users out of over 185,000 users.  The only other campaign showing a similar level 
of political involvement was #stopstoning where EU ministers became active in the 
campaign.  Proximity to election is likely the reason there is more political activity in 
#niunamenos than the other campaigns.  As evidenced earlier, targeting politicians and 
candidates was a specific campaign strategy.   
Content analysis 
 
Here the two tactical concessions campaigns differ.  Looking at sentiment, #delhigangrape 
was dominated by positive Tweets with very little polarity.  Conversely, #niunamenos was a 
far more negative campaign, second only to #sendeanlat, showing large variation in sentiment 
over time.  In other words, #niunamenos was a far more volatile campaign as opposed to the 
generally positive sentiment in #delhigangrape.     
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Figure 5.4: Positivity and Peaks, #niunamenos 
 
 
This chart plots the number of Tweets per day against the average positivity score.  For 
#niunamenos, there were clear patterns in the sentiment, indicating a potential relationship to 
peak events.  The sentiment appears to become more positive when peak events occurs, 
particularly later in the campaign.  The baseline is a slightly positive sentiment, ranging 
around 0.6 (0.5 being neutral).  However, around peak times the sentiment becomes more 
positive, ranging from 0.7 to 0.8.  This is particularly evident in the final two peak periods, 
which relate to two large protests.  Tweets became much more positive in the days just 
before, during, and after the protests.  The campaign was clearly buoyed up by the face to 
face activism of the protests, the excitement of the protest drawing closer, and reporting the 
large numbers of people attending the protests.  This certainly presents an interesting 
dimension when looked at through the lens of social media literature which finds that online 
activism is stronger when there are offline ties as well.  This clustering pattern was more 
distinct in #niunamenos than in other campaigns. 
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Figure 5.5: Positivity and Peaks, #delhigangrape 
 
 
Conversely, the pattern in #delhigangrape is steadier and consistently positive.  The sentiment 
does not appear to be as affected by peak events as it was in #niunamenos.  The average 
sentiment over the life of this campaign is 0.75.  As peaks in #delhigangrape tend to occur 
around milestones in the court cases it follows that there would be less positive sentiment.  
On the contrary, peak events in #niunamenos are almost always around the organisation of 
protests.  It also follows that, as seen above, Tweets about protests would be more positive 
than Tweets about prosecution and sentencing of perpetrators.  The campaigns, in terms of 
sentiment, are almost mirror images of each other.   
Normatively, these campaigns showed very intriguing, but somewhat different, findings.  
#delhigangrape Tweets showed both high levels of consistency with, on average, more 
consistent organic framing present in each time period than variable, as well as extremely 
clear messaging.  The variable content paints an incredibly clear picture of the campaign’s 
focus and mood in almost all time periods.  #niunamenos, on the other hand, had less 
consistent and less focused framing and messaging, despite the high proportion of retweets 
around the time of protests.  The analysis of the Tweets seem to confirm some of the other 
evidence which indicated that the #niunamenos campaign lost focus over time.   
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#delhigangrape showed another notable finding in the presence of a high number of legal 
words.  This campaign manifested and kept a focus on the law, the cases, and the overall 
involvement of the judicial system far more than any other campaign.  This appears to be a 
connection to the tactical concession outcome for this campaign.  The campaign clearly 
demanded a change in the law, so the government reacted with an immediate change in the 
law.  45% of the consistent words and 18% of the variable words were of a legal nature.  This 
did not appear to be the case in #niunamenos, where the emerging frames and messages, both 
consistent and variable, did not have a clear legal focus.   
Figure 5.6: Consistently used words, #delhigangrape 
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Figure 5.7: Consistently used words, #niunamenos 
 
These visualisations of consistent words shows in detail the overall focus of the campaigns.  
#delhigangrape Tweets consistently used words and ideas relating to justice.  Words such as 
‘victim’, ‘case’, ‘government’, ‘justice’, ‘accused’, ‘sentence’, and ‘law’ remained prevalent 
throughout the lifespan of the campaign.  In #niunamenos, the one focus which remained 
clear was the organisation of marches and protests, with words such as ‘march’, the 
prevalence of the dates of the big marches, and words like ‘join’.   
An unusual finding was a trend where #niunamenos was connected to the Argentinian 
version of Big Brother.  Across several months, Tweets were consistently referencing an 
incident in the Big Brother house which many felt was exemplary of the epidemic of violence 
against women and machismo in Argentina.  Although Big Brother is a reality television 
show, this shows an interesting ‘pop culture’ connection between social media users and 
reality TV audiences.  This kind of pop culture reference was not prevalent in the other 
campaigns. 
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Overall, the Tweets in #delhigangrape show clear, focussed messaging.   There was a 
consistent emphasis on justice, the judicial system, and the law, with many consistent 
messages of a legal nature and many of the organic content showing reactions to milestones 
in the cases.  #niunamenos had a much more varied approach, with fewer consistent messages 
sending a coherent message and much less focus in the variable organic content.  
#niunamenos did lose its campaign focus over time, which may have contributed to the 
tactical concessions outcome with less long term implementation.  It is perhaps surprising 
then that the clear legal focus of #delhigangrape did not lead to more positive long-term 
outcomes.  Even though #delhigangrape was generally persistent, there was a tail-off of 
Tweets over the life of the campaign.  Perhaps had the campaign maintained a higher level of 
participation and visibility over a longer period of time, the focussed nature of the Tweets 
themselves could have had a greater impact on implementation of legal changes.  The lack of 
visibility in the later months of the campaign may have rendered the consistent messaging 
less impactful.     
These campaigns both showed a good presence of international norms, with 84% of 
international norms analysed present in #delhigangrape and 87% in #niunamenos.  
#niunamenos also showed the highest percentage of consistent and organic norms which are 
also international norms at 10%.  Inclusion of international norms is linked to campaign 
success. 
Conclusion 
 
These two campaigns exemplified the lack of progression critique of the spiral model, with 
both countries engaging in tactical concessions but with little to no movement towards rule-
consistent behaviour.  It appears that the large public attention, driven by domestic users, in 
close proximity to potential regime change, could run the risk of stalling the process.  Both 
campaigns showed extremely positive persistence parameters and very similar users driving 
the campaigns.  Differences were seen in the engagement metrics and content analysis, which 
may have impacted in some of the differences in the components of legal change.   
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Chapter 6 : Possible Success: #women2drive 
 
Introduction 
 
One campaign showed potentially positive results and can, tentatively, be categorised as a 
possible success.  It is still a tentative finding as the legislative change is yet to be fully 
implemented.  It is also not complete change as there are still lingering (and significant) 
problems around institutionalisation and the role of the courts.  However, the campaign may 
provide critical insight into what an ‘ideal’ hashtag campaign might look like.   
#women2drive overview 
 
For decades, Saudi Arabia has enforced a ban on women driving.  In modern times, Saudi 
was the only country to enforce such a ban.  Beginning in 1990, women activists began to 
protest the ban by driving themselves.1  The first major driving protest resulted in the arrest of 
47 women.2  In 2011, a prominent Saudi activist Manal al-Sharif filmed herself driving and 
used social media (YouTube) to share, leading to her arrest and detention.  The hashtag 
campaign went ‘viral’.  Driving protests first took place annually 17th June and then on 26th 
October, with the 2013 October protest seeing the largest turn out.3  Some activists point out 
that it was in the middle of the Arab spring, giving a unique opportunity to reignite the protest 
movement.4  In September 2017, the new King of Saudi announced that the ban would be 
lifted, starting in June 2018.      
 
1 ‘Saudi Women Rejoice at End of Driving Ban’ BBC News (27 September 2017) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-41411799> accessed 12 February 2018; Human Rights Watch, 
‘Saudi Arabia: As Women’s Driving Ban Ends, Provide Parity’ (27 September 2017) 
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/27/saudi-arabia-womens-driving-ban-ends-provide-parity> accessed 12 
February 2018; Daily Mail, ‘Saudi Women Protest Driving Ban in 1990’ 
<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-4924266/Saudi-women-protest-driving-ban-1990.html> accessed 
14 February 2018. 
2 Center for Security Policy, ‘Saudi Women Gain the Right to Drive’ 
<https://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/2017/10/02/saudi-women-gain-the-right-to-drive/> accessed 11 
February 2018. 
3 Human Rights Watch, ‘Saudi Arabia: As Women’s Driving Ban Ends, Provide Parity’ (n 1); ‘Dozens of Saudi 
Arabian Women Drive Cars on Day of Protest against Ban’ The Guardian (October 2013) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/26/saudi-arabia-woman-driving-car-ban> accessed 13 February 
2018. 
4 ‘How I Got There: Manal al-Sharif’ Huffington Post <https://www.huffingtonpost.com/lan-anh-vu/how-i-got-
there-manal-als_b_12650652.html> accessed 14 February 2018; Jason Burke, ‘Saudi Arabia Women Test 
Driving Ban’ The Guardian (17 June 2011) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/17/saudi-arabia-
women-drivers-protest> accessed 14 February 2018; Neil MacFarquhar, ‘Saudis Arrest Woman Leading Right-
to-Drive Campaign’ The New York Times (23 May 2011) 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/24/world/middleeast/24saudi.html> accessed 15 February 2018. 
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Many activists are said to have ‘met’ over Twitter through the hashtag campaign.5  Nearly all 
media articles about #women2drive focus on Tweets.6  ‘[Twitter] has proved to be a potent 
tool in many respects and is a constant reminder to the Government of the importance of 
public engagement, especially in relation to social and economic policies’7  and ‘social 
networking sites such as Twitter and Facebook have been key for the women drivers, 
providing support networks and, crucially, publicity outside the kingdom.’8 
The domestic activists driving this campaign publicly noted the importance of foreign 
pressure, in particular from the US.9  Many reports on the hashtag campaign focus on the role 
of US foreign policy.10  Notably, at one point, Hillary Clinton stated that the US was not 
actively involved in the campaign given Saudi’s ‘suspicion of foreign influence, especially 
Western influence’, but she did note that the US engaged in ‘quiet diplomacy’ on the issue.11  
Manal al-Sharif claims that it was pressure from Hillary Clinton and international NGOs, 
fuelled by social media, which led to her release.12  Leaked cables indicate that the US did put 
some pressure on Saudi officials to lift the ban.13  Of note, the lifting of the ban was 
 
5 ‘Saudia Arabian Women Launch Campaign For Right To Drive -- But Will It Make A Difference?’ HuffPost 
UK (17 June 2011) <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/17/saudi-arabia-women-drive_n_878884.html> 
accessed 14 February 2018; ‘Saudi Authorities Detain Six Women for Driving’ (ArabianBusiness.com) 
<http://www.arabianbusiness.com/saudi-authorities-detain-six-women-for-driving-404597.html> accessed 14 
February 2018. 
6 See, e.g. Robert Mackey, ‘Saudi Women Drive, Despite Ban, and Find Some Support on the Kingdom’s 
Roads’ The New York Times (10 October 2013) <//thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/10/10/saudi-women-drive-
despite-ban-and-find-some-support-on-the-kingdoms-roads/> accessed 14 February 2018; ‘Social Media Fuels 
#Women2Drive Campaign’ (29 June 2011) <https://blogs.position2.com/social-media-fuels-women2drive-
campaign> accessed 14 February 2018. 
7 ‘End of Mission Statement Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, Professor Philip Alston 
on His Visit to Saudi Arabia’ 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21094> accessed 15 February 
2018. 
8 Burke (n 4). 
9 ‘What Overturning the Ban on Female Drivers Means for Saudi Arabia and the World’ 
<https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/what-overturning-the-ban-on-female-drivers-means-for-saudi-
arabia-and-the-world> accessed 13 February 2018. 
10 ‘Hillary Clinton Backs Saudi Women Defying Driving Ban | GulfNews.Com’ 
<http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/saudi-arabia/hillary-clinton-backs-saudi-women-defying-driving-ban-
1.1242231> accessed 13 February 2018. 
11 ‘Clinton Adds Her Voice in Support of Saudi Women’ The New York Times 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/22/world/middleeast/22clinton.html> accessed 13 February 2018. 
12 ‘How I Got There: Manal al-Sharif’ (n 4); ‘Saudi Women Defy Ban to Take Driver’s Seat’ Al Jazeera 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/video/middleeast/2011/06/201161713200141723.html> accessed 14 February 2018; 
‘The Woman Who Defied Saudi’s Driving Ban and Put It on YouTube’ CNN 
<https://edition.cnn.com/2012/06/10/world/meast/sharif-saudi-women-drive/index.html> accessed 14 February 
2018; ‘Freedom House Shows Solidarity with Saudi #Women2Drive Campaign’ (25 October 2013) 
<https://freedomhouse.org/article/freedom-house-shows-solidarity-saudi-women2drive-campaign> accessed 15 
February 2018. 
13 David Leigh, ‘US Put Pressure on Saudi Arabia to Let Women Drive, Leaked Cables Reveal’ The Guardian 
(27 May 2011) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/may/27/us-pressurised-saudis-let-women-drive> 
accessed 14 February 2018; ‘Is This the Year Saudi Women Drive?’ (Saudi Arabia Riyadh 2009) Wikileaks 
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announced via state television in Saudi as well as a media event in Washington, D.C.14  This 
clearly indicates a desire to speak to and engage with Western influences.15   
Context 
 
While the general measures of context in this study show that Saudi is neither the best nor the 
worst place for women and activism, some context which is not captured in the basic metrics 
is important to this campaign.  As introduced above, #women2drive particularly and 
specifically used Twitter to reach and include Westerners as a strategic pressure point.  A 
similar strategy was adopted around the 1990 protests: ‘the drivers had intentionally looked 
to attract attention from the high number of foreign journalists who were in the kingdom 
covering the buildup to the first Gulf War.’16  It seems that the first attempt to campaign with 
such a strategy did not work.  Social media, however, opened a new door.  This campaign 
was therefore more strategically driven from the outset.   
Many think that the legal changes resulting from this campaign are also part of a wider 
programme of modernisation by the new, young, modern King who came to power in 2015 
and, more importantly, the Crown Prince who came into power in 2017 just months before 
the ban was lifted.17  That the campaign spanned regime change may indeed be important to 
its success.  Given a whole range of changes that could have been made, activists agree that 
the social media attention this particular campaign garnered was a primary reason the Crown 
Prince chose to make this reform.  Saudi women activists celebrated the move and largely 
attributed the lifting of the ban to the protest efforts over the years and the hashtag 
campaign.18   
  
 
Public Library of US Diplomacy 09RIYADH357_a 
<https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09RIYADH357_a.html>. 
14 ‘Saudi Arabia Agrees to Let Women Drive’ The New York Times 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-women-drive.html> accessed 11 
February 2018. 
15 ‘What Overturning the Ban on Female Drivers Means for Saudi Arabia and the World’ (n 9). 
16 ibid. 
17 ‘Saudi Women Can Drive at Last but Some Say Price Is Silence’ <https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-saudi-
women-driving-politics/saudi-women-can-drive-at-last-but-some-say-price-is-silence-idUKKCN1C71TJ> 
accessed 12 February 2018; ‘Opinion: Give Saudi Women the Right to Drive’ 
<https://edition.cnn.com/2013/10/24/opinion/begum-saudi-women-driving/index.html> accessed 14 February 
2018. 
18 Chris Bell and Lina Shaikhouni, ‘Saudi Women Driving Reform: “We Did It”’ BBC News (27 September 
2017) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/blogs-trending-41412237> accessed 12 February 2018. 
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Legal Outcomes 
 
This campaign showed the most positive successes, not just in the change in legislation, as 
this was also seen in the tactical concessions campaigns, but also in institutionalisation and 
dialogue with UN human rights mechanisms.  #women2drive showed poor outcomes in law 
enforcement, particularly as women activists continue to be arrested, detained, and charged 
for unrelated activities.  Additionally, guardianship laws remain in place which call into 
question the true status of women in the country. 
Legislative Change 
 
Since 1957, women have been legally banned from driving, unable to obtain a licence and 
risking arrest for being caught driving.  Women relied on male guardians or chauffeurs for 
transportation.19  Although it is technically a royal decree and more recently a fatwa (not a 
law per se), several administrative laws brought it into force, such as traffic laws which did 
not allow the issuing of licenses to women.20  The original rationale behind the introduction 
of the ban was of a religious, cultural, and social nature.  One piece of evidence stated that 
‘the grand mufti claimed that allowing women to drive would result in public mixing of 
women, put women into dangerous situations because they could be alone in cars, and 
therefore result in social chaos.’21  Activists also refer to it as a ‘societal norm’.22  Some 
commentators are of the view that the ban came less from the royal family and more as a 
means to appease hard line clerics over the years.23  Again, this is a story that was seen across 
several of the legal issues in this study. 
 
19 Center for Security Policy (n 2). 
20 ‘Saudi Arabia Agrees to Let Women Drive’ (n 14); ‘Saudi Arabia to Allow Women to Drive in Major 
Milestone for Country’ <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/09/26/saudi-arabia-allow-women-drive/> 
accessed 11 February 2018. 
21 ‘Saudi Arabian Women Banned from Driving Because of Fatwa against Gender “Mixing”’ The Washington 
Post <https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/blogpost/post/fatwa-against-gender-mixing-prevents-saudi-
women-from-driving-according-to-wikileaks-
cable/2011/06/06/AGVVTDKH_blog.html?utm_term=.b836f08b6f24> accessed 12 February 2018. 
22 ‘How I Got There: Manal al-Sharif’ (n 4). 
23 Jane Kinninmont, ‘End of Saudi Women Driving Ban Reflects Deep Changes in Society’ BBC News (27 
September 2017) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-41412022> accessed 11 February 2018; 
‘Saudi Women Rejoice at End of Driving Ban’ (n 1); ‘Dozens of Saudi Arabian Women Drive Cars on Day of 
Protest against Ban’ (n 3); Burke (n 4). 
Chapter 6: Possible Success: #women2drive 
176 
 
Protests against the ban started in 1990.24  After the 1990 protest, rather than lifting or easing 
the ban, the religious conservatives expressed backlash and in fact strengthened the ban with 
a religious fatwa.  In response, the government then issued a decree to solidify the ban.25   
In 2008, a similar protest effort emerged from women but with much less following and 
much less success.  The activists had been encouraged by what they thought was a softening 
of the government.26  In November 2007, the foreign minister told the press that he thought 
women should be allowed to drive and that the ban was a social, not political, issue for ‘the 
people to decide.’27  Yet no progress was made.  In 2010, reports again emerged that the ban 
might be lifted.28  The #women2drive hashtag rose to international prominence in 2011. 
Discussions around lifting the ban started in November 2014, after a full three years of online 
campaigning driving offline activities.  Many felt that the conversation started because of the 
‘feminist cyber-activism.’29  At the time, the contemplation over lifting the ban was limited to 
women over the age of 30, only during the day, and with a male guardian. 30  Some local news 
outlets even outright denied that discussions were taking place.31   
Interestingly, just a year earlier, Prince Saud told local media outlets that the Saudi 
community ‘is not convinced about women driving’ and ‘women driving is not a religious 
issue as much as it is an issue that relates to the community itself that either accepts it or 
refuses it.’32  This very much reflects the discourse from before the campaign.  This indicates 
that, if the government truly thought of this as a social issue for the people to decide, then the 
social media campaign in particular would be well positioned to see success.   
 
24 ‘Saudi Women Rejoice at End of Driving Ban’ (n 1); Human Rights Watch, ‘Saudi Arabia: As Women’s 
Driving Ban Ends, Provide Parity’ (n 1); Daily Mail (n 1). 
25 ‘Opinion: Give Saudi Women the Right to Drive’ (n 17). 
26 Faiza Saleh Ambah, ‘Saudi Women See a Brighter Road on Rights’ Washington Post (31 January 2008) 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/30/AR2008013003805.html> accessed 14 
February 2018. 
27 ibid. 
28 Fahad Faruqui, ‘Saudi Women Get in the Driver’s Seat’ The Guardian 
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/may/05/saudi-women-drivers-seat> accessed 14 February 
2018. 
29 ‘Cyberactivism: the case of the Women2Drive movement in Saudi Arabia’ <http://www.fcome.org/portfolio-
view/cyberactivism-the-case-of-the-women2drive-movement-in-saudi-arabia/> accessed 13 February 2018. 
30 ‘Saudi Activists Call for the Release of Women Detained for Driving’ The New York Times 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/09/world/middleeast/saudi-activists-call-for-the-release-of-women-
detained-for-driving.html> accessed 14 February 2018. 
31 ibid. 
32 ‘Saudi Arabia Is “not Ready” for Women Drivers, Says Deputy Crown Prince’ The Independent 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-is-not-ready-for-women-drivers-says-
deputy-crown-prince-mohammed-bin-salman-a7004611.html> accessed 15 February 2018. 
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In September 2017, the new King announced that the ban would be lifted and women could 
apply for driving licenses from June 2018.33  Although some sceptics see it as a concession 
used by the Saudi government to divert attention away from other human rights abuses, 34 it is 
more generally felt that the strength of the campaign likely led to the decision to lift the ban 
as part of the larger programme of modernisation and moving away from the stronghold of 
the hard line conservative clerics.35  In other words, had it not been for #women2drive and the 
social media pressure and attention, perhaps other issues would have benefitted from the 
programme of modernisation.36  Saudi women activists celebrated the move and largely 
attributed the lifting of the ban to the protest efforts over the years and the hashtag 
campaign.37 ‘Brave women's driving activists were the tip of the iceberg.’38  One female 
activist called it a ‘great victory’, while another said things would ‘never be the same 
again’.39 
Institutionalisation 
 
Discourse from those in power in Saudi Arabia had indicated for many years a lack of 
institutionalisation of women’s rights norms, with religious clerics being particularly 
outspoken and derogatory towards women.40  However, in more recent years the split 
between hard-line conservatives and those looking to move towards a more liberal way of life 
became apparent.  In 2005, in an interview with American reporter Barbara Walters, King 
Abdullah then said ‘I believe strongly in the rights of women, my mother is a woman, my 
 
33 Center for Security Policy (n 2); ‘Saudi Arabia Agrees to Let Women Drive’ (n 14); ‘Saudi Arabia to Allow 
Women to Drive’ Al Jazeera <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/saudi-arabia-women-drive-
170926190857109.html> accessed 11 February 2018; Human Rights Watch, ‘Saudi Arabia: As Women’s 
Driving Ban Ends, Provide Parity’ (n 1). 
34 Human Rights Watch, ‘Saudi Arabia: As Women’s Driving Ban Ends, Provide Parity’ (n 1); ‘What 
Overturning the Ban on Female Drivers Means for Saudi Arabia and the World’ (n 9); Human Rights Watch, 
‘Human Rights Abuses Stemming from Male Guardianship and Sex Segregation in Saudi Arabia’ (2008) 
<https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/04/19/perpetual-minors/human-rights-abuses-stemming-male-guardianship-
and-sex> accessed 15 February 2018; Human Rights Watch, ‘Saudi Arabia: Repression Overshadows Women’s 
Reforms’ (2018) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/01/18/saudi-arabia-repression-overshadows-womens-
reforms> accessed 15 February 2018; ‘What Overturning the Ban on Female Drivers Means for Saudi Arabia 
and the World’ (n 9); ‘“Battle of the Sexes”: Saudi Men React to Women Driving’ (Dhaka Tribune, 4 October 
2017) <http://www.dhakatribune.com/world/middle-east/2017/10/04/saudi-men-react-women-driving/> 
accessed 13 February 2018. 
35 Kinninmont (n 23); ‘Saudi Arabia to Allow Women to Drive’ (n 33); ‘Saudi Arabia’s Driving Ban and the 
Pioneering Women Who Got It Lifted’ The Independent <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-
east/saudi-arabia-driving-ban-women-protestors-who-lifted-fought-against-sexist-law-a7993306.html> accessed 
12 February 2018. 
36 Kinninmont (n 23). 
37 Shaikhouni (n 18). 
38 Kinninmont (n 23). 
39 ‘Saudi Women Rejoice at End of Driving Ban’ (n 1). 
40 ‘Saudi Arabia’s Driving Ban and the Pioneering Women Who Got It Lifted’ (n 35). 
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sister is a woman, my daughter is a woman, my wife is a woman.  I believe the day will come 
when women drive.’41  Four years later in 2009, Saudi royal Prince Waleed made statements 
that seemed to indicate the ban would be overturned.  However, shortly thereafter when King 
Abdullah appointed a woman to a governmental position of power and opened a mixed sex 
university, there was significant backlash. 42  Quotes from clerics included denouncing ‘the 
King’s teaching of deviant ideas such as evolution,’ ‘mixing with women ... [would] open the 
field for them to undertake jobs for which they were not created,’ and that women had 
‘abandoned their basic duties such as housekeeping, bringing up children ... and replaced this 
by beautifying themselves and wantonness.’ 43  This tension continued into and throughout 
the campaign, and is still palpable now that the ban has been lifted.  Yet it appears that, while 
before the campaign the religious conservatives had the dominant discourse, now the 
pendulum has swung and the more liberal, arguably Western, voices have more of a say, 
perhaps influenced by the voice of society on social media.  
Before the October 26 driving protest in 2013, the government made it clear that protests 
would not be tolerated.44  Specifically referring to the protests organised over social networks, 
the government said that demonstrations of such nature were legally prohibited in the 
Kingdom. 45  Amnesty International responded and called upon the government to allow the 
public protests.46  After the 2013 Oct 26th driving protest, the #women2drive website was shut 
down in Saudi Arabia, but an online petition fuelled by the hashtag still managed to collect 
somewhere between 14,000 and 16,000 signatures.47 
 
41 ‘One Day Women Will Drive, Saudi King Says’ ABC News (14 October 2005) 
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2005-10-14/one-day-women-will-drive-saudi-king-says/2124474> accessed 14 
February 2018; See also ‘Opinion: Give Saudi Women the Right to Drive’ (n 17). 
42 ‘Saudi Arabian Women Banned from Driving Because of Fatwa against Gender “Mixing”’ (n 21). 
43 ibid. 
44 ‘Saudi Arabia Issues Warning against Women’s Driving Campaign’ Foreign Policy 
<https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/10/25/saudi-arabia-issues-warning-against-womens-driving-campaign/> 
accessed 14 February 2018; ‘Kingdom of Saudi Arabia – Statement on Female Driving Protest | Genius’ 
<https://genius.com/Kingdom-of-saudi-arabia-statement-on-female-driving-protest-annotated> accessed 15 
February 2018; Mohammed Jamjoor, ‘Saudi Arabia Issues Warning to Women Drivers, Protesters’ CNN 
<https://www.cnn.com/2013/10/24/world/meast/saudi-arabia-women-drivers/index.html> accessed 15 February 
2018. 
45 ‘Saudi Government Says Laws Will Be Enforced on “female Driving” Day’ CNN 
<https://edition.cnn.com/2013/10/23/world/meast/saudi-arabia-women-drivers/index.html> accessed 12 
February 2018. 
46 ‘Saudi Arabia Must Not Thwart Campaign for Women Drivers’ 
<https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2013/10/saudi-arabia-must-not-thwart-campaign-women-drivers/> 
accessed 15 February 2018. 
47 Jasmine Bager, ‘Forbidden to Drive: A Saudi Woman On Life Inside the Kingdom’ Time 
<http://ideas.time.com/2013/10/25/forbidden-to-drive-a-saudi-woman-on-life-inside-the-kingdom/> accessed 14 
February 2018. 
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After a loosening on women’s ability to sit on the Shura Council (the country’s legislative 
assembly), three women on the council just before the Oct 2013 driving protest publicly 
stated that women should be allowed to drive.48  The Council, however, rejected this, 
claiming that since only three members of the Shura brought the proposal it was considered 
an individual recommendation which is not part of the Council’s remit.  The same year, after 
another major driving protest, clerics organised a counter-protest outside the royal palace.49  
150 clerics gathered to protest against women driving.50  ‘We came here for many issues, 
most importantly to combat Westernization and particularly women,’ claimed one cleric, 
notably using YouTube to convey his message.51  Another cleric accused the campaign of 
being driven by the US as the protest was advertised with a Western date and not an Islamic 
one.52  One cleric went so far as to state that driving would harm women’s ovaries and would 
lead to birth defects.53  As late as 2017, a cleric was quoted as saying that women have only 
‘half the brains of men,’ adding that the figure drops to one quarter ‘when they go to market,’ 
claiming that allowing them to drive would therefore be unsafe.54  However, this time the 
cleric was suspended from preaching and all religious activity after his comments.55  
Unsurprisingly, Twitter users reacted to his statement, using an Arabic hashtag ‘Al-Hijri-
women-quarter-brain.’ 56  
The royal family and the government began showing signs of change as the campaign 
progressed.  In 2016, Prince Alwaleed bin Talal released a lengthy statement titled ‘it is high 
 
48 ‘3 Saudi Shura Council Women Urge Female Drive Ban Lifted - Daily Nation’ 
<https://www.nation.co.ke/lifestyle/women/3-Saudi-Shura-Council-women-urge-female-drive-ban-
lifted/1950830-2024144-12mi5dsz/index.html> accessed 14 February 2018. 
49 ‘Saudi Arabia to Allow Women to Drive in Major Milestone for Country’ (n 20). 
50 ‘Saudi Clerics Protest Outside King’s Palace, Blame US for Women Driving’ Mehr News Agency 
<https://en.mehrnews.com/news/56993/Saudi-clerics-protest-outside-king-s-palace-blame-US-for-women> 
accessed 15 February 2018. 
51 Ahmed, ‘Saudi Clerics Protest Women Driving at the Royal Court’ 
<https://riyadhbureau.wordpress.com/tag/royal-court/> accessed 14 February 2018. 
52 ‘Saudi Clerics Protest Outside King’s Palace, Blame US for Women Driving’ (n 50). 
53 ‘Driving Damages Women’s Ovaries: Saudi Cleric’ (Al Akhbar English) <http://english.al-
akhbar.com/content/driving-damages-womens-ovaries-saudi-cleric> accessed 13 February 2018; ‘Cleric Says 
Driving Risk to Ovaries’ BBC News (29 September 2013) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-
24323934> accessed 14 February 2018. 
54 Manal Al-Sharif, ‘Opinion | I Can’t Wait to Drive in Saudi Arabia Again’ The New York Times (27 September 
2017) <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/27/opinion/saudi-arabia-women-driving-.html> accessed 14 
February 2018. 
55 Nadia Khomami, ‘Saudi Cleric Banned for Saying Women’s Brains “a Quarter the Size” of Men’s’ The 
Guardian (23 September 2017) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/23/saudi-cleric-saad-al-hijri-
banned-woman-driving-cars-quarter-brain> accessed 15 February 2018. 
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time that Saudi women started driving their cars.’57  He likened the ban to restrictions on 
access to education or employment, both of which are rights which Saudi women already 
had.  He detailed several factors, including financial, economic, social, religious, and 
political.58  Bin Talal’s wife, Princess Ameerah Al-Taweel, was also outspoken about 
women’s rights, stating in a US interview that she saw nothing in religion that forbid women 
from driving.59  Both the Council of Senior Scholars (the top clerical body) and the head of 
the morality police eventually agreed that allowing women to drive could be done in 
accordance with Sharia Law and that driving per se was not a religious violation.60 
The delay between announcing the lifting of the ban and the implementation was seen to be 
to make it easier to adjust for the clerics.61  This delay is, however, a major difference 
between the tactical concessions campaigns and this potential success campaign, as it 
indicates the regime’s intention to properly implement the change over time, rather than a 
reactionary and hasty legislative move to quell waves of public outrage. 
Unfortunately, the move towards institutionalisation is far from complete.  Some rumours 
circulated after the ban was lifted claiming that the government had contacted activists telling 
them to keep silent, to downplay the role of activism in the lifting of the ban.62  This was 
denied by the government.63  Additionally, what many see as the biggest barrier to 
institutionalisation of women’s rights is the guardianship system, which still remains.64  The 
government has pledged to take special measures to ensure that women will be free to take 
driving lessons, take driving tests, and receive their license, but it will be quite some time 
before true implementation can be measured.65 
 
57 ‘It’s High Time That Saudi Woman Started Driving Their Cars’ <http://www.alwaleed.com.sa/news-and-
media/news/driving/> accessed 15 February 2018. 
58 ibid. 
59 ‘Saudi Princess Lobbies For Women’s Right To Drive’ (NPR.org) 
<https://www.npr.org/2011/07/14/137840538/saudi-princess-lobbies-for-womens-right-to-drive> accessed 15 
February 2018. 
60 ‘Saudi Arabia Agrees to Let Women Drive’ (n 14); ‘Saudi Arabia to Allow Women to Drive’ (n 33); See also 
‘“Battle of the Sexes”: Saudi Men React to Women Driving’ (n 34); Human Rights Watch, ‘Saudi Arabia: As 
Women’s Driving Ban Ends, Provide Parity’ (n 1); ‘Saudi Women Driving Ban Not Part of Sharia-Morality 
Police Chief’ Reuters (19 September 2013) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-women-driving/saudi-
women-driving-ban-not-part-of-sharia-morality-police-chief-idUSBRE98I0LJ20130919>. 
61 Kinninmont (n 23). 
62 ‘Saudi Arabia’s Driving Ban and the Pioneering Women Who Got It Lifted’ (n 35); See also ‘Saudi Women 
Can Drive at Last but Some Say Price Is Silence’ (n 17); ‘Saudi Arabia’s Driving Ban and the Pioneering 
Women Who Got It Lifted’ (n 35). 
63 ‘Saudi Women Can Drive at Last but Some Say Price Is Silence’ (n 17). 
64 Kinninmont (n 23); See also ‘“Battle of the Sexes”: Saudi Men React to Women Driving’ (n 34); Human 
Rights Watch, ‘Human Rights Abuses Stemming from Male Guardianship and Sex Segregation in Saudi 
Arabia’ (n 34). 
65 ‘“Battle of the Sexes”: Saudi Men React to Women Driving’ (n 34). 
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Law Enforcement 
 
As soon as women began the driving protests many years ago, there were arrests, detentions, 
and confiscation of passports.66  47 women were arrested at the 1990 driving protest.  They 
were not released from custody until their male guardians signed statements confirming that 
the women would not drive again.67  This practice continued for years throughout the country.  
In 2010, American female drivers were hired to drive the Saudi royal family on a visit in 
Minnesota in the US.  The women were fired from that job for being female.68  Notably, the 
drivers brought a case of discrimination in the US, and won, but damages from the Saudis 
have not emerged.69 
Arrests carried on once the hashtag campaign took off. 70  The first major protest drive from 
the hashtag campaign took place in 2011, leading to the documenting of 70 women who once 
again had to sign statements that they would not drive again.71  Most famously, after Manal 
al-Sharif filmed herself driving and posted it on YouTube, she was arrested and detained for 
more than a week.72  According to Amnesty International, she was only released when she 
pledged to not participate in any more driving protests.  The official headline after the arrest 
was to underscore that driving was illegal for women.73  Some women when arrested for 
driving as part of the protests were asked not only sign a statement that they would not drive 
again, but also that they would not film themselves or any other women driving.74  Prominent 
activist Wajiha Howeidar stated in response: 
 
66 Center for Security Policy (n 2); ‘Saudi Arabia’s Driving Ban and the Pioneering Women Who Got It Lifted’ 
(n 35). 
67 Human Rights Watch, ‘Saudi Arabia: As Women’s Driving Ban Ends, Provide Parity’ (n 1); See also ‘Saudi 
Arabia’s Driving Ban and the Pioneering Women Who Got It Lifted’ (n 35). 
68 ‘Driving Out Oppression’ (Gender Justice) <http://www.genderjustice.us/driving-out-oppression/> accessed 
13 February 2018. 
69 ibid. 
70 ‘Saudi Religious Police Clamp Down on Rural Women Drivers’ Huffington Post 
<https://www.huffingtonpost.com/sabria-jawhar/saudi-religious-police-cl_b_320071.html> accessed 14 
February 2018; ‘Five Saudi Women Drivers Arrested, Says Activist’ The Guardian (29 June 2011) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/29/saudi-women-drivers-arrested-jiddah> accessed 14 February 
2018. 
71 ‘Saudi Arabia to Allow Women to Drive in Major Milestone for Country’ (n 20); Center for Security Policy 
(n 2); ‘Opinion: Give Saudi Women the Right to Drive’ (n 17). 
72 ‘A Saudi Activist, in Her Own Words’ (The Lede - The New York Times) 
<https://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/31/a-saudi-activist-in-her-own-words/> accessed 13 February 2018. 
73 ‘Saudia Arabian Women Launch Campaign For Right To Drive -- But Will It Make A Difference?’ (n 5). 
74 Mohammed Jamjoor, ‘Saudi Blogger Detained, but Hopeful about Push to Let Women Drive’ CNN 
<https://www.cnn.com/2013/10/11/world/meast/saudi-arabia-women-drivers/index.html> accessed 14 February 
2018. 
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Usually they just make you sign a paper that you will not do it again and let you 
go.  They don’t want anybody to think that they can get away with something like 
that. It is a clear message that you cannot organize anything on Facebook.75  
Then in September 2011, between the June 17 and Oct 26 driving protests, a woman was 
sentenced to ten lashes, the first time this kind of legal punishment was used against women 
for driving.76  Many found the sentence surprising, given that it came just one day after the 
announcement that women would have the right to vote and run in the next general election.77  
At the time, activists saw the sentencing as evidence of the power of the hard line 
conservatives over the courts and the police in Saudi.78  Human Rights Watch officials stated 
that the courts were being used ‘to send a message that they won’t tolerate any attempt to 
alleviate the dismal status of women’s rights in the kingdom.’79   Her sentence was eventually 
overturned by the King.80   
In 2014, an activist was arrested attempting to drive into Saudi from UAE.81  She used 
Twitter to keep followers updated as she attempted to cross.82  She was arrested and detained 
for 73 days, alongside another activist who came to help her.83  Their initial detention was 
then extended by 25 days.84   This was the longest detention for driving in recent years.85  She 
was released only when she signed a statement that she would never speak out ‘in videos’ 
again; she claims she negotiated this specific wording so that she could continue to use 
 
75 MacFarquhar (n 4). 
76 ‘Saudi Woman to Get 10 Lashes for Driving a Car’ CBS News <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/saudi-
woman-to-get-10-lashes-for-driving-a-car/> accessed 14 February 2018; See also ‘Saudi Woman “spared 
Lashing” in Driving Case’ Al Jazeera 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/09/201192820341050915.html> accessed 15 February 2018. 
77 ‘Saudi Woman “spared Lashing” in Driving Case’ (n 76). 
78 ‘Saudi Woman to Get 10 Lashes for Driving a Car’ (n 76). 
79 Human Rights Watch, ‘Saudi Arabia: Activists Convicted for Answering Call for Help’ (Human Rights 
Watch, 17 June 2013) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/06/17/saudi-arabia-activists-convicted-answering-call-
help> accessed 14 February 2018. 
80 ‘Saudi Woman’s Lashing “Revoked”’ BBC News (29 September 2011) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
middle-east-15102190> accessed 14 February 2018. 
81 ‘Saudi Woman “arrested” for Driving’ Al Jazeera 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/12/saudi-woman-arrested-driving-
2014121165739368209.html> accessed 14 February 2018. 
82 ‘Saudi Woman Driving Blog “Arrest”’ BBC News (3 December 2014) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/blogs-
trending-30316837> accessed 13 February 2018. 
83 ‘Saudi Arabia Agrees to Let Women Drive’ (n 14); ‘Saudi Woman Driving Blog “Arrest”’ (n 82). 
84 ‘Saudi Arabia Extends Detention of Women Driving Activists: Amnesty’ (The Express Tribune, 9 December 
2014) <https://tribune.com.pk/story/804221/saudi-arabia-extends-detention-of-women-driving-activists-
amnesty/> accessed 14 February 2018. 
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Twitter to campaign for women’s rights in Saudi.86  Notably, she also announced her release 
on Twitter.87 
Since the lifting of the ban, but before it came into effect, there has been one report of a 
woman being ‘penalised’, though not arrested, for driving.88  It appears that while the courts 
were instrumental in attempting to quash the campaign, both before and immediately after the 
hashtag went viral, in recent years there has been much improvement.  There were no major 
incidents or reports of major arrests or detentions from 2014 – 2017.   
 
UN Dialogue 
 
Saudi Arabia is party to several international treaties, though notably not CCPR or CESCR, 
ratifying CEDAW in 2000.  As expected, Saudi submitted a reservation of the primacy of 
Islamic law.  The first CEDAW report was submitted in 2007, where the State claimed that 
‘generally, there is no discrimination against women in the laws of the Kingdom.’89  The 
report is filled with references to and framing of rights in Islam.  The word Islam or Islamic is 
used 46 times in the report.  In response, the Committee specifically addressed the lack of 
discussion of the driving ban.90  The driving ban was brought up in session as well.91  The 
government responded: 
In the early days of Islam, women had ridden donkeys and camels; the question 
of their right to drive cars was not covered by sharia or secular law, but rather by 
traditional mentalities that influenced decision makers…When those attitudes 
changed…women would be able to drive…the Government needed to study the 
 
86 Roula Khalaf, ‘Loujain Alhathloul on How Saudi Women Won the Right to Drive’ (Financial Times, 7 
December 2017) <https://www.ft.com/content/b4186c36-da18-11e7-a039-c64b1c09b482> accessed 14 
February 2018. 
87 Robert Mackey, ‘Saudi Women Free After 73 Days in Jail for Driving’ The New York Times (12 February 
2015) <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/13/world/middleeast/saudi-women-free-after-73-days-in-jail-for-
driving.html> accessed 14 February 2018. 
88 ‘Saudi Woman Penalised for Driving Car before Ban Is Lifted’ The Guardian 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/09/saudi-arabia-woman-penalised-driving-car-before-ban-lifted> 
accessed 15 February 2018. 
89 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, ‘Combined Initial and Second Periodic 
Reports of States Parties Saudi Arabia’ (2007) UN Doc CEDAW/C/SAU/2. 
90 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, ‘List of Issues Saudi Arabia’ (2007) UN 
Doc CEDAW/C/SAU/Q/2 para 7. 
91 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, ‘Summary Record of the 816th Meeting’ 
(2008) UN Doc CEDAW/C/SR.816 para 70. 
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issue and to deal with it quietly so that the people would not think that the 
nation’s sovereignty was being threatened.92  
The Committee included the issue in concluding observations.93  This discourse seems to 
indicate a willingness to change, but in a way that could be properly institutionalised over 
time.  This reads as a positive indication of the government’s approach to the issue, especially 
when compared to other State reports from countries such as Iran and India. 
The 2008 UPR Working Group report called attention specifically to the ban on driving on 
four occasions.94  Saudi Arabia accepted all recommendations relating to women, including 
the driving ban, however with a caveat that in accordance with Sharia law and respect for 
religious doctrine.  On several occasions, the State noted that any issues with women’s 
inequality was not a legal matter for the State to decide, but rather a societal matter.95  This is 
not necessarily untrue, and in some ways could be a more progressive approach to change in 
sensitive areas such as this.  It is certainly an improvement over defensiveness or simply 
thinking that changing the law itself will solve all of the problems. 
After the campaign, there was some movement in the dialogue with the UN, particularly 
around the time the announcement was made that the ban would be lifted.  Although again 
not a complete shift, positive change can be detected.  However, it did take time.  After the 
election of Saudi to the Human Rights Council in 2013, there was much controversy.  In 
2015, Amnesty International submitted a statement to the Human Rights Council on Saudi’s 
participation as a member.96  In a second report they specifically referred to the campaign.97 
Shifts, however, were reported by Special Rapporteur Philip Alston after his 2017 mission to 
Saudi.  After pointing out areas of progress and problems, he went on to state: ‘As in almost 
every country today, societal change is driven by both external and internal factors, and Saudi 
 
92 ibid 78. 
93 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, ‘Concluding Comments Saudi Arabia’ 
(2008) UN Doc CEDAW/C/SAU/CO/2 para 15. 
94 Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review Saudi Arabia’ 
(2009) UN Doc A/HRC/11/23. 
95 ibid; Human Rights Council, ‘Views on Conclusions and/or Recommendations, Voluntary Commitments and 
Replies Presented by the State under Review Saudi Arabia’ (2009) UN Doc A/HRC/11/23/Add.1 paras 33–34. 
96 Amnesty International, ‘Written Statement Submitted by Amnesty International, a Non-Governmental 
Organization in Special Consultative Status’ (2015) UN Doc A/HRC/28/NGO/19. 
97 Amnesty International, ‘Saudi Arabia: Is This What Is to Be Expected of a UN Human Rights Council 
Member (Part 2)?’ “Women who supported the Women2Drive campaign, launched in 2011 to challenge the 
prohibition on women driving vehicles, faced harassment and intimidation by the authorities, and were 
threatened with arrest and detention. Some were arrested but released after a short period.” 
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Arabia is now an integral and deeply connected part of the global system.’98  Upon the lifting 
of the ban, Alston commented: 
In January, I praised Vision 2030, the country’s change agenda, as an ambitious 
and deeply transformative plan that could be a catalyst for women’s rights.  The 
end of the driving ban is of crucial importance for Vision 2030 because it unlocks 
the economic potential of women in the Kingdom, especially those women living 
in poverty.99   
The work recently undertaken by Alston shows a possible change in the dialogue and 
engagement with international human rights mechanisms.  There are still concerns, but the 
general discourse and agendas seem to cautiously indicate some positive progress.      
 
Twitter Characteristics 
 
#women2drive was the third largest campaign with 88,100 Tweets analysed.  38% of those 
were in a language other than English, which is fairly representative of the target audience 
given the strategy outlined above.   
Persistence (Tweets per day) 
 
This was the second longest running campaign, shorter only to #stopstoning.  In total, 2,033 
days were analysed.  What this campaign exhibited was not necessarily the highest or the 
most peaks, but the most sustained and consistent activity.  61% of the total days in the 
campaign showed at least one Tweet.  #women2drive also showed the second highest 
percentage of days with more than five Tweets at 26% (#niunamenos was significantly higher 
at 84%).  Notably, a comparatively small percentage of Tweets were in peaks – 32%.    
 
98 ‘End of Mission Statement Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, Professor Philip 
Alston on His Visit to Saudi Arabia’ (n 7); UNHRC, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and 
Human Rights on His Mission to Saudi Arabia’ (2017) UN Doc A/HRC/35/26/Add.3.   ‘Most officials suggest 
that the Government is not opposed to abolishing the ban on driving or eliminating many of the guardianship 
restrictions, but they quickly add that important elements in society remain opposed. However, the Government 
cannot just remove itself from those debates. It has obligations to respect and promote the human rights of 
women, as acknowledged in the context of the universal periodic review, and it should seek to educate and 
inform the general public, especially in relation to any traditional and community practices that seek to deny 
basic rights to any group. It is also important to note that when systematic surveys of public opinion have been 
undertaken, a clear majority has in fact favoured letting women drive.’ (para 49) 
99 OHCHR, ‘End to Saudi Driving Ban for Women Should Be Just the First Step’ 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22179&LangID=E> accessed 15 
February 2018. 
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Figure 6.1: Number of Tweets per day, up to 1,000, #women2drive 
 
  
As compared to other campaigns, this chart shows a high level of persistence, with mid to 
high peaks continuing long into the campaign.  The kinds of events which correlate to the 
peaks change over time as well.  The first driving protests resulted in peaks, followed by the 
arrest of an activist for driving.  The next peak was the lashing sentence for another activist.  
Another large-scale driving protest resulted in a peak two years into the campaign.  This 
study did not collect any data after November 2016 which pre-dated the announcement of the 
lifting of the ban and the changes to the law.  It is very much expected that there would be 
large peaks at that time.   
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Figure 6.2: Number of Tweet per day up to 200, #women2drive 
 
 
Looking at the Tweets over time in more detail (up to 200 Tweets as opposed to 1,000 in 
Figure 6.1), it becomes very clear that this campaign was extremely persistent, with very 
consistent, albeit low levels, of Tweeting throughout the campaign.  This is one aspect of this 
campaign that is markedly different from the others.  The other campaigns did not show the 
same levels of consistency.  Although this campaign did not show many extreme metrics in 
persistence, it was a very low-level persistent campaign, which could be one of the reasons 
behind its success.  This campaign overcame the lack of progression critique of the spiral 
model, proving that social media campaigns can exert long-term and sustained pressure on 
decision-makers.    
Engagement (Retweets, Likes, and Replies) 
 
As might be hypothesised based on the level of consistency seen above, #women2drive 
showed very high levels of uniform engagement across the campaign.  #women2drive had the 
lowest like to Tweet ratio, indicating that very few individuals participating in the online 
campaign simply clicked ‘like’ to engage.  More individuals Retweeted than other 
engagement metrics which again shows consistent messaging.  The ratios of replies, 
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Retweets, and likes to Tweets were extremely similar in peak and non-peak periods, showing 
very little variation.  One could say that this campaign was ‘slow and steady’ to win the race.   
 
Figure 6.3: log(n) log(s), #women2drive 
 
 
Looking at these engagement metrics on the log(n) log(s) plot once again the consistent 
behaviour of the campaign is evident.  This was a campaign clearly driven by Retweets, 
indicating consistent messaging.  The Retweet and reply gradients here are not particularly 
steep compared to other campaigns, however the like gradient for #women2drive was the 
steepest of all the campaigns in this study.  This indicates that there was not much activity 
simply liking Tweets, suggesting more involved activity and behaviour of individuals 
participating in the campaign.   
Users (Profiles of the 100 most active users) 
 
As seen earlier in this chapter, attracting foreign users was a strategic cornerstone of this 
campaign.  This strategy, given the political context of Saudi Arabia, may have contributed to 
some of the campaign’s success.  Also as noted earlier, #women2drive was a very consistent 
campaign.  This is reflected in some of the user metrics as well.  #women2drive was one of 
only two campaigns with more unique users in non-peak periods than in peak periods.  This 
is a good indication of the stability of #women2drive, where the campaign itself was less 
volatile around peak periods.  Having more unique users in non-peak periods shows the 
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ongoing nature of the campaign, attracting continued, if lower levels, of attention throughout 
the campaign.  This was not just a campaign which gained participants during high coverage 
events, but rather individuals show continued and ongoing interest in the campaign by 
participating outside of peak, viral events.  Adding to these campaign characteristics, 
#women2drive showed the second highest average Tweets per user at 3.81 
(#letwomengotostadium was top with 4.28).  Those who were involved in this campaign were 
very involved, Tweeting on average almost 4 times.   
One of the most prominent activists in #women2drive was Manal al-Sharif.  She herself 
accounted for 15% of the Tweets from the 100 most active users.  She sent out a total of 290 
Tweets, placing her in the top ten of the most active.  This is an important finding in this 
campaign, showing that while there was a strategic choice to appeal to foreigners, the 
campaign was still primarily driven by domestic activists who had the knowledge and 
experience to accurately represent the situation of women living in Saudi Arabia.  The most 
active user is a Saudi individual who Tweeted 1,802 times in this campaign.   Interestingly, 
the second most prolific user in #women2drive self-labelled as a ‘Saudi-American’, living in 
the US but Tweeting in both English and Arabic.    
Overall, 44% of the 100 most active users were from Saudi Arabia, accounting for 48% of the 
Tweets from the most active users.  Having a strong domestic individual voice is statistically 
significant for positive legal outcomes.  Non-domestic users had more reach, however, 
accounting for 61%.  This is line with the strategic goals of the campaign, where it seems 
Saudi women themselves were steering the campaign but achieving a global reach to increase 
foreign pressure.   
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Figure 6.4: Profiles of the 100 most active users, #women2drive 
 
 
The figure above shows the percentage share of users, campaign Tweets, and reach of the top 
100 most active accounts, disaggregated across domestic and non-domestic locations.  
#women2drive was clearly a campaign driven by activists and individuals, both domestic and 
non-domestic.  There were a small number of counter-narrative accounts in the top 100, 
primarily from religious individuals who did not approve of women driving.  What is 
interesting to note here is where the percentage share differs from users to Tweets to reach.  
For example, while domestic activists make up 2% of the users, they account for 15% of the 
reach.  Equally, domestic individuals are 30% of the users, 38% of the Tweets, and 13% of 
the reach, indicating that they are more active but with less followers.  Also of note is that 
foreign independent journalists take 3% of the users but 33% of the reach.  Overall, this chart 
shows that domestic users are very active but, generally, foreign users have more followers 
and thus more reach (with the exception of the domestic activists). 
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Content analysis (Sentiment, Personalisation, Framing, Messaging, and Norms) 
 
#women2drive was a generally positive campaign.  In the beginning of the campaign, there 
was a very consistent picture painted with the sentiment scores.  Unlike most of the other 
campaigns, there was very little variation or volatility in the sentiment.  Over the life of the 
campaign, for days with at least ten Tweets, the standard deviation in average positivity score 
was only 0.06, demonstrating again the consistency in this campaign.   
 
Figure 6.5: Positivity over time, #women2drive 
 
As the campaign progressed, however, spikes in positive sentiment were seen.  Interestingly, 
the spikes in positivity do not correspond to peak events.  The highest positive days 
surrounded praise for a Human Rights Watch video about the campaign and women driving 
in Saudi Arabia (December 2013).  Another extremely positive day was on the 1st anniversary 
of #women2drive where a Twibbon campaign was launched (June 22, 2012).  Another small 
peak in positivity occurred when two more activists were arrested for driving (December 
2014). While this may not seem like a particularly ‘positive’ event, the sentiment of activism 
and purpose was high on these days, which resulted in a higher positive sentiment.    
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Notably, #women2drive showed very high prevalence of pronouns.  52% of Tweets 
contained a first-person pronoun, 24% a second person pronoun, and 8% a female pronoun, 
the second highest across all three categories.  4% used a male pronoun and 17% used a third 
person plural pronoun, the highest in these two categories across all campaigns studied.  This 
finding indicates that the campaign had a very personal tone, with users speaking in the first 
person often, speaking ‘to’ others, and referring to a specific ‘her’, ‘him’, or ‘them’.  In the 
early days of the campaign, some event-based time periods saw 76-79% of Tweets with a 
first-person pronoun.  This kind of ownership and personal investment in the issue and the 
campaign may very well have contributed to its success, as this level of personalisation was 
not seen in the other campaigns.   
Overall, as seen in many other Twitter variables, this campaign showed great consistency in 
the normative analysis.  #women2drive had the highest proportion of consistent organic 
messaging compared to variable organic messaging of any of the campaigns studied; 37% of 
the words analysed were consistent.  Although this clearly is not a majority, it is higher than 
any other campaign, where the percentages ranged from 16% to 33%.  Similarly, 
#women2drive also showed the highest ratio of average number of consistent words to 
variable words per event-based time period.  Also contributing to its success is likely the 
presence of international norms, with 86% of the international norms analysed mentioned 
over the course of the campaign.   
The consistent frames and messages appear to stay focussed on the campaign itself, with 
continued reference to activist and campaign leader Manal al Sharif, uniform use of words 
such as ‘rights’ and ‘support’, and references to Twibbons and the campaign itself.  Although 
perhaps outdated now, at the time of the campaign, Twibbons (a combination of Twitter + 
Ribbon, as in wearing a specific coloured ribbon to participate in a campaign) were a popular 
tool.  There was also a clear and consistent focus on the issue, with derivatives of the word 
‘drive’ in nearly 30% of all Tweets, as well words such as ‘ban’ and ‘car’ appearing 
consistently throughout the lifespan of the campaign.  It is also interesting to note that God 
was mentioned in 5% of all Tweets across the campaign.  Spot checking shows that this 
comes from both activists and counter-narratives both using religion as a point of persuasion.  
The analysis of this campaign has time and time again pointed to the consistency as a positive 
force behind its success.  This framing and messaging continue to underscore that point. 
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Figure 6.6: Consistently used words, #women2drive 
 
There are some interesting findings in the analysis of variable content.  The most intriguing 
result, perhaps of any campaign, was the emergence of the word ‘Clinton’ in the middle of 
the campaign.  Hillary Clinton was the foreign secretary at the time and, as seen earlier in this 
chapter, was very involved in ‘quiet diplomacy’ on the matter.  It is extremely interesting that 
her name emerged in the 100 most words used in that specific time period, being mentioned 
294 times, or in 3% of all Tweets in the time period.  That Clinton’s name emerged so clearly 
is a fascinating outcome – both in the representation of the strategic campaign choices in the 
Tweets and in the prevalence of her role in the Twitter campaign.  It was also very interesting 
to see a shift in focus to the royal family after the campaign took off.  This was true in 
English and Arabic, again underscoring the strategic drive of the campaign to tap into 
transnational networks as well as domestic to exert pressure.   
Conclusion 
 
#women2drive was a fascinating campaign.  Although all the campaigns were deeply rooted 
in Twitter, this campaign used social media more as a strategic choice, tapping into both 
domestic and non-domestic pressures.  It was a campaign steered by domestic activists, but 
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the non-domestic attention and participation was strong.  The Twitter characteristics again 
and again exhibited clear consistency, with long-term persistence, uniformity in engagement, 
and maintained focus in the content of Tweets.  This persistence and consistency are likely 
associated with the high levels of success, particularly in the parameters of institutionalisation 
and UN dialogue, setting it apart from the partially successful campaigns #delhigangrape and 
#niunamenos.     
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Chapter 7 : Aggregated Analysis 
 
Introduction 
 
Given the in-depth analysis of the legal changes and Twitter characteristics for each 
campaign and outcome group, this chapter now sets out to explore any overarching findings, 
beginning to build statistical models to understand in more detail the role of Twitter in legal 
change.  To frame the work presented in this chapter, the table below builds upon the 
theoretical framework set out in Chapter 2.  This shows the various statistical tests that have 
been performed to investigate the overarching research questions and to identify patterns and 
trends in Twitter-driven campaigns which could help to understand legal outcomes.   The 
research questions in this thesis, to reiterate, are: 
5. Can international campaigns originating in and driven by Twitter contribute to 
domestic legal change in women’s rights? 
6. If so, which campaign behaviours are associated with change? 
It is also critical to reiterate the selection criteria for the campaigns in the study: 
5. International attention 
6. More than 1,000 Tweets 
7. Seeking specific domestic legal change in the area of women’s rights 
8. Originating in, and continuing to be driven by, Twitter 
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Returning now to the research map, the next elements to add are the statistical tests chosen to 
analyse each independent variable:  
Table 7.1: Overview of statistical tests 
Critique/Risk Independent 
variable(s) 
Null hypothesis (that 
which this research 
sets out disprove) 
Test 
Lack of focus on domestic 
actors/overemphasis on 
Western approaches; Social 
media is elite-driven and 
non-neutral; campaigns may 
be dominated and/or driven 
by elite international actors 
Twitter profiles 
of 100 most 
prolific users in 
each campaign 
Campaigns dominated 
by foreign actors will 
be more successful. 
Geo-mapping 
exercise of 
campaign 
drivers. 
Correlate 
domestic and 
non-domestic 
user variables 
to outcomes. 
 
Potential government 
backlash; lack of message 
tempering due to organic 
nature of medium 
Content analysis  Consistency of 
messaging in Tweets 
will not affect 
campaign outcomes. 
Correlate 
consistency 
variables to 
outcomes.   
Compare to 
correlations of 
organic 
content. 
Lack of long-term 
progression; ‘fickleness’ 
and speed of social media 
Persistence 
(Tweets per 
day) 
Persistence of Tweets 
in Twitter driven 
campaigns do not affect 
campaign outcomes. 
Correlate 
persistence 
variables to 
outcomes. 
Ignores domestic capacity 
issues; lack of knowledge of 
domestic context 
Context (various 
indicators of 
domestic 
political context 
and situation for 
women) 
Domestic context has 
no impact on campaign 
success. 
Analysis of 
variance 
(ANOVA) test 
based on 
domestic 
political 
capacity 
scores. 
Ignores material or nuanced 
incentives; does not present 
Engagement 
(reply, retweet, 
and like data) 
Campaigns driven by 
‘likes’ will have the 
same impact as 
Correlate likes 
versus replies 
to outcomes. 
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enough incentive for change 
to domestic government 
campaigns driven by 
replies (replies used as 
a proxy for 
engagement/ 
investment/risk in 
campaign, as opposed 
to a simple click to 
like) 
Weaknesses in spiral model 
are amplified in social 
media driven campaigns 
Combined 
quantified 
variables 
Twitter variables have 
no relationship to 
campaign outcomes. 
Testing 
composite 
scores 
 
This chapter will work through these tests sequentially, culminating in testing the aggregated 
model.   
Lack of focus on domestic actors 
 
A key critique of the spiral model is its overemphasis on foreign (Western) actors and its lack 
of focus on domestic actors.1  Social media is statistically dominated by the Global North and 
is constructed in a way that favours the elite, however the domestic targets for change in this 
research are predominantly located in the Global South.2  The critique of the spiral model is that 
there is not enough emphasis on domestic actors, and the overemphasis on foreign influence 
 
1 Alison Brysk, ‘Communicative Action and Human Rights in Colombia: When Words Fail’ [2009] Colombia 
Internacional 36; Anthony Tirado Chase, ‘The State and Human Rights: Governance and Sustainable Human 
Development in Yemen’ [2003] International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 213; Isabelle Cheng and 
Lara Momesso, ‘Look, the World Is Watching How We Treat Migrants! The Making of the Anti-Trafficking 
Legislation during the Ma Administration’ (2017) 46 Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 61; Umit Cizre, ‘The 
Truth and Fiction About (Turkey’s) Human Rights Politics’ (2001) 3 Human Rights Review 55; Xinyuan Dai, 
‘The “Compliance Gap” and the Efficacy of International Human Rights Institutions’ in Thomas Risse-Kappen 
and Stephen C Ropp (eds), The persistent power of human rights: from commitment to compliance (Cambridge 
University Press 2013); Man-ho Heo, ‘Mongolia’s Political Change and Human Rights in Five-Phase Spiral 
Model: Implications for North Korea: Mongolia’s Political Change and HR’ (2014) 29 Pacific Focus 413; 
Andreas Laursen, ‘Israel’s Supreme Court and International Human Rights Law: The Judgement on “Moderate 
Physical Pressure”’ (2000) 69 Nordic Journal of International Law 413; Alejandro Anaya Muñoz, 
‘Transnational and Domestic Processes in the Definition of Human Rights Policies in Mexico’ (2009) 31 
Human Rights Quarterly 35; Rolf Schwarz, ‘The Paradox of Sovereignty, Regime Type and Human Rights 
Compliance’ (2004) 8 The International Journal of Human Rights 199; Beth A Simmons, ‘From Ratification to 
Compliance: Quantitative Evidence on the Spiral Model’ in Thomas Risse-Kappen and Stephen C Ropp (eds), 
The persistent power of human rights: from commitment to compliance (Cambridge University Press 2013). 
2 Simon Kemp, ‘Global Digital & Social Media Stats: 2015 | Social Media Today’ (2015) 
<http://www.socialmediatoday.com/content/global-digital-social-media-stats-2015> accessed 14 March 2016; 
ITU, ‘‘Key ICT Indicators for Developed and Developing Countries and the World (Totals and Penetration 
Rates)’ (2014) <http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Documents/facts/ICTFactsFigures2014-e.pdf> accessed 
14 March 2016; Maeve Duggan and Aaron Smith, ‘Social Media Update 2013’ (Pew Research Center: Internet, 
Science & Tech, 30 December 2013) <http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/12/30/social-media-update-2013/> 
accessed 14 March 2016. 
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can contribute to unintended and indeed negative domestic outcomes.  If this is a risk in a 
campaign which is not driven by social media, this risk is even more prevalent and 
concerning in a social media environment, dominated by elite, usually Western users.3  This 
variable is therefore crucial to understanding the impact of international social media 
campaigns on domestic law.    
The hypothesis in this area is that campaigns which are driven by domestic actors and voices, 
as opposed to being overshadowed by foreign actors, will be more likely to influence 
domestic governments to change.  If social media campaigns continue to be dominated by 
Western influences, the hypothesis is that it is very unlikely that they will contribute to long 
term meaningful legal change.    
As discussed in Chapter 2, for each campaign an in-depth analysis was conducted of the 100 
most active users in each campaign, in other words, the 100 users who Tweeted the most in 
the hashtag campaign.  Data for each of these 100 users was collected on location (self-
identified), profile description, number of followers, number of Tweets sent in the campaign, 
and total number of Tweets ever sent by the user.  It is important to note that this information 
was collected at the time of the research, not at the time of the campaign.  It is therefore used 
as a proxy but it not representative of the user’s followers or reach while Tweeting with the 
hashtag.  Relevant to this test, location was coded as domestic or non-domestic based on the 
users’ own description of their location.  This data provides an indicator of the location of the 
drivers of the campaign – domestic or non-domestic.  A geo-mapping exercise shows the 
differences in locations based on legal outcomes. 
  
 
3 ‘Digital in 2018: World’s Internet Users Pass the 4 Billion Mark’ (We Are Social UK, 30 January 2018) 
<https://wearesocial.com/uk/blog/2018/01/global-digital-report-2018> accessed 4 October 2018; Kate Ott, 
‘Social Media and Feminist Values: Aligned or Maligned?’ (2018) 39 Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies 
93. 
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Figure 7.1: Map of 100 most active users, #stopstoning 
 
 
Figure 7.2: Map of 100 most active users, #letwomengotostadium 
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Figure 7.3: Map of 100 most active users, #farkhunda 
 
 
Figure 7.4: Map of 100 most active users, #sendeanlat 
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Figure 7.5: Map of 100 most active users, #mydressmychoice 
 
 
Figure 7.6: Map of 100 most active users, #delhigangrape 
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Figure 7.7: Map of 100 most active users, #ninunamenos 
 
 
Figure 7.8: Map of 100 most active users, #women2drive 
 
 
As the maps progress from least successful through to more successful, the concentration of 
users in the domestic country and surrounding region tends to increase.  It is of particular 
interest that #niunamenos was the first campaign to show no drivers from the US.  Although 
not a perfect model, there is a general identifiable trend for campaigns with a larger 
geographic spread of driving users to be associated with less long-term success.  Even though 
#women2drive was strategically designed to utilise foreign pressures, there is still a strong 
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concentration of Saudi users driving the campaign – the most active users.  On the contrary, 
#stopstoning and #farkunda showed a large geographic spread of most active users. 
Another interesting point may be a diaspora effect, whereby domestic nationals are currently 
located in non-domestic locations.4  This could show as ‘foreign’ influence when in fact it is 
more closely linked to the domestic interests.  However the users still do not have any 
domestic power as they do not currently reside in the target country, under the target 
government.  Therefore they cannot be classified as true domestic voices either.  While it is 
not possible to specifically identify a possible diaspora effect given the availability of 
information on Twitter profiles, the mapping exercise may indicate this phenomenon in 
#sendeanlat (Germany) and #delhigangrape (UK) in particular.     
These maps therefore do indicate, visually, that there may be an association between the 
presence of domestic drivers in Twitter campaigns and legal change.  Again, this is certainly 
not a perfect model, but as an initial indicator of a possible trend the maps do show some 
patterns.  A critical challenge in this area is the user provided information itself.  Not all users 
provide a location, and of those that do, they may simply indicate a region or an unspecified 
location (i.e. ‘planet earth’).  It is not always possible to identify a location for users. 
To explore this theory further, correlations between some of the key user variables against 
outcome variables were run.5  The full results are presented in the table below.  Italics 
indicate a statistically significant relationship at p < 0.05 level and bold italics indicate a p < 
0.01 level.  In other words, the relationships with R closer to 1.00 and a p-value < 0.01 
indicate that the independent variable explains a statistically significant amount of variation 
in the dependent variable.  As the independent variable moves up or down (ordinally) the 
dependent variable will likely do the same.  The higher the R, the stronger the relationship, 
and the lower the p-value, the more statistically significant. 
 
  
 
4 Response from Dr. Sebastian Peyer to Reilly Dempsey Willis, ‘Evaluating the Impact of Global Twitter 
Campaigns on Domestic Women’s Rights: Statistical Modelling and Analysis’ (Research Seminar, University 
of East Anglia School of Law, 6 June 2018). 
5 Pearson correlations measure the relationship between two variables, looking at both strength and 
directionality.  In the simplest terms, changes in one variable will result in changes to the other.  A value of 1 
means a perfect linear relationship, a value of 0 means there is no relationship at all, and a value of -1 is a 
perfect negative relationship.   
Chapter 7: Aggregated Analysis 
204 
 
Table 7.2: Statistically significant correlations, user profiles 
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Of the 100 most active users in 
the campaign, the number clearly 
identified as being domestic 
Correlation 
coefficient (R) 
.719* .671 .406 .503 .481 
Significance 
(p-value) 
.044 .068 .318 .204 .228 
Number of Tweets in the 
campaign sent by the most active 
users who clearly identified as 
being domestic 
Correlation 
coefficient (R) 
.813* .900** .558 .273 .504 
Significance 
(p-value) 
.014 .002 .150 .513 .203 
Number of Tweets in the 
campaign sent by the most active 
users who identified as being 
non-domestic 
Correlation 
coefficient (R) 
.873** .944** .611 .259 .605 
Significance 
(p-value) 
.005 .000 .108 .536 .112 
Percent of Tweets sent by the 
most active users from those who 
identified as being non-domestic 
Correlation 
coefficient (R) 
-.710* -.632 -.417 -.488 -.523 
Significance 
(p-value) 
.049 .093 .304 .220 .183 
Of the 100 most active users in 
the campaign, the percent who 
clearly identified as being 
domestic individuals 
Correlation 
coefficient (R) 
.605 .383 .230 .852** .389 
Significance 
(p-value) 
.112 .349 .583 .007 .340 
Percent of Tweets sent by the 
most active users from those who 
clearly identified as being 
domestic individuals 
Correlation 
coefficient (R) 
.546 .386 .030 .725* .490 
Significance 
(p-value) 
.161 .345 .943 .042 .218 
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The initial tests therefore show statistically significant correlations between: 
Table 7.3: Summary of significant relationships, user profiles 
 Strong correlation 
(0.01) 
Correlation 
(0.05) 
Of the 100 most active users in the campaign, 
the number clearly identified as being domestic 
 Overall legal 
change 
Number of Tweets in the campaign sent by the 
most active users who clearly identified as 
being domestic 
Legislative change^ Overall legal 
change^ 
Number of Tweets in the campaign sent by the 
most active users who identified as being non-
domestic 
Overall legal change^, 
Legislative change 
 
Percent of Tweets sent by the most active users 
from those who identified as being non-
domestic 
 Overall legal 
change 
Of the 100 most active users in the campaign, 
the percent who clearly identified as being 
domestic individuals 
Law enforcement  
Percent of Tweets sent by the most active users 
from those who clearly identified as being 
domestic individuals 
 Law 
enforcement 
^ relationships which change when running partial correlations 
 
As it is not logical that the number of Tweets from domestic users and the number of Tweets 
from non-domestic users can both be significant, there is likely a confounding factor at play, 
possibly the overall number of Tweets in the campaign.  In other words, it is not whether the 
Tweets are domestic or non-domestic that is showing significance, but just the raw number of 
Tweets influencing the relationship.  This is underscored by the correlation shown between 
the percentage of campaign Tweets which are from non-domestic users to changes in 
legislation.  Partial correlations, which control for other variables, are necessary to exclude 
the possible confounding factor of total number of Tweets.  Running this test shows that there 
is, actually, no strong relationship between the number of Tweets sent by domestic campaign 
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drivers (R= 0.807, p=0.028), but there remains a significant correlation between the number 
of Tweets sent by non-domestic campaign drivers and changes in legislative change (R= 
0.900, p=0.006).   
The initial significance between domestic campaign Tweets and overall legal change is 
removed completely when controlling for total number of Tweets (R= 0.642, p=0.120).  The 
strong correlation between non-domestic campaign Tweets and overall legal change is also 
weakened in the partial correlation.  However, the strong relationship between non-domestic 
campaign Tweets and legislative change remains.  This is contrary to the hypothesis and in 
fact upholds, in part, the role of international actors in the spiral model.  This may indicate 
that some level of online foreign pressure is indeed necessary to push a government to change 
the law.  This was certainly seen in #women2drive and these statistics further prove the 
relationship. 
This is tempered to some extent by the relationship between the strength of the voice of 
domestic individuals and law enforcement.  There is a strong statistical relationship between 
the percent of campaign drivers who self-identify as domestic individuals and law 
enforcement (R=0.852, p=.007) and the percent of campaign Tweets from drivers sent by 
domestic individuals (R=0.725, p=0.042).  This indicates that the voice of ‘ordinary’ 
domestic individuals may have an influence on how seriously law enforcement takes the 
issue.  For example, #delhigangrape and #niunamenos had particular problems in law 
enforcement outcomes, and these campaigns showed only 27% and 14% domestic drivers 
respectively.  Conversely, #mydressmychoice and #women2drive showed more positive 
outcomes in law enforcement and reported higher levels of domestic individuals at 32% and 
30% respectively.  Although the differences may not seem large, the patterns are still 
informative and statistically significant.  The campaigns with the poorest outcomes in law 
enforcement, #stopstoning and #farkhunda, showed the lowest levels of domestic individuals 
at 0% and 6% respectively.   
As seen below, the Saudi campaign on this particular variable is of interest.  Campaign 
analysis showed that foreign pressure, given foreign relations and the domestic political 
situation, was actively sought.  No other campaign visibly or vocally used this strategy.   
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Figure 7.9: Relationship between domestic users and overall legal change 
 
This could indicate that for most campaigns, domestic voices are indeed critical to success, 
however there may be exceptions where it is both appropriate and necessary to draw upon 
foreign pressure.  As discussed earlier, it could also be the strength and importance of the 
domestic voices that matters more than the number.  In the case of #women2drive, using 
social media to tap into transnational advocacy networks and specifically American public 
opinion was a strategic choice, yet the campaign was still very much driven by the domestic 
activists.  Other campaigns which saw success (albeit limited), such as #niunamenos and 
#delhigangrape, also had domestic drive to the campaign, greater in number but perhaps not 
in strength.  In other words, it is always important to understand what is going on behind the 
numbers.  At the opposite end of the scale, with campaigns such as #stopstoning and 
#farkhunda, it appears that the foreign involvement was associated with poorer outcomes.  
Therefore there are three important findings in these tests: that there is a relationship between 
the number of domestic drivers and overall legal change (both in the correlations and the 
mapping trends), that there is a strong relationship between the number of Tweets sent by 
non-domestic drivers and legislative change, and that there is a strong relationship between 
the voice of ‘ordinary’ domestic individuals and law enforcement.  Taken as a whole, this 
may show that the spiral model holds true for legislative change (i.e. Phase 3 tactical 
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concessions), but that more emphasis on domestic voices, influence, and power is needed to 
see long term, on the ground implementation and societal change.  This finding also links to 
the critique on the lack of progression seen in the spiral model case studies.  It may be that 
the emphasis on foreign influence is also to blame for the lack of long-term progression.  
Perhaps a more correct assessment would see foreign influence curtailed and limited to early 
phase legislative work, but a complete shift to domestic pressure to move from tactical 
concessions towards rule consistent behaviour. 
Potential government backlash 
 
Critiques of the spiral model highlight that the model ‘ignores’ the potential for governments 
to lash out against what can be interpreted as foreign interference in domestic matters.  Critics 
point out that the model’s emphasis on the role and power of foreign actors could have a 
negative impact on domestic matters if the State reacts to foreign ‘meddling’. 6  Given the 
possibility of both actual foreign involvement in social media campaigns and the perception 
of over-involvement from foreigners/Westerners in social media, this risk is potentially 
greater.  The legal and discourse analysis showed on multiple occasions and in multiple 
countries a distrust of Western influences and Western-driven media.  Statistics also show 
that social media tends to be Western driven.7  In a structured, strategically designed and 
driven advocacy campaign, messages can be tempered and carefully constructed so as to 
avoid this impression.  Messaging can also be designed to ensure a focus on the domestic 
aspects, again in the hopes of avoiding potential backlash.  Framing and messaging on social 
media, however, is by definition unstructured and unfiltered.  Additionally, the non-neutrality 
of Twitter may contribute to the lack of control over messaging as the algorithms working in 
the background which allow some messages to thrive and some to become supressed will 
contribute to the perception of the campaign.8  There is little strategic design to what is said, 
repeated, or reported as social media content is user defined, even if activists and 
organisations attempt to steer the campaign.  They still cannot control what individuals Tweet 
 
6 Brysk (n 1); Omar G Encarnación, ‘International Influence, Domestic Activism, and Gay Rights in Argentina’ 
(2013) 128 Political Science Quarterly 687; Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, ‘How to Influence States: 
Socialization and International Human Rights Law’ (2004) 54 Duke Law Journal 621; Kathryn Sikkink, ‘The 
United States and Torture: Does the Spiral Model Work?’ in Thomas Risse-Kappen and Stephen C Ropp (eds), 
The persistent power of human rights: from commitment to compliance (Cambridge University Press 2013); 
Anja Jetschke, ‘The Power of Human Rights a Decade after: From Euphoria to Contestation?’ in Thomas Risse-
Kappen and Stephen C Ropp (eds), The persistent power of human rights: from commitment to compliance 
(Cambridge University Press 2013). 
7 ‘Digital in 2018: World’s Internet Users Pass the 4 Billion Mark’ (n 3). 
8 Ott (n 3). 
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or what Twitter promotes.  This could indicate that the lack of controlled, consistent 
messaging on social media may increase the risk of government backlash.  Although difficult 
to assess, as a proxy for the content of Tweets two tests were run.  Each campaign was 
divided into event-driven time periods (as opposed to peak and non-peak time periods which 
are defined by the number of Tweets on a given day).  For each time period, the 100 most 
used words were collected and the number of instances of words which relate to international 
norms on women’s rights were counted.  From these tests, four distinct areas of interest 
emerged: the use of pronouns, the content of consistent yet still user-defined framing and 
messaging, variable framing and messaging which was strong but differed across time 
periods, and the presence of international norms.  The use of pronouns does not relate to the 
content of messaging and is discussed later in this chapter.   
The hypothesis here is that more consistent and ‘structured’ messaging will lead to less 
government backlash and therefore more likely to see positive legal change.  Campaigns with 
less consistent messaging and more variable (and potentially volatile or perceived as 
Western-driven) organic messaging which may stray from the overarching goals are 
hypothesised to see less success and run a greater risk of alienating government inroads for 
change.  Again, the first step in testing this hypothesis is to look at correlations between 
relevant variables and legal outcomes: 
  
Chapter 7: Aggregated Analysis 
210 
 
Table 7.4: Statistically significant correlations, messaging content 
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Percent of tweets with variable 
messaging 
Correlation 
coefficient (R) 
-.746* -.562 -.223 -.567 -.874** 
Significance (p-
value) 
.033 .147 .595 .142 .004 
Highest percent of Tweets in a 
given time period with a given 
variable word 9 
Correlation 
coefficient (R) 
-.376 -.019 .064 -.750* -.601 
Significance (p-
value) 
.358 .965 .881 .032 .115 
Ratio of consistent to variable 
words 
Correlation 
coefficient (R) 
.659 .645 .595 -.071 .731* 
Significance (p-
value) 
.076 .084 .120 .867 .039 
Percent of international 
women’s rights norms present 
Correlation 
coefficient (R) 
.926** .826* .501 .637 .719* 
Significance (p-
value) 
.001 .011 .206 .090 .045 
 
  
 
9 In other words, the number of times a variable norm was used divided by the number of total Tweets in the 
given time period.  This test looked at the highest value across each time period.  This shows the presence and 
strength of the variable norms.  The higher the number the more prevalent the variable norm was in the given 
time period. 
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With the following significant summary: 
Table 7.5: Summary of significant relationships, messaging content 
 Strong correlation (0.01) Correlation (0.05) 
Percent of tweets with 
variable messaging 
UN dialogue (negative 
relationship) 
Overall legal change 
(negative relationship) 
Highest percent of Tweets in 
a given time period with a 
given variable word 
 Law enforcement (negative 
relationship) 
Ratio of consistent to 
variable words 
 UN dialogue 
Percent of international 
women’s rights norms 
present 
Overall legal change Legislative change, UN 
dialogue 
 
These correlations show a potentially significant relationship between messaging and 
outcomes.  As hypothesised, campaigns which have more variable, erratic, and irregular 
content, specific to time periods and not the overarching campaign, are correlated to less 
positive outcomes, while campaigns with consistent messaging which draw heavily from 
women’s rights norms are associated with more positive outcomes.   
To explore these relationships further, scatter plots were created and regression equations 
generated.  The presence of organically emerging messages in Tweets continues to show a 
negative relationship with dialogue with UN international human rights mechanisms in 
particular: 
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Figure 7.10: Relationship between changing messaging and UN dialogue 
 
 
This plot shows the negative relationship between the presence of variable (unstructured and 
changing) messaging and legal outcomes, looking in more detail at UN dialogue.  Of critical 
importance, UN dialogue is the legal variable that most clearly shows government backlash.  
In particular in the Iranian campaigns, dialogue with the UN treaty bodies was where State 
backlash against the campaigns was most clearly evidenced.  Although not as strong as the 
percent of Tweets, the continued negative statistical relationship between the presence of 
variable framing to law enforcement supports the findings.  The presence of variable framing 
shows the percentage of times that one particular organically emerging word or phrase was 
used for each campaign.  This is another indicator of the strength and visibility of the 
changing, variable messaging across event-based time periods as opposed to the consistent 
campaign driven framing and messaging which are evidenced across the lifespan of the 
campaign and international norms which reflect a focus on women’s rights norms.    
This relationship therefore begins to give credence to the hypothesis that less controlled 
social media messaging is more likely to see a hostile government response, and less likely to 
be associated with positive legal outcomes.  This is underscored by the additional, though less 
strong, relationship between the ratio of consistent messaging to organic messaging and UN 
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dialogue.  The less consistent the campaign Tweets are, the more likely it is to show backlash 
in UN dialogue.   
Lack of long-term progression 
 
Some of the case studies used to develop the spiral model, even after years of strategic 
advocacy work, never progressed to full rule consistent behaviour and institutionalisation of 
human rights change.  Critics of the model point to this risk of lack of long-term progression 
as a major fault in the model.10  When used in a social media context which is quite renowned 
for being short-term and short-lived, the risk is potentially increased.  To explore this further, 
several variables to measure campaign persistence were examined.  Although the clearest 
indicator of persistence would be the total number of days in the campaign, given the 
selection criteria for the campaigns in this study total days is not necessarily a comparable 
variable (i.e. campaigns were not selected to be matched in length of time).  Additionally, a 
cut-off date for data collection was practically necessary to complete this research, while 
some of the campaigns were still in an active phase.  However, an initial look at the 
relationship between the total number of days analysed and the legal outcomes shows that 
this is not a statistically significant predictor. This chart plots the number of Tweets against 
the number of days of the campaign (log scale for comparability).  As can be seen, there is no 
discernible pattern and certainly no linear relationship to indicate that simply being a ‘bigger’ 
campaign means the campaign will see more success. 
 
  
 
10 Raed A Alhargan, ‘The Impact of the UN Human Rights System and Human Rights INGOs on the Saudi 
Government with Special Reference to the Spiral Model’ (2012) 16 The International Journal of Human Rights 
598; Brysk (n 1); Jetschke (n 6); Eran Shor, ‘Conflict, Terrorism, and the Socialization of Human Rights Norms: 
The Spiral Model Revisited’ (2008) 55 Social Problems 117. 
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Figure 7.11: Relationship between total number of days of campaign and overall legal 
outcomes (log scale) 
  
Therefore, other indicators of a hashtag campaign’s persistence need to be explored.  The 
hypothesis here is that campaigns which show more persistence will be more likely to see to 
legal change; in other words, campaigns which are more sensitive to the whims of social 
media that ‘die out’ of public interest quicker are far less likely to achieve meaningful 
success.  Given that most hashtags on Twitter trend for a short amount of time, it is very 
likely that most social media campaigns will lack the persistence necessary for long term 
change, particularly given that some critiques of the spiral model point to the lack of 
persistence of traditional advocacy campaigns which may take several years.   
Persistence in these tests is therefore measured not by the simple length of a campaign, but 
rather the ongoing activity in the campaign.  More days with more Tweets are therefore 
defined as persistent, for example #women2drive.  Higher numbers of days with fewer 
Tweets and completely inactive days (no Tweets) are defined as lacking persistence as was 
the case with #stopstoning.  The number of peaks (numerically defined) are also included as 
indicators of persistence; in other words, days with a very high number of Tweets.  
Campaigns which have more peak days over time are also defined as more persistent, and it 
is hypothesised are more likely to contribute to long term meaningful change.  Fewer peaks 
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are indicative of campaigns which lack persistence - those that grab attention for short 
periods of time but do not engage users to participate over a longer time span, for example 
the status quo campaigns #farkhunda, #sendeanlat, and #mydressmychoice.  Based on the 
critique of the spiral model around lack of progression, the hypothesis follows that social 
media campaigns with less persistence will see less change, and equally campaigns with more 
persistence will be associated with more positive change.     
To test the hypothesis, starting from correlations, the following significant relationships were 
found: 
Table 7.6: Statistically significant correlations, Tweets per day 
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Persistence composite 
score11 
Correlation 
coefficient (R) 
.869** .827* .639 .450 .578 
Significance (p-
value) 
.005 .011 .088 .263 .134 
Number of Tweets in non-
peak periods 
Correlation 
coefficient (R) 
.706 .738* .483 .112 .646 
Significance (p-
value) 
.051 .037 .226 .792 .084 
Number of days with at least 
one Tweet 
Correlation 
coefficient (R) 
.865** .814* .772* .360 .557 
Significance (p-
value) 
.006 .014 .025 .382 .151 
Number of days with at least 
five Tweets 
Correlation 
coefficient (R) 
.912** .926** .701 .230 .724* 
Significance (p-
value) 
.002 .001 .053 .584 .042 
Percent of days with no 
Tweets 
Correlation 
coefficient (R) 
-.778* -.655 -.590 -.380 -.678 
Significance (p-
value) 
.023 .078 .124 .353 .064 
 
11 An average of the number of peaks, the number of peak periods, the longest peak period (merged), the 
number of days with at least one Tweet, the number of days with at least five Tweets, the number of days with 
at least 100 Tweets, the number of days with at least 1,000 Tweets, the percentage of days with at least five 
Tweets, and the number of days with Tweets above the average for the campaign, based on quintiles to create an 
index ranging from 1.00 – 5.00). 
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Which can be summarised as follows: 
Table 7.7: Summary of significant relationships, Tweets per day 
 Strong Correlation (0.01) Correlation (0.05) 
Persistence composite score Overall legal change^ Legislative change^ 
Number of Tweets in non-
peak periods 
 Legislative change 
Number of days with at least 
one Tweet 
Overall legal change Legislative change, 
Institutionalisation 
Number of days with at least 
five Tweets 
Overall legal change, 
legislative change 
UN dialogue 
Percent of days with no 
Tweets 
 Overall legal change 
(negative) 
^ relationships which change when running partial correlations 
In order to verify the strength of the relationship between the number of days with more than 
zero Tweets and the number of days with more than five Tweets, it is necessary to run a 
partial correlation controlling for the total number of days in the campaign.  The partial 
correlation test confirms that the relationship stands when controlling for total days: 
Table 7.8: Partial correlations, Tweets per day 
Control 
Variables 
 
 
Overall legal change 
Total days 
of campaign 
Number of days with at 
least one Tweet 
Correlation coefficient 
(R) 
.949 
Significance (p-value) .001 
Number of days with at 
least five Tweets 
Correlation coefficient 
(R) 
.931 
Significance (p-value) .002 
 
Taking the above correlations with the negative directionality of the correlations of percent of 
days with no Tweets, there is a strong relationship between the number of ‘active’ days in a 
campaign to outcomes, regardless of the total length of the campaign.  A campaign therefore 
could be ongoing for years, but with very few days with more than just a handful of, if any, 
Tweets (i.e. #stopstoning), whereas a campaign could be relatively short but with mostly very 
active days (i.e. #niunamenos).  The latter is much more likely to be associated with success.  
The status quo campaigns tended to show very high activity levels in the early days but 
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lacked in persistence over the long-term course of the campaign.  These campaigns therefore 
were not statistically likely to see positive change.   
It is also important to control for the total number of days in the persistence composite score 
as well.  That partial correlation produces the following results: 
Table 7.9: Summary of significant relationships, Tweets per days, after partial correlations 
Control Variables   Overall legal 
change 
Legislative 
change 
Total days of 
campaign 
Persistence 
composite 
score 
Correlation 
coefficient (R) 
0.868 0.831 
Significance (p-
value) 
0.011 0.020 
 
This shows that the relationship between persistence and overall legal change and legislative 
change is weakened, though only slightly, when controlling for total number of days of the 
campaign.   The significance level for both shifts to the 0.05 level.   
To therefore explore the strong relationship between active days and outcomes, a scatter plot 
shows: 
Figure 7.12: Relationship between number of active days and overall legal change 
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The hypothesis that campaigns exhibiting higher levels of persistence would lead to more 
positive legal change is therefore tentatively supported.  The most important component part 
is the number of active days of the campaign.  Campaigns with a high number of inactive 
days are not likely to be associated with positive legal change.  This is a challenging finding 
for social media campaigns, as they generally tend to come and go quite quickly.  In this 
study alone, the majority of campaigns lacked in persistence. 
Domestic Capacity Issues 
 
The spiral model itself recognises that the capacity and ability of the domestic government to 
implement change could be an issue, but some scholars critique the model in that it does not 
pay enough attention to the potential barrier of domestic capacity.12  This critique holds that 
governments may have the will to change, but lack the practical capacity to initiate and 
implement change.  Measuring capacity is challenging.  Only two useful indices, produced by 
researchers at Harvard, were found for this research.  Both measure relative political capacity, 
one which approximates the ability of governments to appropriate portions of the national 
output to advance public goals and one which gauges the capacity of governments to mobilise 
populations under their control.  Indices such as these are never perfect and are based on 
many assumptions, however as a proxy for estimating a government’s ability to implement 
legal change (based on the campaign goals), these indices will suffice.  Each campaign was 
then grouped into low, medium, and high capacity to compare.  
The domestic capacity issue could be a potentially major barrier to success in social media 
campaigns.  As opposed to more structured and strategically planned campaigns which can 
work within the bounds of capacity for change, social media campaigns lack this strategic 
direction.  While some domestic activists participating in social media campaigns may be 
aware of government capacity issues, it can at least be speculated that most hashtag 
participants will be relatively unaware of a State’s capacity to implement change.  In practical 
terms, this means that it is possible that a hashtag campaign is asking a government to do 
something that it is not capable of doing.   
 
12 Tanja Borzel and Thomas Risse, ‘Human Rights in Areas of Limited Statehood: The New Agenda’ in Thomas 
Risse-Kappen and Stephen C Ropp (eds), The persistent power of human rights: from commitment to 
compliance (Cambridge University Press 2013); Jack Goldsmith and Stephen D Krasner, ‘The Limits of 
Idealism’ (2003) 132 Daedalus 47; Shor (n 10). 
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The primary statistical test to explore this hypothesis is a one-way ANOVA (Analysis of 
Variance).  This tests for statistically significant differences in the dependent variable average 
for different groups.  A statistically significant difference between the groups would indicate 
that capacity is critical to change.  ANOVAs were performed for both capacity measures 
against the overall legal change score and all its component parts.  There were no statistically 
significant differences between capacity groups across any of the outcomes, although the 
small number of campaigns in this study does mean that the finding must be interpreted with 
caution.  
Still, this is a particularly interesting, and perhaps tentatively positive, finding for social 
media campaigns.  If the above assumptions are correct, then it matters not whether or not a 
government has political capacity.  Campaign success, including institutionalisation, does not 
vary significantly across countries with different domestic capacities.  For example, India 
ranks relatively low in capacity, yet this research shows at least some change resulting from 
the Twitter-driven campaign.  The government was able to commission a judicial report and 
pass legislative change relatively quickly once the campaign took hold.  Similarly, Saudi 
Arabia scored quite low on the capacity measures, yet seems to exhibit the most ability to 
implement and institutionalise change.  Perhaps the public nature of social media campaigns 
somehow help a government to overcome capacity issues, at least those relating to 
mobilisation.  It is important to note that this may be based on the measures chosen, however 
it is a challenge across the field finding ways to accurately measure capacity.  It is hoped that 
by using more than one measure, and finding a lack of statistical difference in both, will at 
least go some way to overcoming this challenge.   
However, this does not mean that context does not matter at all.  This research also uses the 
World Justice Project Open Government Index to understand the domestic context.  The 
Open Government Index looks at four indicators of the openness of a government: publicised 
laws and government data, right to information, civic participation, and complaint 
mechanisms.13  The spiral model itself specifies some conditions of the openness of a 
government as a scope condition for success.  While this is a very useful measurement of 
domestic governments, it must be looked at with significant caution as there is no index 
 
13 ‘WJP Open Government Index 2015’ (World Justice Project) <https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/wjp-
rule-law-index/wjp-open-government-index-2015> accessed 20 October 2018. 
Chapter 7: Aggregated Analysis 
220 
 
available for Saudi Arabia.  Although pure conjecture, one could assume that Saudi would 
not likely rank high on the openness scale but has shown responsiveness to the campaign.   
The other campaigns have all been ranked by the World Justice Project, and within this group 
the variable has proven to be significant: 
 
Figure 7.13: Relationship between World Justice Project rankings and overall legal change, 
excluding Saudi Arabia 
 
 
This scatter plot shows three distinct groupings; these groupings directly map onto the legal 
outcome groups.  This indicates, to some extent, that governments which are more open are 
more likely to respond to online campaigns.  It does not mean that this is the only predictor of 
success; the level of success within the grouping is still dependent on the other variables 
discussed in this chapter.  However it does appear that the openness of a government is an 
important factor in social media campaigning.  Again this must be interpreted with caution as 
it excludes Saudi Arabia and the inclusion of Saudi Arabia most likely would change the 
significance rendering it less important.   
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Ignores material or nuanced incentives 
 
Yet another critique of the spiral model is that is it based almost exclusively on the concept of 
naming and shaming, using international reputational harm as the primary incentive for 
governments to change.14  Critics highlight that, in many cases, material incentives are 
actually at play in pressuring a State to change.  Social media campaigns not only rely solely 
on naming and shaming but can even fall below that level of incentive as users are not 
necessarily in a position to put themselves at risk or present any incentive at all for a 
government to change.  Although this is an extension of the critique of the spiral model, it 
bears exploration.  The hypothesis is that campaigns with lower levels of user engagement 
will be less likely to lead to positive change; the lack of engagement equates to a lack of 
pressure on the government which is linked to lack of incentives.  In other words, if the 
online campaign participants are not properly engaged with the issue and the campaign, then 
there is no compulsion for the government to implement change; essentially even less so than 
traditional campaigns on which the spiral model was developed and on which the critique 
rests.   
To test this hypothesis, several engagement metrics were explored to determine both the level 
and type of engagement linked to each campaign.  Replies are deemed the highest level of 
engagement; users are engaged in dialogue and debate on the issue, taking the time and effort 
to write original thoughts and responses in conversation with other campaign users.  Replying 
is also the best proxy for a user putting themselves at any sort of risk, which is usually a 
necessary component for a protest-driven campaign.15  By putting their own thoughts, words, 
images, and responses in the public sphere, users take a much more risky and active part in 
the campaign.  A campaign with more replies is therefore categorised as showing higher 
levels of engagement, and therefore more likely to contribute to positive legal change.  Likes 
are seen as the least engaged form of Twitter campaigning.  Users show their support and 
participation by simply clicking like, showing the least level of risk, time, effort, and 
 
14 Goldsmith and Krasner (n 12); Jérôme Y Bachelard, ‘The Anglo-Leasing Corruption Scandal in Kenya: The 
Politics of International and Domestic Pressures and Counter-Pressures’ (2010) 37 Review of African Political 
Economy 187; Ronald R Krebs and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, ‘Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The 
Power of Political Rhetoric’ (2007) 13 European Journal of International Relations 35; Robyn Linde, 
‘Statelessness and Roma Communities in the Czech Republic: Competing Theories of State Compliance’ (2006) 
13 International Journal on Minority & Group Rights 341; Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri, ‘Trials and Errors: 
Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice’ (2003) 28 International Security 5. 
15 Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani, Social Movements: An Introduction (2nd edn, Blackwell Publishing 
2006); Malcolm Gladwell, ‘Small Change’ [2010] The New Yorker 
<http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/10/04/small-change-malcolm-gladwell> accessed 14 March 2016. 
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participation – otherwise defined as ‘slactivism’.  This type of engagement brings the least 
incentives to domestic governments to change.  The final type of engagement is Retweeting.  
While this may not show a high level of engagement, it shows more ownership and 
participation than liking a Tweet.  In a different vein, a campaign driven by Retweets may in 
fact show consistent messaging, which could also lead to positive legal outcomes.  Therefore, 
it is expected that replies would be associated with the most success, Retweets somewhere in 
the middle, and likes the least amount of legal change.   
Again, starting from a series of correlations the following variables emerged as potentially 
significant: 
Table 7.10: Statistically significant correlations, engagement metrics 
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Ratio of total number of replies 
to total number of Tweets 
Correlation 
coefficient (R) 
.689 .836** .581 -.028 .463 
Significance (p-
value) 
.059 .010 .131 .947 .248 
Ratio of total number of likes to 
total number of Tweets 
Correlation 
coefficient (R) 
-.202 -.174 -.712* .055 .186 
Significance (p-
value) 
.631 .680 .048 .896 .660 
Ratio of total number of replies 
to total number of Tweets during 
non-peak periods 
Correlation 
coefficient (R) 
.854** .928** .430 .352 .635 
Significance (p-
value) 
.007 .001 .288 .393 .091 
Ratio of total number of likes to 
total number of Tweets during 
non-peak periods 
Correlation 
coefficient (R) 
-.208 -.171 -.712* .048 .165 
Significance (p-
value) 
.621 .686 .048 .910 .696 
Total number of replies in non-
peak periods 
Correlation 
coefficient (R) 
.679 .727* .452 .092 .619 
Significance (p-
value) 
.064 .041 .261 .829 .102 
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These results can be summarised as follows: 
Table 7.11: Summary of significant relationships, engagement metrics 
 Strong correlation (0.01) Correlation (0.05) 
Ratio of total number of 
replies to total number of 
Tweets 
Legislative change  
Ratio of total number of 
likes to total number of 
Tweets 
 Institutionalisation 
(negative) 
Ratio of total number of 
replies to total number of 
Tweets during non-peak 
periods 
Overall legal change, 
legislative change 
 
Ratio of total number of 
likes to total number of 
Tweets during non-peak 
periods 
 Institutionalisation 
(negative) 
Total number of replies in 
non-peak periods 
 Legislative change^ 
^ relationship which changes when running partial correlation 
Initially, these results seem to support the hypothesis – replies look to be positively 
associated with legal change, while likes seems to be negatively associated (less likely to lead 
to positive change).  It also appears that, closely linked to persistence metrics, having that 
dialogue and debate continue in non-peak periods is also potentially important for positive 
change.  It is necessary to run a partial correlation on the non-peak total replies, as again this 
significance could simply be reflecting the overall number of Tweets in the campaign.   
Controlling for total Tweets, the significance is no longer present (R=0.484, p=0.271).  This 
eliminates this variable from having any statistical significance.   
There are no other identified potential confounders for the remaining significant variables.  It 
appears that campaigns with high levels of dialogue and debate are linked to more positive 
outcomes, and in particular legislative change.  Producing a scatter plot further clarifies the 
relationships: 
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Figure 7.14: Relationship between replies and legal outcomes 
 
 
 
The role of dialogue, debate, and indeed user engagement in non-peak periods appears to be 
even more important than that during the campaign overall.  This relates to the spiral model 
critique in that it shows the highest level of engagement and therefore, by extension, risk to 
the user and incentive to the government.   
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Equally, looking at the relationship of likes to campaign outcomes, a similar finding can be 
seen: 
Figure 7.15: Relationship between likes and institutionalisation 
 
 
Although a weaker relationship, the trend can still be identified.  Campaigns with more likes, 
and therefore the least level of engagement, risk, and incentive, are correlated with less 
positive change in the institutionalisation of legal change.  The incentives for the State to 
work towards institutionalisation simply are not present in campaigns where the users are less 
engaged.   
Overall Models 
 
The final piece of analysis attempts to put all the variables and hypotheses together into 
composite models.   The first test to explore a composite, aggregated view of the research is 
to look at the relationship between the overall legal change and an overall composite 
campaign score.  The overall campaign composite score in essence distils down over 500 
potential parameters of interest into one summary number.  It is an average of four composite 
scores: users, engagement, persistence, and content (the full list of variables included in the 
composite scores is in Appendix 3).  Context and sentiment are excluded as these are not 
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continuous, ordinal scales on which to build a linear regression.  The composite scores 
include a selection of parameters chosen as the most illustrative of the variable.  Therefore, a 
higher score indicates: 1) a more domestically driven campaign, 2) with high levels of 
ongoing dialogue and debate from users, 3) with high levels of activity in both peak and non-
peak periods, and 4) consistent messaging which draws down from international norms on 
women’s rights.   
Starting with a correlation: 
Table 7.12: Correlation between overall campaign score and legal change 
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Overall Twitter driven 
campaign composite score 
Correlation 
coefficient (R) 
.907** .850** .732* .444 .594 
Significance (p-
value) 
.002 .008 .039 .271 .121 
   
The above table shows that the overall composite score does show a statistically significant 
relationship with the overall legal change, and in particular with changes in legislation and to 
a lesser but still important extent, institutionalisation.  Running a partial correlation 
controlling for the total number of days of the campaign (which could play a part in the 
persistence component), the relationship remains significant with overall legal change at the 
0.01 level (R=0.907, p=0.005), while the relationship remains but slightly weaker for 
legislative change (R=0.851, p=0.015) and institutionalisation (R=0.784, p=0.037).   
Looking at a simple linear regression between the overall composite campaign score and the 
overall legal change may show some summary insight.  It is important to note that aggregated 
models do tend to lose some of the nuances of more complex or disaggregated models but 
can be useful as a simple way to summarise a large amount of information.   At this stage, it 
is also worth noting that the outcome variable is normally distributed (analysed with a 
histogram and P-P plot).     
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Plotting the relationship shows the following: 
Figure 7.16: Relationship between overall campaign score and overall legal change 
 
 
This shows that there does appear to be a linear relationship between the overall composite 
score and the overall legal change.  As this is a relatively small sample size (N = 8), any 
extrapolation of these findings to the entire ‘population’ of campaigns meeting the selection 
criteria must be thought of with caution.  Additionally, the variance appears to show 
heteroscedasticity, meaning that the spread of outcomes is larger at the successful end of the 
range and less varied at the unsuccessful end (although a preliminary test using a weighted 
estimate regression which corrects for this kind of variation returned the same results).  
Future work may need to make adjustments to overcome these potential biases.  However, we 
can apply this model with confidence to this data, and therefore draw some tentative 
conclusions about next steps to develop models which may apply outside of the data set.   
The full analysis shows that this is a statistically significant relationship (R = 0.907, R2 = 
0.822, R2Adj = 0.792, p=0.002).  This means that 82% of the changes in the overall legal 
score are explained by the Twitter driven campaign’s composite score, or 79% in the model 
adjusted for the small sample size.  This also means that 18% (or 21%) of the variance is due 
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to other factors.  However, explaining 82% of the variance is a fairly good fit.  Examining the 
output further, the model produces a B value of 0.686.  This means that for each increase of 1 
in the overall campaign composite, it is likely that the legal change will improve by 0.686.  
Again, this is a statistically significant result.  It can therefore be concluded, albeit tentatively, 
that there is a meaningful relationship between the characteristics of the hashtag campaign 
and the legal outcome.  Although it would have been desirable to look at the relationship 
while controlling for the WJP index, without a value for #women2drive this runs the risk of 
presenting false results.  At this stage, it will just be said that openness of a government may 
be a scope condition for success, but without full data it cannot be explored further.     
Of note, correlations were run between all component parts of both the dependent composite 
score and the independent composite score: 
Table 7.13: Correlations, composite scores 
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Persistence composite 
score 
Correlation coefficient 
(R) 
.869** .827* .639 .450 .578 
Significance (p-value) .005 .011 .088 .263 .134 
Engagement composite 
score 
Correlation coefficient 
(R) 
.647 .584 .601 .512 .191 
Significance (p-value) .083 .129 .115 .195 .651 
User composite score Correlation coefficient 
(R) 
.658 .619 .508 .329 .439 
Significance (p-value) .076 .101 .199 .426 .276 
Content composite score Correlation coefficient 
(R) 
.624 .588 .556 -.031 .705 
Significance (p-value) .098 .126 .152 .942 .051 
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These correlations show that, while some of the elements of the composite scores on their 
own hold statistical significance, the composites themselves (with the exception of 
persistence) do not have a strong relationship with legal outcomes.  This harkens back to the 
Rubik’s Cube finding in some of the legal analysis.  This may be interpreted as showing that 
it is the combination of the critical elements that lead to more successful outcomes, discussed 
more fully in Chapter 8. 
Conclusion 
 
Taking all of the foregoing analyses into account, the following summarises the statistically 
significant parameters.  It is important to keep in mind that these 11 parameters are out of a 
possible range of 513. 
Table 7.14: Summary of all significant relationships 
Parameter 
Controlling 
for p-value < 0.01 
Correlation 
coefficient 
(R) 
World justice project  Overall legal change 0.899 
Number of days with at least one 
Tweet Total days Overall legal change 0.949 
Number of days with at least five 
Tweets Total days Overall legal change  0.931 
Non-peak reply : Tweet ratio  Overall legal change 0.854 
Percent of international norms present  Overall legal change  0.926 
    
Reply : Tweet ratio  Legislative change 0.836 
Number of Tweets from non-
domestic users in the most 100 active 
users 
Total 
Tweets Legislative change 0.900 
    
Percent of the most 100 active users 
who clearly identify as domestic 
individuals   Law enforcement 0.852 
Weighted negativity mean in peak 
periods 
Total 
Tweets Law enforcement 0.927 
Percent of Tweets using first person 
pronouns  Law enforcement 0.842 
    
Percent of Tweets with a variable 
message present  UN dialogue -0.874 
 
 
In sum, the above parameters show that: 
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1. Open governments, active days, dialogue during ‘down’ times, and invocation of 
international norms with a consistent focus on women’s rights are all associated with 
overall positive legal change. 
2. Ongoing dialogue including foreign actors is associated with legislative changes 
3. ‘Ordinary’ domestic citizens vocalising their personal anger (negative sentiment and 
first-person pronouns) are associated with better outcomes in the courts 
4. Lack of consistent messaging and more volatile, reactive Tweets are associated with 
poorer outcomes evidenced in UN dialogue, mostly likely the expression of 
government backlash 
A set of ideal campaign characteristics and behaviours that are associated with different 
aspects of legal change can also begin to be seen.  Complete legal change is defined as 
spanning legislation, soft law, government discourse, implementation by authorities including 
the courts, and ultimately rule consistent behaviour (as evidenced by UN dialogue).  The 
empirical evidence in this study now shows that the campaigns showing the most legal 
change exhibit a high level of ongoing activity.  This does not simply mean the length of time 
that the hashtag is used, but rather the proportion of days with at least one, and ideally more 
than five, Tweets.  Interestingly, having days with more than 1,000 Tweets did not impact on 
the overall outcome.  This indicates that continued focus and support on the issue is more 
important than huge peaks of attention which taper off.  This was clearly seen in 
#women2drive, which did not have the height, length, or number of peaks seen in 
#niunamenos or #delhigangrape, but which did have a high number of days with more than 
five Tweets.  Conversely, although #stopstoning was the longest running campaign in the 
study, there were a large number of completely inactive days with no Twitter activity at all.     
In a related vein, campaigns which encourage dialogue through replies are also associated 
with more positive outcomes.  This is particularly true in time periods which do not include 
large spikes in Tweets or events which draw social media attention.  It is the ongoing 
dialogue and debate throughout the lifespan of the campaign which matters, not just sheer 
numbers of users Tweeting, Retweeting, or clicking like when the hashtag trends.  This is an 
interesting finding, as it is not a typical exhibition of public pressure which would 
traditionally be associated with positive change, and certainly as specified by the spiral 
model.  This shows that governments are perhaps more willing to respond when campaigners 
show higher levels of engagement, and, therefore personal investment and even risk. 
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Finally, the presence of international norms on women’s rights in the content of Tweets is 
associated with more positive overall change.  This may indicate a level of consistency, with 
messaging staying focussed on women’s rights.  The invocation of international norms shows 
a connection to external pressures.  It may be that, combined with domestic drivers, this 
indicates that the domestic campaign is being supported and buoyed by foreign actors.  This 
ties into the critique of the spiral model that emphasis needs to be shifted from the external to 
the internal.  This finding may indicate that external influence is still critical, but perhaps 
more so when invoked or used by domestic voices.  As seen earlier in this chapter, there is a 
significant relationship between the number of domestic drivers of the campaign (the most 
prolific users) and overall legal outcomes.  This, in the future, can be tested by exploring the 
combined effect of international norm usage with domestic users and activity.     
Disaggregating further, the data also shows particular aspects which are related to legislative 
changes, namely ongoing campaign dialogue and activity levels from non-domestic campaign 
drivers.  This indicates that governments may respond legislatively to a campaign which 
sparks some level of personal investment from participants.  This may be a type of ‘petition’ 
concept, where if enough people voice their opinion on a matter (through replying to Tweets 
in a campaign), the government will listen.  It may be that Twitter replies are more powerful 
than online petitions as the time, effort, and personal risk is greater when replying to a Tweet 
than electronically adding one’s name to a petition.  Personal risk is greater as the user is 
allowing their own opinion to be permanently memorialised in their online profile through 
the publication of the reply.  It also seems that this dialogue and debate needs to include a 
certain level of activity from non-domestic users, though in balance with domestic.  It is not 
the number of non-domestic users driving the campaign that matters, conversely it looks like 
a combination of a high number of domestic users with a high activity level of a smaller yet 
perhaps more dedicated group of non-domestic users is associated with higher levels of 
change. 
Next, and possibly one of the most striking findings in the data, are the parameters associated 
with better law enforcement.  The data seems to indicate that a high prevalence of first-person 
pronouns (‘I’, ‘we’, ‘our’), a high proportion of domestic individuals driving the campaign, 
and a high presence of negative sentiment combined see more positive implementation of 
change in law enforcement.  In plain language, this means that angry domestic citizens 
voicing their personal opinion can perhaps contribute to more justice.  Again, it is always 
important to reassert that this does not mean the judges are sitting at their PCs reading Tweets 
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and deciding how to proceed in any related cases, but that the characteristics of the campaign 
influence the media, on the ground activities, and the general feeling of ‘pressure’ exerted by 
social media.  In this area, it is the combination of factors which has produced what are such 
interesting results.  Perhaps any of these parameters on their own might not paint such a clear 
picture – domestic individuals, first person pronouns, or negative sentiment – yet when the 
elements are combined the results show a fascinating dynamic – angry citizens voicing their 
opinions.   
Finally, and discussed at length earlier in this chapter, is the role of messaging.  The data has 
also shown that campaigns which are less consistent and less focussed on women’s rights 
norms are more likely to lead to negative outcomes in UN dialogue.  UN dialogue has shown 
to be the site of the manifestation of government backlash, particularly in the Iranian 
campaigns.  It appears that campaigns which remain consistent and invoke, even to a small 
extent, international norms around women’s rights are more likely to lead to positive dialogue 
with the UN system.    
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Chapter 8 : Conclusions, Limitations, and Future Work 
 
Introduction 
 
This thesis has set out to answer the following research questions: 
1. Can international campaigns originating in and driven by Twitter contribute to 
domestic legal change in women’s rights? 
2. If so, which campaign behaviours are associated with change? 
This chapter will summarise the findings presented throughout the thesis to answer these 
questions.  In short, 
1. Yes, international Twitter-driven campaigns can contribute to domestic legal change; 
however the changes can be both positive and negative. 
2. Twitter-driven campaigns which are domestically-driven but with a high level of 
foreign interest, where users continue to Tweet regularly over the lifespan of the 
campaign, with evidence of dialogue and debate through the reply function, and 
which show consistent messaging drawing down from international women’s rights 
norms are associated with more positive legal outcomes.  
Campaign ‘groupings’ based on outcomes 
An initial important finding in this research was the general ‘grouping’ of campaigns by 
outcome.  Campaigns primarily fell into four different categories: negative outcomes 
(government backlash), status quo (no overall change), tactical concessions (legislative 
change but lacking institutionalisation), and possible success (some indication of overall 
positive legal change).  In the section below, broad conclusions are drawn about the different 
categories of potential outcomes.  It is worth noting that this aspect will be explored in 
greater statistical detail in future work with an ordinal logistic regression (discussed later in 
this chapter). 
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Backlash Campaigns: Lack of domestic drive 
 
At first, it may seem that the common characteristic of the backlash campaigns was simply 
the target country: Iran.  However, this assumption failed when tested further.  First and 
foremost, there were important differences in legal outcomes between the two Iranian 
campaigns themselves.  Although they both overall showed negative outcomes, the gradient 
and degree were different.  This indicates that something other than simply context in the 
target country was likely influencing outcomes.  Second, context variables across all of the 
campaigns in the study were collected specifically to ensure that the domestic situation could 
be tested as a control factor.  In this case, the context variables in Iran were not different from 
context variables in other target countries.  This indicates, at least to some extent, that it was 
not solely the target country of Iran that pre-determined the negative legal outcomes.  
Although this may have contributed to the outcomes, it was not a sufficient factor to explain 
all of the differences.  In particular, countries such as Afghanistan, Turkey, India, and Saudi 
Arabia had some similar domestic characteristics.  A wide variety of context variables were 
examined in order to ensure that it was not down to researcher choice.  Therefore, other 
factors are likely at play.  In other words, while the target country of course matters in a pre-
determined way, characteristics in the Twitter campaigns themselves can still influence the 
outcome, making it worse or better.   
Twitter behaviours across #stopstoning and #letwomengotostadium were fairly similar but 
did show enough differences to tentatively draw some conclusions.  Both showed high levels 
of non-domestic involvement with low levels of domestic drive, lacked in persistence and 
engagement, and lacked focus on international women’s rights norms.  It is likely the 
combination of these factors led to the similarly regressive outcomes.  However, these 
behaviours were seen to a greater degree in #stopstoning, particularly the lack of domestic 
drive and voice in the campaign.  Government responses were driven primarily from hard-
line religious conservatives expressing deep hostility towards ‘Western’ propaganda.  It also 
appeared that law enforcement was used as a tool to re-assert domestic power and 
prominence over foreign influences, adversely affecting the lives of women and girls in Iran.  
These campaigns are a stark example of the potential dangers of social media driven 
advocacy campaigns and the very real potential for destructive domestic government 
backlash and regression. 
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Status Quo Campaigns: Lack of persistence 
Three campaigns showed no meaningful overall legal change - #farkhunda, #sendeanlat, and 
#mydressmychoice.  These campaigns may have shown some aspects of positive legal 
change, but there were equally some negative aspects.  As seen with the backlash campaigns, 
the geo-political and socio-economic contexts of the countries in this category (Afghanistan, 
Turkey, and Kenya) were markedly different and thus not likely a sufficient explanation for 
the similarity in lack of legal changes.  This group also underscores how a country can have a 
relatively decent baseline status for women and girls but not necessarily be primed for 
meaningful change.     
The three campaigns did, however, show remarkable similarities in aspects of the Twitter 
behaviours.  All three campaigns showed almost identical timelines with very large peaks 
around the initial viral spread of the campaign but little to no activity in the long term.  All 
three spark incidents – Farkhunda’s mob murder video, the death of Ozgeclan, and the video 
of the public stripping in Nairobi – gathered enormous social media attention in the 
immediate aftermath.  Peaks of more than 10,000 Tweets per day were recorded for 
#sendeanlat and #mydressmychoice.  This attention however quickly waned with these three 
campaigns showing very little activity after the reaction to the initial incident faded.  It is 
likely that this initial interest contributed to some of the positive legal outcomes, but that the 
lack of sustained interest left the campaigns ‘unfinished’ with no pressure to implement 
meaningful long-term change.   
Campaigns which showed higher levels of success showed far more persistence in the level 
of Twitter activity.  This tends to indicate that campaigns which show high levels of attention 
that quickly fade are less likely to lead to long term change.  Although this may seem like an 
obvious conclusion, this study now provides empirical evidence for what many may have 
assumed.  
 
Tactical Concession Campaigns: Extremely high level of domestic attention in close 
proximity to election 
These two campaigns - #delhigangrape and #niunamenos - appeared to gather extreme levels 
of attention around the spark incident, primarily from domestic users, and began fairly close 
to elections and potential regime change.  They were the largest campaigns in the study at 
Chapter 8: Conclusions, Limitations, and Future Work 
236 
 
144,867 and 410,858 Tweets respectively.  Legal outcomes showed quick, reactionary 
tactical concessions but lacked in moving to institutionalisation or rule-consistent behaviour.  
In Argentina, the campaign peaked approximately six months before national elections, 
where a change in ruling party occurred.  #delhigangrape peaked 16 months before a national 
election that also saw a change in the ruling party.  Candidates in #niunamenos openly used 
the hashtag in their campaigning.1   
The evidence suggests that these kind of high-profile online campaigns could push 
governments to implement changes in reaction to the mass negative public attention fuelled 
by social media rather than a more considered long term decision.  Both campaigns scored 
high in legislative change but low in law enforcement, showing the wide gap between 
legislating and implementation and enforcement.  Although they were only two campaigns in 
this study which showed this relationship, it was quite strong and striking how similar the two 
were.   The mass online public attention brought about the large scale ‘naming and shaming’ 
and reputational damage on which the spiral model relies.  However, as some critics of the 
spiral model warned, this push to tactical concessions did not then translate to long-term 
efforts to move towards institutionalisation and rule-consistent behaviour.  This can be seen 
as a missed opportunity, perhaps even closing doors to future advocacy work.  If the 
government feels that they have ‘done their bit’ and addressed the campaign’s concerns 
through the legislative changes, then continuing advocacy work could be hampered or 
seriously impeded.  
 
Potential Success Campaign: Consistency across all Twitter behaviours 
 
One campaign in the study appeared to be associated with a tentative level of success.  
#women2drive, after years of online advocacy and campaigning, finally saw the Saudi 
government change the law to allow women to drive in July 2018.2  This campaign did not 
 
1
 ‘Four Months From #NiUnaMenos: Has Anything Changed?’ 
<http://www.argentinaindependent.com/currentaffairs/four-months-from-niunamenos-has-anything-changed/> 
accessed 21 November 2017. 
2
 Center for Security Policy, ‘Saudi Women Gain the Right to Drive’ 
<https://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/2017/10/02/saudi-women-gain-the-right-to-drive/> accessed 11 
February 2018; ‘Saudi Arabia Agrees to Let Women Drive’ The New York Times 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-women-drive.html> accessed 11 
February 2018; ‘Saudi Arabia to Allow Women to Drive’ Al Jazeera 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/saudi-arabia-women-drive-170926190857109.html> accessed 11 
February 2018; Human Rights Watch, ‘Saudi Arabia: As Women’s Driving Ban Ends, Provide Parity’ (27 
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see perfect outcomes, however, as there are still issues around institutionalisation and law 
enforcement, particularly around the lack of change to guardianship laws.3  It also remains to 
be seen how the change in the law will be fully implemented and how, in practice, it will 
impact the rights and freedoms of women.  However, at this stage, the campaign does show 
association with success and therefore it is worthwhile to identify the key characteristics that 
may have led to the positive legal changes.   
On the whole, this campaign showed a much higher level of consistency across all variables 
than the other campaigns.  It did not show the fluctuation in peaks and troughs of the other 
campaigns, and the framing, messaging, and norms tended to be both internationally driven 
and consistent.  The driving users remained domestic but there was a well-executed strategic 
choice to ensure that the campaign tapped into foreign pressure, particularly from the US.4  
This pattern of consistency, domestic drive, and strategically selected foreign pressure 
appears to have combined to see positive legal outcomes.  Although international actors were 
potentially central to its success, this was not at the expense of the domestic drive.  The 
critiques of the spiral model were less prominent, if present at all, in this campaign.  
 
Ideal Twitter Campaign Behaviours 
 
This research has provided strong evidence of Twitter campaign behaviours that are 
associated with positive legal outcomes.  The ultimate aim from a research impact 
perspective is to understand if there is a ‘package’ of elements which, taken together, are 
more likely to contribute to positive legal change for women and girls.  The ‘package’ of 
elements for an ideal Twitter-driven campaign are variables which are drawn from the 
critiques of the spiral model and overcome some of the potential risks of campaigning in 
social media.  Keeping in mind the overall scores of legal change, not a single campaign 
 
September 2017) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/27/saudi-arabia-womens-driving-ban-ends-provide-
parity> accessed 12 February 2018. 
3
 Jane Kinninmont, ‘End of Saudi Women Driving Ban Reflects Deep Changes in Society’ BBC News (27 
September 2017) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-41412022> accessed 11 February 2018; See 
also ‘“Battle of the Sexes”: Saudi Men React to Women Driving’ (Dhaka Tribune, 4 October 2017) 
<http://www.dhakatribune.com/world/middle-east/2017/10/04/saudi-men-react-women-driving/> accessed 13 
February 2018. 
4
 ‘What Overturning the Ban on Female Drivers Means for Saudi Arabia and the World’ 
<https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/what-overturning-the-ban-on-female-drivers-means-for-saudi-
arabia-and-the-world> accessed 13 February 2018. 
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reached a level of perfect change, nor even breaching the 4th bracket.5  The best campaign 
came in at 3.88 out of a possible 5.00.  While this still shows a range of outcomes, it is not 
necessarily a range of successful outcomes, but rather a range of less than successful 
outcomes.  Even #women2drive with its success in lifting the ban on women driving has 
major issues around the continuation of guardianship laws and the role of the courts in 
arbitrary arrests and detentions of women activists.   
The ideal Twitter-driven campaign would be steered in the direction presented below, as 
much as possible (with full understanding that the organic, user-driven and non-neutral nature 
of social media in and of itself presents challenges): 
Variable Indicators of success 
Context Target governments which are considered more ‘open’6 
It may also be advisable to avoid social media campaigning in close 
proximity to elections and potential regime change 
Size of 
campaign 
Try to ensure that the campaign is big enough to exert pressure (as in 
#women2drive), but not so big that it pushes the government into 
reactionary change (as evidenced by #delhigangrape and #niunamenos) 
Persistence Avoid days with no Tweets and aim for at least five Tweets per day.  
Equally, huge peak days with more than 10,000 Tweets may have a 
‘tactical concession’ effect.  Slow and steady campaigns are linked to 
more positive outcomes, as seen in #women2drive. 
Users While the campaign needs to be domestically driven, there also needs to 
be a baseline level of foreign pressure, most importantly to move 
towards legislative change.  Falling below the baseline of foreign 
pressure, particularly without domestic groundswell, runs the risk of 
government backlash, as seen in #stopstoning.  The voice of ordinary 
domestic individuals (as opposed to activists or organisations) is 
important.  
 
5
 5.00 being perfect change and 1.00 representing total regression. 
6 Campaigns which target more ‘open’ governments may be associated with better outcomes, however this 
finding must be qualified as it does not include Saudi Arabia.  Given that #women2drive saw the highest level 
of legal success, but that it might be speculated that Saudi Arabia would not have scored positively in the world 
justice project scores, the overall relationship may very well change with the inclusion of Saudi.   
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Engagement Higher levels of replies, particularly in non-peak periods, show higher 
levels of engagement and are linked to more positive outcomes.  
Retweeting indicates consistent messaging and has some positive 
effects.  Campaigns with high proportions of likes without the dialogue 
of replies or the consistent messaging of retweets are likely to lead to 
less positive outcomes.   
Sentiment Negative sentiment is linked with more positive outcomes in law 
enforcement.  
Framing, 
Messaging, and 
Norms 
The consistent presence of international norms around women’s rights is 
one of the most important elements of a campaign’s success.  Volatile 
and changing framing and messaging is linked with government 
backlash, particularly evident in dialogue with UN treaty bodies. 
 
Deconstructing the Research Map 
 
Here, it is also important to engage in ‘deconstructing’ the construction of the research map 
which framed this study.  It was an important exercise to identify theoretically grounded 
variables, linking the critiques of the spiral model through the media effects literature with 
the risks of campaigning in Twitter.  However, the findings of the study have born much 
more complex, nuanced, and intertwined results that cannot be distilled down into a two 
column, binary table.  Equally, the overly simplistic unidirectionality of the spiral model does 
not map onto a social media driven campaign, where the directionality of both influence and 
change is multi-lateral.       
The first area of critique which this research explored was the lack of focus on domestic 
actors the overemphasis on Western approaches.  This was linked to the evidence showing 
that social media continues to be dominated by users from Global North and is technically 
built on platforms which are non-neutral and tend to favour the global elite.  This risk was 
initially matched to the drivers of the campaigns (users).  The concern that traditional 
advocacy campaigns may place too much emphasis on the role of transnational/Western 
actors is potentially greater in a social media environment where campaigns are more likely 
to be dominated and/or driven by elite and foreign/Western participants.  The overemphasis 
on foreign actors is problematic in that it reinforces the potential victim/saviour dichotomy, 
can result in a campaign which exports Western ideals without due regard to domestic culture 
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and values, and could result in silencing an already silenced domestic population.  The last 
concern is of particular prominence with the functionality of social media which brings some 
Tweets to the fore and sends others to the background.  The cycle created by this algorithm 
and filter-bubble driven effect can dramatically influence the direction of influence of a 
campaign.   
This research, taking cognisance of the above, has shown that the presence (or lack thereof) 
of domestic drive is actually intimately linked to nearly all the spiral model critiques: the 
potential for government backlash, the lack of knowledge of the domestic context, and a lack 
of incentive for the domestic government to change (a predominantly foreign driven 
campaign may not have any power over a domestic government as compared to voting 
domestic citizens).  The outcomes therefore clearly break the binary relationship and instead 
show that a campaign which is dominated and driven by foreign users cuts across many of the 
critiques and risks, not just one. 
The organic and chaotic nature of social media was initially linked to potential government 
backlash.  The lack of complete organisational or hierarchical ability to temper, control, or 
strategically frame messaging was hypothesised to open the door to government backlash, 
another of the main critiques of the spiral model.  The relationship, however, is also much 
more complex than the initial binary mapping.  There is a correlation between the variability 
of messaging and government backlash as evidenced primarily in state dialogue with UN 
Treaty Bodies.  Government backlash was also, as seen above, the result of an overly foreign 
driven campaign.  Equally, messaging was seen to significantly affect long term 
implementation in law enforcement, and is also influenced by the non-neutrality of Twitter.  
Again, the relationships between the theory, risks, and variables of interest are more inter-
related and interdependent than the initial research map. 
The short attention span of social media campaigns was identified as problematic in that these 
Twitter driven campaigns generally do not last long enough to properly affect long-term, 
meaningful, institutionalised change – even more so than traditional campaigns.  This was 
matched with persistence variables which measured the number of Tweets per day over the 
lifespan of the campaigns.  Yet again, while the binary relationship did hold true when tested, 
the lack of long-term progression through to rule consistent behaviour or meaningful 
implementation was also correlated to the level of engagement of the users and the variability 
of messaging.  While persistence was most closely linked to a lack of long-term progression 
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as hypothesised, it was also important to note that domestic drive and user engagement were 
also important in moving target countries through to full implementation and 
institutionalisation.   
The final piece of the research map to ‘deconstruct’ is the hypothesised binary relationship 
between lack of incentives and engagement metrics.   The incentives for domestic 
government to change were heavily influenced by the level of domestic drive in the campaign 
as measured by users, not just how they engaged with the campaign.  While engagement 
levels did appear to affect governments’ willingness to change, as seen above this campaign 
behaviour also affected institutionalisation.  It was not possible to clearly link engagement to 
incentives, but the results do show that higher levels of user engagement are associated with 
more positive change.  It thus follows that the engagement is a proxy for how much 
individuals are willing to risk for a campaign, and higher risk presents more intense 
incentives for governments to change.  Campaigns which had high levels of ‘likes’ seemed to 
embody the scholarly positions on ‘slactivism’, which do not carry the levels of risks or 
incentives needed to exert enough pressure on the domestic state.  Beyond this relationship, 
the study also found that Retweets became aligned with consistent messaging, rather than an 
indicator of participant engagement.  This was a notable finding which was not within the 
scope of the initial hypotheses.    
Therefore, this study has shown that the critiques of the spiral model and the risks of social 
media campaigning rooted in media effect theories are intertwined, multidirectional, and 
cyclical.  All of the variables stemming from the theoretical framework cut across the binary 
and unidirectional lines to contribute to outcomes, both positive and negative.  With this 
deconstructed approach, this chapter now turns to the major findings of the study, cognisant 
of the interconnected and interdependent relationships between the spiral model critiques, the 
social media risks, the variables of interest, and the analytical findings.   
Major findings 
1. The first important finding was that campaigns are associated with a variety of legal 
outcomes.  When the research began, it was a very real possibility that all campaigns 
would have had similar legal outcomes, neither positive nor negative.  The overall 
legal change scores ranged from 2.00 to 3.88 (out of 1.00 – 5.00) and individual legal 
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component7 scores ranged from 1.00 through to 5.00.  The poorest results were seen 
in #stopstoning, where not only did the law change in what activists see as a negative 
way, but reliable reports women being stoned to death increased after the campaign 
began.8   The most positive campaign was #women2drive.  Although the driving ban 
has now been lifted in Saudi, it is not a perfect 5.00 score as guardianship laws remain 
and the government still uses law enforcement to control activists.9  The fact that the 
campaigns do differ in legal outcomes is an important initial finding in and of itself, 
as it allowed the research to then delve into discovering the differences in the online 
campaigns themselves that may be associated with or correlated to different 
outcomes.  
2. There is threshold above which non-domestic participation becomes ‘pressure’ and is 
associated with positive change, but below which can be seen as ‘foreign meddling’ 
potentially opening the door to government backlash.  Although with such a small 
sample size it is not yet possible to determine where that threshold sits, there are 
indications that some level of foreign pressure is needed to change the legal 
landscape.  For example, #women2drive strategically chose to use Twitter in order to 
draw down from Western influences.10  Additionally, the presence of non-domestic 
users in the 100 most active in a campaign is strongly correlated with positive 
legislative change.  Conversely, #stopstoning showed a high percentage of foreign 
influence but low raw numbers.  This appeared to open the door to government 
backlash and negative outcomes.11  Therefore, it can be deduced from these sets of 
results that, if foreign pressure is a strategic campaign choice, it needs to reach a level 
to actually ‘work’; falling below that level runs the risk of being viewed more as 
foreign meddling and less as an exertion of foreign pressure.  This finding tends to, in 
some ways, support many of the critiques of the spiral model, in that a blanket 
 
7
 Legislative change, Institutionalisation, Law enforcement, and UN dialogue 
8
 Reilly Dempsey Willis, ‘Can Twitter Change the Iranian Legal Landscape for Women?’ (2018) 0 International 
Review of Law, Computers & Technology 1. 
9
 Human Rights Watch, ‘Saudi Arabia: Repression Overshadows Women’s Reforms’ (2018) 
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/01/18/saudi-arabia-repression-overshadows-womens-reforms> accessed 15 
February 2018; Human Rights Watch (n 2). 
10
 Jason Burke, ‘Saudi Arabia Women Test Driving Ban’ The Guardian (17 June 2011) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/17/saudi-arabia-women-drivers-protest> accessed 14 February 
2018; ‘What Overturning the Ban on Female Drivers Means for Saudi Arabia and the World’ (n 4). 
11
 Maryam Hosseinkhah, ‘The Execution of Women in Iranian Criminal Law: An Examination of the Impact of 
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reliance on international actors is not sufficient to move a government to meaningful 
human rights change.  It indicates that foreign pressure may work, but in a way that 
starts from the domestic actors first, as was the strategy in #women2drive.  
3. Drawing down from international norms on women’s rights appears to be linked with 
more successful campaigns.  Using a deductive list of 93 key words and phrases 
derived from international women’s rights norms, those online campaigns which 
showed higher use of these words were more successful.  The relationship was one of 
the strongest in the study, with a correlation coefficient of 0.926 and an R2 of 0.858.  
This tends to indicate that campaigns which are more closely linked to internationally 
accepted norms will likely see a greater chance of positive legal change.  This also 
indicates a level of consistency, showing that the messaging in Tweets stays ‘on 
target’ rather than organically and chaotically veering off course or shifting focus over 
the course of the campaign.  The variable of interest was the percent of international 
norms which were present.  Less important was the relationship between the number 
of Tweets and the number of times international norms were mentioned.  It was the 
level of reflection of international women’s rights norms which was statistically 
significant.  In other words, the number of times the international norms were used 
was not as important as the number of international norms that were used, even if only 
a small number of times.  For example, only 23% of the international norms were 
present in #stopstoning, while 87% of the international norms were mentioned at least 
once in #women2drive (in translated Tweets overcoming any language concerns).  
This finding is one that will be explored in greater detail in future work.   
4. Looking at specific legal outcome components (i.e. legislative change, 
institutionalisation, law enforcement, and UN dialogue as opposed to overall legal 
change) additional findings emerged.  Positive legislative change is associated with a 
higher ratio of replies to Tweets across both peak and non-peak periods and more 
Tweets from non-domestic campaign drivers (controlling for total Tweets in the 
campaign).  This indicates that dialogue (more replies) which includes non-domestic 
users may lead to positive legislative changes.  This is the one finding in the study 
that upholds the role of international actors in the spiral model.  Here, the data 
suggests that pressure from foreign influences (including organisations, media outlets, 
and individuals) could help a campaign in achieving positive legislative change.  It is 
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important to note that this finding does not apply to overall legal change, 
institutionalisation, law enforcement, or UN dialogue.  The only statistically 
significant relationship is with legislative change.  Here, foreign pressure may be 
needed to force a government to change the law, but it is not relevant when it comes 
to implementing or institutionalising the changes.  The power then shifts (or needs to 
shift) to the domestic voice. 
5. ‘Ordinary’ domestic citizens vocalising their personal anger (negative sentiment) are 
associated with improvements in law enforcement.  Three separate variables show 
statistical significance for law enforcement – the percent of the 100 most active users 
who self-identify as domestic individuals (not activists or campaigners), the weighted 
negativity average during peak times, and the percent of Tweets with a first-person 
pronoun.  Future work will need to explore how these variables interact with each 
other to paint a more accurate picture of these behaviours.  However, at this initial 
stage, this seems to indicate that campaigns with your average, ordinary, domestic 
user, using first person pronouns and negative language, particularly during peak 
times, are associated with positive changes in law enforcement.  Law enforcement 
covers the entire process from front line police involvement to charging to 
prosecution and appeals.  It seems that campaigns which spark vocal anger in citizens 
may see better police and judicial enforcement of laws which are intended to protect 
women and girls.  One researcher has suggested that this may be due to a wider 
phenomenon where the most difficult issues facing the courts are often ‘worked out’ 
in the public sphere.12  In these Twitter-driven campaigns, the opinion of the public is 
voiced on social media.  The more present the domestic voice is, the more likely the 
campaign is to see meaningful change in law enforcement.  From the legal research 
undertaken in this study, law enforcement seemed to be one of the more challenging 
aspects of human rights change.  It therefore makes sense that a strong domestic voice 
would be necessary to overcome this challenge.     
6. Lack of consistent framing and messaging and more volatile, reactive Tweets are 
associated with poorer outcomes evidenced in dialogue with UN treaty bodies, mostly 
 
12
 Response from Tola Amodu to Reilly Dempsey Willis, ‘Evaluating the Impact of Global Twitter Campaigns 
on Domestic Women’s Rights: Statistical Modelling and Analysis’ (Research Seminar, University of East 
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the expression of government backlash.  Here, the higher the percentage of Tweets 
with variable, organically emerging messaging the less likely there is to be positive 
change evidenced in state dialogue with UN human rights mechanisms.  This was the 
only negative-direction strong statistically significant relationship.  Here, variable, 
organically emerging framing and messaging are used a large number of times, but 
only across one or two time periods.  This can be interpreted as campaign volatility, 
inconsistent framing, and changing messaging.  This volatility is then statistically 
associated with poorer outcomes in the UN dialogue.  As the UN dialogue tended to 
be the site of most of the manifestations of government backlash, as seen clearly in 
#stopstoning and #delhigangrape, this may indicate that more volatile campaigns, 
with less tempered messaging or inconsistent foci, are more likely to open the door to 
government backlash.   
 
Impact 
 
Campaigners will use social media.  Individuals will use hashtags.  This is without a doubt.  
There is nothing in this study that suggests that advocates should stop using social media 
tools.  What this study shows is that there are ways in which activists could perhaps harness 
the power of social media in more meaningful ways, at least when it comes to international 
campaigns targeting domestic legal change for women’s rights.  The study also cannot 
compare the legal outcomes given the existence of the Twitter-driven campaigns to what 
might have happened if the campaigns had not started to trend or go ‘viral.’  It could be that 
the situation would be worse for women and girls if the issues had never made it into the 
public social media conscious at all.  What this study aims to provide is, rather, empirical 
insight into how campaigns can be more successful once they ‘take off’, and how, to 
whatever extent possible, to avoid the Twitter behaviours which bring an element of risk for 
women and girls.  Although social media is by definition chaotic, unpredictable, and elite 
user-driven, there may be ways for activists and even organisations to creatively work to 
avoid these risky social media behaviours that potentially lead to negative outcomes.  Some 
of these efforts may already be underway, but it is hoped that the level of comparative, 
empirical evidence in this thesis will help to inform advocacy in the future.  Conversely, if it 
proves impossible to ‘control’ Twitter-driven campaigns, then this research may serve as a 
caution to activists over the potential for unanticipated and unintentional negative outcomes.    
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Limitations 
 
This study had a number of limitations, many of which were explored in detail in Chapter 2 
and the methodological Appendices of this thesis.13  For the most part, these limitations and 
challenges in the end provided opportunities for strengthening the research design.  As this 
study in some ways can act as a pilot, limitations have been clearly identified for future work.   
The first, and perhaps greatest, limitation of this study was the ‘sample size’ – the number of 
campaigns.  Ideally, the full set of ten originally selected campaigns would have been 
included in the final list.  Having eight campaigns certainly allowed for in depth exploration 
with many different parameters, but the small number limits the applicability of the findings 
outside of the study.  As mentioned earlier in this thesis, the statistical findings are reliable 
and significant within the confines of the study, but the small ‘n’ means the findings cannot, 
at this stage, be extrapolated further to other campaigns.  There are ways to work with the 
data set, statistically, to build predictive models.  This will be explored in future work.   
A second limitation to the study was the availability of Twitter data.  Adjustments have been 
made where necessary to overcome this challenge, however it was a significant hurdle in the 
study design.14  For some campaigns, upwards of 10,000 tweets per day were accessible while 
for others it ranged from 4,000-8,000.  While this is still a healthy sample size for those days, 
due to the nature of Twitter data collection it may mean that for a small number of days for 
some of the campaigns Tweets from a specific time of day may not be included in the study.  
Wherever possible, steps have been taken to overcome this challenge, primarily through 
double collection via ‘Top’ and ‘Latest’ tabs so as to avoid skipping a particular time of day.  
However this was not possible for every day in every campaign as outlined in Chapter 2.  
This could have impacted some of the analysis, although it is likely to not be significant.       
Thirdly, the non-neutrality of social media and Twitter in particular is a major challenge to 
any social media research.  The algorithms which reward selected Tweets and users with 
visibility are difficult to overcome, and most certainly influence the trajectory and 
directionality of the online campaigns.  The filter bubbles which are meant to create a more 
personalised user experience may have a homogenising effect and have undoubtedly moulded 
 
13
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the behaviours of the online campaigns from within.  Messaging, framing, and Retweeting in 
particularly will be intimately affected by the platforms’ functionality.  Remaining cognisant 
of this non-neutrality is critical when reading and interpreting these results.   
The next limitation to explore in these concluding thoughts is the challenge of quantifying 
qualitative data.  Again, steps have been taken to maintain a level of consistency, objectivity, 
and reliability.  With any study of this nature, the researcher has to make choices and 
decisions on how to quantify the data and how to determine what is legal change.  Wherever 
possible, subjectivity has been removed through careful process documentation and 
consistent application of set rules.  It may be that a different researcher with different 
experiences and understandings may have come to different quantified conclusions.  
Consistency was used as the main tool to address this challenge, attempting to ensure that the 
results were comparable.15 
The final limitation to note is the ever-present correlation – causation debate.  At no point in 
this thesis is it argued that the campaign behaviours can be pinpointed as direct causes of 
change.  With this kind of data, it is just not possible to prove causation.16  Nor is it prudent to 
try.  What this study is designed to do is show correlations, associations, trends, 
directionalities, and patterns.  Timelines, discourse, reports, and other pieces of information 
certainly provide enough evidence to make connections between the Twitter-driven 
campaigns and the legal outcomes.  There is ample evidence throughout this thesis which 
allows for these correlations to be made.17  However, it is not possible to begin to make any 
claims about causation. 
 
Future Work 
 
This research has much potential for future work, and in many ways became almost a pilot 
study where research design challenges and issues were identified and worked out.  The next 
 
15
 ibid. 
16
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and the court opinions in #delhigangrape,  politicians using the hashtag to announce legislative changes in 
Argentina, and ample evidence from activists themselves of the role of Twitter in the success of #women2drive.  
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campaigns and the legal outcomes.   
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step the researcher would like to take is in the area of statistical analysis.  The data is ripe for 
in depth, potentially experimental, statistical work.  In particular, the researcher would like to 
explore the following work: 
1. Multivariate regression analysis – at this stage, only a simple, condensed single linear 
regression was performed. While this produced insightful and meaningful results, it 
would be extremely useful to build a much more sensitive multivariate regression to 
better understand the interaction and interplay between variables of interest.   
2. Data transformation – there are some ways in which the data can be transformed to 
address the small sample size to still allow for predictive models to be created.  This 
is one area where the thesis’s impact could be greatly increased, providing a more 
predictive model to apply to other Twitter campaigns. 
3. Ordinal logistic regression – this statistical test looks at groups of outcomes.  In this 
test, the regression would not scale for each individual campaign outcomes, but rather 
for ‘backsliding’, ‘status quo’, ‘tactical concessions’, and ‘possible success’.  This test 
would allow exploration of statistically significant variables and combinations of 
variables to predict group outcomes, not individual campaigns.   
4. Finally, interesting work is being done using principle component analysis on Twitter 
data.18  This statistical analysis looks at a large number of parameters (~ 500 in this 
study) and identifies the most significant components for explaining variance in 
outcomes.  In this way, rather than looking at individual variables or selecting 
variables in a regression model, all variables can be taken into account and distilled 
down to the most statistically significant.  This is used to clearly identify trends in the 
data and understand variability.   
Future work could also extend the research into new and emerging campaigns and other 
forms of social media.  This work quantifying and modelling the legal impact of social media 
campaigns has much potential for growth, development, and extension. 
A fascinating finding in this research which bears further study and development is the 
presence of the counter-narrative.  This was a surprising but overwhelming observation when 
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collecting Tweets.  Further, in depth, and theory-based work is needed to understand the role 
and impact of counter-narratives in these campaigns.19   
Finally, there is scope for a pure theory study, specifically focussing on the utility and 
applicability of the spiral model in a social media environment.  This would fall more under 
the scholarship which ‘tests’ the spiral model in different countries, with different rights, and 
under different conditions.  A pure spiral model study would take this thesis and proffer 
specific changes and modifications to improve its use when applied to social media 
campaigning.  This thesis has focussed more on using the spiral model and its critiques to 
inform methodological choices and research questions.  Further work could take a much more 
theory-based approach.   
Conclusions 
 
In short, this research has shown that international Twitter-driven campaigns can and do have 
relationship with domestic legal changes, specifically looking at rights for women and girls.  
This is a unique, important, and substantial contribution to academia across areas of 
international human rights, women’s rights, activism, international relations, and social 
media.  Studying nearly one million Tweets across eight campaigns targeting seven countries 
in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and South America brings an important comparative 
approach to the study of Twitter and social media campaigning.  The approach to 
understanding norms from both an inductive and deductive process is novel, innovative, and 
important in the development of understanding of norms and norm institutionalisation.   
From an impact perspective, this research provides crucial evidence-based insight for 
activists and campaigners around the world working to improve the lives of women and girls.  
The data shows that there are certain campaign behaviours which are associated with more 
positive legal outcomes and characteristics which are linked to negative legal outcomes.  
Campaigns which are domestically-driven, with a high level of foreign-attention, showing 
persistence, engagement, and consistency are more likely to lead to positive legal outcomes.  
Conversely, campaigns which lack in domestic drive, can be seen as ‘foreign meddling’, and 
fail to achieve persistence, engagement, or consistency are more likely to lead to negative 
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outcomes.  It is hoped that these findings can help campaigning in the future to, at the very 
least, attempt to avoid social media campaigns that could lead to more harm than good.     
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Parameter Description 
LEGAL  
Legislation  Quantified on a scale from : 
1. The law has actively been changed in a way that is against 
the goals of the campaign 
2. The law has been somewhat modified in a way that is 
against the goal of the campaign 
3. The law has not changed at all 
4. The law has been somewhat modified in a way that aligns 
with the campaign 
5. The law has been changed to completely align with the 
goals of the campaign 
Institutionalisation Quantified on a scale from: 
1. Government discourse is actively hostile against the goals 
of the campaign, there is no evidence of soft law and/or 
budget allocations to support the goals of the campaign. 
2. Government discourse does not align with the goals of the 
campaign, little evidence of soft law and/or budget 
allocations to support the goals of the campaign 
3. No change in government discourse, soft law, and/or budget 
allocations 
4. Some evidence of positive change in government discourse, 
soft law, and/or budget allocation to align with the goals of 
the campaign 
5. Complete positive change evidenced in government 
discourse, soft law, and/or budget allocations to align with 
the goals of the campaign 
Law enforcement Quantified on a scale from: 
1. Evidence of arbitrary arrest and detention of activists, 
and/or significant lack of police or judicial enforcement or 
prosecution of perpetrators 
2. Some evidence of arbitrary arrest and detention of activists, 
and/or some lack of police of judicial enforcement or 
prosecution of perpetrators 
3. No evidence of any change, positive or negative, in the 
involvement from the police or judiciary in any way 
4. Some positive changes in law enforcement, in particular 
prosecution of perpetrators 
5. High levels of positive changes in law enforcement, in 
particular prosecution of perpetrators 
UN dialogue Quantified on a scale from: 
1. The language used by the government in their submissions 
is highly defensive, denies issues, or does not reflect the 
expected language of the norm 
2. The language used by the government in their submissions 
is somewhat defensive, denies issues, or does not reflect the 
expected language of the norm 
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3. The language and dialogue shows no perceptible change 
4. The language used by the government gives some 
indication of institutionalisation but is lacking in some way 
5. The language and content submitted by the government is 
indicative of full institutionalisation of the norm in question 
CONTEXT  
Months to regime 
change 
The number of months between the start of the campaign and the 
next election, collected from publically available information 
Gender Dev Index Gender Development Index, as developed from UNDP.  This score 
looks at health, knowledge, and living standards. 
Index is from the year the campaign started. 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/gender-development-index-gdi 
Gender Inequality 
Index 
The Gender Inequality Index is also UNDP and measures 
differences between men and women in reproductive health, 
empowerment, and economic status.   
Index is from the year the campaign started. 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/gender-inequality-index-gii 
Gender Gap Index The Gender Gap Index is produced by the World Economic Forum 
and uses parameters in Economic Participation and Opportunity, 
Educational Attainment, Health and Survival, and Political 
Empowerment. 
Index is from the year when the campaign started. 
https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-gender-gap-report-
2018 
Political terror scale 
AI 
The Political Terror Scale measures political terror as violations of 
basic human rights to the physical integrity of the person by agents 
of the state within the territorial boundaries of the state in question.  
The AI indicator uses information taken from Amnesty 
International’s State of the Worlds’ Human Rights Report.   
The score is taken from the year the campaign started. 
http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/ 
Political terror scale 
US State 
The Political Terror Scale measures political terror as violations of 
basic human rights to the physical integrity of the person by agents 
of the state within the territorial boundaries of the state in question.  
The US State indicator uses the information published by the 
United States Department of State in the Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices. 
The score is taken from the year the campaign started. 
http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/ 
Gender equality 
CSOs 
The number of national ‘civil society organisations’ registered with 
ECOSOC that specify work on MDG3 (gender equality). 
Due to availability of data, this variable is from 2017. 
https://esango.un.org/civilsociety/login.do 
Treaty status The number of International Human Rights Treaties, including 
Optional Protocols, that have been signed and ratified by the 
country before 2017.  The score is out of 13. 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CoreInstrum
ents.aspx 
CEDAW Status Specifically measures engagement with the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and its 
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two Optional Protocols.  Score is from 2017 and is out of a possible 
3. 
CEDAW 
Decl/Reserv 
The total number of declarations and reservations to CEDAW as of 
2017.  The higher the number the less engaged the country is with 
CEDAW. 
Relative capacity 
score, agri 
The relative capacity score is somewhat experimental and aims to 
measure government performance from a social science 
perspective.  The relative capacity score ‘agri’ approximates the 
ability of governments to appropriate portions of the national 
output to advance public goals, using mining and agriculture.  The 
score for all countries is from 2013 due to the availability of data. 
http://transresearchconsortium.com/  
Relative capacity 
score, work 
The relative capacity score is somewhat experimental and aims to 
measure government performance from a social science 
perspective.  The relative capacity score ‘work’ gauges the capacity 
of governments to mobilize populations under their control using 
activity rate of population.  The score for all countries is from 2013 
due to the availability of data. 
http://transresearchconsortium.com/ 
World justice project 
Open Government 
Index 
The Open Government Index aims to measure how ‘open’ a 
government is based on the perspective of the people.  It measures 
across publicized laws and government data, the right to 
information, civic participation, and complaint mechanisms. 
The data available is from 2015. 
https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/wjp-rule-law-index/wjp-
open-government-index-2015 
Internet access Captured by the World Bank, this measures the number of 
individuals using the internet as a percentage of the total 
population.  This measure is from the year the campaign started.   
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.ZS 
DESCRIPTIVE  
Number of tweets Number of Tweets in each campaign (duplicates removed) 
Number non-English The number of Tweets which are not in English. 
% non-English The percent of Tweets which are not in English. 
PERSISTENCE  
Total days of 
campaign 
The total number of days between when the campaign started and 
the 30th November, 2016. 
SD of tweets per day The standard deviation of number of Tweets per day. 
Mean tweets per day The average number of Tweets per day. 
Median tweets per 
day 
The median number of Tweets per day. 
Mode tweets per day The mode of Tweets per day. 
Days >  2 SDs The number of days where the number of Tweets was greater than 
two standard deviations. 
Days > 3 SDs The number of days where the number of Tweets was greater than 
three standard deviations. 
Highest peak The number of Tweets on the most active day of the campaign (i.e. 
the highest number of Tweets per day). 
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Number of peaks The number of days where the number of Tweets was above a 
specified threshold (specific to each campaign). 
Number of peak 
periods 
The number of ‘groups’ of peak days. 
Tweets in peak 
periods 
The total number of Tweets in all peak days added together. 
% tweets in peak The percent of Tweets which occurred on peak days. 
No. peak events 
(timelines) 
The number of events during the campaign which resulted in peaks 
in the number of Tweets.   
Longest peak period 
(merged) 
The number of days in the longest peak period. 
Tweets in non-peak 
periods 
The total number of Tweets from non-peak days. 
SD of peaks The standard deviation of the number of Tweets on peak days. 
Mean of peaks The average number of Tweets on peak days. 
Median of peaks The median of Tweets on peak days. 
Days tweets > 0 The number of days in the campaign with at least 1 Tweet. 
Days tweets >5 The number of days with more than five Tweets. 
Days tweets >100 The number of days with more than 100 Tweets. 
Days tweets >1,000 The number of days with more than 1,000 Tweets. 
% Days at 0 The percent of days with no Tweets. 
% Days > 5 The percent of days with more than 5 Tweets. 
Days above 75% 
peak 
The number of days where the number of Tweets is more than 75% 
of the highest peak.   
Days above 50% 
peak 
The number of days where the number of Tweets is more than 50% 
of the highest peak.   
Days above 25% 
peak 
The number of days where the number of Tweets is more than 25% 
of the highest peak.   
Days above average The number of days where the number of Tweets is more than the 
overall average.  
 
ENGAGEMENT 
METRICS 
 
Reply: tweet ratio The total number of replies divided by the total number of Tweets.  
Replies are the total number of times a collected Tweet was replied 
to.  For example, a score of 0.5 would mean that, on average, one 
out of every two Tweets was replied to. 
Retweet: tweet ratio The total number of Retweets divided by the total number of 
Tweets.  Retweets are the total number of times a collected Tweet 
was Retweeted.  For example, a score of 2 would mean that, on 
average, each Tweet was Retweeted twice.   
Like: tweet ratio The total number of Likes divided by the total number of Tweets.  
Likes are the total number of times a collected Tweet was Liked.  
For example, a score of 6 would mean that, on average, each Tweet 
was liked six times.   
Total replies The total number of times Tweets were replied to across the entire 
campaign.   
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Total retweets The total number of times Tweets were Retweeted across the entire 
campaign.   
Total likes The total number of times Tweets were liked across the entire 
campaign.   
Reply alpha Derived from the log(n) log(s) plot, the alpha shows the gradient of 
the relationship between the parameter and the occurrences.  The 
lower the number (alphas are negative), the steeper the gradient.  
For example, a reply alpha of -2.827 indicates that while there may 
have been a small number of Tweets which were replied to many 
times, there were not many Tweets that were replied to a small 
number of times.  A steep gradient would indicate that there is not 
much replying activity in the campaign.  Conversely, a higher alpha 
of -1.45 would indicate that there are lots of Tweet which spark a 
few replies.   
Retweet alpha See above but for Retweets. 
Likes alpha See above but for likes. 
RT-Like Diff The difference between the Retweet and Like alphas. 
Reply A The ‘A’ is taken from the log(n) log(s) plot represents the Y axis 
intercept and indicates the highest number of times a single Tweet 
was replied to.  For example, a reply A of 758 would mean that 1 
Tweet in the campaign was replied to 758 times.   
Retweet A See above but for Retweets. 
Like A See above but for likes. 
Non-peak Reply: 
tweet ratio 
All of the above but specific to non-peak periods. 
Non-peak Retweet: 
tweet ratio 
Non-peak Like: 
tweet ratio 
Non-peak Total 
replies 
Non-peak Total 
retweets 
Non-peak Total likes 
Non-peak Reply 
alpha 
Non-peak Retweet 
alpha 
Non-peak Likes 
alpha 
Non-peak RT-Like 
Diff 
Non-peak Reply A 
Non-peak Retweet A 
Non-peak Like A 
Peak Reply: tweet 
ratio 
All of the above but specific to peak periods. 
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Peak Retweet: tweet 
ratio 
Peak Like: tweet 
ratio 
Peak Total replies 
Peak Total retweets 
Peak Total likes 
Peak Reply alpha 
Peak Retweet alpha 
Peak Likes alpha 
Peak RT-Like Diff 
Peak Reply A 
Peak Retweet A 
Peak Like A  
 
USERS  
Unique users The total number of unique users who Tweeted using the hashtag 
during the time period measured. 
Unique users in peak 
periods 
The total number of unique users who Tweeted using the hashtag 
during peak days only. 
Unique users in non-
peak periods 
The total number of unique users who Tweeted using the hashtag 
during non-peak days only. 
Unique users diff 
peak non-peak 
The difference between the number of unique users in peak times to 
the number of users in non-peak times.   
Average tweets per 
user 
The total number of Tweets divided by the total number of unique 
users, as a proxy for how many times users Tweets, on average. 
Average tweets per 
user peak 
Above but for peak days only. 
Average tweets per 
user non-peak 
Above but for non-peak days only.  
Tweet per user diff 
peak non-peak 
The difference between the average number of Tweets per user 
during peak times and non-peak times.   This is used to gauge if 
there is a difference in activity levels per user between peak and 
non-peak times.   
% tweets from Top 
100 users 
The percent of total Tweets which came from the 100 most active 
users. 
top 100 dom users Of the 100 most active users, the number who clearly identify as 
living in the target country. 
top 100 non-dom 
users 
Of the 100 most active users, the number who do not clearly 
identify as living in the target country. 
Top 100 dom reach The total number of followers of the 100 most active users who 
clearly identify as living in the target country. 
Top 100 non-dom 
reach 
The total number of followers of the 100 most active users who do 
not clearly identify as living in the target country. 
Top 100 dom 
campaign tweets 
The total number of Tweets in the campaign sent by the 100 most 
active users who clearly identify as living in the target country. 
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Top 100 non-dom 
campaign tweets 
The total number of Tweets in the campaign sent by the 100 most 
active users who do not clearly identify as living in the target 
country. 
Top 100 % dom Of the 100 most active users, the percent who clearly identify as 
living in the target country. 
Top 100 % non-dom Of the 100 most active users, the percent who clearly identify as 
living in the target country. 
Top 100 % dom 
reach 
Of the total number of followers of the 100 most active users, the 
percent which follow users who clearly identify as being from the 
target country. 
Top 100 % non-dom 
reach 
Of the total number of followers of the 100 most active users, the 
percent which follow users who do not clearly identify as being 
from the target country. 
Top 100 % dom 
campaign tweets 
Of the campaign Tweets sent from the 100 most active users, the 
percent which are from users who clearly identify as living in the 
target country. 
Top 100 % non-dom 
campaign tweets 
Of the campaign Tweets sent from the 100 most active users, the 
percent which are from users who do not clearly identify as living 
in the target country. 
No. Tweets from 
most active user 
The number of campaign Tweets sent from the single most active 
user. 
Top 100 less active Of the 100 most active users, those who have sent less than 5,000 
Tweets ever. 
Top 100 active Of the 100 most active users, those who have sent more than 5,000 
Tweets ever. 
Top 100 very active Of the 100 most active users, those who have sent more than 
10,000 Tweets ever. 
Top 100 highly 
active 
Of the 100 most active users, those who have sent more than 
100,000 Tweets ever. 
Top 100 small reach Of the 100 most active users, those who have less than 1,000 
followers. 
Top 100 average 
reach 
Of the 100 most active users, those who have more than 1,000 
followers. 
Top 100 good reach Of the 100 most active users, those who have more than 10,000 
followers. 
Top 100 large reach Of the 100 most active users, those who have more than 100,000 
followers. 
Top 100 extreme 
reach 
Of the 100 most active users, those who have more than 1,000,000 
followers. 
Top 100 dom less 
active 
As above, disaggregated by those who clearly identify as living in 
the target country and those who do not. 
Top 100 dom active 
Top 100 dom very 
active 
Top 100 dom highly 
active 
Top 100 dom small 
reach 
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Top 100 dom 
average reach 
Top 100 dom good 
reach 
Top 100 dom large 
reach 
Top 100 dom 
extreme reach 
Top 100 non-dom 
less active 
Top 100 non-dom 
active 
Top 100 non-dom 
very active 
Top 100 non-dom 
highly active 
Top 100 non-dom 
small reach 
Top 100 non-dom 
average reach 
Top 100 non-dom 
good reach 
Top 100 non-dom 
large reach 
Top 100 non-dom 
extreme reach 
Top 100 users: 
academic 
Of the 100 most active users, those who self-identify as an 
academic in their profile. 
Top 100 users: 
activists 
Of the 100 most active users, those who self-identify as an activist 
in their profile; the word ‘activist’ must be present in the profile. 
Top 100 users: artist Of the 100 most active users, those who self-identify as an artist in 
their profile. 
Top 100 users: 
business 
Of the 100 most active users, those accounts which are from a 
business, not an individual.   
Top 100 users: 
counter narrative 
Of the 100 most active users, those who represent the counter-
narrative.   
Top 100 users: 
entertainment 
industry 
Of the 100 most active users, those accounts that represent the 
entertainment industry, i.e. nightclubs. 
Top 100 users: 
government 
Of the 100 most active users, those accounts that are officially 
representing some part of government. 
Top 100 users: 
independent 
Journalist 
Of the 100 most active users, those who self-identify as a journalist 
but are not officially affiliated with a news outlet in their profile. 
Top 100 users: 
individual 
Of the 100 most active users, those who self-identify as an 
individual but not one of the other categories in their profile, i.e. ‘I 
like long walks on beach, coffee, and dogs.’ 
Top 100 users: 
journalist 
Of the 100 most active users, those who self-identify as a journalist 
and are officially affiliated with a news outlet in their profile. 
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Top 100 users: news 
agencies 
Of the 100 most active users, those accounts which report news. 
Top 100 users: 
organisation 
Of the 100 most active users, those accounts that are from NGOs or 
CSOs. 
Top 100 users: 
politician 
Of the 100 most active users, those accounts which are officially 
from a politician.   
Top 100 users: 
selling 
Of the 100 most active users, those accounts which are using the 
hashtag to promote sales. 
Top 100 users: 
trending topic 
accounts 
Of the 100 most active users, those accounts that Tweet out 
trending topics. 
Top 100 users: 
writer 
Of the 100 most active users, those who self-identify as a writer in 
their profile. 
Top 100 users: 
unknown 
Of the 100 most active users, those who’s profiles are blank. 
Campaign tweets 
from Top 100 
academics 
Of the campaign Tweets sent from the 100 most active users, those 
which are sent by [insert profile category] 
Campaign tweets 
from Top 100 
activists 
Campaign tweets 
from Top 100 artists 
Campaign tweets 
from Top 100  
business 
Campaign tweets 
from Top 100  
counter narrative 
Campaign tweets 
from Top 100 
entertainment 
industry 
Campaign tweets 
from Top 100 
government 
Campaign tweets 
from Top 100 
indepdendent 
journalist 
Campaign tweets 
from Top 100 
individuals 
Campaign tweets 
from Top 100 
journalist 
Campaign tweets 
from Top 100 news 
agency 
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Campaign tweets 
from Top 100 
organisation 
Campaign tweets 
from Top 100 
politician 
Campaign tweets 
from Top 100 selling 
Campaign tweets 
from Top 100 
trendtopic 
Campaign tweets 
from Top 100 writer 
Campaign tweets 
from Top 100 
unknown 
Reach Top 100 
users: academic 
Of the total number of followers from the 100 most active users, 
those that follow [insert profile category] 
Reach Top 100 
users: activists 
Reach Top 100 
users: artist 
Reach Top 100 
users: business 
Reach Top 100 
users: counter 
narrative 
Reach Top 100 
users: entertainment 
industry 
Reach Top 100 
users: government 
Reach Top 100 
users: independent 
Journalist 
Reach Top 100 
users: individual 
Reach Top 100 
users: journalist 
Reach Top 100 
users: news agencies 
Reach Top 100 
users: organisation 
Reach Top 100 
users: politician 
Reach Top 100 
users: selling 
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Reach Top 100 
users: trending topic 
accounts 
Reach Top 100 
users: writer 
Reach Top 100 
users: unknown 
Top 100 users: dom 
academic 
Of the 100 most active users, [insert profile category] who clearly 
identify as living in the target country. 
Top 100 users: dom 
activists 
Top 100 users: dom 
artist 
Top 100 users: dom 
business 
Top 100 users: dom 
counter narrative 
Top 100 users: dom 
entertainment 
industry 
Top 100 users: dom 
government 
Top 100 users: dom 
independent 
Journalist 
Top 100 users: dom 
individual 
Top 100 users: dom 
journalist 
Top 100 users: dom 
news agencies 
Top 100 users: dom 
organisation 
Top 100 users: dom 
politician 
Top 100 users: dom 
selling 
Top 100 users: dom 
trending topic 
accounts 
Top 100 users: dom 
writer 
Top 100 users: dom 
unknown 
Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: dom 
academics 
Of the campaign Tweets sent from the 100 most active users, those 
Tweets sent from [insert profile category] who clearly identify as 
living in the target country. 
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Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: dom 
activists 
Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: dom 
artists 
Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: dom 
business 
Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: dom 
counter narrative 
Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: dom 
entertainment 
industry 
Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: 
domgovernment 
Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: dom 
indepdendent 
journalist 
Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: dom 
individuals 
Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: dom 
journalist 
Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: dom 
news agency 
Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: dom 
organisation 
Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: dom 
politician 
Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: dom 
selling 
Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: dom 
trendtopic 
Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: dom 
writer 
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Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: dom 
unknown 
Reach Top 100 
users: dom academic 
Of the total number of followers of the 100 most active users, those 
that follow [insert profile category] who clearly identify as living in 
target country. Reach Top 100 
users: dom activists 
Reach Top 100 
users: dom artist 
Reach Top 100 
users: dom business 
Reach Top 100 
users: dom counter 
narrative 
Reach Top 100 
users: dom 
entertainment 
industry 
Reach Top 100 
users: dom 
government 
Reach Top 100 
users: dom 
independent 
Journalist 
Reach Top 100 
users: dom 
individual 
Reach Top 100 
users: dom journalist 
Reach Top 100 
users: dom news 
agencies 
Reach Top 100 
users: dom 
organisation 
Reach Top 100 
users: dom politician 
Reach Top 100 
users: dom selling 
Reach Top 100 
users: dom trending 
topic accounts 
Reach Top 100 
users: dom writer 
Reach Top 100 
users: dom unknown 
Top 100 users: non-
dom academic 
Of the 100 most active users, [insert profile category] who do not 
clearly identify as living in the target country. 
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Top 100 users: non-
dom activists 
Top 100 users: non-
dom artist 
Top 100 users: non-
dom business 
Top 100 users: non-
dom counter 
narrative 
Top 100 users: non-
dom entertainment 
industry 
Top 100 users: non-
dom government 
Top 100 users: non-
dom independent 
Journalist 
Top 100 users: non-
dom individual 
Top 100 users: non-
dom journalist 
Top 100 users: non-
dom news agencies 
Top 100 users: non-
dom organisation 
Top 100 users: non-
dom politician 
Top 100 users: non-
dom selling 
Top 100 users: non-
dom trending topic 
accounts 
Top 100 users: non-
dom writer 
Top 100 users: non-
dom unknown 
Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: non-
dom academics 
Of the campaign Tweets sent from the 100 most active users, those 
Tweets sent from [insert profile category] who do not clearly 
identify as living in the target country. 
Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: non-
dom activists 
Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: non-
dom artists 
Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: non-
dom business 
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Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: non-
dom counter 
narrative 
Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: non-
dom entertainment 
industry 
Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: non-
dom government 
Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: non-
dom indepdendent 
journalist 
Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: non-
dom individuals 
Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: non-
dom journalist 
Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: non-
dom news agency 
Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: non-
dom organisation 
Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: non-
dom politician 
Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: non-
dom selling 
Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: non-
dom trendtopic 
Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: non-
dom writer 
Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: non-
dom unknown 
Reach Top 100 
users: non-dom 
academic 
Of the total number of followers of the 100 most active users, those 
that follow [insert profile category] who do not clearly identify as 
living in target country. 
Reach Top 100 
users: non-dom 
activists 
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Reach Top 100 
users: non-dom artist 
Reach Top 100 
users: non-dom 
business 
Reach Top 100 
users: non-dom 
counter narrative 
Reach Top 100 
users: non-dom 
entertainment 
industry 
Reach Top 100 
users: non-dom 
government 
Reach Top 100 
users: non-dom 
independent 
Journalist 
Reach Top 100 
users: non-dom 
individual 
Reach Top 100 
users: non-dom 
journalist 
Reach Top 100 
users: non-dom news 
agencies 
Reach Top 100 
users: non-dom 
organisation 
Reach Top 100 
users: non-dom 
politician 
Reach Top 100 
users: non-dom 
selling 
Reach Top 100 
users: non-dom 
trending topic 
accounts 
Reach Top 100 
users: non-dom 
writer 
Reach Top 100 
users: non-dom 
unknown 
% Top 100 users: 
academic 
As above as a percent. 
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% Top 100 users: 
activists 
% Top 100 users: 
artist 
% Top 100 users: 
business 
% Top 100 users: 
counter narrative 
% Top 100 users: 
entertainment 
industry 
% Top 100 users: 
government 
% Top 100 users: 
independent 
Journalist 
% Top 100 users: 
individual 
% Top 100 users: 
journalist 
% Top 100 users: 
news agencies 
% Top 100 users: 
organisation 
% Top 100 users: 
politician 
% Top 100 users: 
selling 
% Top 100 users: 
trending topic 
accounts 
% Top 100 users: 
writer 
% Top 100 users: 
unknown 
% Campaign tweets 
from Top 100 
academics 
% Campaign tweets 
from Top 100 
activists 
% Campaign tweets 
from Top 100 artists 
% Campaign tweets 
from Top 100  
business 
% Campaign tweets 
from Top 100  
counter narrative 
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% Campaign tweets 
from Top 100 
entertainment 
industry 
% Campaign tweets 
from Top 100 
government 
% Campaign tweets 
from Top 100 
indepdendent 
journalist 
% Campaign tweets 
from Top 100 
individuals 
% Campaign tweets 
from Top 100 
journalist 
% Campaign tweets 
from Top 100 news 
agency 
% Campaign tweets 
from Top 100 
organisation 
% Campaign tweets 
from Top 100 
politician 
% Campaign tweets 
from Top 100 selling 
% Campaign tweets 
from Top 100 
trendtopic 
% Campaign tweets 
from Top 100 writer 
% Campaign tweets 
from Top 100 
unknown 
% Reach Top 100 
users: academic 
% Reach Top 100 
users: activists 
% Reach Top 100 
users: artist 
% Reach Top 100 
users: business 
%Reach Top 100 
users: counter 
narrative 
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% Reach Top 100 
users: entertainment 
industry 
% Reach Top 100 
users: government 
% Reach Top 100 
users: independent 
Journalist 
% Reach Top 100 
users: individual 
% Reach Top 100 
users: journalist 
% Reach Top 100 
users: news agencies 
% Reach Top 100 
users: organisation 
% Reach Top 100 
users: politician 
% Reach Top 100 
users: selling 
% Reach Top 100 
users: trending topic 
accounts 
% Reach Top 100 
users: writer 
% Reach Top 100 
users: unknown 
% Top 100 users: 
dom academic 
% Top 100 users: 
dom activists 
% Top 100 users: 
dom artist 
% Top 100 users: 
dom business 
% Top 100 users: 
dom counter 
narrative 
% Top 100 users: 
dom entertainment 
industry 
% Top 100 users: 
dom government 
% Top 100 users: 
dom independent 
Journalist 
% Top 100 users: 
dom individual 
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% Top 100 users: 
dom journalist 
% Top 100 users: 
dom news agencies 
% Top 100 users: 
dom organisation 
% Top 100 users: 
dom politician 
% Top 100 users: 
dom selling 
% Top 100 users: 
dom trending topic 
accounts 
% Top 100 users: 
dom writer 
% Top 100 users: 
dom unknown 
% Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: dom 
academics 
% Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: dom 
activists 
% Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: dom 
artists 
% Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: dom 
business 
% Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: dom 
counter narrative 
% Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: dom 
entertainment 
industry 
% Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: 
domgovernment 
% Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: dom 
indepdendent 
journalist 
% Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: dom 
individuals 
% Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: dom 
journalist 
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% Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: dom 
news agency 
% Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: dom 
organisation 
% Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: dom 
politician 
% Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: dom 
selling 
% Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: dom 
trendtopic 
% Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: dom 
writer 
% Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: dom 
unknown 
% Reach Top 100 
users: dom academic 
% Reach Top 100 
users: dom activists 
% Reach Top 100 
users: dom artist 
% Reach Top 100 
users: dom business 
% Reach Top 100 
users: dom counter 
narrative 
% Reach Top 100 
users: dom 
entertainment 
industry 
% Reach Top 100 
users: dom 
government 
% Reach Top 100 
users: dom 
independent 
Journalist 
% Reach Top 100 
users: dom 
individual 
% Reach Top 100 
users: dom journalist 
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% Reach Top 100 
users: dom news 
agencies 
% Reach Top 100 
users: dom 
organisation 
% Reach Top 100 
users: dom politician 
% Reach Top 100 
users: dom selling 
% Reach Top 100 
users: dom trending 
topic accounts 
% Reach Top 100 
users: dom writer 
% Reach Top 100 
users: dom unknown 
% Top 100 users: 
non-dom academic 
% Top 100 users: 
non-dom activists 
% Top 100 users: 
non-dom artist 
% Top 100 users: 
non-dom business 
% Top 100 users: 
non-dom counter 
narrative 
% Top 100 users: 
non-dom 
entertainment 
industry 
% Top 100 users: 
non-dom 
government 
% Top 100 users: 
non-dom 
independent 
Journalist 
% Top 100 users: 
non-dom individual 
% Top 100 users: 
non-dom journalist 
% Top 100 users: 
non-dom news 
agencies 
% Top 100 users: 
non-dom 
organisation 
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% Top 100 users: 
non-dom politician 
% Top 100 users: 
non-dom selling 
% Top 100 users: 
non-dom trending % 
Topic accounts 
% Top 100 users: 
non-dom writer 
% Top 100 users: 
non-dom unknown 
% Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: non-
dom academics 
% Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: non-
dom activists 
% Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: non-
dom artists 
% Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: non-
dom business 
% Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: non-
dom counter 
narrative 
% Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: non-
dom entertainment 
industry 
% Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: non-
dom government 
% Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: non-
dom indepdendent 
journalist 
% Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: non-
dom individuals 
% Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: non-
dom journalist 
% Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: non-
dom news agency 
Appendix 1: Full list of parameters with definitions 
316 
 
% Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: non-
dom organisation 
% Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: non-
dom politician 
% Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: non-
dom selling 
% Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: non-
dom trendtopic 
% Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: non-
dom writer 
% Campaign tweets 
from Top 100: non-
dom unknown 
% Reach Top 100 
users: non-dom 
academic 
% Reach Top 100 
users: non-dom 
activists 
% Reach Top 100 
users: non-dom artist 
% Reach Top 100 
users: non-dom 
business 
% Reach Top 100 
users: non-dom 
counter narrative 
% Reach Top 100 
users: non-dom 
entertainment 
industry 
% Reach Top 100 
users: non-dom 
government 
% Reach Top 100 
users: non-dom 
independent 
Journalist 
% Reach Top 100 
users: non-dom 
individual 
% Reach Top 100 
users: non-dom 
journalist 
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% Reach Top 100 
users: non-dom news 
agencies 
% Reach Top 100 
users: non-dom 
organisation 
% Reach Top 100 
users: non-dom 
politician 
% Reach Top 100 
users: non-dom 
selling 
% Reach Top 100 
users: non-dom 
trending topic 
accounts 
% Reach Top 100 
users: non-dom 
writer 
% Reach Top 100 
users: non-dom 
unknown 
Activity/Reach (log) 
c 
The relationship between followers and activity levels of the 100 
most active users. 
Activity/Reach (log) 
b 
CONTENT  
Total words The total number of unique words in all of the Tweets analysed in 
each campaign. 
Words : Tweets ratio The total number of unique words divided by the total number of 
Tweets. 
Total hashtags The total number of unique hashtags used in all of the Tweets 
analysed in each campaign. 
Most used word 
length 
The most commonly used word length. 
Most used tweet 
length 
The most common Tweet length (characters). 
Total words non-
peak 
As above, disaggregated across peak and non-peak days. 
Total hashtags non-
peak 
Most used word 
length non-peak 
Most used tweet 
length non-peak 
Total words peak 
Total hashtags in 
peaks 
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Most used word 
length peak 
Most used tweet 
length peak 
Positivity Mean From the sentiment analysis, the average positivity score (per day). 
Negativity Mean From the sentiment analysis, the average negativity score (per day). 
Polarity1 Mean  From the sentiment analysis, the average polarity score (per day). 
Subjectivity2 Mean From the sentiment analysis, the average subjectivity score (per 
day). 
Weighted positivity 
mean 
From the sentiment analysis, the average positivity score weighted 
by the number of Tweets per day. 
Weighted negativity 
mean 
From the sentiment analysis, the average negativity score weighted 
by the number of Tweets per day. 
Weighted polarity 
mean 
From the sentiment analysis, the average polarity score weighted 
by the number of Tweets per day. 
Weighted 
subjectivity mean 
From the sentiment analysis, the average subjectivity score 
weighted by the number of Tweets per day. 
Non-peak Positivity 
Mean 
As above, disaggregated across peak and non-peak periods. 
Non-peak Negativity 
Mean 
Non-peak Polarity 
Mean  
Non-peak 
Subjectivity Mean 
Non-peak Weighted 
positivity mean 
Non-peak Weighted 
negativity mean 
Non-peak Weighted 
polarity mean 
Non-peak Weighted 
subjectivity mean 
Peak Positivity Mean 
Peak Negativity 
Mean 
Peak Polarity Mean  
Peak Subjectivity 
Mean 
Peak Weighted 
positivity mean 
Peak Weighted 
negativity mean 
Peak Weighted 
polarity mean 
 
1 Polarity compares positive and negative scores. 
2 Subjectivity looks at objectivity and subjectivity. 
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Peak Weighted 
subjectivity mean 
Peak to non-peak 
difference Positivity 
Mean 
The difference between peak and non-peak sentiment metrics. 
Peak to non-peak 
difference Negativity 
Mean 
Peak to non-peak 
difference Polarity 
Mean  
Peak to non-peak 
difference 
Subjectivity Mean 
Peak to non-peak 
difference Weighted 
positivity mean 
Peak to non-peak 
difference Weighted 
negativity mean 
Peak to non-peak 
difference Weighted 
polarity mean 
Peak to non-peak 
difference Weighted 
subjectivity mean 
Highest positivity 
score (>= 10 Tweets) 
The highest positivity score from days with at least 10 Tweets. 
Highest negativity 
score (>=10 Tweets) 
The highest negativity (the most negative) score from days with at 
least 10 Tweets. 
Highest polarity 
score (>=10 Tweets) 
The highest polarity score from days with at least 10 Tweets. 
Highest subjectivity 
score (>=10 Tweets) 
The highest subjectivity score from days with at least 10 Tweets. 
Highest weighted 
positivity score (>= 
10 Tweets) 
The highest weighted positivity score from days with at least 10 
Tweets. 
Highest weighted 
negativity score (>= 
10 Tweets) 
The highest weighted negativity score from days with at least 10 
Tweets. 
Highest weighted 
polarity score (>= 10 
Tweets) 
The highest weighted polarity score from days with at least 10 
Tweets. 
Highest weighted 
subjectivity score 
(>= 10 Tweets) 
The highest weighted subjectivity score from days with at least 10 
Tweets. 
Lowest positivity 
score (>= 10 Tweets) 
The lowest positivity score from days with at least 10 Tweets. 
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Lowest negativity 
score (>= 10 Tweets) 
The lowest negativity (least negative) score from days with at least 
10 Tweets. 
Lowest polarity 
score (>= 10 Tweets) 
The lowest polarity score from days with at least 10 Tweets. 
Lowest subjectivity 
score (>= 10 Tweets) 
The lowest subjectivity score from days with at least 10 Tweets. 
Lowest weighted 
positivity score (>= 
10 Tweets) 
The lowest weighted positivity score from days with at least 10 
Tweets. 
Lowest weighted 
negativity score (>= 
10 Tweets) 
The lowest weighted negativity (least negative) score from days 
with at least 10 Tweets. 
Lowest weighted 
polarity score (>= 10 
Tweets) 
The lowest weighted polarity score from days with at least 10 
Tweets. 
Lowest weighted 
subjectivity score 
(>= 10 Tweets) 
The lowest weighted subjectivity score from days with at least 10 
Tweets. 
Highest to lowest 
difference positivity 
(>= 10 Tweets) 
The difference between the most positive and the least positive 
scores from days with at least 10 days.   
Highest to lowest 
difference negativity 
(>= 10 Tweets) 
The difference between the most negative and the least negative 
scores from days with at least 10 days.   
Highest to lowest 
difference polarity 
(>= 10 Tweets) 
The difference between the most polar and the least polar scores 
from days with at least 10 days.   
Highest to lowest 
difference 
subjectivity (>= 10 
Tweets) 
The difference between the most subjective and the least subjective 
scores from days with at least 10 days.   
Highest to lowest 
difference weighted 
positivity (>= 10 
Tweets) 
The difference between the most positive and the least positive 
scores, weighted, from days with at least 10 days.   
Highest to lowest 
difference weighted 
negativity (>= 10 
Tweets) 
The difference between the most negative and the least negative 
scores, weighted, from days with at least 10 days.   
Highest to lowest 
difference weighted 
polarity (>= 10 
Tweets) 
The difference between the most polar and the least polar scores, 
weighted, from days with at least 10 days.   
Highest to lowest 
difference weighted 
subjectivity (>= 10 
Tweets) 
The difference between the most subjective and the least subjective 
scores, weighted, from days with at least 10 days.   
Tweets - Weighted 
positive slope 
The gradient of the relationship between the number of Tweets and 
the weighted positivity scores. 
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% 1st person The number of instances of a first person pronoun divided by the 
total number of Tweets. 
% 2nd person The number of instances of a second person pronoun divided by the 
total number of Tweets. 
% 3rd person female The number of instances of a third person female pronoun divided 
by the total number of Tweets. 
% 3rd person male The number of instances of a third person female pronoun divided 
by the total number of Tweets. 
% 3rd person plural The number of instances of a third person plural pronoun divided 
by the total number of Tweets. 
% top 100 cons The percent of the 100 most commonly used words that are used 
consistently across three or more epochs.   
% tweets with cons The total number of times an organic but consistent word is used 
divided by the total number of Tweets. 
% cons norms legal The percent of consistently used words that are of a legal nature. 
highest cons norm The number of times the most often used consistent (three or more 
epochs) word is used.   
no. cons norms in 
majority of epochs 
The number of consistent words which occur in a majority of 
epochs. 
% top 100 org The percent of the 100 most often words which do not appear in 
three or more epochs.   
% tweets with org 
norm 
The total number of times an often used but not consistent word is 
used divided by the total number of Tweets. 
highest org norm From the 100 most often used words, the number of times the most 
used non-consistent word was used. 
ratio cons:org norms Of the 100 most often used words, the number of consistently used 
words divided by the number of inconsistent. 
% org norms legal The percentage of inconsistent but highly used words that are of a 
legal nature. 
% tweets with int'l 
norms 
The number of times an international norm is mentioned divided by 
the total number of Tweets.   
no. consistent norms 
= intl 
Of the 100 most often used words, those that appear in three or 
more epochs which are also international norms.   
no. organic norms = 
intl 
Of the 100 most often used words, those that appear in less than 
three epochs which are also international norms.   
% intl norms present The percentage of international norms which appear at all across 
the whole campaign. 
% top 100 = intl 
norms 
The percent of the 100 most used words which are also 
international norms. 
highest % intl norm The number of times an international norm appears divided by the 
total number of Tweets per epoch. 
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Campaign Issue Normative 
language 
Sources 
#stopstoning 
#women2drive 
Equality 
in law 
 
Non-
discrimination 
Discrimination 
Equality 
Inequality 
Women’s rights 
Human rights 
Repeal 
Impunity 
Decriminalisation 
Prejudice 
Fair trial 
Procedural 
fairness 
Abolish 
Dignity 
Privacy 
Fundamental 
freedoms 
Dignity 
Empower 
Obligations 
Gender 
Protect 
Prohibit 
discrimination 
Equal rights 
Gender bias 
Effective 
protection 
Gender equality 
Accountability 
Status of women 
Implementation 
Equal 
participation 
Guardianship 
Advancement of 
women 
Women’s 
movement 
UNHRC, ‘Adultery as a 
Criminal Offence Violates 
Women’s Human Rights’ (2012) 
‘Beijing Platform for Action’, 
Fourth World Conference on 
Women, (1995) 
‘Beijing +20’, UN Women 
(2015) 
UN Committee for the 
Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against 
Women, ‘General 
Recommendation No 21’ (1994)  
The Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women 
(1979) 
AWID, ‘The Devil is in the 
Detail’ (2016) 
UNHRC, Working Group 
Report on Discrimination in law 
and practice (2015) UN Doc 
A/HRC/29/40 
Commission on the Status of 
Women, Agreed Conclusions III 
from the 42nd Session (1998) UN 
Doc E/1998/27 
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Religious 
fundamentalisms 
Marginalization 
Structural 
inequality 
Oppressive 
practices 
Effective legal 
remedies 
Gender-sensitive 
Gender-
responsive 
#stopstoning Access 
to justice 
Redress 
Legal aid 
Access 
Gender-sensitive 
Status of women 
Implementation 
Effective access 
Obstacles 
Barriers 
Stigma 
Patriarchy 
Empowerment 
Redress 
Impartiality 
Impunity 
Prevention 
Investigation 
Prosecution 
Provision of 
remedies 
Safe 
Effective 
Accessible 
Women’s 
movement 
Marginalization 
‘Beijing Platform for Action’, 
Fourth World Conference on 
Women, (1995) 
‘Beijing +20’, UN Women 
(2015) 
UN Committee for the 
Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against 
Women, ‘General 
Recommendation No 33’ (2015)  
The Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women 
(1979) 
 
#letwomengotostadium 
#women2drive 
Gender 
equality 
Non-
discrimination 
Discrimination 
Equality 
Inequality 
Gender 
stereotyping 
Harmful 
stereotypes/ing 
Fundamental 
freedoms 
Women’s rights 
OHCHR, ‘Gender stereotyping 
as a human rights violation’ 
(2013) 
‘Beijing Platform for Action’, 
Fourth World Conference on 
Women, (1995) 
‘Beijing +20’, UN Women 
(2015) 
The Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women 
(1979) 
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Human rights 
Social 
Cultural 
Equal rights 
Patriarchy 
Dignity 
Empower 
Status of women 
Right to 
participate 
Advancement of 
women 
Women’s 
movement 
Marginalization 
Eliminate gender 
stereotypes 
OHCHR, ‘Gender stereotypes 
and stereotyping and women’s 
rights’ (2014) 
#farkhunda 
#sendeanlat 
#mydressmychoice 
#delhigangrape 
#niunamenos 
VAWG 
Sexual 
violence 
Violence against 
women 
Gender based 
violence 
Discrimination 
Harmful 
traditional 
practices 
Protection 
Victim/survivor 
Prevent 
Eliminate 
violence 
Protect 
Protect victims 
Prosecute 
Punish 
perpetrators 
Access to justice 
Effective 
implementation 
Status of women 
Exploitation 
Power 
Vulnerable 
Obligations 
Prejudice 
Adequate 
resources 
Enforce/ment 
Dignity 
Status of women 
Sexual violence 
‘Beijing Platform for Action’, 
Fourth World Conference on 
Women, (1995) 
‘Beijing +20’, UN Women 
(2015) 
The Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women 
(1979) 
The Declaration on the 
Elimination of Violence Against 
Women and Elimination of 
Violence Against Children in 
ASEAN. Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (2013) 
The Inter-American Convention 
on the Prevention, Punishment, 
and Eradication of Violence 
Against Women “Convention of 
Belem do Para” (1994) 
UN Committee for the 
Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against 
Women, ‘General 
Recommendation No 12’ (1989) 
UN Committee for the 
Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against 
Women, ‘General 
Recommendation No 19’ (1992)  
UN Committee for the 
Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against 
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Implementation 
Recourse 
Subordination 
Eradicate violence 
against women 
Effective 
remedies 
Prevent 
Prohibit 
Impunity 
Respect 
Rehabilitation 
Support services 
Protect women 
Data collection 
Statistical data 
Advancement of 
women 
Subordinate 
Free from 
violence 
Disaggregated 
data 
Conviction rates 
Integrity 
Dignity 
Equal protection 
Due diligence 
National plan of 
action 
Subjected to 
violence 
Re-victimization 
Root causes 
Root factors 
Women’s 
movement 
Bodily integrity 
Failure to protect 
women 
Accountability 
mechanisms 
Oppression 
Oppressive 
behaviour 
State 
responsibility 
Reparations 
Marginalization 
Hypermasculinity 
Women, ‘General 
Recommendation No 35’ (2017)  
Council of Europe Convention 
on preventing and combating 
violence against women and 
domestic violence  (Istanbul 
Convention) (2011) 
Declaration on the Elimination 
of Violence Against Women, 
General Assembly (1993) 
Equality Now, ‘The Global Rape 
Epidemic’ (2017)  
AWID, ‘The Devil is in the 
Detail’ (2016) 
UNHRC, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on violence against 
women, 
its causes and consequences, 
Rashida Manjoo (2014) UN Doc 
A/HRC/26/38  
SG, Adequacy of the 
international legal framework on 
violence against women (2017) 
UN doc A/72/134 
UNHRC, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on violence against 
women, 
its causes and consequences, 
Yakin Ertürk: Intersections 
between culture and violence 
against women (2007) UN Doc 
A/HRC/4/34 
UNHRC, Towards an effective 
implementation of international 
norms 
to end violence against women: 
Report of the Special Rapporteur 
on violence against women, its 
causes and consequences, Yakin 
Ertürk (2003) UN Doc 
E/CN.4/2004/66 (“Concern over 
these trends has caused further 
alarm with the more recent 
threats to reproductive health 
and rights as well as the failure 
of the Commission on the Status 
of Women at its forty-seventh 
session in 2003 to reach a 
consensus on the draft agreed 
conclusions on women’s human 
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Misogyny 
Root causes 
Documentation of 
complaints 
Mandatory 
reporting 
Bodily integrity 
Reparation 
Judicial 
stereotyping 
Perpetuating 
harmful 
stereotypes 
Helplines 
Crisis centers 
Support services 
Counselling 
services 
Strengthen legal 
mechanisms 
Economic support 
rights and the elimination of all 
forms of violence against women 
and girls, the first time in the 
history of the Commission that 
agreed conclusions have not 
been adopted on one of its 
themes. Similarly, the same year, 
the General Assembly had to 
abandon an omnibus resolution 
on violence against women, 
replacing it with a narrower text 
on domestic violence against 
women only”) 
UNHRC, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on violence 
against women, its causes and 
consequences, 
Rashida Manjoo (2013) UN Doc 
A/HRC/23/49  
Cusack, S. ‘Eliminating judicial 
stereotyping: Equal access to 
justice for women in gender-
based violence cases (2014) 
Womankind Worldwide, 
‘Tackling Violence against 
Women and Girls in the 
International Context ‘ (2013) 
Commission on the Status of 
Women Agreed Conclusions 
from the 51st Session (2007) UN 
Doc E/2007/27 
Commission on the Status of 
Women Agreed Conclusions 
from the 42nd Session (1998) UN 
Doc E/1998/27 
Commission on the Status of 
Women Agreed Conclusions 
from the 57th Session (2013) No 
UN Doc number available. 
 
#sendeanlat 
#niunamenos 
Femicide Femicide 
Feminicide 
Gender-based 
violence 
Violence against 
women 
Status of women 
Implementation 
Impunity 
Gender 
‘Beijing Platform for Action’, 
Fourth World Conference on 
Women, (1995) 
‘Beijing +20’, UN Women 
(2015) 
The Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women 
(1979) 
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Unequal power 
relations 
Crime of passion 
Diminished 
responsibility 
Access to justice 
Root causes 
Women’s 
movement 
Disempowerment 
Honour-related 
killing 
Structural 
discrimination 
Eradication of 
harmful 
stereotypes 
Good quality data 
Adequate 
enforcement 
Adequate 
provision of 
services 
Femicide watch 
Gender-related 
killing 
Gender-motivated 
killing 
Right to life 
Continuum of 
violence 
Observatory 
Intimate partner 
violence 
Intimate partner 
femicide 
Effective 
measures 
Statistics 
Domestic 
violence 
Disaggregated by 
sex 
Disaggregated by 
gender 
Battered women 
Protection orders 
Structural 
discrimination 
Misogyny 
Organisation of American 
States, Inter-American 
Commission of Women, 
Committee of Experts of the 
Follow-up Mechanism to the 
Belém do Pará Convention: 
Declaration on Femicide (2008) 
OHCHR, Gender-related killings 
of women and girls (2013) 
UNHRC, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on violence against 
women, its causes and 
consequences (2016) UN Doc 
A/71/398 
UNHRC, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on violence against 
women, its causes and 
consequences, Rashida Manjoo 
(2016) UN Doc A/HRC/20/16 
UN Women, Latin American 
Model Protocol for the 
investigation of gender-related 
killings of women 
(femicide/feminicide) (2014) 
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Misogynist killing 
Ownership over 
women 
Condemn 
violence against 
women 
Gender-based 
murder 
Sexist 
Sexism 
Sexist culture 
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Composite Score Components 
Context Gender Development Index 
Gender Inequality Index 
Political Terror Scale 
Gender equality CSOs 
Number of treaties ratified 
CEDAW status 
Relative capacity scores 
Internet access 
Persistence Number of peaks 
Number of peak periods 
Longest peak period (merged) 
Days tweets > 0 
Days tweets >5 
Days tweets >100 
Days tweets >1,000 
% Days > 5 
Days above average 
Engagement Reply: tweet ratio 
Like: tweet ratio (reverse) 
Non-peak Reply: tweet ratio 
Non-peak Like: tweet ratio (reverse) 
Peak Reply: tweet ratio 
Peak Like: tweet ratio (reverse) 
Users Top 100 % domestic 
Top 100 % non-domestic (reverse) 
Top 100 % domestic reach 
Top 100 % non-domestic reach (reverse) 
Top 100 % domestic campaign tweets 
Top 100 % non-domestic campaign tweets (reverse) 
Sentiment Positivity Mean 
Peak positivity mean 
Peak to non-peak difference Positivity Mean 
Highest positivity score (>= 10 Tweets) 
Lowest positivity score (>= 10 Tweets) (reverse) 
Norms % tweets with consistent norms 
% tweets with variable norms (reverse) 
Ratio consistent : variable norms 
% international norms present 
% tweets with international norms 
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Appendix 4: Of the 100 most commonly used words, those that appear in less than three epochs 
 
#stopstoning variable norms 
15/05/10-25/06/13 26/06/13-26/06/13 27/06/13-
24/07/13 
25/07/13-
25/07/13 
26/07/13-
09/12/13 
10/12/13-10/12/13 11/12/13-
24/10/16 
Sakineh’s case first 
garners attention 
WLUML change.org Non-peak WLUML 
Thunderclap 1 
Non-peak WLUML 
Thunderclap 2 
Non-peak 
#IranElection Torture global Join #16days #16days EU 
Iran/ian Cares Join Thunderclap Join control Stop Stoning 
(Italian) 
#StopExecutions Victims Thundercla
p 
global UN women's Zullo 
Sakineh violence Make #Orangeday global freedom #pakistan 
sentence/d #UN action #WomensRight
s 
#Brunei Call 
 
adultery Stoning (Arabic) message 
 
call Ban 
 
Ashtiani together Screening 
 
legal Ki-moon 
 
barbaric #Stopstoning (Arabic) Shroud 
 
Thunderclap 
  
Executions International still 
 
code 
  
International form difference 
 
penal 
  
#hrw say 
  
rights 
  
#StopChildExecutions Stoning (Persian) 
  
Iran 
  
Azar action 
  
form 
  
Bagheri cruel 
  
voice 
  
#Amnesty General 
     
Mohammadi Secretary 
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15/05/10-25/06/13 26/06/13-26/06/13 27/06/13-
24/07/13 
25/07/13-
25/07/13 
26/07/13-
09/12/13 
10/12/13-10/12/13 11/12/13-
24/10/16 
Sakineh’s case first 
garners attention 
WLUML change.org Non-peak WLUML 
Thunderclap 1 
Non-peak WLUML 
Thunderclap 2 
Non-peak 
#queennoor 
      
#SaveMaryam 
      
Stoning (Persian) 
      
#FreeSakineh 
      
#Afghanistan 
      
SUMMARY 
Focussed on 
executions, Sakineh, 
specific cases 
Stoning in several 
languages, shift to focus 
on the act 
Thunderclap International 
campaign, 
changing the law 
More positive 
empowerment 
approach 
EU/non-
domestic 
involvement 
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#letwomengotostadium Variable Norms 
15/06/14-18/06/15 19/06/15-19/06/15 20/06/15-25/06/15 26/06/15-26/06/15 27/06/15-15/11/16 
Build up Tehran tournament 
(peak) 
Tehran tournament (non-
peak) 
Tehran tournament (2nd 
peak) 
Non-peak 
ask go/ing against Poland Poland 
attend League front set set 
Azadi WorldLeague2015 united people watch 
storm freely fundamentalism say authorities 
night citizenship #iranfreedom sports #KishOpen 
WorldLeague2015 say go just must 
front team Tehran public say 
watch 
 
team Rouhani safely 
allow 
 
Response  freely 
sports 
 
people 
 
World 
gov 
 
national 
  
match 
    
team 
    
evening 
    
#Tehran 
    
support 
    
arrested 
    
gather 
    
police 
    
SUMMARY 
Tells story of 
campaign 
Rights-based approach Some religious rooted 
language 
Notable: Rouhani Return to rights-based 
approach 
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#farkhunda variable norms 
19/03/15-
20/03/15 
21/03/15-
27/03/15 
28/03/15
-
01/05/15 
02/05/15
-
08/05/15 
09/05/15
-
18/05/15 
19/05/15-
19/05/15 
20/05/15-
01/07/15 
02/07/15-
02/07/15 
03/07/15-
10/08/15 
11/08/15-
11/08/15 
12/08/15
-
17/11/16 
Spark 
incident 
Video goes 
viral 
Non-
peak 
Televise
d trial 
Non-
peak 
Sentencin
g 
Non-peak Sentences 
quashed 
Non-peak BBC 
Documentar
y 
Non-
peak 
#KabulMo
b 
coffin today suspects prison Jail/ed Release/d overturned/
s 
please Newsnight #Islam 
Quran carry/ing London begins jail protect/in
g 
Appeals quashes human film innocent 
beaten all shrine 
 
duty prison bail cancels ask just film 
candles beaten media 
 
others duty just decision join martyr 
 
fire funeral 
  
bile exposes quashes convicted documentar
y 
world 
 
angry Quran 
  
civil report defining stoned killers making 
 
mentally innocent 
  
clerics role moment run just shocking 
 
should bury 
  
free violence #womensrigh
ts 
secret World words 
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19/03/15-
20/03/15 
21/03/15-
27/03/15 
28/03/15
-
01/05/15 
02/05/15
-
08/05/15 
09/05/15
-
18/05/15 
19/05/15-
19/05/15 
20/05/15-
01/07/15 
02/07/15-
02/07/15 
03/07/15-
10/08/15 
11/08/15-
11/08/15 
12/08/15
-
17/11/16 
Spark 
incident 
Video goes 
viral 
Non-
peak 
Televise
d trial 
Non-
peak 
Sentencin
g 
Non-peak Sentences 
quashed 
Non-peak BBC 
Documentar
y 
Non-
peak 
ashamed tradition 
  
protect think fear fire should documentar
y 
 
claimed 
   
postpone
s 
thoughts killers system religion report 
 
country 
   
released 
  
acquits state heartbreakin
g 
 
ill 
      
shrine 
 
moving 
 
religion 
      
transparenc
y 
 
must 
 
allegedly 
      
world 
 
powerful 
 
involved 
      
March 
 
violence 
 
light 
      
ruling 
 
horrific 
 
barbaric 
        
News 
 
must 
        
barbaric 
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19/03/15-
20/03/15 
21/03/15-
27/03/15 
28/03/15
-
01/05/15 
02/05/15
-
08/05/15 
09/05/15
-
18/05/15 
19/05/15-
19/05/15 
20/05/15-
01/07/15 
02/07/15-
02/07/15 
03/07/15-
10/08/15 
11/08/15-
11/08/15 
12/08/15
-
17/11/16 
Spark 
incident 
Video goes 
viral 
Non-
peak 
Televise
d trial 
Non-
peak 
Sentencin
g 
Non-peak Sentences 
quashed 
Non-peak BBC 
Documentar
y 
Non-
peak 
stop 
        
human 
 
         
piece 
 
         
coffin 
 
SUMMARY 
 
Clear 
anger 
about the 
incident 
Reflecting 
Farkhunda'
s funeral 
Foreign 
focus 
Clear 
reaction 
to trial 
No clear 
focus 
Reflectin
g 
sentencin
g 
Continued 
reflection of 
sentencing 
and trial 
Continued 
reflection 
of 
sentencing 
and trial 
No clear 
focus 
Foreign 
documentar
y 
No clear 
focus 
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#sendeanlat variable norms 
14/02/15-19/02/15 20/02/15-29/11/16 
Spark incident Non-peak 
girl/s Turkey/ish 
because murder 
Turkey harassment 
#Specialist Be together (French) 
afraid Do not forget (French) 
think Friends (French) 
day Never (French) 
want Protest (French) 
been love 
 
all 
 
violence 
 
brutal 
 
Sign 
 
simple 
SUMMARY 
No clear focus Exhibiting high emotions 
 
Appendix 5: Data collection 
 
337 
 
#mydressmychoice variable norms 
12/11/14-13/11/14 14/11/14-20/11/14 21/11/14-27/11/16 
Spark incident Goes viral Non-peak 
naked Lady/ies word 
Lady/ies naked spoken 
Video #NudityIsNotMyChoice discrimination/harassment 
support protest choice 
wear wear risk 
protest #strippingshame #CrossDressers 
want support Cross 
people right public 
right people Stop 
sparks see Check 
touts mob face 
think assault undress 
walk 
 
Jobs 
  
#QueerArtist4LGBTRights 
SUMMARY 
Reflecting the facts of the 
incident 
Some reaction to counter-narrative, though still mainly focussed 
on facts 
More variation, though still incident-
focussed 
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#delhigangrape variable norms 
16/12/12 - 
19/12/12 
20/12/12-
23/12/12 
24/12/12-
09/01/13 
10/01/13-
09/03/13 
10/03/13-
11/03/13 
12/03/13-
30/08/13 
31/08/13-
31/08/13 
01/09/13-
09/09/13 
10/09/13-
14/09/13 
15/09/13-
27/11/16 
Spark 
incident 
Peak Aftermath Non-peak Ram Singh 
dies 
Non-peak Juvenile 
convicted 
Non-peak Other 
convictions 
Non-peak 
people protest/ers/s end end Ram Singh NEVER years today penalty year 
time people impunity Uprising suicide FORGET crime hope convicts change/d 
need PM Sign Sign commit/ted/s gangrape home year lawyer 16 
country #IndiaGate email petition Jail Singh system 10 Finally Dec  
time petition Pls Tihar #Maldives murder #Asaram defence questions  
Rashtrapati stop sexual suspect/s #VAW minor 17 guilty convicts  
need Stand #VAW hang/s/ed old guilty day life still  
Bhavan sexual protests prison #PhotoShow age consider Friday since   
send men found Uprising 18 crime hanged Supreme   
acabar trial Prime changed #PMChorHai Citizen' murder 
 
  
war send main 5 jail 'Senior day 
 
  
urging email say/s trial country expected men 
 
  
RIP impunity reports 16 
  
Singh 
 
  
agresiones honor news 
     
  
sexuales stop Lawyer 
     
  
Apoya #Maldives confirms 
     
   
Singh cell 
     
   
war security 
     
   
urging 
      
SUMMARY 
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16/12/12 - 
19/12/12 
20/12/12-
23/12/12 
24/12/12-
09/01/13 
10/01/13-
09/03/13 
10/03/13-
11/03/13 
12/03/13-
30/08/13 
31/08/13-
31/08/13 
01/09/13-
09/09/13 
10/09/13-
14/09/13 
15/09/13-
27/11/16 
Spark 
incident 
Peak Aftermath Non-peak Ram Singh 
dies 
Non-peak Juvenile 
convicted 
Non-peak Other 
convictions 
Non-peak 
Small 
number 
indicates 
that focus 
was on 
consistent 
norms 
which 
remained 
prevalent 
throughout 
the 
campaign 
Reflecting 
on the 
ground 
protests in 
reaction 
Focus on 
ensuring 
that 
perpetrators 
are brought 
to justice 
Call to 
sign 
petition 
and protest 
Twitter 
reacts to 
perpetrator's 
alleged 
suicide 
Emotional 
reaction 
during non-
peak event 
time 
Twitter reacts 
to the 
conviction of 
the juvenile 
perpetrator 
No clear 
focus 
Twitter 
continues to 
follow and 
react to 
outcomes of 
the trials 
Lack of 
satisfying 
end or 
closure 
 
  
Appendix 5: Data collection 
 
341 
 
#niunamenos variable norms (As many of the time periods had no organic norms or no clear focus, time periods with fewer than four organic 
norms have not been included) 
03/0
1/15-
10/0
5/15 
11/05/15-
11/05/15 
12/05/15-
20/06/15 
15/07/15-
15/07/15 
13/10/15-
17/10/15 
07/11/15-
26/11/15 
08/03/16-
08/03/16 
20/07/16-
24/07/16 
08/08/16-
16/08/16 
28/09
/16-
28/09
/16 
Build 
up 
Spark 
incident 
First 
protest/ 
laws 
changed 
Facebook post 
of VAW goes 
viral 
Second 
protest 
Third protest International 
Women's Day 
Campaign 
moves to 
other 
South 
American 
countries 
Marches in Peru Marc
hes in 
Arge
ntina 
death
s 
#MeCuesta #BastaDe
Violencia 
Angeles 
Rawson 
(victim) 
Diana 
(victim) 
#NoalaViolenc
iadeGenero 
Intl Women's Day country Cordera 
(accused 
musician) 
ask 
mara
thon 
call campaign life 
imprisonment 
family fight beautiful CR 
Women's 
Desk 
people every
thing 
Mexi
co 
Chiara media Mangieri 
(perpetrator) 
involved Plaza continue support should Mend
oza 
Muse
um 
country Plaza case issues 
 
equality touch 
 
peopl
e 
Natio
nal 
leaves Song crime matters 
 
Fatmagul 
(Turkish  rape 
drama) 
   
readi
ng/s 
love 
 
jail 
  
fight 
   
socie
ty 
marks 
 
last 
  
flowers 
   
State 
  
little 
  
Happy 
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03/0
1/15-
10/0
5/15 
11/05/15-
11/05/15 
12/05/15-
20/06/15 
15/07/15-
15/07/15 
13/10/15-
17/10/15 
07/11/15-
26/11/15 
08/03/16-
08/03/16 
20/07/16-
24/07/16 
08/08/16-
16/08/16 
28/09
/16-
28/09
/16 
Build 
up 
Spark 
incident 
First 
protest/ 
laws 
changed 
Facebook post 
of VAW goes 
viral 
Second 
protest 
Third protest International 
Women's Day 
Campaign 
moves to 
other 
South 
American 
countries 
Marches in Peru Marc
hes in 
Arge
ntina 
   
peace 
  
love 
   
   
prison 
  
respect 
   
   
rest 
  
rights 
   
   
sentence/d 
      
SUMMARY  
Focus on 
spark 
incident 
 
Reaction to 
case 
Individua
l stories 
 
International 
Women's Day 
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#women2drive variable norms 
05/05/1
1-
20/05/1
1 
21/05/1
1-
30/05/1
1 
31/05/11-
15/06/11 
16/06/1
1-
18/06/1
1 
19/06/1
1-
23/08/1
1 
24/08/11-
25/08/11 
26/08/
11-
26/09/
11 
27/09/11
-
28/09/11 
29/09/1
1-
26/10/1
1 
27/10/1
1-
27/10/1
1 
28/10/1
1-
24/10/1
3 
25/10/1
3-
30/10/1
3 
31/10/1
3-
27/11/1
6 
Build up Spark 
incident 
Non-peak Driving 
protest 
Non-
peak 
Arrest Non-
peak 
Lashing 
sentence 
Non-
peak 
Unknow
n peak 
Non-
peak 
Driving 
protest 
Non-
peak 
#Haririd
rive 
#Haririd
rive 
#Women
Rights 
all Clinton police 
 
lashes King Prince 
Nayef 
road oct26dri
ving 
oct26dri
ving 
lead issue 
 
go 
 
arrested 
 
skin 
 
Prince 
Nayef 
(Arabic) 
 
protest female 
shoppin
g 
  
police 
 
license 
 
King 
 
Crown 
 
freedom against 
market 
    
lead 
 
rule 
 
dream/s 
 
video law      
pledge 
 
vote 
 
shoppin
g 
 
defy allowed 
       
news 
 
love 
 
wheel 
 
       
judge 
 
Manal al 
Sharif 
(Arabic) 
 
#BeepB
eep 
 
       
decision 
 
market 
   
       
Right2D
ignity 
 
long 
   
       
sentence
d 
 
ambitio
n 
   
       
ten 
 
appoint
ment 
   
Appendix 5: Data collection 
 
344 
 
05/05/1
1-
20/05/1
1 
21/05/1
1-
30/05/1
1 
31/05/11-
15/06/11 
16/06/1
1-
18/06/1
1 
19/06/1
1-
23/08/1
1 
24/08/11-
25/08/11 
26/08/
11-
26/09/
11 
27/09/11
-
28/09/11 
29/09/1
1-
26/10/1
1 
27/10/1
1-
27/10/1
1 
28/10/1
1-
24/10/1
3 
25/10/1
3-
30/10/1
3 
31/10/1
3-
27/11/1
6 
Build up Spark 
incident 
Non-peak Driving 
protest 
Non-
peak 
Arrest Non-
peak 
Lashing 
sentence 
Non-
peak 
Unknow
n peak 
Non-
peak 
Driving 
protest 
Non-
peak 
         
buy 
   
SUMMARY 
Practical
, factual 
focus 
   
Explicit 
foreign 
connectio
n 
Reflect
ing 
arrest 
 
Reacting 
to 
lashing 
sentence 
 
Notable 
focus on 
royal 
family 
 
Continued push for 
protests 
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Appendix 5: Data collection 
Collection of Tweets 
The process for collecting the Tweets manually was as follows.  First, the researcher used the 
Twitter advanced search function to search by hashtag, over a given time period based on the 
campaign timelines.  Google Chrome was used consistently, from two different work station 
PCs.  The Tweets were first loaded under the ‘Latest’ tab.  In most cases, with well-defined 
time periods, all Tweets were able to be loaded into one batch using scrolling.  When 
reaching the end of the available Tweets, they were copied and pasted into a plain text format 
and saved as individual files.  The process was repeated using the ‘Top’ tab to ensure that the 
highest number of Tweets were collected and that any collection errors would be rectified 
through the dual process.   
Difficulties arose when there were more than roughly 8,000 Tweets during one 24-hour 
period.  The smallest possible search is one calendar day and the Tweets are always loaded in 
reverse time order (the most recent first).  While attempting to load more than approximately 
8,000 Tweets in the same page, Chrome would ‘crash’ and the Tweets that had been loading 
via scrolling were lost; it was not possible to cut down or re-order the search parameters to 
avoid the crash or collect the Tweets differently.  After extensive trial and error, it was 
determined that the source of the limitation was the memory available in the browser.  By 
monitoring the memory usage in Chrome while loading Tweets, it was possible to anticipate 
a potential crash and save progress.  Then more Tweets could be loaded onto the page, saving 
every time approximately 100 additional Tweets had been loaded, until Chrome crashed.  
This meant that there were a small number of incomplete days where it was not possible to 
access the full range of Tweets over approximately 8,000.  It also meant that for some of 
these very high activity days, it was not feasible to repeat the process using both ‘Latest’ and 
‘Top’ tabs.  There were therefore the following incomplete days: 
Number of ‘incomplete’ days analysed, by campaign 
Campaign Incomplete days Total days % incomplete 
#stopstoning No incomplete days 2,354 0% 
#letwomengotostadium No incomplete days 884 0% 
#farkhunda No incomplete days 609 0% 
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#sendeanlat 2 incomplete days, 
gathered via both 
Latest and Top tabs 
654 < 1% 
#mydressmychoice 1 incomplete day, 
gathered via both 
Latest and Top tabs 
746 < 1% 
#delhigangrape 4 incomplete days, 
gathered via both 
Latest and Top tabs 
1,442 < 1% 
#niunamenos 33 incomplete days, 
13 gathered via both 
Latest and Top, and 
20 gathered via Top 
only 
696 5% 
#women2drive 1 incomplete day, 
gathered via both 
Latest and Top 
2,033 < 1% 
Additionally, the initial data collection phase took place from December 2016 to March 2017.  
In the initial phase, the hashtag #niunamas was used to collect data on the Argentinian 
campaign.  However, during the legal data collection and analysis, it was determined that the 
more widely used hashtag was #niunamenos.  Therefore, in December 2017 and January 
2018, data collection on this hashtag was undertaken.  It appeared that either Google Chrome 
or Twitter had changed memory allocations and fewer Tweets per day were accessible.  
Chrome crashed at approximately 4,000 Tweets.  This explains the higher number of 
incomplete days in the #niunamenos campaign.  However, as this campaign was also the 
largest by quite some margin, there were still ample Tweets available for analysis and it was 
decided that the campaign could therefore still be included in the study.1   
In total, it took approximately five months to collect the Tweets manually.  Including the two 
campaigns which were eventually excluded, 1,051,525 unique Tweets were collected.  After 
#malala and #notacriminal/#repealthe8th were excluded, a total of 743,671 Tweets were 
analysed.   
Cleaning the Twitter Data 
 
1 Additionally, if the Latest tab could not be fully loaded, it would be the earlier Tweets that would be missing.  
This could have meant that for those days Tweets from a specific time of day would consistently be missing.  
However, as many days were complete and a third of the incomplete days were able to be gathered via Latest 
and Top tabs, it was determined any gaps in specific time periods on the incomplete days gathered via Latest 
only would be overcome.  As it took several hours to load just one day of Tweets, practical realities were taken 
into consideration.   
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Once the Tweets for all campaigns were collected and saved in plain text formats, technical 
assistance was provided in programmatically writing a simple script to format the data and 
remove duplicates.2  Given that Tweets were collected via Latest and Top tabs, removing the 
duplicates was important.  The Tweets were then in tab-delineated format (.csv) and could 
easily be imported into Excel.  Simple descriptive statistics were generated during this 
process as well, including the most 100 used words, the most 100 used hashtags, word length 
(i.e. number of two letter words used, number of four letter words used, etc.), Tweet length 
(i.e. number of 140 character Tweets, etc.), 100 most prolific users, numbers of Retweets, 
Replies, and Likes, and Tweets per day.  The data was then disaggregated over peak and non-
peak time periods, determined by the number of Tweets per day (the bar for peak was set for 
each campaign based on the average number of Tweets per day).   
A small set of Tweets generated unreadable content only.  Something was lost in translation 
in the process of copying and pasting.  These were therefore included in the persistence, 
engagement, and user analysis, but were excluded from the sentiment and content analysis.  
As a small percentage of total Tweets, this was deemed an acceptable level of loss.     
Number of content-excluded Tweets 
Campaign Number of content-
excluded Tweets 
% of Total Tweets 
#stopstoning 10 < 1% 
#letwomengotostadium 81 1% 
#farkhunda 177 2% 
#sendeanlat 1,728 4% 
#mydressmychoice 204 <1% 
#delhigangrape 627 <1% 
#niunamenos 0 0% 
#women2drive 12 <1% 
 
2 Dr. David Willis, a research associate and clinical scientist in UEA’s Medical School, with senior expertise in 
computer programming and data analysis, provided this assistance.  As a matter of disclosure, he is also the 
researcher’s husband.   
Appendix 5: Data collection 
 
348 
 
Quality assurance was undertaken by spot checking various randomly selected data points 
against the original text files and against live data on Twitter.com.  This process provided all 
the data needed to continue on to analysis.   
Initial Analysis of Twitter Data 
Once the data was collected and cleaned, analysis could begin.  When looking at persistence 
across the campaigns, various parameters were derived from the basic data.  The clearest 
parameter was simply the number of Tweets each day, which was used to generate timelines 
and overall peaks for the campaigns.  In more detail, this data was also broken down to look 
at the standard deviation of Tweets per day and the mean Tweets per day.  These provide 
information about the variability of the campaign’s popularity.  Additional information on 
peaks was also produced, such as the number of peak periods, the number of individual 
peaks, the number of Tweets on peak days, and the breakdown of the campaign across peak 
and non-peak periods.  The data was explored to look at the number of days with no Tweets, 
with five or more Tweets, with 10 or more Tweets, and with 1,000 or more Tweets.  Where 
possible, these figures were converted into percentages for comparability.  Some of this data 
was explored but not included in statistical tests given the issue with incomplete days 
explained above.  For example, even though the highest peak for #niunamenos was 4,809, 
this is not comparable to the other campaigns given the differences in maximum Tweets 
collected per day.  Equally, although the highest peak for #delhigangrape is 13,136, for 
#sendeanlat is 12,993, and for #women2drive is 12,055, these are not accurate representations 
of the peaks themselves but rather the ability to load as many Tweets as possible given the 
browser memory constraints.  Therefore raw numbers in this vein are interesting, but not 
comparable.   
The engagement metrics are drawn from the number of times each Tweet in the data set was 
retweeted, replied to, or liked.  These numbers were then tallied up and used to generate 
ratios to compare the incidence of the different kinds of engagement to the total number of 
Tweets and to each other.  The process was then repeated for peak versus non-peak periods.  
This was done in order to characterise the kind of engagements most prominent in each 
campaign.  Additionally, a scientific tool called a log(n) log(s) plot was generated for each 
campaign, and again repeated for peak and non-peak periods.3  This shows the number of 
 
3 This process was recommended by Dr. David Willis after seeing the data. 
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occurrences for a given parameter.  For example, how many Tweets are Retweeted once 
(which is likely a very high number) up to how many Tweets are Retweeted 10,000 times 
(which is likely a very low number).  The plot then shows the number of occurrences and the 
number of Tweets (on a log scale).  Retweets, replies, and likes can then be plotted on the 
same graph.  This helps to visualise the engagement metrics for each campaign.  
From manually accessing the profile pages of the 100 most prolific users in each campaign, 
information was collected to measure their campaign activity, reach (number of followers), 
overall activity (number of Tweets ever sent), location, and profile category.  Note that these 
profiles reflect the current number of followers and Tweets, and thus are a proxy for what the 
profile may have looked like at the time of the campaign.  Users’ reach and activity levels 
were then categorised into the following broad groups: 
Range Group 
> 100,000 Tweets Highly active 
100,000 > Tweets > 10,000 Very active 
10,000 > Tweets > 5,000 Active 
< 5,000 Tweets Less active 
  
> 1,000,000 Followers Extreme reach 
1,000,000 > Followers > 100,000 Large reach 
100,000 > Followers > 10,000 Good reach 
10,000 > Followers > 1,000 Average reach 
< 1,000 Small reach 
 
Profile categories were inductively coded, using a free coding method which was then 
standardised and used as a code book for re-coding the profiles.4  Users were categorised into 
 
4 Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods (Fifth Edition, Oxford University Press 2016). 
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the following profile codes: academic, activist, artist, business, counter-narrative, 
entertainment industry, government party, independent journalist, individual, official 
journalist, news agency, organisation, individual politician, sales/product account, trending 
topics, writer, or unknown (definitions are provided in Appendix 1).  The code was 
determined based on what the users wrote themselves in their profile description.  Therefore, 
to be coded as an activist, this word must have been used in their self-written profile.  To be 
considered an independent journalist, the user self-identified as a journalist but was clear that 
they were not associated with an official outlet.  News agencies were the official Twitter 
accounts for local, national, or international news outlets.  Individuals were Twitter users who 
did not self-identify as a specific category and clearly identified as unaffiliated users.  
Unknown were profiles that had been left blank or were otherwise nonsensical.  The profiles 
were also used to identify locations.  As these also are generated by the users themselves, the 
location was not always accurate or included.  If a location was listed but unknown to the 
researcher, Google maps was used to pinpoint a country.  Locations were coded as domestic 
or non-domestic, as it was clear whether a user was in the target country, but when the 
location was unclear it was more accurate to label the user as ‘non-domestic’ as opposed to 
‘foreign’ as they may not have been foreign, but equally could not clearly be classed as 
domestic.  These groups could then be ‘sliced and diced’ to look at relationships across the 
different metrics as percentages.   
Content analysis started with basic information, such as most used word length, most used 
Tweet length, and total hashtags (apart from the campaign hashtag) used.  Sentiment analysis 
was performed programmatically with Python, using TextBlob to generate positivity, 
negativity, polarity, and subjectivity scores.5  The process also has a built-in system for 
translation, using Google Translate.  It was not possible to translate all non-English Tweets 
into English, but it was possible to translate discrete sets of Tweets.  The following 
translations were run: 
 
 
5 TextBlob, ‘TextBlob: Simplified Text Processing’ <https://textblob.readthedocs.io/en/dev/> accessed 18 
September 2018.  TextBlob uses the natural language processing (NLP) through the ‘Natural Language Toolkit’ 
(NLTK) and the pattern.en module to classify the Tweets.  The process removes ‘stopwords’ such as I, am, you, 
are, etc. and then classifies words based on their part of speech (adjective, noun, adverb, etc.).  Only those parts 
of speech which can be classified as positive or negative are passed through to the sentiment analysis.  The 
TextBlob sentiment analysis uses a Naïve Bayes Classification system on a known dataset to score the Tweets.   
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Overview of translated Tweets 
Campaign % non-English Language translated to 
English 
#stopstoning 1% No translation 
#letwomengotostadium 60% Persian 
#farkhunda 9% No translation 
#sendeanlat 76% Turkish 
#mydressmychoice 5% No translation 
#delhigangrape 7% No translation 
#niunamenos 63% Spanish 
#women2drive 38% Arabic 
The translated Tweets were analysed for sentiment.  Spot checks were undertaken to ensure 
that, to the extent possible, the sentiment score was reflective of the Tweets.  This was 
particularly undertaken for days which showed either extremely positive or extremely 
negative average scores.  Various parameters were generated using these scores, looking at 
the differences between peak and non-peak periods, weighted scores (based on the number of 
Tweets), highest and lowest scores, and differences.  Again, full explanations are provided in 
Appendix 1.   
The final piece of initial Twitter analysis was to explore framing and messaging and to proxy 
the presence of norms in Tweets.  This process took two forms: one inductive and one 
deductive.  The inductive process used a script to programmatically search for the 100 most 
used words across a set of event-based epochs (time periods).  The deductive process used a 
pre-defined set of 93 words to measure the presence of international norms in each campaign.   
The list was derived from a survey of international instruments and reports on women’s rights 
and violence against women, utilising both UN and NGO documents to have a rounded 
approach, included in full in Appendix 2. 
From the list of most 100 used words from each epoch, words which could not be used to 
interpret a norm or message were removed (i.e. and, are, were, the, etc.)   All pronouns were 
grouped into categories of first person, second person, third person female, third person male, 
and third person plural.  Although most sentiment analysis will remove these pronouns, they 
were quite prevalent and could, in fact, be used to characterise the content and messaging of 
the Tweets.  It was determined that these words actually provided important insight and 
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should be included in the normative analysis.  The remaining list of inductive words were 
then divided into those that appeared in three or more epochs and those that appeared in less 
than three epochs.  This showed the difference between organically emerging but consistent 
framing and messaging (more than three epochs) and organically emerging but variable and 
short-lived framing and messaging (less than three).  This process emerged through the initial 
cleaning and analysis of the data and was then applied to all campaigns.  Finally, each epoch 
was scanned for the number of times each of the deductive international norm key words 
were used.  Inductive frames were also matched against deductive international norms to see 
how many of the most used words were also representative of international norms.  Frames, 
messages, and norms which were legal in nature were also identified to see how much of a 
legal focus was taken on by the campaign users.   
Collection and Analysis of Legal Data 
The collection of legal evidence was much more straightforward.  Additionally, collection 
and analysis were undertaken simultaneously for each campaign, rather than bulk collection 
followed by bulk analysis (as done for the Twitter data).  This approach was adopted as it was 
a cyclical and snowballing process of collection, analysis, further collection and cross-
referencing, analysis, and so on.  While the collection process was unique and specific for 
each campaign, a few general principles were applied.  The collection began with a simple 
internet search of the hashtag.  This provided the starting point for research.  Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch materials were searched for all campaigns, as well as 
the BBC and NY Times.  Where possible, NGOs actively supporting the campaigns were 
identified and their websites were thoroughly searched for any and all relevant reports, 
statistics, or press releases.  Government websites were searched for relevant materials, 
including crime statistics.  Case law was accessed where possible, after identification of 
relevant cases.  An extensive process of cross referencing was undertaken to ensure that a 
wide range of materials were sourced.  Once the initial round was completed, analysis began.  
Tables were created to collect information and quotes, and to help identify gaps in evidence.  
The collection process was then repeated to fill gaps and follow up on additional referenced 
sources or involved NGOs.  This carried on until the table was as complete as possible.  Each 
campaign generated a table of 10-15 pages of analysis to ensure a comparable level of 
information gathered for each.  The quantification was done as an ongoing process during the 
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analysis, reviewed regularly and ultimately when all campaigns were completed to ensure 
consistency and comparability.  An overview of the evidence collected is presented: 
 
Legal evidence examined, by campaign 
 #
st
o
p
st
o
n
in
g
 
#
le
tw
o
m
en
g
o
to
st
a
d
iu
m
 
#
fa
rk
h
u
n
d
a
 
#
se
n
d
ea
n
la
t 
#
m
y
d
re
ss
m
y
ch
o
ic
e
 
#
d
el
h
ig
a
n
g
ra
p
e 
#
n
iu
n
a
m
en
o
s 
#
w
o
m
en
2
d
ri
v
e
 
Total pieces of legal evidence analysed 248 208 169 204 149 186 169 187 
Academic articles 
   
4 
   
4 
Amnesty International 38 2 9 1 
   
7 
Case law 
   
8 8 4 2 
 
EU reports 
   
5 
    
Freedom of the Internet reports 6 6 
      
Government documents (legislation, 
Constitutions, reports, documents, policies, 
crime statistics and press releases) 
35 20 13 12 50 13 8 2 
Human Rights Watch 
 
11 5 8 
   
6 
Media reports 
 
61 21 95 21 76 54 134 
NGO reports 69 7 21 16 4 7 16 7 
UN Reports 93 94 85 55 66 86 89 27 
US State Department Reports 7 7 15 
     
Grand total: 1,520 documents or reports 
Statistical Analysis 
The breadth of the statistical methodology is presented in Chapter 8.  However, a broad brush 
stroke overview is given here to frame the discussion in the chapters which follow.   
All of the parameters collected and cleaned were collated into one ‘master data set’ 
spreadsheet.  Here it was possible to compare the campaigns side-by-side, identify key 
characteristics (very high or very low scores in any given parameter), and begin to gain an 
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overview into overall trends or patterns.  From this exercise and the in depth legal analysis, it 
became clear that the campaigns fell into broad groupings based on legal outcomes.6   
As an initial test of the hypotheses, simple correlations were run between all parameters and 
the overall legal outcomes.  To explore further, coefficients of determination (R2) were 
produced to identify parameters with a strong linear relationship with the overall legal 
change.  These were initially done quite simply in Excel in the master data set.  These tests 
provided excellent insight into which parameters may be of interest overall, and which 
parameters, while important to explore in each campaign, may have less of a linear and 
therefore predictive relationship with legal outcomes.  SPSS was used to run more extensive 
tests.  The information contained in the master data set, including all of the parameters, the 
composite scores, and the initial associative tests were then used to analyse the results.  This 
is the information contained in the remaining chapters in this thesis. 
 
 
 
6 #stopstoning and #letwomengotostadium showed many signs of government backlash, and scored at 2.5 or less 
(1.0 being the worst and 5.0 being the best) in legal outcomes.  Not one of the components showed any positive 
change above 3.0 and but did show more than two parameters at 2.0 or less.  Although both targeted Iran, the 
campaigns were different enough to see that this grouping was based on the legal outcomes more than the 
context.  #farkhunda, #sendeanlat, and #mydressmychoice all broadly showed no overall legal change, 
categorised as status quo.  Each of the campaigns had two or more parameters that scored 3.0 or greater, and no 
campaign scored less than 2.5 in more than one category.  Although #farkhunda showed a particularly negative 
score in law enforcement, this was balanced out by some positive change in legislation, placing this campaign in 
the status quo grouping.  #farkhunda was a borderline campaign, but the positive change in legislation set it 
apart from the two Iranian campaigns which showed no positive change.  #delhigangrape and #niunamenos 
showed extremely similar legal results, with full marks in legislative change but poorer scores in law 
enforcement.  They also showed a lack of progress in institutionalisation (at 3.0 and 3.5 respectively).  These 
campaigns showed very clear signs of tactical concessions but lacked long term implementation or 
institutionalisation.  Finally, #women2drive stood apart from the other campaigns as showing the most positive 
signs of change, particularly in institutionalisation.    
